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Résumé 
L’organisation est un processus managérial qui exige un but. 
L’organisme qui se comprend — peut mieux planifier, expliquer et justifier 
l’action collective (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Ainsi, un corps de 
recherche lie la dualité dans l’organisation — quand une organisation se 
considère simultanément comme deux différents types d’organisation 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985) — à l’effondrement de la dualité ou à des 
défaillances organisationnelles. Cependant, d’autres études suggèrent que 
la dualité organisationnelle peut être durable ou apporter une synergie. 
Cette thèse étudie la dualité organisationnelle à identité sociale et 
commerciale lors de l’évaluation d’une nouvelle entreprise et la prise de 
décision des investisseurs. La première étude examine comment la dualité 
organisationnelle se reflète dans les critères de sélection et d’évaluation 
d’un investissement par un fonds de capital-risque social (CRS), un acteur 
hybride socio-commercial investissant dans des organisations hybrides 
social-commerciales. Utilisant des méthodes inductives pour analyser des 
données détaillant 1 614 décisions d’un CRS en cinq ans, cette étude établit 
la première taxonomie des critères de CRS en partant des décisions 
effectives d’investissements (19 acceptées, 1 574 échoué, 40 à l’étude). De 
plus, cette étude montre que le processus d’évaluation du CRS est itératif et 
n’est pas exclusivement fixé sur l’identification d’une cible 
d’investissement. 
La deuxième étude se focalise sur les interactions entreprise-CRS 
entre l’évaluation initiale et la décision finale d’investissement. Partant 
d’une étude ethnographique de 25 mois (dont sept mois consécutifs in situ), 
cette recherche révèle cinq stratégies utilisées par le CRS pour comprendre 
et façonner l’identité des nouvelles entreprises : poursuite prudente, 
ajustement, rapprochement, assistance et filtrage éliminatoire. Ces 
stratégies coûteuses permettent au CRS d’accroître la plausibilité de 
l'identité émergente afin d’aboutir à des opportunités d’investissement 
donnant de bonnes performances sociales et commerciales. Inversement, 
ces mêmes stratégies aident le CRS à éviter d’investir dans des entreprises 
avec une dualité à haut risque d’effondrement (à aléa de compromis).
Enfin, la troisième étude examine comment les caractéristiques des 
individus influencent l’attractivité d’un investissement hybride. 154 
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investisseurs au sein d’organisations hybrides et non-hybrides et à l’état 
d’esprit varié ont évalué des décisions d’investissement dans le cadre d’une 
expérience conjointe, résultant en une base de 3 388 évaluations 
d’investissement. Les résultats statistiques confirment les connaissances 
concernant les états d’esprit sociaux et commerciaux ainsi que leurs 
préférences. Cependant, les résultats défient nos préconceptions au sujet de 
l’hybridité individuelle.
Prenant le point de vue d’un investisseur, cette thèse fait avancer la 
recherche sur le rôle du processus organisationnel dans la génération, la 
perpétuation et la résolution de conflits liée à la combinaison de deux 
identités. Cette étude vise à aller au-delà des analyses conceptuelles ou 
réalisées sur un échantillon limité et elle considère des processus duaux au-
delà des processus internes des entreprises hybrides établies. 
Le choix du point de vue de l’investisseur facilite cette démarche, 
permet l’analyse de plusieurs types d’organisations hybrides, et il nous 
éclaire sur les processus organisationnels dans le cadre de la dualité 
identitaire.1
 
Mots-clés : étude de cas, analyse conjointe, entrepreneuriat, capital de 
risque, prise de décision, stratégie, entrepreneuriat social, identité 
organisationnelle, hybridité organisationnelle, identité sociale
 
  
                                                                        
1 Un résumé étendu en français est disponible sur la page 344. 
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Abstract 
Organizing is a managerial process which demands a sense of 
purpose. When stories about “who we are” and “what we do” are salient 
and coherent (Voss, Cable & Voss, 2006), organizations can better plan, 
explain and justify collective action (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). This 
explains why research links identity duality―when firms consider 
themselves to be two types of organizations (Albert & Whetten, 1985)―to 
organizational conflict, loss of duality or firm failure. Yet studies also 
suggest that dual identities can be sustainable, complementary and 
synergistic. Intrigued by this divide, this thesis investigates duality in the 
context of new venture evaluation and investor decision-making. It focuses 
on a type of duality found in social-commercial hybrids: organizations that 
combine a social welfare identity and a commercial profit identity.  
Study One examines how identity duality translates into the 
investment selection criteria of a social venture capital firm (SVC), a 
social-commercial hybrid that makes equity investments into early-stage 
social-commercial hybrids (social ventures). The study applies inductive 
analysis to five years of archival data on investment decisions made by the 
SVC, producing the first taxonomy of SVC criteria drawn from a large, 
varied sample of actual investment outcomes: accepted (19 cases), failed
(1,574) and still under review (40). Results reveal a set of social-mission-
related venture attributes and a set of commercial venture attributes used 
by the SVC to decide a ventures’ social and commercial potential―and 
show that the two attribute sets, at times, overlap. Moreover, variance in 
the length of the evaluation periods suggest the SVC’s differentiated 
approach extends beyond its criteria, into its evaluation process. 
Study Two builds on a 25-month in-depth case study at the same 
SVC to understand its venture engagement activities over the evaluation 
process. Interviews and non-participant observation (including seven 
consecutive months onsite) reveal five emergent strategies used by the 
SVC to understand and shape the plausibility of social-commercial duality 
in new ventures (Cautious Pursuit, Tinkering, Rapprochement, Helping, 
and Filtering Out). Though these strategies are costly and resource-
dependent, they help the SVC to evaluate ventures’ emerging duality and 
to avoid investing in those with a high risk of trading-off commercial 
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outcomes at the cost of social outcomes or vice versa (Trade-off Hazard). 
Moreover, when successful, these strategies can increase the plausibility of 
evaluated ventures’ identity claims and co-create access to attractive 
investment opportunities previously unavailable to the SVC. 
Study Three uses an experimental method called conjoint analysis to 
test and quantify the effect of individual funder mindsets on the 
relationship between investment proposal duality and its perceived 
attractiveness. 154 individual funders with different social and commercial 
orientations were asked to assess the same set of 22 different venture 
proposals, producing 3,388 investment evaluations. Statistical analyses of 
these nested data partially confirm past research on social and commercial 
dominance in mindsets, implying that evaluations of duality in investment 
proposals depend on venture-fund fit as determined, in part, by individuals.  
In sum, these studies shed light on how firms and individuals relate 
to duality, revealing the complexities and benefits of tackling social issues 
through business. 
Keywords: case study, conjoint analysis, entrepreneurship, venture capital, 
decision-making, strategy, social entrepreneurship, organizational identity, 
hybrid identity, social identity
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I. Introduction 
- Why study identity duality and investor decision-making? 
 
 
Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting 
different results.               — Unknown (attributed to Albert Einstein) 
 
What are we doing here?7 
From for-profit firms to non-profit organizations, social movements 
to new ventures: people organize for a reason. Beliefs about who they are, 
as individuals, and as organizations, provide a “set of ‘ultimate whys’ for 
planning, explaining and justifying collective action” (Whetten & Mackey, 
2002: 396). When organizations’ stories about “who we are” and “what we 
do” are salient and coherent, leaders within the organizations have a better 
framework of how to make important decisions (Voss, Cable, & Voss, 
2006), and actors outside the organizations are more likely to engage with 
them (Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011). 
However, sometimes an organization “considers itself (and others 
consider it) alternatively, or even simultaneously, to be two different types 
of organizations” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270). This phenomenon, where 
organizations manifest a single hybrid identity, or two identities 
simultaneously, is called identity duality (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; 
Smith & Besharov, 2017) and represents a type of hybrid organization 
(Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017; Pratt, 2016). These constructs—
identity duality and other types of organizational hybridity—are constructs 
which have captured and held scholarly interest over the past decades 
because, in many ways, hybridity is puzzling and poorly understood 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014). It is puzzling because hybridity challenges what 
scholars and managers intuitively believe about organizing (Battilana et al., 
2017). When organizations combine identities “not normally be expected 
                                                                        
7 This chapter represents the author’s own work. 
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to go together” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270), decision-making is no 
longer guided by a single, coherent idea of what is an appropriate in both 
day-to-day activities and important strategic decisions (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Nicholls, 2010). Practitioners no longer know according to which 
principles, or combination of principles, to act. As such, scholars have 
flocked to study the phenomenon in past years, to develop theory to help 
explain how these organizations function, and to predict organizational 
thinking and behavior in such organizations. 
Although scholars have studied hybridity as related to the 
combination of dual “identities” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000), 
“organizational forms” (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), “logics” 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), and other core 
organizational elements (Battilana et al., 2017: 128), the hybrid 
organization of special interest to this thesis is a type of organizational 
hybridity which combines a commercial profit identity with a social 
welfare identity.8 
This hybrid organization is particularly intriguing because it seems 
to challenge decision-makers to choose between what is better for them, or 
for their firm, and what will bring them closer to meeting the goals they 
have for others (e.g., their community, the world). But while dual 
organizational self-concept, and in particular social-commercial self-
concept, has existed for centuries—in orchestras (Glynn, 2000), creative 
organizations (Eikhof & Haunschild, 2007; Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & 
Ingram, 2010), universities (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Murray, 2010) and other types of organizations (e.g., Mars & 
Lounsbury, 2009; Shore, 1998, Ramus, Vaccaro & Brusoni, 2017)—it is 
only recently that management scholars have started exploiting these 
settings to extend our understanding of hybrid organizing.  
This recent scholarly interest in social-commercial hybrids coincides 
with the ongoing shift in the discourse around the purpose of business 
(BlackRock, 2018; Godelnik, 2018; Krouse, 2018), business education 
(Petriglieri & Petriglieri, 2010; Miller et al., 2012; Tracey & Phillips, 2007; 
Weber, 2012) and management research (Donaldson & Walsh, 2015). As 
described in the second section of this chapter, even firms which have 
maintained a singular commercial identity through its history are now 
being called to actively contribute to social welfare issues (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003). Top business schools have witnessed an 800% increase in 
demand for courses which address how to address societal challenges 
(Milway & Goulay, 2013). Finally, recent publications from top 
management scholars, in top-ranking journals, challenge researchers to 
carefully consider the impact of their work on business and society 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Ferraro et al., 2005; Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
                                                                        
8 For other scholarly approaches to studying this phenomenon see: Austin, Stevenson, & Wei? Skillern, 2006; Lyons & Kickul, 
2013; Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012; Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015; Short et al., 2009. 
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Across these domains it is becoming clear that society faces critical 
social and environmental issues (Miller et al., 2012), and that established 
and emerging firms can take action to address these issues (Eisenhardt, 
Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & 
Tihanyi, 2016; Hollensbe, Wookey, Hickey, George, & Nicholls, 2014). 
For example, some businesses are now going beyond legal requirements 
and intentionally seek to address huge numbers of people without access to 
basic goods and services (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Karnani, 2007; 
London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad, 2006; Yunus, 2007; Yunus, Moingeon, & 
Lehmann-Ortega, 2010). Likewise, other businesses are surpassing legal 
thresholds and increasingly seek to reduce their negative environmental 
impact and address other environmental concerns (Dean & McMullen, 
2007; Howard-Grenville et al., 2014). 
The good news is that scholars have also responded to increased 
societal demand for insights in this domain, and there is much we have 
learned about hybridity.9 Scholars have theorized at length about the 
macro-foundations of hybridity (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). They have linked 
hybridity to organizational outcomes such as organizational tension (e.g., 
Glynn, 2000), failure (e.g., Tracey et al., 2011) and innovation (e.g., 
Murray, 2010). These organizational outcomes have then been linked to 
hybridity outcomes, such as the collapse (e.g., Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 
2014) or maintenance of hybridity (e.g., Smith & Besharov, 2017). More 
recently, a rich body of work on internal dynamics of hybrid organizations 
has flourished, including research on the managerial and organizational 
strategies internally applied to cope with and attempt to shape the diverse 
consequences of duality (e.g., Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Jay, 2013; Lok, 
2010; see also: Oliver, 1991). 
This wealth of research has provided a compelling frame, revealing 
an opportunity for scholars to ask and address theoretically significant 
questions which have not yet been empirically addressed. For example, the 
literature on hybrid organizing has rarely examined how hybridity affects 
individual decisions within firms (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997). And while 
the literature has linked hybridity to various organizational and hybridity 
outcomes, the literature has struggled to find a suitable and transferable 
proxy for performance (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Next, while scholars have 
looked at strategies and processes to manage hybridity, research on hybrid 
organizing has tended to intervene at a single level of analysis (Tracey et 
al., 2011), looking mostly at internally-directed and organically-developed 
processes with little attention placed on how third-parties might 
systematically shape hybridity outcomes in organizations (Lyons & Kickul, 
2013; Nicholls, 2014). Finally, hybridity studies have rarely examined the 
                                                                        
9 Figure 8, at the end of the following section, under “scholarly research on social-commercial hybrids,” maps past empirical research 
on social-commercial hybridity and research opportunities. 
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microfoundations of hybridity or how individual attributes influence 
organizational and hybrid outcomes (Almandoz, 2012; Zilber, 2002). 
This thesis seizes these opportunities by investigating hybridity from 
the perspective of social investors, defined as a person or resource-
providing organization which takes social and/or environmental concerns 
into account in their funding practice. The thesis asks, how does social-
commercial duality affect new venture evaluation and investor decision-
making? 
This question is addressed in three parts. The first two studies focus 
on a Social Venture Capital firm (SVC), a type of social investment firm 
which makes early-stage equity investments into social-commercial 
hybrids, while being itself, a social-commercial hybrid. The first study 
examines the role of hybridity on firm-level decision-making and on 
venture-level outcomes. The second study continues in this vein but places 
a spotlight on venture-firm interaction. 
The third and last study moves to the individual level, examining the 
role of individual decision-making on the evaluation of social, commercial 
and hybrid attributes in investment proposals. Tests are conducted at the 
level of the individual decision-maker, drawing on a sample of 154 
individuals from hybrid and non-hybrid investment practices, including 
both commercial and social investment firms.  
These three studies together contribute to research on hybrid 
organizing by taking puzzling and poorly understood phenomena, 
unpacking the elements that comprise them, theorizing the relationship 
between the elements, and testing related hypotheses on the actual 
populations of interest. The studies qualify the specific attributes of 
hybridity at the venture level that lead to successful resource acquisition. 
Moreover, these studies indicate factors affecting the funding decision at 
the level of the firm, as well as, at the level of the individual decision-
maker. This multi-level investigation is, in part, enabled by taking the 
perspective of the investor, an increasingly prominent and influential actor 
and resource-provider—whose role in shaping hybridity outcomes has, 
until now, largely been overlooked by both hybridity and investor decision-
making research. 
 
Thesis overview 
The three empirical studies in this thesis are intended to build on and 
complement each other. Each study investigates hybridity at the level of 
the decision-maker and the investment proposal. The first two studies are 
inductive, qualitative studies which examine hybridity at the level of the 
decision-making firm, followed by one deductive, quantitative study, 
which examines hybridity at the level of the decision-making individual. 
The first study of the thesis takes a qualitative approach to better 
understand how firm-level hybridity affects the evaluation and investment 
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decisions on investment proposals from other firms (early-stage ventures 
varying in hybridity). Essentially, the study aims to understand how social-
commercial hybridity translates into investment selection criteria.
Hybridity at the level of the investment firm is denoted as Hf in the 
following diagram, while the hybridity of the venture submitting the 
investment proposal is denoted Hi. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for Study One 
This study examines how venture and investment deal attributes related to 
the investment proposal’s hybridity affect the investment firm’s decision,
and how this in turn affects investment outcomes.10 The investment 
outcome for each investment proposal reviewed by the investment firm is 
denoted as Oi in the above diagram, and may refer to a lost, rejected, or 
successfully completed investment deal. The funding decision of the 
investment firm in this study (denoted Df in Figure 1) refers to the decision 
to pursue or not pursue an opportunity. The four constructs of interest to 
Study One are summarized in Figure 1. 
Study One is conducted in the context of a social venture capital 
firm (SVC), an early-stage equity investment firm which seeks to directly 
finance social ventures, defined as newly-formed, privately-owned social-
commercial hybrids addressing critical social or environmental issues 
(Acumen Fund & Monitor Institute, 2012; Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Randjelovic, O’Rourke, & Orsato, 2003; Timmons & 
Bygrave, 1986). It draws on 1,614 investment proposals reviewed by a 
European-based social investment firm over a five-year period. 
Insights from Study One helped to create theoretical space to 
conduct Study Two. In the second study, I continue to study hybridity at 
the level of the investment firm and remain interested in the prior four 
constructs: the hybridity of the fund (Hf), the hybridity of the venture 
submitting the investment proposal (Hi), the investment decision of the 
investment fund (Df), and the eventual funding outcome (Oi). However, 
while the prior study focuses on how hybridity at the level of the firm 
affects firm decisions and outcomes, this study places more emphasis on 
the investment firm’s engagement with the venture, delving deeper into the 
strategies used by the firm to arrive at its decisions and outcomes, defined 
as “a pattern in a stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982, 1985). Drawing 
on 25 months of fieldwork at the same investment firm, including seven 
                                                                        
10 Decisions are considered separate to funding outcomes, because as illustrated in Chapter 3, these funding outcomes are also 
dependent on other factors. For example, the venture may decide to cease activities, cease fundraising, or select a different funding 
partner. 
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consecutive months onsite, an inductive investigation into the investment 
firm’s processes yielded five strategies used by the fund to evaluate 
venture hybridity, shape venture hybridity, and come to an investment 
decision (with implications for investment outcomes). The following 
Figure 2 indicates how Study One builds on Study Two. The investment 
firm’s strategies are denoted in the Figure 2 as Sf. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework for Study Two 
At the beginning of this thesis, Studies One and Two were guided by 
a single, broad, open-ended question due to the scarcity of research in this 
area and limited understanding of the phenomenon. However, once the 
majority of the analyses in Studies One and Two were completed, a more 
deductive study could be designed. Study Three uses insights from Studies 
One and Two to design a quantitative test of the microfoundations of 
hybridity, studying hybridity at the level of the individual investor, 
investigating how hybridity within individual mindsets shapes the 
evaluation of venture attributes in hypothetical investment decisions. As 
Figure 3 illustrates, this study views individual-level attributes as the 
(micro)foundations of hybridity and decision-making at the level of the 
firm.  
 
Figure 3: Conceptual framework for Study Three (see: black solid lines) 
Insights derived from prior fieldwork helped to develop constructs 
(the venture attributes) used in an experimental investment assessment 
exercise from the tradition of conjoint analysis (Lohrke, Holloway, & 
Woolley, 2010; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999). Individual commercial and 
social orientation were calculated based on a social identity scale we 
adapted for this purpose (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Sieger, Gruber, 
Fauchart, & Zellweger, 2016). The assessment exercise resulted in 22 
investment evaluations from 154 individuals from hybrid and non-hybrid 
investment practices, including both commercial and social investment 
firms (3,388 decisions). The following diagram illustrates the underlying 
foundation of hybridity of firms and their decisions lie at the level of the 
individual, that is, the hybridity of an individual decision-maker’s mindset, 
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denoted as Hm. Study Three investigates the hybridity of the investment 
decision itself, denoted as Hd.
The main constructs and relationships of interest to this thesis are 
summarized below, in Figure 4.
  
Figure 4: Overview of constructs and relationships investigated in this thesis (nomological network) 
 
Structure of chapter 
The following four sections of this chapter are organized as follows. 
The first section is dedicated to the theoretical background of this research 
project. I begin by explaining how I have chosen to conceptually demarcate 
this area of study in the first three sections on logics of appropriateness, 
hybrid organizations, and philosophical perspectives on hybridity. Then, I 
introduce social-commercial hybrids, focusing first on the “separate” social 
and commercial identities, followed by related research on these types of 
organizations.  
For a shorter version of the theoretical motivation, skip to the third 
section of this chapter, titled “Overview of research project.” For a shorter 
introduction to social and commercial identities, please see the theoretical 
development section of Chapter 5 (Study Three) on individual mindsets. 
For a summary of research on social-commercial hybrid organizations, see 
Figure 6, which provides a conceptual framework for how organizational 
identity forms in organizations, Figure 8, which situates Studies 1, 2, and 3 
on this diagram (the figures can be found just before the section on social-
commercial hybrids, on page 52 and 58, respectively).
The second section of Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
empirical contexts in which this research takes place. This section explains 
how social ventures relate to other types of social and commercial 
organizations, and why social ventures differ from phenomena like 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Similarly, this section also explains 
how social-commercial hybrid funds differ from other types of investors. 
For a shorter introduction to social-commercial hybrid funds, please refer 
to the introduction section of Chapter 3 (Study One).
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The third section of this chapter provides an overview of the 
research project, summarizing the research motivation, presenting the 
research questions, and a summary of each of the three empirical studies of 
the thesis.  
Finally, the fourth and last section of this chapter explains the 
proceeding structure of this document. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
If the institutional constraints on behavior are not specified, the social 
sciences risk becoming ideologies of the institutions they study.                               
― Friedland and Alford (1991: 260) 
 
Organizations rely on salient and coherent stories about “who we 
are” and “what we do,” because they provide a “set of ‘ultimate whys’ for 
planning, explaining and justifying [collective] action” (Whetten & 
Mackey, 2002: 396). When simple and coherent, decision-making is easier 
for managers (Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; 
Voss, Cable, & Voss, 2006). However, sometimes managers receive 
conflicting input on the most appropriate line of action. It is this logic of 
appropriateness, and how organizations manage multiple messages on what 
is appropriate which is of interest to this thesis. 
 
A logic of appropriateness as a promising entry point for research 
For centuries, scholars have investigated how individual and 
organizational mindsets influence behavior. Depending on the research 
stream, scholars have operationalized these different ways of thinking at 
different levels of analysis (e.g., field, organization, individual), referring 
to these mindsets as institutional logics (or logics), identities, or mindsets 
(see Table 1 for an overview of approaches the literature has taken to 
understand the different mindsets of organizations and decision-makers).  
Although many of these characterizations—or underlying 
approaches—borrow from “individual-level theories to enrich our 
understanding of organizational-level dynamics” (Pratt & Foreman, 2000: 
19), they vary in the extent to which they recognize agency at the level of 
the organization and at the level of the individuals which comprise the 
organization (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984). Assumptions about organizational 
behavior as driven by the intention of an individual or a collective of 
individuals (Whetten & Mackey, 2002) are usually evident in the level of 
analysis treated by each approach in the literature.  
However, despite the extent to which scholars treat individual-level 
mechanisms as drivers of organizational-level outcomes, what these 
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approaches do have in common is their acknowledgement that 
organizational behavior is driven by a “logic of appropriateness” (Levitt & 
March, 1988: 320; March, 1999: 228)—whether this takes place at an 
organizational-level, in which organizations are themselves, the social 
agent (a collective social actor) (Whetten & Mackey, 2002)—or, at an 
individual-level, whereby humans make sense of and deliberately lead the 
process.  
For example, neoinstitutional scholars view appropriateness as 
stemming from organizational forms which are “institutionally derived” 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1028). Organizational forms are “an 
archetypal configuration of organizational structures and practices given 
coherence by underlying values regarded as appropriate within an 
institutional context” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006: 30); as such, they are 
usually fixed determinants of what is appropriate (D’Aunno, Succi, & 
Alexander, 2000; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Alternatively, a bottom-up 
researcher which prioritizes the role of individuals within organizations 
might take the following view, whereby identity and action are closely 
linked (Weick, 1995). 
“The logic of appropriateness approach proposes that people ask 
themselves the question (consciously or unconsciously): ‘What 
(rules) does a person like me (identity) do in a situation like this 
(recognition)?’ It is the combination of these factors—recognizing 
the kind of situation it is, understanding the norms that apply, and 
considering how one’s identity interacts with the other elements—
that determines the ‘appropriate’ action. People generally seek to 
act ‘appropriately’” (Weber & Messick, 2006: 53). 
Despite their varying levels of analysis, or the terms used to describe them 
(institution, logic, mission, interests, values, identity, etc.), scholars are 
converging on the idea that these are all “related constructs” (Battilana, 
Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017; Schad, Lewis, Raisch, & Smith, 2016). 
One scholar defined identity broadly as “the institutional notions of who or 
what any social actor might or should be in a particular institutional 
context, and by implication, how the actor should act” (Lok, 2010: 1308). 
All point to a foundational source of appropriateness which provide a set of 
“screens,” “frames of reference” and “givens” that drive individual-level 
and organizational-level behavior, whether they be sociological and 
cultural, or cognitive and psychological (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 
1955; Walsh, 1995). As such, this source of appropriateness becomes 
extremely important to study. First of all, differences in opinion on what is 
appropriate is a source of conflict in organizations (Fiol, Pratt, & 
O’Connor, 2009). As described by Friedland and Alford (1991:256): 
“some of the most important struggles between groups, organizations, and 
classes are over the appropriate relationships between institutions, and by 
which [institutional logic] different activities should be regulated and to 
which categories of person they apply.” Sometimes what is framed as a 
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technical or strategic question may be hiding a more fundamental 
philosophical conflict worth understanding. 
Construct Level of analysis Exemplary excerpts Main source 
Institutionalized 
rules 
- Society 
- Industry (“field,” 
market, or 
selected 
population) 
“Institutionalized rules are classifications built into society as 
reciprocated typifications or interpretations (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, p. 54). Such rules may be simply taken for granted or may be 
supported by public opinion or the force of law (Starbuck 1976). 
Institutions inevitably involve normative obligations but often enter 
into social life primarily as facts which must be taken into account 
by actors. Institutionalization involves the processes by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like 
status in social thought and action.” 
Meyer & 
Rowan (1977: 
341) 
Institutions  - Supra-
organizational 
- Inter-
organizational 
 
“We conceive of institutions as both the supra-organizational 
patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material 
life in time and space, and symbolic systems through which they 
categorize that activity and infuse it within meaning” (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991: 232). 
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) “focus on institutional logics as supra-
organizational patterns, both symbolic and material, that order 
reality and provide meaning to actions and structure conflicts” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 802). 
Friedland & 
Alford (1991: 
232) 
Institutional 
logics 1 
- Industry >> 
organization 
“While power and politics are present in all organizations, the 
sources of power, its meaning, and its consequences are contingent 
on higher-order institutional logics. Institutional logics define the 
rules of the game by which executive power is gained, maintained, 
and lost in organizations (Jackall, 1988). […] We define institutional 
logics as the socially constructed, historical pattern of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, 
organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality 
(Jackall 1988, p. 112; Friedland and Alford 1991, p. 243).” 
Thornton & 
Ocasio (1999: 
802–804) 
Institutional 
logics 2 
- Individual 
- Organization 
- Field 
“The material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules that 
define a particular social world – shape and coordinate action 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton and 
Ocasio).” 
Glaser, Fast 
Harmon & 
Green Jr. 
(2016: 1) 
Organizational 
forms 1 
- Organization 
- Individual 
“An organizational form is a blueprint for organizational action, for 
transforming inputs into outputs. The blueprint can usually be 
inferred, albeit in somewhat different ways, by examining 
any of the following: (1) the formal structure of the organization 
in the narrow sense-tables of organization, written rules of 
operation, etc.; (2) the patterns of activity within the organization-
what actually gets done by whom; or (3) the normative order-the 
ways of organizing that are defined as right and proper by both 
members and relevant sectors of the environment" (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977: 935) 
Hannan & 
Freeman 
(1977); 
Stinchcombe 
(1965) 
Organizational 
forms 2 
- Organization 
- Individual 
“Neoinstitutionalists, whom we follow here, regard forms as 
"incarnations of beliefs and values" (Haveman & Rao, 1997: 1611, 
see also: D’aunno et al., 2000; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). That is, “An 
organizational form is an archetypal configuration of structures and 
practices given coherence by underlying values regarded as 
appropriate within an institutional context (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996).” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) 
Greenwood & 
Hinings 
(1996) 
Stakeholder 
interests 
- Organization “Any identifiable group or individual who can affect the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by 
the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman & Reed, 
1983: 91) 
 
“Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. 
Stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation, 
whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest 
in them” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 67) 
Freeman 
(1984); 
Mitchell, Agle 
& Wood 
(1997) 
 
43 
Values - Individual "According to the literature, values are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) 
about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific 
situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, 
and (e) are ordered by relative importance."  
Schwartz & 
Bilsky (1987: 
551) 
 
Organizational 
identities 
- Organization 
(collective social 
actor) 
- Organization 
(social aggregate) 
“Organizational identity consists of those attributes that members 
feel are fundamental to (central) and uniquely descriptive of 
(distinctive) the organization and that persist within the 
organization over time (enduring)” (Pratt & Foreman, 2000: 20). 
 
“The concept of organizational identity is specified as the central 
and enduring attributes of an organization that distinguish it from 
other organizations” (Whetten, 2006: 220) 
Albert & 
Whetten 
(1985), 
Whetten 
(2006: 220) 
Role identities - Individual (usually 
interpersonal) 
“Identity theorists refer to the multiple components of self as 
identities (or, more specifically, role identities). The notions of 
identity salience and commitment are used in turn to account for 
the impact of role identities on social behavior” (Hogg, Terry, & 
White, 1995: 256). 
Stryker 
(1968), 
Stryker & 
Burke (2000), 
Stryker & 
Serpe (1994) 
Social identities - Individual (usually 
intergroup) >> 
organization 
“The term social identity [consists of] those aspects of an 
individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to 
which he perceives himself as belonging” “The essential criteria for 
group membership, as they apply to large-scale social categories, 
are that the individuals concerned define themselves and are 
defined by others as members of a group […] a collection of 
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same 
social category, share some emotional involvement in this common 
definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social 
consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their 
membership of it. Following from this, our definition of intergroup 
behavior is basically identical to that of Sherif (1966, p. 62): any 
behavior displayed by one or more actors toward one or more 
others that is based on the actors' identification of themselves and 
the others as belonging to different social categories” (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979: 40). 
 
“The individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him 
of this group membership” (Hogg & Terry, 2014: 122; Tajfel, 1972: 
292). 
Tajfel (1972), 
Tajfel & 
Turner (1979 
Table 1: Different approaches to studying ways of thinking within and of organizations 
 
Next, conflicts on what is appropriate are also influential 
emotionally. Tied to constructs like “who I am” and “who we are” (Brewer 
& Gardner, 1996), they are often more emotionally charged than conflicts 
on other aspects, as conflicts over what is appropriate within organizations 
is often considered an end in itself, rather than a means to an end (Fiol et 
al., 2009). As Besharov and Smith (2014: 9) summarize: goals, “core 
values, and beliefs are evaluated against a logic of appropriateness, making 
them hard to challenge or modify. In contrast, means are evaluated based 
on a logic of consequence and are therefore more malleable”11 (Fiol, 2002; 
Jones & Massa, 2013; March, 1994; Pache & Santos, 2010). Fauchart and 
Gruber (2011: 952) write, in the context of entrepreneurship, 
“A founder’s social identity establishes an important restrictive 
corridor, because only some behaviors and actions are considered 
                                                                        
11 There is some debate about whether organizational identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000) or individual identities (Gioia, 1998) are 
harder to change (Fiol, 2002: 653) 
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appropriate in entrepreneurship and not others—a circumstance 
that could also be a fundamental source of conflict when a team of 
founders is composed of individuals with different identities.”  
As such, researchers argue that more attention should be directed at how 
individual identities shape organizations (Watson, 2008). This makes the 
source of what is appropriate a promising point of intervention for scholars.  
From a pragmatic perspective, appropriateness is also an intriguing 
point of entry for research. Appropriateness, as perceived through 
[organizational] identity, has been described as “guideposts for 
organizational action” (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016; Kogut & Zander, 1996), 
while decision-makers have been described as “sites of causation” (Abbott, 
1995; Kraatz & Block, 2008: 43). This suggests that individual identity, 
driving organizational identity, are antecedents to most of the means that 
organizations will employ; the antecedent of actively selected actions as 
well as subconsciously enacted behaviors (Corley et al., 2006). These, in 
turn, have real consequences for the organization, e.g., determining firm 
characteristics, firm strategy (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Fauchart & Gruber, 
2011; Ravasi, Tripsas, & Langley, 2017; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) and the 
appeal of the firm to broader stakeholders (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; 
Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012). Thus, understanding these 
“guideposts” and “sites of causation” can give us rich insight into the 
functioning of organizations. 
Finally, studying appropriateness is interesting due to the window it 
provides into the “primary categories of analysis,” i.e., the institutions from 
which theories are powered. As Friedland and Alford (1991: 260) argue, 
“without understanding the historical and institutional specificity of the 
primary categories of analysis, social scientists run the risk of only 
elaborating the rationality of the institutions they study, and as a result 
become actors in their reproduction.”  
Although the specific theoretical grounding of this thesis changes 
slightly between studies, ultimately the uniting concepts this thesis will 
focus on are the individual mindsets, or conceptions of appropriateness 
driving their own—and, in turn, their organization’s—decision-making and 
behavior.  
The next section delves into the concept of hybridity—a feature of 
individual mindsets and organizational identity that has caught the interest 
of researchers and practitioners in recent years. 
 
Hybrid organizations  
This thesis takes a particular interest in organizations which contain 
multiple views on what is deemed appropriate, or, “suitable or compatible” 
for particular circumstances (Merriam-Webster.com, 2018a). The 
contestation between the different mindsets existing within these 
organizations is a topic of great interest to many literature streams and has 
 
45 
been studied using terms such as dialectic, duality, hybridity, organizational 
contradiction, and paradox. For the most part, scholars have studied how 
organizations allocate their attention between one organizational concept or 
activity as juxtaposed against a second organizational concept or activity.  
A summary of approaches and themes which have been treated in the 
literature are summarized in the following table (Table 2). 
 
Labels Level of analysis12 Example of themes treated 
Ambidexterity - Organization - exploration vs. exploitation (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; March, 1991; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Simsek, 2009) 
Contradictions 
(including: 
pragmatic 
paradoxes and 
double-binds) 
- Individual 
- Organization 
- stated organizational policy versus the experience of practice 
- the account of one organizational member versus the account of another 
- simultaneous belief in two logically contradictory thoughts (i.e. “doublethink”) 
(El-Sawad, Arnold, & Cohen, 2004: 1180) 
- respect vs. suspect 
- nurture vs. discipline 
- consistency vs. flexibility 
- solidarity vs. autonomy (Tracy, 2004: 135) 
Dialectics - Inter-
organizational 
- design vs. emergence 
- cooperation vs. competition 
- trust vs. vigilance 
- expansion vs. contraction 
- control vs. autonomy (de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004) 
- flexibility vs. control (Das & Teng, 2001) 
- functions vs. dysfunctions of formalization (Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 
2007) 
Dilemmas - Individual  
- Organization 
- Society 
- socially defecting choice (e.g. having additional children, using all the energy 
available, polluting his or her neighbors) vs. socially cooperative choice (Dawes, 
1980: 169; Weber & Messick, 2006: 359) 
- shareholder interest vs. stakeholder interest (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Matsusaka, 1993) 
Hybrid identity 
and organizational 
duality 
- Individual 
- Group 
- Organization  
- artistic excellence vs. fiscal responsibility (Eikhof & Haunschild, 2007; Glynn, 2000) 
- art vs. industry (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016) 
- academic vs. commercial logics (Murray, 2010) 
- social welfare and social work logic vs. bureaucratic funding logic (Binder, 2007) 
- care vs. science logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010) 
- conformity vs. novelty (Navis & Glynn, 2011) 
- community-focus vs. broader-beneficiary-focus (Powell & Baker, 2017) 
- community vs. finance (Almandoz, 2012) 
- community-focus vs. geographic scale and diversification (Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007) 
- creative passion vs. budgetary pressures (Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 
2010) 
- ecologizing vs. economizing logics (York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016) 
- environmental logics vs. market logics (Mars & Lounsbury, 2009) 
- feminist vs. therapeutic practices (Zilber, 2002) 
- inclusiveness and authenticity vs. codification and market legitimacy (Lee, Hiatt, & 
Lounsbury, 2017) 
- informality vs. formality (Stone & Brush, 1996) 
- market forces (e.g., proximity to competitors) vs. broader institutional forces (e.g., 
state regulation, ownership, governance norms) (D’aunno et al., 2000) 
- medical professionalism vs. business-like health care (Reay & Hinings, 2009) 
- open science vs. technology commercialization (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008) 
- passion vs. preparedness (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009) 
- patient service vs. costs (Shore, 1998) 
- patient center vs. nursing-profession center (Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997: 883) 
- personal vs. social identities (Kreiner, Hollensbe, & Sheep, 2006) 
- poverty alleviation vs. commercial banking (Kent & Dacin, 2013) 
- small-town values vs. progressive values (Haveman & Rao, 2006) 
- focus vs. diversification in social-commercial hybrids (Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Roca, 
2016) 
- social vs. business tensions (Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013) 
- social development vs. commercial banking (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & 
Lee, 2014) 
- social justice vs. commercialization (Yue, Wang, & Yang, 2018) 
- social welfare vs. personal gain (Wry & York, 2017) 
- science vs. technology (Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014) 
- social welfare vs. commerce (Pache & Santos, 2013) 
                                                                        
12 Field-level analyses are excluded from this table. 
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- social idealism (e.g., cooperative and environmental values, co-op governance, 
member services, organic purity) vs. more pragmatic business concerns (e.g., 
profitable management, saving money, increasing sales, financial viability) (Ashforth 
& Reingen, 2014: 479, 481) 
- unions, religion, and green political parties vs. financial logic (Yan, Ferraro, & 
Almandoz, 2018) 
- US universities’ athletic vs. academic offer (Kraatz & Block, 2008) 
- vigilant monitoring vs. friendly relations between board and organization (Golden-
Biddle & Rao, 1997) 
Ironies - Individual 
- Organization  
- Society 
- humorous vs. serious talk 
- non-literal vs. literal meaning 
- unexpected instance highlighting human vulnerability vs. expectation 
- earnest serendipity vs. deceptive instrumentalism to reveal new perspectives 
- self vs. other 
- union vs. separation in theorizing 
- reality 1 vs. reality 2 
- reality vs. desired reality 
- stability vs. change 
- claimed reality vs. actual reality (Johansson & Woodilla, 2005) 
Organizational 
design tensions 
- Individual 
- Organization 
- centralization vs. decentralization (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003) 
- informal structure vs. formal structure (Felin & Zenger, 2014; Gulati & Puranam, 
2009; Lee et al., 2017; McEvily, Soda, & Tortoriello, 2014; Nickerson & Zenger, 
2004; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2014: 20) 
- interdependence vs. independence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Finkelstein, 1997; 
Pfeffer, 1972a, 1972b) 
- worker productivity vs. meaningful work (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Paradoxes - Individual 
- Organization 
- flexibility vs. efficiency (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Denison, Hooijberg, & 
Quinn, 1995; Ghemawat & Ricart Costa, 1993; Lüscher & Lewis, 2008) 
- learning tensions (exploration vs. exploitation, long-term vs. short-term) (Miron-
Spektor, Ingram, Keller, Smith, & Lewis, 2018) 
- leadership vs democracy, the paradox of the second violinist, and confrontation vs 
compromise (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991) 
- organizational change vs. member belonging (Fiol, 2002) 
- public service logic vs. client service logic (Jay, 2013) 
- performing tensions (strategic needs vs. regulatory needs, company needs vs. 
customer needs) (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018) 
Strategic 
challenge 
- Organization - predictability vs. adaptability (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece & Pisano, 1994) 
- value creation vs. value capture (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000) 
Table 2: Themes and levels of analyses targeted in the study of hybrid organizing 
 
Together these scholarly works represent analyses conducted at a 
range of levels, from the society-, industry-, community-,  
inter-organizational-, organizational-, within-organization group-, to the 
within-organization individual-level. This wealth of research points to 
scholars having acted on “the observation that multiple institutional logics 
exist and compete for attention,” realizing “the importance of examining 
the institutional arenas or relational contexts wherein such contests get 
played out” (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002: 47). While Dacin and 
colleagues have written from the institutional logics perspective, this 
research stream lends itself to multiple streams of literature interested in 
perceptions of legitimacy, and what is right and wrong for specific people 
and organizations. For example, logics could be seen to represent a sort of 
paradox: “contradictory and yet interrelated elements that exist 
simultaneously and persist over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011: 382), or 
interdependent parts which embrace seemingly opposing mindsets (Schad 
et al., 2016: 10, 40). Or, they can be seen as identities. 
In Studies One and Two of this thesis, I build on a concept in 
organizational theory catalyzed by the seminal paper on organizational 
identity by Albert and Whetten (1985). This paper recognizes that 
organizations (usually) do not have a “single and sovereign identity” but 
that “many, if not most organizations are hybrids composed of multiple 
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types” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270). They describe the characteristics of 
hybrid organizations in their paper. In hybrid organizations, two different 
ways of thinking do not co-exist, but rather, organizations in which each 
way of thinking is seen as equally central to the organization’s identity:
“In both everyday language as well as in more formal scientific 
discourse, we tend to treat most organizations as if they were either 
one type or another, for example, church or state, profit or 
nonprofit. This taxonomic tradition assumes that most organizations 
have a single and sovereign identity. The alternative assumption is 
that many, if not most, organizations are hybrids composed of 
multiple types […]. By a hybrid we mean an organization whose 
identity is composed by two or more types that would not normally 
be expected to go together. Of such an organization we would say 
that it is part X and part Y, the simplest case of which is a hybrid of 
two types, a dual identity organization. Thus, it is not simply an 
organization with multiple components, but it considers itself (and 
others consider it) alternatively, or even simultaneously, to be two 
different types of organizations.”
While tensions may occur as a potential consequence of duality (Ashforth 
& Reingen, 2014), in the original definition of duality tensions are not a 
pre-requisite for hybridity, nor are they the sole outcome of hybridity (Jay, 
2013; Kraatz & Block, 2008). This is important because by using a 
definition which does not necessitate tension, the full potential range of 
outcomes resulting from duality can be explored.  
Research in this stream of literature uses the lens of organizational 
duality or identity duality within organizations to better understand how 
organizations move between one perspective, self-concept and related 
activities to another perspective, self-concept, and related activities 
(Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997; Smith & Besharov, 
2017).  
 
Figure 5: Simplified categorization of a dual-identity hybrid organization 
A note on terms. While this thesis will tend to use the terms 
hybridity and duality interchangeably, it is important to note that not all 
studies on hybrid organizations refer to dual-identity hybrid organizations, 
as indicated in Figure 5. Hybrid-identity or dual-identity organizations can 
be classified into the broader category of hybrid organizations—
organizations which jointly embrace dual “identities” (Albert & Whetten, 
1985; Glynn, 2000), “organizational forms” (Tracey et al., 2011), “logics”
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(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), or other core 
organizational elements that would not normally be expected to go together 
(Battilana et al., 2017: 128).  
There has been increasing cross-fertilization of concepts and ideas 
between these literature streams, suggesting that these literatures may soon 
converge (Battilana et al., 2017; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Hargrave & Van 
de Ven, 2017; Schad et al., 2016; see also: Smith & Lewis, 2011: 383). A 
summary of how paradox researchers conceptualize the exhaustive types of 
tensions present in organizations is presented the following table (Table 3).  
 
Category Related tensions 
Learning Adaptation: moving from past and current capabilities to improved, future ones 
Organizing Exploration vs. exploitation, structure vs. flexibility; balancing managerial demands 
Performing Managing stakeholder interests in pluralistic environments, e.g., (financial) shareholder interests vs. 
(social/ecological) stakeholder interests 
Belonging Distinction vs. similarity, self vs. other 
Learning & Belonging Stability (current identity and purpose) vs. change (adaptation and evolution) 
Performing & Belonging  Whole vs. parts; managing internal plurality of identities as linked to role and social identity 
Performing & Organizing Managing pluralistic stakeholder interests across the organizational boundary, e.g., employee vs. 
customer demands, means vs. ends 
Learning & Performing  Stability (maintain current capabilities) vs. change (developing improved, future capabilities) 
Belonging & Organizing  Whole vs. parts; managing internal plurality of identities as linked to organizational structure 
Table 3: Categorization of organizational tensions (adapted from Smith & Lewis, 2011: 382) 
Yet, although the literature increasingly suggests that mindsets, identities 
and logics are “related constructs” (Battilana & Lee, 2014: 402), and 
although the literature is increasingly recognizing that organizations can be 
equally being comprised of two (or more) “types” or two (or more) equally 
influential “identities,” it is important to note that these terms belie distinct 
philosophical assumptions and methodological approaches. I describe a 
few of the ways these philosophical assumptions converge and diverge in 
the following section. 
 
Philosophical perspectives on hybrid logics of appropriateness  
Dualistic organizational identities emerge within a single 
organizational identity through a number of interrelated mechanisms.13 One 
group of scholars believes this occurs through culture and norms at the 
level of society or industry, in some cases, stripping the individual and 
organization of all agency (Kraatz & Block, 2008). This institutional and 
neo-institutional perspective is built on sociological foundations, one 
branch of which argues that organizations, as actors in society, comply to 
norms perpetuated by cultural authorities in order to attract physical or 
intangible resources (e.g., funds, legitimacy, or, the right to operate) 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). Depending on the branch of institutional theory, 
organizations either actively strive to conform in order to gain influence 
from key stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), or subconsciously adapt 
                                                                        
13 The term dualistic refers to the dual nature of the organizational identity. 
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to norms because these norms decide which behaviors are considered 
appropriate or legitimate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pedersen & Dobbin, 
2006). 
Others focus their analysis using a bottom-up approach, taking a 
cognitive perspective that views individual agents as carriers of values, 
believes, motivations; identities. This thesis takes this latter view that 
individuals establish, populate and shape organizations, acting as the 
means through which organizations “respond to their environments by 
interpreting and acting on issues” (Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991: 518), offering pragmatic takeaways for the reader and 
manager. 
This is not to say that organizations do not experience pressures 
from their environment. In fact, this thesis recognizes that hybrid 
organizing is more likely to be found in pluralistic environments, where 
viewpoints and stomping grounds overlap, and multiple external demands 
claim an organization’s attention (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood, 
Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Heimer, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). But 
scholars which adopt these viewpoints argue that contextual factors, which 
they call a pluralistic or institutionally complex environments, are 
responsible for why and how organizations move towards hybridity 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kraatz & Block, 2008; McPherson & Sauder, 
2013; Toubiana & Zietsma, 2017), and this perspective tends to overlook 
the possibility for cognitive heterogeneity among managers, or managerial 
agency to interpret or choose to diverge from the demands of the 
environment (for exceptions, see: Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; 
Heimer, 1999; Oliver, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009).14 
This thesis takes the view that norms (and thus, hybridity) can also 
emerge as a result of multiple viewpoints emanating from within the 
organization (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Powell & Baker, 2017). The internal source from which the multiple 
viewpoints emanate may come from founders or co-founders (Fauchart & 
Gruber, 2011; Powell & Baker, 2017), managers (Besharov, 2014; Gotsi et 
al., 2010), two or more groups of individuals within the organization (e.g., 
Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Glynn, 2000), or may come from single 
individuals or a single group of individuals who have integrated multiple 
perspectives on what is appropriate within their own mindset. This 
integrated perspective has been referred to as a hybrid social identity 
(Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Pan, Gruber, & Binder, forthcoming) or 
paradox mindsets (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018). The literature refers to 
                                                                        
14 Managerial mindsets are further investigated in Chapter 5, referring to a cognitive construct approached in the literature from a 
variety of angles in recent decades (Walsh, 1995). For example, mindsets have been referred to in the context of belief structures 
(Walsh, 1988; Walsh, Henderson, & Deighton, 1988), belief systems (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Ocasio, 1997; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005), cognitive frames (Kaplan, 2008), institutional identities (Lok, 2010), social or role identities (Brewer & Gardner, 
1996; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995), frames of reference (Deshpandé, 1986; Dunn & Ginsberg, 1986) managerial lenses (Miller, 
1993), and worldviews (Mason, 1969). 
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these organizations in which all members jointly hold dual perspectives as 
ideographic hybrids (Albert & Whetten, 1985). 
But what this bottom-up, inside-out approach espouses is that 
individual actors are required to recognize and maintain beliefs about what 
is important and unimportant, appropriate and irrelevant (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002; Zilber, 2002). Through their sensemaking about “who I 
am” and “who we are,” they can develop strategy, and practices (Gehman, 
Trevino, & Garud, 2013) to transform prevailing mindsets (Binder, 2007; 
Fiol, 2002; Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Jay, 2013; Lok, 2010), shape 
organizations, and potentially pave the way for industry-level change 
(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Haveman & Rao, 2006; Jones et al., 2012; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & 
Hirsch, 2003). Consequently, this has implications for managerial 
strategies in hybrid settings (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). 
This identity-driven perspective is built on psychological 
foundations and views individuals as the actors in society, collaborating 
and organizing through their agency in order to fulfill multiple facets of 
their identity (Hogg & Terry, 2014; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One advantage 
of this perspective is that it offers a cognitive explanation for “how much 
institutional values and assumptions get imprinted at the individual level” 
(Almandoz, 2012: 1401). Unlike in the top-down theoretical lens which 
attributes changes in perspectives to field logic, cultures, industry actors, 
and elites, the identity driven perspective tends to identify past experiences 
and cognitive differences as the mechanism in which actors develop an 
idea of what is appropriate is in their own mind, defined, as is the actor 
assigning the label of appropriateness (and to a certain extent, legitimacy), 
e.g., what may be appropriate in my view may not be appropriate in your 
view. Because of the individual level variance in the interpretation of an 
identity framework, there is potential disagreement—or at least 
confusion—on the correct course of action to take within organizations.  
Therefore, this thesis would assume that there are organizations 
where two or more conflicting and interdependent perspectives exists, 
which may, under certain conditions, benefit from active and responsive 
management, whose role is to make sense—to determine what makes sense 
– and make decisions that will drive the organization forward (Pratt & 
Foreman, 2000). Thus, there is a critical role for decision-makers—striving 
to promote functional, sustainable organizations—to play (Battilana & Lee, 
2014: 404; Jay, 2013: 140; Smith & Lewis, 2011: 381), whether this means 
finding appropriate strategic managerial responses (Oliver, 1991; Pache & 
Santos, 2013; Smith & Besharov, 2017), or coming to terms with what 
hybridity-related conflicts and tensions mean for the organization 
(Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2017; Smith & Lewis, 2011). As Albert, 
Ashforth and Dutton (2000: 14) write, “the beauty of the identity and 
identification concepts is that they provide a way of accounting for the 
agency of human action within an organizational framework.” 
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Moreover, the identification process explains how individuals might 
reconcile choices which seem to oppose each other. For example, social 
identity theory offers an elegant challenge to the concepts of self-interest 
found in agency, transaction cost theory and modern economics 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Friedman, 1970; Williamson, 1979) by redefining the 
conception of the self. As Brewer (1991: 476) explains, “when the 
definition of the self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving 
motivations also changes accordingly.”15  
A second advantage of this perspective is that individuals develop a 
fairly enduring sense of what is appropriate behavior for themselves and 
for others over their life, which they can carry across organizational and 
industry boundaries (Almandoz, 2012; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). 
Individuals and individually-driven action thus are rich sources of values, 
interests, goals, identities and related constructs within organizations. 
Research in this area is just starting to empirically “link individual actions 
and the influence of organizational subunits to the implementation of 
strategic initiatives” (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008: 70), however there is 
potential for more of this. 
This thesis takes the emerging view that the activities external to the 
organizational boundary and the activities internal to the organization can 
be essentially viewed as mirror images, interacting in an iterative process 
of influence, from society to the organization to the self to the organization 
back to society16 (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Combining logics can be seen 
either as a result of conflicting external demands (from stakeholders), or 
conflicting internal demands and identity claims (which are in turn 
prompted by external perspectives, lead to internally-driven responses, and 
begin the cycle once again). 
A recent paper, by Jay (2013:140), portrays these internal and external 
activities as occurring in parallel, prompting responses that change 
organizational practices and identity. He distinguishes between work which 
terms these responses as “strategic responses” (Oliver, 1991; Pache & 
Santos, 2010), and tends to depict the organizational as reacting to the 
external environment, and “managerial responses,” referring to work which 
sees organizations as driven by internal needs and desires (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2010; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). However, 
the responses themselves bear some similarity. The strategic set of 
responses include compromise, avoidance (decoupling), defiance, 
manipulation, while the managerial responses include deletion, 
                                                                        
15 For example, seeing yourself as a member of your community would likely influence you to act as a steward of your community 
(Bacq & Eddleston, 2017; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Haugh, 2007; Marti, Courpasson, & Barbosa, 2013). Maslow 
(1943) and Argyris (1973) refer to the fulfillment of these social goals as higher-order needs called self-actualization. Not quite 
selfless, the utility or well-being of a community-oriented entrepreneur is simply tied to the well-being of her community. 
16 This thesis extends Pedersen and Dobbin’s (2006: 903) depiction of interaction between the levels of society and the organization 
one level down, to the individual. 
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compartmentalization, aggregation, synthesis, hiring and socialization into 
new logic. 
As Stryker (2008) writes, 
“We enter now a bridging arena that provides persons like myself 
special satisfaction given the past intellectual distance, sometimes 
disdain and dismissal, that marked the attitudes of many interested 
in institutional and organizational sociology towards a social 
psychology inspired by Mead.”
Thus, hybrid organizations—defined as organizations driven by the joint 
adoption of dual “identities” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000), 
“organizational forms” (Tracey et al., 2011), “logics” (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), or other core organizational elements that 
would not normally be expected to go together (Battilana, Besharov, & 
Mitzinneck, 2017)—occur as a result of both, internal (e.g., stakeholder-
based) and external (e.g., institutional) pressures (Fosfuri et al., 2016; Pratt, 
2016). By taking this view, the terms and theoretical grounding of this 
thesis thus act as pragmatic tools to explore “the possibility of an emergent 
organizational whole that is capable of accommodating, encompassing, and 
governing its various distinct parts” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 48). Figure 6 
represents the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
  
Figure 6: Theoretical framework of hybridity emergence, dynamics and organizational consequences (see also: Figure 8) 
 
Social-commercial hybrid organizations  
Introduction to social and commercial identities 
One hybrid organization which has become increasingly prominent 
in scholarly research and practice, is the hybrid organization combining a 
social welfare mindset with a commercial mindset (Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Mongelli & Rullani, 2017). Also referred to as a social mission- or 
mission-driven organization, these organizations are comprised of two 
organizational mindsets not usually expected to go together; ones which 
embrace both a social welfare mission, and commercial mission. See 
Figure 7 for a summary of the theoretical context of this thesis.
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Figure 7: Simplified categorization of a social-commercial organization 
On one hand, a social-commercial hybrid organization contains a 
social welfare-oriented organization, associated with charitable work in the 
social sector. Table 4 provides a list of social sectors. As shown, this 
mindset mainly encompasses social (Salamon & Anheier, 1996) and 
environmental constructs (Rennings, 2000), as well as psychological and 
relational constructs such as selflessness, acting for the benefit of others (in 
the community or the world), and serving those disadvantaged and 
suffering from issues such as poverty, violence, illness, etc. (Miller, 
Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012). This thesis will use the term social to 
refer to this concept, pertaining to the “welfare of human beings as 
members of society,” (Merriam-Webster.com, 2018b), including, by 
extension, environmental and ecological concerns (Austin et al., 2006). 
Social sector Elaboration
Business and professional 
associations Unions and other business and professional associations
Culture and recreation Culture, Arts, Sports, Other Recreation and Social Clubs
Economic and social development Community development, fair trade, ethical clothing, agriculture, employment and training
Education Primary, Secondary, Higher, Other
Financial inclusion Financial inclusion and access to finance
Environment Organic, cleantech, animal protection
Healthcare Hospitals, Rehabilitation, Nursing Homes, Mental Health/Crisis Intervention
Housing N/A
International promotion of intercultural 
understanding 
International promotion of intercultural understanding between peoples of different 
countries and backgrounds, provision of relief during emergencies (referring to 
international sectors of work, not the geographic focus of other sectors)
Law, advocacy and politics N/A
Philanthropic intermediaries and 
voluntarism promotion N/A
Religion and spirituality N/A
Research N/A
Other social services Emergency, Relief, Income Support/Maintenance
Table 4: List and description of social sectors17 
In Fauchart and Gruber’s (2011: 942) study of new venture founders, 
they demonstrated how these founders introduced a (pro)social 
17 Adapted from Salamon & Anheier (1996) and The European Venture Philanthropy Association (2016). 
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organizational identity to their new organization. Moreover, they showed 
how this social motivation could be directed to both known and unknown 
others, as shown in Table 6. 
On the other hand, the social-commercial hybrid organization is also 
comprised of a commercial organizational identity. As Pache and Santos 
(2013: 980) write,  
“Embedded in a larger societal market logic (Friedland & Alford, 
1991), the commercial logic is structured around a clear goal: 
selling products and services on the market to produce an economic 
surplus that can ultimately be legitimately appropriated by owners. 
While it is widely recognized that commercial organizations also 
serve social needs, the provision of these services is conceived as a 
means to achieve the profit appropriation goal. The commercial 
logic rewards efficiency and control (D’Aunno et al., 2000), which is 
best achieved through for-profit entities that grant shareholders 
control over the organizational goals and operations, and channel 
human resources and capital to areas of high economic return.”  
Table 5 summarizes their depiction of social and commercial identities, 
which they refer to as logics. Another scholar described it as being 
“permeated by economic assumptions and goals,” “profit-maximizing 
objectives and a self-interested, individualistic, and arm’s-length ethos” 
(Almandoz, 2012: 1382; Galaskiewicz & Barringer, 2012; Marglin, 2008). 
 
Characteristics Social Welfare Logic Commercial Logic 
Goal Make products and/or services available to 
address local social needs. 
Sell goods and/or services on the market 
to generate economic surplus that can be 
legitimately appropriated by owners. 
Organizational form The nonprofit form (association) is legitimate 
because of its ownership structure giving 
power to people who adhere to a social 
mission. The non-redistribution constraint 
ensures a real focus on the social goal. 
The for-profit form is legitimate because 
its ownership structure allows it to 
channel human resources and capital to 
areas of higher economic return. 
Governance mechanism Democratic control, which is, by law, 
constitutive of the association status, is the 
appropriate way to monitor strategy and 
operations, allowing organizations to consider 
local social needs. 
Hierarchical control is the appropriate 
way to monitor strategy and operations in 
a way that ensures consistency of 
products and services and efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Professional legitimacy Professional legitimacy is driven by 
contribution to the social mission. 
Professional legitimacy is driven by 
technical and managerial expertise. 
Table 5: Social and commercial identities from an institutional logics perspective, as adapted from Pache and Santos (2013: 980) 
Fauchart and Gruber (2011: 942) demonstrate how this commercial 
organizational identity can also be driven by founders of a new 
organization (see column 3 in Table 6). 
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 Social welfare focus (unknown 
others) 
Social welfare focus (known 
others) 
Commercial focus (known self) 
Identity dimensions 
Basic 
social 
motivation 
(as 
firm 
founder) 
Advancing a cause 
Firm creation supports the political 
vision of the individual and the 
ambition to advance a particular 
cause (social, environmental, etc.) 
Support and be supported by a 
community 
firm creation is indiscernible from 
the individual’s involvement in 
a community (firm both supports and 
is supported by the community 
because of mutually beneficial 
relationships) 
Self-interest 
firm creation enables the individual 
to pursue his self-interest (making 
money, creating personal wealth, 
building a business that will be 
inherited by the next 
generation) 
Basis of 
self-
evaluation 
(as firm 
founder) 
Responsible behavior 
Responsibility as the basis for self-
evaluation: contributing to a 
better world is perceived as 
critical (truly responsible people 
do act) 
Authenticity 
Authenticity as the basis for self-
evaluation: bringing something truly 
useful to the community is perceived 
as critical (based on intimate 
knowledge of and care for the needs 
of fellow community members) 
Professionalism 
Business-related competences as 
the basis for self-evaluation: being 
professional is perceived as 
critical 
Frame of 
reference/ 
relevant 
others 
(as firm 
founder) 
Society 
- Society as the primary frame of 
reference 
- Demonstrating that alternative 
social practices are feasible and 
leading by example seen as core 
to the entrepreneurial process 
Community benefiting from 
product 
- Social group as the primary frame 
of reference 
- Offering products (services) that 
support the community seen as 
core to the entrepreneurial 
process 
Competitors 
- Competing firms as the primary 
frame of reference 
- Being distinct from other firms 
seen as core to the 
entrepreneurial process 
Strategic implications of identity dimensions 
Market 
segment(s) 
served 
- Produce for those consumers 
where they expect the greatest 
social impact; ultimately society is 
their audience 
- May serve additional segments, if 
this allows the firm to leverage its 
socio-political mission 
- “Our customers are like us” (the 
criterion of similarity drives the 
choice of market served)  
- Stick to initial segment addressed 
because it is the only place 
perceived as legitimate 
- Produce for the average 
consumer or for quickly growing 
segments (the criteria of likelihood 
and value drive the choice of 
market served) 
- Tend to serve additional 
segments over time/extend 
applications to new segments to 
achieve firm growth 
Customer 
needs 
addressed 
- Tend to address new social 
practices (e.g., new modes of 
consumption or production) 
- Derived from what the founder 
would like the world to become 
- Tend to address novel kinds of 
customer needs 
- Derived from own needs 
- Tend to address known 
dimensions of merit (e.g., safety, 
ease-of-use) 
- Derived from market analysis 
Capabilities 
and 
resources 
deployed 
- Focus on socially responsible 
production methods 
- Sourcing from suppliers that 
match strict criteria (according to 
mission) 
- Demonstration of firm capabilities 
to diffuse the exemplary model 
- Tend to use highly 
individualized and artisanal 
production methods (products 
often considered works of art) 
- Reliance on personal capabilities 
- Reluctance to use intellectual 
property rights protection 
within community/would run 
counter to sharing values 
- Focus on cost-effective and mass 
production 
methods (which are 
necessary to reach profitability) 
- International sourcing of 
production capabilities (if needed) 
- Value intellectual property rights 
protection/help in achieving 
business goals 
Table 6: Social and commercial identities from a social identity perspective, as adapted from Fauchart and Gruber (2011: 942, 947) 
 
Scholarly research on social and commercial hybrid organizations 
Organizations with social and commercial components have existed 
for centuries, in agriculture (Cook, 1995), education (Albert & Whetten, 
1985; Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Murray, 2010; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), the arts and creative industries (Eikhof & 
Haunschild, 2007; Glynn, 2000), finance (Almandoz, 2012; Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Gotsi et al., 2010; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), energy 
(York et al., 2016), religious institutions (Yue et al., 2018) and healthcare 
(Reay & Hinings, 2009; Shore, 1998). However, organizations with 
formidable elements of both identities appear to have increased over the 
last decades (Battilana & Lee, 2014), with the aid of influential business 
and philanthropic institutions (Milway & Goulay, 2013). The research 
community has followed along, researching the business-market-fiscal-
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economic-commercial organizational component as it is juxtaposed against 
the social component of hybridity as illustrated in academic science, 
creativity, community, authenticity, ecology, patient-health, social welfare, 
social relationships, among other things (see Table 7 below for a 
summary).  
 
Theme X Theme Y Level of analysis Empirical study 
Academic science Commercial science - Intergroup Murray, 2010 
Artistic excellence Fiscal responsibility - Intergroup (org-level) Glynn, 2000 
Art Industry - Organizational process  Dalpiaz et al., 2016 
Artistic logic of practice Economic logic of practice - Organizational practice Eikhof & Haunschild, 2007 
Creative passion Budgetary pressures - Individual experience of tension 
- Organizational practice 
Gotsi et al., 2010 
 
Community Finance - Organizational  
- Industry  
Almandoz, 2012 
Community Geographic scale - Community  
- Industry  
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007 
 
Authenticity Market legitimacy/scale - Organizational process  Lee et al., 2017 
Ecologizing logics Economizing logics - Field  York et al., 2016 
Environmental logics Market logics - Narrative << Industry Mars & Lounsbury, 2009 
Patient service Financial costs - Industry  Shore, 1998 
Socially cooperative 
choice 
Socially defective choice - Decision (by individual) Weber & Messick, 2006 
Social development Commercial banking - Organizational process  Battilana & Dorado, 2010 
Social mission Business mission - Organizational process Smith & Besharov, 2017 
Social welfare Commerce - Organizational process  Pache & Santos, 2013 
Social idealism Pragmatism (i.e., business 
concerns) 
- Interpersonal 
- Intergroup (org-level) 
Ashforth & Reingen, 2014 
Friendly relations between 
board and organization 
Vigilant monitoring and 
control 
- Organizational process  Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997 
Public service logic Client service logic - Organizational process  Jay, 2013 
Social Commercial - Organizational process  Ramus, Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 
2017 
Varied Varied - Individual experience of tension 
- Individual adoption of hybrid 
mindset 
Miron-Spektor et al., 2018 
Table 7: Examples of themes and levels of analyses targeted in the study of social-commercial hybrids 
This stream of research has advanced enormously, allowing us to 
better understand how pressures internal to the organization and pressures 
external to the organization shape organizational identity, organizational 
processes and organizational outcomes (i.e., strategic decisions and 
organizational performance).  
As the following figure illustrates (Figure 8), researchers have 
studied the following relationships as related to hybrids and social-
commercial hybrids: 
 
A. How external factors lead to organizational hybridity (macro-level 
processes) 
(e.g., environmental characteristics, regulatory pressures, market 
response, market- or industry-level logics, cultural influences, task 
characteristics)  
 
B. How inter-organizational relationships shape field- or industry-
level hybridity (macro-level processes) 
 
 
57 
C. How internal factors lead to and/or maintain different types of 
organizational hybridity (micro-level processes) 
(i.e., individual-level behavior led by individuals with various 
characteristic, such as, prior experiences, role identity, social 
identity, values, emotional attachment, and cognition) 
 
D. How individuals influence decisions within hybrid organizations 
(micro-level processes) 
 
E. How inter-organizational relationships shape organizational-level 
hybridity  
 
F. The relationship between hybridity, managerial decisions, 
organizational processes and organizational outcomes18  
 
G. Effects of organizational hybridity on organizational performance 
and maintenance of hybridity 
 
 
 
                                                                        
18 Specifically: how (organizational hybridity and) managerial decisions shape organizational processes and hybridity outcomes 
(solid line) and how (organizational hybridity and) organizational processes shape organizational decisions and hybridity outcomes 
(dotted line) 
 
58 
 
Fi
gu
re
 8
: R
es
ea
rc
h 
on
 so
cia
l-c
om
m
er
cia
l h
yb
rid
ity
 in
 o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 (s
ee
 a
lso
: T
ab
le
 8
) 
 
59 
Hybridity and macro-level factors: industry and field-level 
attributes. Research on social-commercial hybrid organizations began by 
looking at the external and internal factors that affect hybridity, originating 
primarily from the sociology and psychology fields respectively. 
Sociological perspectives attribute the majority of the influence to 
institutions and field logics (see column 1 in Table 8). In the case that these 
scholars mentioned individual or organizational constructs, little agency is 
ascribed to these constructs; the focus instead being on how these 
organizational constructs occur as a consequence of external forces. For 
example, when writing about student activists combining market logics 
with ecological logics to support their eco-entrepreneurship, Mars and 
Lounsbury (2009:6) write,  
“To provoke further exploration of the convergence (or not) of 
activist and market logics in fields such as the environment, we 
report on some cursory observations and discussions with student 
eco-entrepreneurs at a large public research university. Our aim is 
to provide some texture to the eco-entrepreneurship phenomenon to 
seed and encourage further scholarly inquiry.”  
However, in recent years, more scholars have taken a multi-level approach 
(e.g., Almandoz, 2012; Tracey et al., 2011), and increasingly, shown 
evidence that organizations can react to turbulence and complexity of 
industry-level logics (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Ramus et al., 2017), and co-create 
relevant identities within organizations, further facilitating development and 
adaptation in the wider industry (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). For example, Zilber 
(2002: 251) states, 
“Institutions–materially and symbolically alike–must be 
continuously constructed and reconstructed by social actors. It is the 
continuous enactment of practices and meanings by organization 
members that constitutes and maintains institutions, including their 
appearance and experience as taken-for-granted.” 
It is a framing issue, as Lok (2010: 1308) writes, 
“Rather than assuming that the identity targets of institutional logics 
are relatively passive consumers of ready-made institutional 
templates, I treat the extent to which they are active or passive in 
their identity work as an empirical question based on the recognition 
that this will vary depending on the institutional circumstances in 
which they find themselves (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Watson, 
2008).” 
Tracey et al., (2011) are more explicit about the agency of actors to create 
hybrid organizational forms, detailing activities at the micro-level (i.e., 
opportunity recognition), the meso-level (i.e., organizational design), and 
the macro-level (i.e., legitimization).  
(2) Hybridity and micro-level factors: individual-level attributes, 
actions and organizational decision-making. The area of greatest growth 
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in the study of social-commercial hybrids in the recent decades relates to 
micro-level and organizational-level processes of hybridity (see column 2 
and 3 in the following table). This research falls in two broad sub-groups. 
In the first sub-group, scholars examine how individual and team 
characteristics affect hybridity. As mentioned, Almandoz (2012) looks at 
how “team embeddedness” in financial and/or community logics impact 
bank founding rates in different environmental conditions; scholars looked 
at how individual and subgroup characteristics within an organization lead 
to conflict, and then efforts to manage this conflict (Ashforth & Reingen, 
2014; Battilana & Dorado (2010).  
Entrepreneurship scholars examine how the social identity of 
founders, in their pure or hybrid forms, affect organizational (venture) 
strategies (Powell & Baker, 2017; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011). In Powell 
and Baker’s (2017) study of commercial ventures which adopt social 
missions alongside their business activity, organizational identity shifts are 
studied at the individual- and venture-level. In addition to adopting a 
commercial mindset in their endeavor as venture founders, the individuals 
in this study had three types of social mindsets, differing by beneficiary: 
the known-other mindset, the unknown-other mindset—which the founder 
identity literature respectively terms as “communitarian” or “missionary” 
founder identities—and a general-other-oriented hybrid mindset combining 
the two. Building on Fauchart and Gruber’s (2011) work, this study reveals 
a finer grained window into the concept of “social,” by orienting the 
“social” identity towards a particular type of beneficiary. The authors 
demonstrate how intra-organizational interaction leads to founder identity 
shifts, which then lead to an organizational identity shift at the level of the 
emerging organization. 
The second sub-group of studies on micro-level processes in social-
commercial hybrids relates specifically to organizational decision-making. 
Several studies have been conducted on how hybridity impacts processes, 
trade-offs and strategic decisions (e.g., Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Golden-
Biddle & Rao, 1997; Lee et al., 2017). However, the link between this 
stream of research, organizational processes and organizational 
performance outcomes, is less developed (linking decisions to G in Figure 
8). Possible reasons to explain the lack of development are related to the 
concept of individual agency and are elaborated at the end of this section. 
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 (1) Macro perspective (2) Micro perspective (3) Organizational level (4) Organizational level 
Theme A. How external factors 
lead to organizational 
hybridity  
 
C. How internal factors 
lead to and/or maintain 
different types of 
organizational hybridity  
E. How inter-
organizational 
relationships shape 
organizational outcomes 
within organizations 
 
G. Effects of 
organizational hybridity 
on organizational 
performance and 
maintenance of 
hybridity 
Past 
studies 
Almandoz, 20121 
Friedland & Alford, 1991 
Heimer, 1999 
Lounsbury, 2007 
Mars & Lounsbury, 2009  
Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007 
Reay & Hinings, 2009 
Yan et al., 2018 
 
 
Almandoz, 20122 
Battilana & Dorado, 20101 
 
 
Tracey et al., 20111 
 
 
G1. Hybridity-sustaining 
from 
complementarities 
Besharov, 2014 
Besharov & Smith, 2014* 
Gotsi et al., 2010 
Jay, 20132 
McPherson & Sauder, 
20132 
Murray, 20103 
Santos et al., 2015* 
Smith & Besharov, 2017 
 
G2. Failure 
Tracey et al., 20112 
 
 
G3. Hybridity-threatening 
from tension 
Ebrahim et al., 2014 
Jegen, 1998* 
Yue et al., 2018 
 
G4. Tension, conflict 
Ashforth & Reingen, 20142 
Battilana & Dorado, 20102 
Golden-Biddle & Rao, 
19972 
Glynn, 2000** 
Murray, 20101 
Pratt & Rafeli, 1997** 
Zilber, 2002** 
 
G5. Hybridity-sustaining 
from tension 
Murray, 20102 
 
Theme B. How inter-
organizational 
relationships shape 
field- or industry-level 
hybridity  
D. How individuals 
influence decisions 
within hybrid 
organizations  
 
F. The relationship 
between hybridity, 
managerial decisions, 
organizational 
processes and 
organizational outcomes  
Past 
studies 
Haveman & Rao, 2006 
Mair & Hehenberger, 2014 
Rao et al., 2003 
Fauchart & Gruber, 2011 
Fosfuri et al., 2016* 
McPherson & Sauder, 
20131 
Miller & Wesley II, 2010 
 
Ashforth & Reingen, 20141 
Besharov & Smith, 2014* 
Golden-Biddle & Rao, 
19971 
Jay, 20131 
Lok, 2010 
Lee et al., 2017 
Pache & Santos, 2010 
Perkmann et al., 2018 
Ramus et al., 2017 
Reay and Hinings (2009) 
Smith & Besharov, 2017 
 
Noteworthy 
studies 
from other 
hybrid 
contexts 
D’Aunno et al., 1991 
DiMaggio, 1997 
Haveman & Rao, 2006 
Heimer, 1999 
Friedland & Alford, 1991 
Oliver, 1991* 
 
 
Fiol, 2002 
Furnari, 2014 
Ibarra, 1999 
Miron-Spektor et al., 2018 
Oliver, 1991* 
Plowman et al., 2007 
Zilber, 2002 
Besharov & Smith, 2014 
Greenwood et al., 2011 
Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 
2007 
Simsek, 2009 
Smith & Lewis, 2011 
Wry et al., 2014 
McPherson & Sauder 
(2013) 
 
 
1, 2, 3, etc. Study appears in 
more than one column 
* Conceptual study 
Table 8: Categorization of research on social-commercial hybrids (see also Figure 8) 
 Hybridity and organizational processes. Before detailing the 
challenges to progress decision-making in hybrid organizations and 
organizational outcomes (linking D, F, and G in Figure 8), it is pertinent to 
talk about the relationship between decision-making and organizational 
process. Oftentimes, these processes provide the link between decisions 
and organizational outcomes. The literature has taken two perspectives to 
this question, at times viewing managerial decisions as shaping 
organizational processes and hybridity outcomes and at times, viewing 
organizational processes as shaping organizational decisions and hybridity 
outcomes. Combined, the literature on how organizations (and thus, their 
members) respond to the challenges—or, conversely, leverage the 
benefits—of hybridity through organizational processes has been 
particularly active. For example, Reay and Hinings (2009) look at how 
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formal and informal collaboration is used by organizations to manage their 
day-to-day work. Reay and Hinings’ (2009) multi-level work illustrates 
how collaboration can occur in the absence of trust, and how collaboration 
in contested fields can enable productive outcomes despite divergent 
identities. Mair and Hehenberger (2014) showed how inter-organizational 
events act as “temporary organizations,” essentially, providing the physical 
and contextual space for micro-level communication, reflection and 
reframing to occur. These “hybrid spaces” (Perkmann, McKelvey, & 
Philips, 2018) provide a structure for competing groups and ideas to 
interact and work through disagreements, with implications not only for the 
organization, but also for the field. Battilana and colleagues’ (2015) work 
equally demonstrated the importance of intra-organizational “spaces of 
negotiation.” 
Multiple scholars examined the how organizations and their 
members made sense of, crafted and maintained their hybrid organizational 
identity through internal processes and market strategies (Jay, 2013; 
Murray, 2010; Powell & Baker, 2017; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & 
Spee, 2015; Smith & Besharov, 2017; Tracey et al., 2011). Lok (2010) 
examined how individual actors adapted their practices and reworked their 
identity, navigating between the concepts of “traditional shareholder value 
maximization” and “enlightened shareholder value maximization.” Within 
the organization, Ramus and colleagues (2017) on the other hand, 
demonstrate how sequences of interaction characterized by inclusiveness 
and/or formality (at different times) allowed organizations originally 
guided by a dominant mindset to evolve, and result in an organization with 
a “blended” mindset, i.e., a hybrid identity. Smets et al., (2015) investigate 
how individual behaviors, they call “balancing mechanisms” allow the 
individual and the organization to manage competing logics in their day-to-
day work, avoiding mission drift and potential tensions from rivals. 
There have been multiple studies as well on how individual 
managers can use language to reframe and regulate identity, as well as to 
achieve strategic outcomes (e.g., Besharov, 2014; Gotsi et al., 2010; 
Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 2007; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Weber & 
Messick, 2006). For example, Jay (2013) and Lok (2010) demonstrated the 
role of language, reflection and reframing in the evolution of dominant 
organizational-identity. Besharov (2014) and Gotsi et al. (2010) look at 
how managers shape organizational members’ identification with the 
hybrid identity of the organization. For example, Besharov (2014) shows 
how managers with hybrid mindsets (called “pluralist managers”) help 
members to co-adopt a social mission from their commercial starting point. 
Gotsi et al. (2010) show how managers use different identity regulation 
techniques to help creative workers integrate their exploratory (artistic) 
side as well as their executive (commercial-consultant) side. 
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Hybridity and micro-level factors: organizational processes, 
decisions, and outcomes – challenges to progress. As mentioned, research 
linking individually-driven organizational decisions to organizational 
outcomes is rare. This section details four possible reasons this could be 
the case: (1) the contested nature of many hybrid organizations; (2) the 
complexity of defining and measuring value (Di Domenico, Haugh, & 
Tracey, 2010; Donaldson & Walsh, 2015; Kroeger & Weber, 2015; 
Lingane & Olsen, 2004) and successful outcomes in social-commercial 
hybrid fields; (3) the empirical problem of the rarity of social-commercial 
hybrid successes; a result of its potentially unstable characteristics and the 
organizational form’s short track record; and (5) the traditional assumption 
that market or industry logics affect all organizations (and individuals) to 
the same degree, in the same way. 
First, because of the contested nature in many dual-identity 
organizations, with no dominant mindset to guide them, members within 
hybrid organizations sometimes struggle even to operate (Miron-Spektor et 
al., 2018; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Therefore, research has tended to infer 
success from an absence of failure (Tracey et al., 2011), i.e., sustained 
operations (so far). Others have inferred success as the ability to sustain 
operations and maintain hybridity (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Smith & 
Besharov, 2017)—since the development of hybridity can also collapse 
(Jegen, 1998; Yue et al., 2018). As illustrated, there is some complexity in 
defining and measuring successful outcomes in this social-commercial 
hybrid fields (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Next, in addition to the lack of 
established measures for organizational success, researchers also face the 
empirical problem of the rarity of social-commercial hybrid successes; a 
result of its potentially unstable characteristics and the organizational 
form’s short track record. Finally, another (ironic) reason why perhaps 
there has not been as much research linking decision-making to 
performance outcomes in hybrid organization is due to the dominant logic 
in this hybrid research field itself—that of institutional logics—which 
traditionally has conducted analyses at the level of the field, thereby 
leading to the assumption that field logics will universally shape the 
behavior of non-rational actors (organizations and individuals), such that 
conflict and contestation will occur if two or more field logics act upon a 
single organization (Kraatz & Block, 2008).  
Two important developments in this field have allowed scholars to 
move past the fourth condition. This includes the acknowledgement of 
variability in the way that logics affect organizations, and 
acknowledgement of the role of individuals as factors contributing to logic 
manifestation within organizations (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Besharov 
and Smith (2014) theorize about why some hybrid organizations benefit 
from their dual identity, while others suffer. They argue that centrality of 
organizational identities within an organization (how core the identity is to 
the functioning of the organization) impacts conflict, thus implying 
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different levels of identity dominance within an organization, as well as 
their potential compartmentalization. They also theorize on factors 
affecting compatibility between individual and organizational identities, 
thus raising the question of how organizations can increase, attain, or 
maintain compatibility, and avoid debilitating conflict. This important 
development makes explicit prior assumptions about hybrid identity and 
leaves theoretical room for interpretations other than conflict (Zilber, 
2002), failure (Tracey et al., 2011) and hybridity collapse (Yue et al., 
2018), when hybrid organizations are studied. Instead, the intention, with 
this new understanding and definition of hybrid organizations, is to leave 
the possibility of “symbiosis and latent cooperation among distinct identity 
groups, even in organizations where conflict and dissensus [sic] are very 
real and perhaps much more clearly evident” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 48). 
Albert and Whetten (1985) mentioned related concepts in their 
introduction of distinct forms of hybrid organizations. In one form, the 
holographic form, “each internal unit exhibits the properties of the 
organization as a whole,” suggesting that both parts of the organization’s 
duality are central to the organization’s functioning, hence why each 
internal unit exhibits these properties. There is an implicit suggestion that 
the holographic form also indicates high compatibility, mentioning the idea 
of conflict and “blending” in the same phrase. They take inspiration from 
Ouchi (1981) suggesting that “different, and to some extent conflicting, 
management styles are blended together and diffused evenly throughout 
the entire organization” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 271).  
The other form, the ideographic or specialized form, involves units 
that each exhibit only one identity (1985: 271). The ideographic form 
suggests that both specialized “parts” are equally central to the functioning 
of the organization (hence the designation as a hybrid organization), but 
rather than peaceful, mutual coexistence, Albert and Whetten seem to 
suggest weak compatibility: “the conflict in an ideographic organization is 
more fundamental. It is a struggle, not simply over alternative budget 
proposals, but over the very soul of the institution” (Albert & Whetten, 
1985: 272).  
That being said, even though past research has suffered from the 
fourth condition, and tended to focus on ideographic forms—in which 
organizational sub-groups hold different views which lead to conflict (e.g., 
Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Glynn, 2000)—an 
increasing number of papers have been able to study holographic hybrid 
organizations by adopting alternative theoretical lenses (e.g., identity 
lenses), discovering insights on how decisions of active agents lead to 
organizational outcomes, such as sustainability or survival (e.g., Golden-
Biddle & Rao, 1997; Smith & Besharov, 2017).  
Hybridity and micro-level factors: organizational processes, 
decisions, and outcomes – current state of research. In this section we 
cover research related to hybrid strategy, referring to “a pattern in a stream 
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of decisions,” as per Mintzberg and Waters (1985: 257), related processes, 
decisions and outcomes. Fauchart and Gruber (2011) adopt a social identity 
lens to understand the link between founder identity and venture decisions 
(i.e., decisions of emerging organizations). In their sample, founders with a 
known-other social identity versus founders with an unknown-other social 
identity implement significantly different strategic decisions.  
Other studies provide additional evidence of decision-makers’ ability 
to execute strategies differing from the dominant organizational- and 
industry-level norm. For example, Pache and Santos (2013) refer to 
strategic decision-makers in their illustration of how organizations can 
decouple from their original institution, selectively choosing which 
strategies to adopt in order to navigate arenas with multiple logics. 
McPherson and Sauder (2013) demonstrate, similarly, that lawyers 
selectively craft arguments originating from different institutional homes. 
At times lawyers build on their home identity, while at other times, they 
borrow from other identities, with performance implications.  
Linking organizational strategies to processes and performance is 
Ashforth and Reingen’s (2014) study of how food cooperatives sustained 
hybridity. They observed how the organization’s shifting locus of power 
and shifting locus of critiques enabled the organization to remain balanced 
over the medium-term. They also observed specific organizational roles 
which acted as conflict diffusers. For example, individual members of the 
cooperative acted as “lightning rods” to absorb and direct conflict, while a 
prevailing logic of civility was maintained by “vibe” guards, who 
interrupted heated conflicts during general meetings to de-escalate 
emotional tensions. 
Likewise, in Smith and Besharov’s (2017) inductive 10-year study—
perhaps the longest longitudinal study of a social-commercial hybrid—they 
examined how the senior management of an organization with a social-
business identity duality adopted “paradoxical frames,” a cognitive 
approach which allowed them to challenge the surfacing identity tensions 
within their organization and stay within a duality threshold. By staying 
within the duality threshold, the organization successfully managed 
hybridity for ten years, iterating until settling on a viable hybrid identity.  
By exploring how social-commercial identities manifest themselves 
within an organization (via micro- and macro-level processes), how 
organizations and decision-makers can attempt to manage this context, how 
they may shape it, and which outcomes their actions can lead to, these 
authors touch upon key organizational tensions—discussed in the paradox 
literature, but—relevant to a broader audience of organizational scholars 
(see Table 9 for an illustration). 
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 Scholarly research on hybridity: opportunities. Despite the wealth 
of past research, scholars have opened up more questions through their 
work, and provided an opportunity for others to contribute to empirical 
research on social-commercial hybrids, the focus of this thesis. First of all, 
there is an opportunity to move beyond the richness of this phenomenon 
and use it as a setting for theoretically-driven research. Scholars recently 
urged colleagues in this domain to move beyond research which is “largely 
descriptive” and “atheoretical” (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; Daggers & 
Nicholls, 2016). There are clear opportunities for research on the processes 
of socially-motivated organizing, its strategic advantages and drawbacks. 
Next, there is an opportunity to gain more insight into the last two 
research streams discussed in the section above. Namely, how 
organizational hybridity, through organizational processes, affects 
organizational decision-making.  This can be approached in a similar 
fashion to the literature above, as well as, from an individual-antecedents 
perspective. Put differently, there is an opportunity to investigate the 
antecedents of hybridity in organizational decision-making.  
There is also an opportunity to investigate how organizational 
hybridity, through organizational processes, shapes organizational 
decisions, and, thereby organizational performance outcomes. Also, while 
processual, small-n case studies are highly important in this complex area 
of study, there is also an opportunity to conduct a broader empirical study 
with additional cases (Hemingway, 2005).  
Finally, while portions of the above literature address the emergence 
of organizations with identity dualities, and the micro- and macro-
processes which may lead to them (Almandoz, 2012; Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Smith & Besharov, 2017), there is scarce comparative longitudinal 
work on how emerging organizations develop their hybrid form. This, 
despite the fact that question of organizational form emergence intrigued 
Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and Freeman (1977) and even, Plato (2007). 
Research has shown that founder imprinting plays a role (Ellis, Aharonson, 
                                                                        
19 Note: In these illustrations the terms “social” or “commercial” are interchangeable. 
Category Example of how related tensions may be applied to the social-commercial hybrid19 
Learning Adaptation: moving from past and current (commercial) capabilities to dual, hybrid capabilities 
Organizing Maintaining current ability to execute along one dimension while exploring alternative domains/metrics 
for success 
Performing Managing stakeholder interests in pluralistic environments (e.g., (financial) shareholder interests vs. 
(social/ecological) stakeholder interests) 
Belonging Self vs. other  
Learning & Belonging Stability (current social identity and purpose) vs. change (commercial adaptation and evolution) 
Performing & Belonging  Whole vs. parts; managing internal plurality of identities as linked to role and social identity (e.g., 
allowing all employees to reap benefits of the organization) 
Performing & Organizing Managing pluralistic stakeholder interests across the organizational boundary (e.g., helping employees 
to become customers; sharing organization benefits with customers; customers as members) 
Learning & Performing  Stability (maintain current commercial capabilities) vs. change (developing or enhancing social 
capabilities) 
Belonging & Organizing  Whole vs. parts; managing internal plurality of identities as linked to organizational structure (e.g., 
allowing all employees to reap benefits of the organization through governance structures such as 
holocracies, or enhanced feedback mechanisms) 
Table 9: Example of how Smith and Lewis’ (2011) paradox themes could be treated in a social-commercial hybrid setting  
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Drori, & Shapira, 2016; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Marquis & Tilcsik, 
2013), however, there is scarce research which takes this literature and 
factors in the effect of interactions with others (Bergman, 2017). 
Viewed together, these reasons justify an empirical investigation into 
a setting which would allow for these research gaps to be addressed. In the 
next section, the research contexts of the social-commercial hybrid venture, 
and emerging social-commercial hybrid investor space are introduced. The 
following sections of this chapter introduces the research context in which 
these theoretical investigations take place, followed by an overview of this 
document. 
 
Overview of Research Contexts 
 
Social-commercial hybrids have become particularly prevalent in the 
entrepreneurship space, with increased media, research, and practitioner 
interest in individuals and groups of individuals acting on their personal 
motivation to start organizations which jointly embrace social and 
economic goals (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). Likewise, there has been 
an increase in social-commercial hybrid funds which seek investments in 
social-commercial hybrids (early-stage, privately owned companies) who 
offer effective, and potentially profitable solutions to critical social issues 
such as poverty, or environmental degradation. As Battilana et al., (2014: 
427) write, 
“The charity and business organizational forms, which historically 
evolved on separate tracks, have thus increasingly been mixed, 
leading to the emergence and development hybrid organizations that 
combine aspects of both organizational forms (Galaskiewicz & 
Barringer, 2012; Haveman & Rao, 2006)” 
Battilana and colleagues (2014: 427) characterize this rise as a re-
emergence, echoing a time when “business and charity sectors did not 
exhibit their contemporary divide.” Definitions of “economic sense” did 
once also include the achievement of a good society (Donaldson & Walsh, 
2015), but following industrialization and modernization, hybrid forms 
became less common, as the social responsibility of the firm began to be 
seen as the responsibility of actors like government, or non-profit 
organizations (Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). However, at a 
time when trust in governments and established businesses are at an all-
time low (Edelman Berland, 2014; Nye, 1997a, 1997b), the public is 
experiencing a “revolution of rising expectations” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 
45; Walsh, Meyer, & Schoonhoven, 2006), expecting more from business. 
Indeed, the commercially-focused practices which recently rendered a firm 
“normal” is now an indicator of deviance, harming corporate reputation 
(see, for example, the practice of downsizing: Love & Kraatz, 2009). 
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The wave of rising expectations is leading to an incremental 
dissolution of the social-commercial separation thesis (Dienhart, 2008). For 
example, Silicon Valley’s most famous (for-profit) startup accelerator 
began accepting non-profits in 2013 (Graham, 2013), and the U.S. National 
Venture Capital Association lists “philanthropy” as one of its sub-
categories (Miller & Wesley II, 2010). At the time of this writing, the CEO 
of BlackRock, a major private equity firm, Larry Fink, penned a letter 
warning CEOs to pay attention to societal impact (BlackRock, 2018; 
Godelnik, 2018; Krouse, 2018), writing, 
“Indeed, the public expectations of your company have never been 
greater. Society is demanding that companies, both public and 
private, serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every 
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show 
how it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must 
benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, 
customers, and the communities in which they operate. Without a 
sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve 
its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from 
key stakeholders.” 
The blurring of lines may be most evident among millennials (Cone, 2016; 
Sustainable Brands, 2016). In one survey, more than half of millennials 
(58%)—individuals born in the 1980s or 1990s, the largest generation in 
the U.S. workforce in 2015 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014)—were 
willing to take a 15% pay cut to work for a firm that mirrors their values, 
and almost half of them (45%) were willing to take a 15% pay cut to work 
for a firm that makes a social or environmental difference (Net Impact, 
2012). In top U.S. business schools, the number of students enrolled in 
social enterprise courses or independent projects has risen by over 800% in 
a 15-year period (to 600 in 2010 from 71 in 1995) (Milway & Goulay, 
2013). Social welfare values increasingly are seeping into business 
strongholds, as more is demanded from business (Donaldson & Walsh, 
2015; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Radon, Drakos, & Maassarani, 2008).  
Simultaneously, despite acknowledgement of market failures, the 
underlying premise that access to markets makes participants better off 
remains strong (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; 
Stiglitz, 1989). The re-emergence of these phenomena provides a new 
playground for researchers; a potentially ideal research setting for studying 
the impact of hybridity on organizational outcomes, as recommended by 
Almandoz (2012: 1401): 
“researchers may need to find fields, and even better, organizations, 
that have espoused or integrated more than one institutional logic, 
perhaps because no particular single logic has become dominant 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Zilber, 2002).” 
These two phenomena—social-commercial hybrid organizations and 
funds have been areas of great growth in the last few decades—but they 
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have also been a source of great confusion, due to the terms used to refer to 
them (Dacin et al., 2011; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). This next section 
will clarify what is meant by social-commercial hybrid organizations and 
funds, and which specific phenomena are the focal points of interest of this 
thesis. 
 
Social ventures as social-commercial-hybrid organizations  
Organizations which incorporate social and commercial aspects in 
their operations may be seen to exist on a spectrum (Alter, 2006; Peredo & 
McLean, 2006). On one side there are traditional social sector 
organizations with a not-for-profit legal designation, as exists in most 
developed economics. In this case, the social component is seen to be the 
primary component of the organization, addressing one of the social 
sectors in the previous table, while the commercial component is absent.  
Moving away from this extreme of the spectrum is the modern-day, 
or evolving not-for-profit organization (Young & Salamon, 2002). These 
organizations have increasingly adopted rational, business-related, market-
based approaches to achieve their social mission (Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Young & Salamon, 2002). Facing pressure to increase their efficiency and 
accountability (Battilana & Lee, 2014: 427), and complement or substitute 
donor and federal funding (Binder, 2007; Defourny & Nyssens, 2007; 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Kerlin, 2006), these organizations partner with 
alternative resource providers, such as businesses (Austin, 2000; Dees & 
Anderson, 2003), or adopt a revenue-generating trade activity (Dees, 1998; 
Drayton, 2002; Harding, 2007; Hockerts, 2006; Seelos & Mair, 2005; 
Thompson & Doherty, 2006), which they have done since the 1980s 
(Child, 2010). 
In this case, the social component of the organization remains the 
primary element of organizational activity, but there is a secondary 
element: a revenue-generating, commercial component, called an earned-
revenue strategy, in the non-profit sector (Oster, Massarsky, & Beinhacker, 
2004). The increasing prevalence of social organizations adopting earned-
revenue strategies has led to debate and fears of “mission drift”—that the 
introduction of a commercial component will distract social organizations 
from their original mission—and cooptation by private actors (Eikenberry 
& Kluver, 2004; Foster & Bradach, 2005; Salamon, 1993; Weisbrod, 
1997). 
On the other side of the spectrum is the traditional for-profit firm, 
which, in the management literature, is usually also a publicly traded 
entity. In this case, the commercial component is the primary component, 
and the social component is predominantly absent, sometimes as required 
by law. As per the Friedman (1970) Doctrine, which states that “the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits,” the firm is accountable 
to its shareholders and therefore, traditionally, will shy away from 
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significantly participating in social activities, beyond those which may lead 
to increasing financial returns, e.g. social-cause marketing (Bloom, 
Hoeffler, Keller, & Meza, 2006). The following figure (Figure 9) depicts a 
simplified version of the social expectations bestowed on a traditional for-
profit firm in a liberal market economy. In many firms today, providing 
basic employment to workers would not suffice. A living wage and 
adherence to mandated workplace safety standards would likely be 
common accepted additions. Customer satisfaction would also likely be 
complemented with adherence to mandated health and safety standards. 
However, from the traditional firm’s perspective, these are not truly 
socially-focused add-ons. They are only integrated because legal regimens 
require them to be (Wright & Nyberg, 2017).20
Figure 9: Liberal market economy view of social value creation in private firms 
Moving closer to the center of the spectrum, is the modern-day 
evolving publicly-traded firm, which invests in image management (Dutton 
& Dukerich, 1991; Love & Kraatz, 2009), particularly as a socially 
responsible firm (Barnett, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2006). In this case, the 
commercial component is the primary component, but there is a secondary 
social component beyond what is required by law (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001). This may manifest itself if three ways. Firstly, at the operational 
level, more benefits may be accorded to employees, related to health, 
family, comfort, finances. But benefits may also be accrued to supplies, 
producers, distributors, etc. These benefits may even be certified by a label 
such as “Fair Trade” (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & Rayp, 2005) or “B-
Corporation” (Cao, Gehman, & Grimes, 2017; Gehman, Grimes, & Cao, 
2018; Kim, Karlesky, Myers, & Schifeling, 2016). Secondly, at the 
customer-level, the business may target a disadvantaged population, or, 
they may specialize in goods or services which generally provide meaning, 
delight, a sense of belonging, efficiency gains, health-gains, or wealth 
creation (e.g., via access to information). Finally, the firm may simply keep 
the operations “traditional” and donate a portion of its profits to a 
charitable cause. 
                                                                        
20 This description does not intend to make a moral judgment, simply observe a philosophical stance. Often accompanying this view 
of the firm, is the presence of voluntary individual philanthropy. 
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Finally, at center of the spectrum sits the social-commercial hybrid, 
a type of organization which aims to fulfill a social mission while wholly 
relying on a commercial business model (Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 
2015). The legal form of this organization varies (Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Haigh, Kennedy, & Walker, 2015). It may be a variant of the traditional 
not-for-profit or for-profit designations, have a special legal designation 
(e.g. benefit corporation, cooperative) (Cooney, Koushyar, Lee, & Murray, 
2014; Munch, 2012), or be a creative composite (e.g. a private company, 
the shares of which are owned by a not-for-profit or trust with majority 
ownership) (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012). 
This thesis does not rely on any legal or certificate indicators in the 
definition of a social-commercial hybrid (e.g., community interest 
corporation (UK), benefit corporation, low-profit limited liability company, 
social purpose corporation (US), B-Corp certification (international)), since 
the most appropriate legal form for social-commercial hybrids will likely 
continue to vary due to idiosyncratic characteristics of the founding process 
(Battilana et al., 2012), and the lack of convergence in international and 
even, national, regulatory systems (Lasprogata & Cotten, 2003). While the 
actual legal form of this organization may vary, the defining feature of this 
organization is that the social and the commercial components are both 
seen to be of primary importance and may even be the same element. The 
table below (Table 10) summarizes the spectrum of social and commercial 
organizations on which the social-business hybrid is located. 
 
 Type of organization Usual legal designation Social 
component 
 Commercial 
component 
more social Traditional social organization  Not-for-profit organization Primary > Absent 
 Evolving social organization Not-for-profit organization Primary > Secondary 
 Commercial-social hybrid  Varies Primary = Primary 
more Evolving firm For-profit firm Secondary < Primary 
commercial Traditional firm For-profit firm Absent < Primary 
Table 10: Spectrum of social and commercial organizations on which the social-business hybrid is located 
This thesis focuses specifically on social ventures, defined as 
emerging social-commercial hybrids, founded from the start with the 
intention of fully combining a social and commercial in pursuit of a market 
opportunity (Austin et al., 2006; Shane, 2012; Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, 
Dew, & Forster, 2012). As the previous table illustrates, both the social and 
commercial component of such a venture are seen as the primary elements 
of the organization, existing in the same structure, thus satisfying the 
definition of a hybrid organization, defined earlier in this chapter. 
Social ventures may also be called cleantech, eco, ecological, 
environmental, green, social impact, societal or sustainable 
entrepreneurship (Dean & McMullen, 2007; Mars & Lounsbury, 2009), 
however, the use of the term social ventures in this thesis refers to a unique 
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phenomenon which should be differentiated from other social-commercial 
organizational forms discussed in the literature.  
For example, definitions of emerging organizations arising from the 
social business and the social entrepreneurship literature vary in the 
emphasis placed on both sides, as well as the degree of hybridity in the 
founding team. Regarding where the emphasis is placed, in this literature, it 
is usually placed on the social component. In fact, social businesses, a term 
popularized by Nobel laureate Muhammed Yunus (Büthe, Yunus, & Jolis, 
2000; Yunus, 2007; Yunus et al., 2010), refer to organizations which 
reinvest all profits into their organizations, except if the organization is 
owned by the marginalized population whose grievances the social 
businesses are trying to address. In which case, the organization would 
distribute dividends to these “poor” owners. Likewise, the focus of study in 
the social entrepreneurship research, which uses the terms social enterprise 
and social venture interchangeable, are organizations which are social-
dominant, whereby the primary goal of the entrepreneur is to create social 
value (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Dacin et al., 2011; Miller et al., 
2012; Yunus et al., 2010) or social transformation (Dees, 1998; Mair & 
Martí, 2006). As Miller et al. (2012:618) write,  
“Hybrid organizations […] seek to apply market-based solutions to 
social issues such that benefits accrue primarily to targeted 
beneficiaries, as opposed to owners (Alvord et al., 2004; Austin et 
al., 2006; Mair & Martí, 2006).” 
While these definitions are somewhat ambiguous, since ventures which 
apply “market-based solutions to social issues” may be said to jointly adopt 
both a market-based and a social mindset, to clarify, the focus of this thesis 
is in emerging organizations which seek benefits both to targeted 
beneficiaries, as well as to owners. 
A note about social-commercial hybridity and Corporate Social 
Responsibility.  The social venture is thus also markedly different from the 
firms which promote internal prosocial behavior, engage in corporate 
volunteering (Grant, 2012; Grant, Dutton, & Rosso, 2008), or firms which 
adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices (Aupperle, Carroll, 
& Hatfield, 1985). This literature is vast and can be divided into three 
streams, all related to established commercially-dominant firms. We 
summarize the literature below, highlighting how our context differs from 
this phenomenon.  
Firstly, this stream of literature seeks to understand how established 
for-profit firms can integrate social programs and interact with 
stakeholders as a secondary element in their primarily commercial 
activities. This is, in many instances, an afterthought, reactive—or, pre-
emptive in the sense that the corporation seeks to be a step ahead of 
stakeholder pressures or changing legislation—whereas social ventures are 
created for the purpose of addressing what they see as important 
stakeholder interests, with heterogeneity in how external they perceive 
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these stakeholders to be (e.g., in many cases stakeholder interests are 
internalized as part of the founder’s identity or guiding logics). For 
example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001), cited 5,812 times according to 
Google Scholar in 2018, advise managers to take a cost-benefit approach to 
determine the ideal “level of CSR that will maximize profits while 
satisfying the demand for CSR from multiple stakeholders” (2001: 125). 
Their statement illustrates a common and (troubling) assumption in 
management that demand for CSR is external, and not internal, and reflects 
the dominant mindset of placing commercial profit—or the interests of 
“those that "own" the firm (shareholders)”—over socially responsible 
behavior—or the interest “those that demand CSR (consumers, employees, 
community)” (2001: 119). Illustrative of this commercial-economic 
dominant mindset is the Ford Pinto case from 1970 in which Ford Motor 
Co. did not recall cars with a defect after a cost-benefit analysis revealed 
that it would be cheaper to payout injury claims (Fortune, 2015). Similar 
cases abound with financial firms preferring to pay fines rather than obey 
the law. 
A second related research stream advocates for an accounting 
practice which honors the “Triple Bottom Line”—financial performance, 
social/ethical performance and environmental performance (Norman & 
MacDonald, 2004)—suggesting that this may be a framework managers 
can use to guide their decision-making. However, the concept has been 
heavily criticized (Sridhar & Jones, 2013), and research in this field 
focuses on the Triple Bottom Line as regulatory, corporate governance 
standards (Painter-Morland, 2006), which, to an extent, reduces the rich 
managerial decision-making processes which can take place within an 
organization, and in interactions with the board (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 
1997) to an auditing exercise. As recounted above, one sub-group of this 
stream is to help profit-oriented firms weigh and understand the impact of 
social responsibility pressures on their financial bottom line, with various 
studies providing evidence for positive (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 
2003), negative, curvilinear (Bowman & Haire, 1975), variable (Kaul & 
Luo, 2016), and null impacts (Abbott & Monsen, 1979; Alexander & 
Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle et al., 1985; Cochran & Wood, 1984). 
The third sub-group within this literature stream has the goal of 
convincing mainstream management research to consider goals outside of 
the main profit-oriented model as legitimate goals (Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
This literature argues from an ethical (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997), pragmatic (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), and to some extent, an 
empirical standpoint (Kaul & Luo, 2016), that a greater share of attention 
should be given to stakeholders other than the primary shareholders. 
Essentially, this stream of research is socially motivated to make a business 
case for socially responsibly practices. 
An opportunity for scholars studying social-commercial hybridity. 
Indeed, while this area of research has produced numerous empirical 
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studies on the performance outcomes of integrating Corporate Social 
Responsibility practices—based largely on stock prices of established firms 
(Barnett, 2007)—the outcome appears to be a dichotomy, “yes, integrate 
social considerations into the primary business activity,” “no, there is little 
evidence that doing so would be beneficial for the firm’s financial bottom 
line” (e.g., King & Lenox, 2001). Few studies are taking the next steps 
forward: tackling the extent to which managerial attention should be split to 
best manage the social and commercial identities of the firm (Tate & Bals, 
2016)—how should decision-makers allocate their resources across these 
competing demands? Furthermore, few scholars in this field move beyond 
the debate on the “correct” allocation of attention across these concerns to 
the evaluation of firm strategies (Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018), and the day-
to-day of how to manage these dynamic organizational configurations 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008: 44).  
These processual and decision-making dynamics are at the core of 
this thesis, the focal point of the three empirical studies. The first part of 
the thesis takes an explicitly processual perspective on how decision-
makers in the organization managed the joint pursuit of social and 
commercial goals, while the last study in the thesis directly investigates 
how decision-makers weigh social welfare-related and commercial factors 
in their resource allocations decisions. 
 
Social venture capital as social-commercial-hybrid funds  
Like other social-commercial hybrid organizations, funds which 
incorporate social and commercial aspects in their operations may be seen 
to exist on a spectrum (Avantage Ventures, 2011). On one side there are 
traditional for-profit funds. In these funds, the primary component is their 
commercial component, whereby the fund will invest in any and all assets 
or companies which will reap the greatest financial returns (usually within 
the boundaries of the law). On the other side of the spectrum traditional 
philanthropic funds, which do not expect any financial returns from their 
investment (and may be barred from generating returns by their legal 
designations) but may impose strict reporting and monitoring measures to 
ensure that social returns are achieved as a result of their financial 
support.21  
As in the social venture context, this thesis takes an interest in the 
manifestation of social-commercial hybrid funds—funds with equally 
represented social and commercial parts—also referred to as impact 
investment funds. These funds have identities which are inherently dualistic 
(Scarlata & Alemany, 2010). 22 While these funds have been areas of great 
                                                                        
21 While philanthropic funds invest to achieve a social mission, some funds generate returns through other investments, in order to 
fund their social mission (e.g., government pension funds). 
22 The term dualistic refers to the dual nature of the organizational identity. 
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growth in the last few decades, they are also still a source of confusion, due 
to fragmentation in the overall industry, with multiple actors using the 
same terms to describe different approaches to investing and vice versa 
(Chiappini, 2017; Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Freireich & Fulton, 2009; 
Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). Moreover, even among similar approaches 
towards financing, differences abound due to the investment target, and the 
preferred financial instrument (e.g., equity, loans, etc.)—often due to real 
or normative constraints around the legal structure of the venture (and/or 
the fund) (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008).  
For example, what is referred to as impact investing in this thesis is 
sometimes referred to as blended value investing, double-bottom line or 
triple-bottom-line investing (Harold, Spitzer, & Emerson, 2007), 
community development venture capital (Jegen, 1998), developmental 
venture capital (Rubin, 2009), mission-driven investing (Kolodny, 2016), 
patient capital (Novogratz, 2010), philanthrocapitalism (McGoey, 2014), 
philanthropic venture capital (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010), social investing 
(Nicholls, 2010), social venture capital (Miller & Wesley II, 2010), 
sustainable venture capital (Bocken, 2015), and venture philanthropy 
(Healey & Hoyt, 2013; Moody, 2007; Pepin, 2005). Chiappini (2017) and 
Höchstädter & Scheck (2015) present a compelling overview of the 
different uses of terms in the literature: all these terms refer to investing 
carried out with the aim of generating “returns,” “good,” “benefits,” 
“impact,” “solutions,” “goods/services.” On the social side, these outcomes 
have been described as “social,” “social (or environmental),” “public 
benefits/benefits for society.” Some authors have placed caveats on how 
the social outcomes should be achieved in terms of intention to do good 
(Cambridge Associates & The Global Impact Investing Network, 2015; 
Chiappini, 2017; Freedman, Vartikar, Wiebeck, & Zoltan, 2016), 
measurement (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-Levine, & 
Brandenberg, 2010), in or outside geographic areas (Freireich & Fulton, 
2009; Harji & Jackson, 2012), or legal structure. On the commercial side, 
authors have spoken of: “profitable investment activity,” “at least the 
return of the principal,” financial return ranging from “principal to market 
return.” “below market to risk-adjusted market rate” (Chiappini, 2017; 
Evenett & Richter, 2011; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). To add to the 
confusion, investors with different investment approaches may still 
inevitably overlap with each other in the types of organizations that they 
fund. 
This thesis differentiates impact investing from other types of 
financial activity which occur on the more commercial side of the 
spectrum. One conceptual step from traditional for-profit funds are Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) funds (see Table 11, second column from 
right). SRI funds are like for-profit funds and usually invest liberally across 
all assets and public companies except in investments deemed to be 
harmful for the environment or society (Rudd, 1981). Traditionally, these 
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harmful industries have referred to tobacco or polluting fuels, however, in 
recent years SRI funds have become more adaptable and selective 
depending on client preferences (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004; Yan et al., 
2018). Representing over 2 trillion USD of managed assets in the United 
States alone, these funds have grown significantly in the past decades. SRI 
fund managers may also implement a “best in class” approach whereby 
they will compare potential investment opportunities to competitors on the 
market (Randjelovic et al., 2003). 
Moving another conceptual step towards the center of the spectrum 
are Environmental-Social-Governance (ESG) funds, funds which combine 
environmental and social concerns with governance, investing only in 
firms which have environmental or social monitoring procedures in place 
(see Table 11, third column from right). Usually ESG funds will also 
employ the same screening practices as SRI funds. Rarely will ESG funds 
will have a strategy for how they intend to achieve desired environmental 
or social goals, although this is sometimes the case.  
 
 Pure Social  Pure Profit 
Type Philanthropic 
Donations 
Venture 
Philanthropy 
Program-
related 
Investing 
Impact 
Investing 
ESG 
Investments 
Socially-
Responsible 
Investments 
Traditional 
Investments 
Investment 
Approach 
Pure 
charitable 
giving with no 
expectation of 
financial 
return 
Donations 
are given as 
seed capital 
with the 
expectation 
of 
operational 
sustainability 
through 
mentoring by 
investors 
Return of at 
least the 
principal is 
expected; 
possibility of 
market 
return, as 
well as of 
social 
performance 
Investments 
in companies 
whose 
primary goal 
is delivering 
social and 
environment
al good, 
whilst also 
delivering 
competitive 
market 
returns 
Limiting 
investments 
to companies 
who track 
and evaluate 
their 
performance 
against key 
environment
, social and 
governance 
metrics 
"Do no 
harm" 
investing in 
listed stocks 
that avoid 
ethically and 
environment
ally 
questionable 
companies 
(e.g. tobacco, 
coal, casinos) 
100% driven 
by 
maximization 
of short-term 
financial gain 
Table 11: The spectrum of social and commercial funds (adapted from Advantage Ventures Analysis, 2011) 
 
Switching to the more social end of the spectrum, are several 
variants. One conceptual step from philanthropy and charity is venture 
philanthropy (philanthropy which adopts practices from venture capital, 
such as staged financing, whereby investees must hit specific milestones 
before accessing the full amount of capital) (Mair & Hehenberger, 2014). 
Interestingly, while the emergence of social ventures is mostly attributed to 
the introduction of social considerations in a traditionally commercial 
domain, i.e., the social pressures felt by traditionally commercial actors 
(Matten & Moon, 2008; Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006), commercial pressures 
among social-commercial hybrid funds appears to be gaining influence in 
the traditional social arena of philanthropy (Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 
1997; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014) and social investment (Daggers & 
Nicholls, 2016). For example, Mair and Hehenberger (2014: 1193) write, 
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“When we began our research, VP [venture philanthropy] was 
considered the insurgent model of giving. Ten years later, and as we 
write, VP is widely considered an appropriate and legitimate model 
of organizational philanthropy in Europe. Practices introduced by 
VP are widely normalized, shared, and incorporated in the 
repertoire of practices used by TP [traditional philanthropy] in 
Europe.” 
Another conceptual step towards the center is program-related investing. 
Program-related investing is often associated with public actors, 
development banks (e.g., the Asian Development Bank), or other types of 
international organizations (such as, the United Nations Development 
Program or the World Food Program), whereby repayment is expected at 
discounted or market-rates (Lyons & Kickul, 2013). The previous table 
depicts where impact investing funds are situated along the spectrum of 
investment approaches. 
However, even within the impact investing space, there is a 
significant amount of variation in terms of ideal investment target 
(industry, legal status, stage of development, etc.), preferred financial 
instrument, source of financing, and their legal structure. Some advocates 
view impact investing as its own asset class, while others claim it 
encompasses multiple asset classes (Chiappini, 2017; Evenett & Richter, 
2011; O’Donohoe et al., 2010). Figure 10 represents the overlaps in ideal 
investment targets across the broader industry.  
In addition to finding variation among ideal investment targets, and 
preferred financial instrument, these funds also vary in the source of their 
financing and their legal structure. These investors are sourced by a variety 
of actors, including large institutions, public, and private funds and 
foundations (Center for Global Development, 2010; Puttick & Ludlow, 
2012; Rodin & Brandenburg, 2014).  
Many of these funds operate in frontier markets, although this is not 
always the case. They are also found in a variety of social sectors such as 
renewable energy (23%), rural development (17%), trade (14%), education 
(4%), and health (17%) (Simon & Barmeier, 2010), but also traditional 
sectors such as Agriculture, Health, Food (AHF), Consumer Products, 
Retail (CPR), Energy, Environmental Technology, Utilities (EEU), 
Financial, Consulting, Services (FCS), Manufacturing, Construction, 
Transportation, Media, Education (MCT), Communications (MEC), and 
Software and IT (SIT) (Clark & Ucak, 2006: 22).  
Beyond the differences in industry, legal status, geography, or stage 
of development, one of the most important difference in the ideal 
investment target of these funds is in the performance and scalability 
expected from these organizations’ (projected or actual) revenue and social 
impact models (Miller & Wesley II, 2010).  
For example, Acumen Fund, one of the first impact investing firms, 
created in 2001, invested raised money into commercial projects with 
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social goals though “loans and equity investments in both nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations.” Profits from these investments are not returned to 
investors (which are, in fact, donors). Instead, profits are reinvested in 
other projects with high short-term financial risk but large long-term social 
returns (Healey & Hoyt, 2013: 5). 
Prior literature in this space has tended to focus on these differences 
in financial and social expectations, most notably in the concept of trade-
offs – that an investor must either sacrifice rigor in the evaluation of a 
venture’s potential social contribution (“finance-first” investors) 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015), or, if she truly wishes to enable meaningful 
social outcomes, she must accept below market-rate financial returns 
(Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). 
Essentially, the literature argues that investors must prioritize either 
financial outcomes or social outcomes but cannot pursue both and achieve 
competitive outcomes. 
 
Figure 10: Variance in ideal investment target of social and commercial funds 
 
 Writing on community development venture capital, Jegen (1998: 
189) argues, 
“inevitably there will be a tension between social and financial 
goals, and at some point[,] every [social venture capital firm] will 
have to choose between higher financial returns and the fund's 
social agenda.” 
These literatures usually assume that there is a negative interdependent 
relationship between social activities and financial activities within a firm, 
creating an intriguing opportunity for research to discover (a) whether this 
is the case, and, (b) if it is the case, how exactly are these trade-offs 
manifested? 
Despite the great mobilization of practitioner-oriented research 
accompanying the great mobilization of capital for social assets from 
private investors—estimates range from 500 billion to 1 trillion US dollars 
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(Acumen Fund & Monitor Institute, 2012; Freireich & Fulton, 2009)—and
the increasing evidence that impact investing funds can beat traditional 
market returns (Cambridge Associates & The Global Impact Investing 
Network, 2015)—most of this research has been conducted on investments 
into established and/or publicly-traded firms. Current findings are based on 
samples with an overrepresentation of later-stage investors and the 
underrepresentation of early-stage investors (see the references to Growth 
and Mezzanine Private Equity classes in Table 12—while Venture Capital 
is included, typically they represent a small portion of study samples). 
Relatively little work has been conducted on impact investing into early-
stage companies, particularly impact investing where the goal is to 
seamlessly combine social and commercial goals, usually using equity-
based financial instruments. 
 Included Excluded 
Fund type Private, closed-ended funds available to 
institutional investors 
Public funds 
Open-ended funds 
Asset class/strategy Private Equity: Growth 
Private Equity: Mezzanine 
Venture Capital 
Private Equity: Buyout 
Fixed Income 
Real Assets 
Impact Intent Intent to generate social impact Intent to generate environmental impact only 
ESG / negative screening 
Target returns "Market rate": target 15%+ net IRR for growth 
and venture; 10% for mezzanine 
Below-market funds: target concessionary 
returns that are lower than our market rate 
expectations 
Table 12: Inclusion criteria of study published by the Cambridge Associates and The Global Impact Investing Network (2015) 
To obtain a better understanding of the emergence of social-
commercial hybrids, this thesis takes an interest in impact investing funds 
which primarily invest in social-commercial hybrids in their early stage 
(i.e., social ventures). As indicate in Figure 11, this thesis refers to these 
social investors as social venture capitalists, or social VCs. 
 
Figure 11: Empirical focus of this thesis 
Social VCs are early-stage equity investment firms which directly 
fund social ventures—newly-formed, privately-owned firms addressing 
social or environmental issues (Austin et al., 2006; Randjelovic et al., 
2003; Rheingold, 2017). Branded as an investor acting in the interests of 
society, exclusively investing in ventures which address social themes, and 
yet simultaneously required to uphold its fiduciary duties to its investors 
(Acumen Fund & Monitor Institute, 2012; Barry et al., 1990; Timmons & 
Bygrave, 1986).  Some prominent social investors include Fifty Years, 
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Acumen Fund, Better Ventures, Collaborative Fund, Obvious Ventures, 
Omidyar Network, Social Capital, The Rise Fund and Village Capital (de 
la Merced, 2016; “Fifty Years — The new Silicon Valley VC that wants to 
save the world AND make money,” 2016; Franklin, 2017; Kolodny, 2017; 
“TPG is raising $2 billion for a social impact fund called Rise,” 2016). 
These investors share similarities with venture capitalists (VCs) due 
to the stage at which they fund firms (i.e., early, uncertain, with little 
information), and the profit component of their investments—social 
investors expect their portfolio companies to generate revenue and 
eventually return cash to their investors (MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 
1985; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Social investors 
share the same challenges as early-stage entrepreneurs, characterized by a 
lack of “hard facts, extreme uncertainty, and significant pressure” (Mueller 
& Shepherd, 2016: 465). An important similarity is the equity or near-
equity-based financial instruments that they use as a result of intervening at 
such an early stage (Rubin, 2009). For example, VCs are often defined as 
firms which invest “concentrated equity positions in the companies they 
fund and exercise significant influence on the management” (Barry et al., 
1990). But unlike traditional VCs, social VCs also expect their investees to 
deliver on social outcomes.  
As a result, social investors can be characterized as seeking 
investment in ventures which are more market-driven and growth-oriented 
than traditional nonprofits, but more socially conscious than traditional 
businesses, and, which suggest potential for profound impact on social 
issues through profitable sales of its product or services. Social investors 
have been estimated to have raised over 13 billion USD since their 
emergence in 2001 (TechCrunch, 2017). 
Social investors represent an appealing research context for several 
reasons. First of all, social investors are hybrid organizations which must 
evaluate organizations with varying degrees of hybridity on a regular basis, 
making them a great subject for understanding how hybridity affects 
organizational processes and decision-making outcomes.  
Second, because social investors have a strong performance 
orientation (Pepin, 2005), the decisions of social investors may provide an 
important success proxy variable, helping to address the lack of consensus 
in impact measurement in hybrid research. For young companies, access to 
resources is often a strong indicator—if not a determinant—of success 
(Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Baum & Silverman, 2004; MacMillan, 
Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). While the research 
stream struggles to define and measure performance outcomes, a positive 
funding decision from a social investor may be able to shed light on the 
characteristics of social ventures—venture attributes beyond the individual 
traits of the social entrepreneur (Dacin et al., 2011)—which indicate a high 
potential for commercially and socially successful organizational 
outcomes.  
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Third, this context could allow for more methodological diversity 
into the study of social ventures, move beyond single- or “small n” case 
studies, towards more systematic methods of analysis (Certo & Miller, 
2008; Dacin et al., 2011). The heterogeneity of investment proposals that 
social investors receive allows for comparative analyses with failed 
funding requests, allowing insights to be gleaned from failure (Light, 
2006), as well as from a more complete sample (Denrell, 2005). In a sense, 
this is an opportunity for researchers to borrow the larger-scale databases 
of social investors for richer insights into this field.  
Fourth, this research setting provides a window to hybrid 
organizations during their process of emergence. This entrepreneurial 
setting allows this thesis to respond to calls beyond the hybrid organizing 
setting, related to (social) mission-driven organizations. For example, this 
setting allows this thesis to respond to calls for researchers to return to “the 
roots of the businesses we study to learn why they were started, what they 
wanted to achieve, and how, perhaps, some lost their way” (Hollensbe et 
al., 2014: 1233).  
Finally, this area of study represents an opportunity to bring the 
discussion about organizational duality to the early-stage investor decision-
making literature which has, until now, largely developed in parallel. 
Traditionally, the cases in which social considerations have been taken into 
account in the investor decision-making literature presents social 
considerations as a distraction to being a good, objective, rational and 
analytical investor (i.e., a commercially-dominant mindset), with some 
similarities to the CSR literature, as described in the preceding section. In 
fact, this literature appears to be even more financially dominated, with 
little mention of social benefits and strategic benefits (Porter & Kramer, 
2006). Alternatively, the research has focused on individual private actors 
deciding whether or not to give personal funds to hybrid causes, as is the 
case in crowd-sourced microlending online platforms such as Kiva 
(Allison, Davis, Short, & Webb, 2014). 
However, there have been some rare conceptual and empirical 
contributions related to social investors in social investment funds (Rubin, 
2009, 2010). For example, Randjelovic (2003) conducted semi-structured 
interviews with venture capital firms and managers investing in social 
ventures focused on environmental issues. They found that this sector, 
which they estimated was worth 100 million EUR, and 0.08% of the 
mainstream market, sourced their funding more from high net-worth 
individuals than from pension funds and banks, and had a longer duration 
of investment (3-5 years versus 2-3 years in mainstream finance. 
Miller and Wesley II (2010) investigate how social investors 
evaluate funding proposals using a sample of 47 social investors. They 
studied how the social venture effectiveness was moderated by venture-
level attributes, entrepreneur-level attributes and investor-level attributes. 
They found evidence for the following attributes on venture effectiveness: 
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the venture’s focus on the social mission, innovation capabilities, business 
experience, ability to generate revenue, measurement methodology, as well 
as the entrepreneur’s passion for social change, social network, business 
experience and education; and the investor’s social focus. 
Finally, research in this field has been spearheaded by practitioners 
(Daggers & Nicholls, 2016), resulting in reports without a strong 
theoretical basis to understand decision-making processes within these 
hybrid funds (Dietz, 1987; Takyi, 2012), creating an opportunity for 
theoretically motivated research. For example, scholars claim there has 
been little work on venture identity perception and evaluation by potential 
resource providers (Navis & Glynn, 2011). In this case, the social 
investors’ perceptions of promising ventures, could be interpreted as a 
plausible identity – or plausible “claims around the founders, organization, 
and market opportunity of an entrepreneurial entity that gives meaning to 
questions of “who we are” and “what we do” (Navis & Glynn, 2011: 480). 
 
Overview of research project 
Summary of research motivation 
As illustrated in the previous sections, the study of organizational 
duality has captured the attention of scholars for decades. As a result, a rich 
body of work has emerged to address questions about social-commercial 
organizational duality (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017; Battilana 
& Lee, 2014). While the origins of this literature suggest that hybridity 
leads to tension (Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997; Zilber, 2002), conflict (Ashforth & 
Reingen, 2014; Glynn, 2000), hybridity collapse (Ebrahim, Battilana, & 
Mair, 2014; Yue, Wang, & Yang, 2018) or organizational failure (Tracey, 
Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), recent studies suggest that hybrid configurations 
can also be both compatible and complementary (Besharov & Smith, 
2014), helping to reinforce the dual identity of their members (Besharov, 
2014; Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 2010) and their organization 
(Jay, 2013; Murray, 2010), as well as, eventually, even further facilitating 
growth and adaptation in their wider industry (Haveman & Rao, 2006; 
Mair & Hehenberger, 2014; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). 
Addressing the dangled possibility of a synergistic, productive 
relationship between commercial and social identities, scholarly work has 
explained how managers can manipulate organizational structure (Ashforth 
& Reingen, 2014; Perkmann, McKelvey, & Philips, 2018; Ramus, 
Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 2017; Smith & Besharov, 2017), processes (Jay, 
2013; Lok, 2010), language (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Besharov, 2014; 
Fiol, 2002; Gotsi et al., 2010), and strategies (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; 
Pache & Santos, 2013) to generate, perpetuate, or resolve conflicts arising 
from the combination of two different organizational identities (Glynn, 
2000; Zilber, 2002). To advance this area of study, this thesis identifies 
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five characteristics of current research on social-commercial hybrid 
organizations, which, if addressed, would allow research on this important 
phenomenon to generate more insights for both scholars and practitioners.  
First, most research in this field builds on pioneering conceptual 
research (e.g., Miller et al., 2012; Nicholls, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010) or 
small samples of social-commercial organizations (Dacin et al., 2011), 
lacking access to large datasets.  
Second, most research has been conducted on “successful” or 
enduring hybrid organizations (Dacin et al., 2011; Denrell, 2005).23 This is 
likely because information on failed hybrids is difficult to obtain, and 
social-commercial success is difficult to define and measure (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014).  
Third, the majority of research on social-commercial organizations 
has tended to focus more on the social-commercial organization itself, its 
internal processes, founding team, and social goals (Ashforth & Reingen, 
2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Pache & 
Santos, 2013). However, this focus on internal processes excludes the 
important role inter-organizational interactions, the influence of resource 
providers (Huang & Knight, 2017; Stinchcombe, 1965), and, specifically, 
the effect that third parties may have in shaping hybridity in other 
organizations (Jones et al., 2012).  
Fourth, research on organizational duality has tended to focus on a 
particular type of hybrid organization in which two separate internal groups 
enact separate identities and advocate for the goals, priorities and activities 
associated with them (see, for example, the food cooperative studied by 
Ashforth & Reingen, 2014). This type of organization, known as an 
ideographic hybrid (Albert & Whetten, 1985), tends to experience conflict 
(e.g., Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002) and failure (e.g., Tracey et al., 2011). 
Fewer studies have been conducted on holographic hybrids, organizations 
in which all members or groups jointly hold dual identities (Smith & 
Besharov, 2017), and in which hybridity can lead to synergy and 
complementarity (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Murray, 2010). As a result, 
this raises the concern of whether attributes and consequences of hybridity 
may have been conflated in prior literature. Indeed, scholars have 
suggested that definitional and theoretical assumptions may have prevented 
scholars from exploring the full range of possible organizational outcomes 
which can result from hybridity (Kraatz & Block, 2008).  
Finally, organizations in most extant studies were usually selected as 
research subjects because of their pre-established hybrid qualities 
(Perkmann et al., 2018; Ramus et al., 2017; Smith & Besharov, 2017). 
When hybridity antecedents are discussed, past studies have usually 
emphasized field- or industry-level context (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Rao et 
                                                                        
23 We consider these organizations to be partially successful because they remain operational long enough for scholars to learn of and 
study their activities. However, these enduring organizations still may be prone to conflict and tension. 
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al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) while overlooking the potential of 
heterogeneity in managerial cognition and individual-level attributes to 
effect hybrid outcomes.24  
 
Presentation of research questions 
To address these limitations to the study of organizational hybridity 
and continue to advance our knowledge of this phenomenon, this thesis 
leverages the empirical context of social investors and social investment 
firms, defined as investors which take social and/or environmental 
concerns into account in their investment practice. The first two studies of 
the thesis focused on social venture capitalists, a type of social investment 
firm which makes early-stage equity investments into social-commercial 
hybrids, while being, itself, a social-commercial hybrid. The last study of 
the thesis conducts tests at the level of the individual decision-maker, 
drawing on a larger sample of investors, to include individuals from hybrid 
and non-hybrid investment practices, including both commercial and social 
investment firms. 
This thesis studies social venture capitalists due to their importance 
as a potential partner for other social-commercial hybrids, and the 
important role they play in providing financial, social, and knowledge 
capital to young, dual-identity organizations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Harding, 2007; Lyon & Ramsden, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013). 
Moreover, despite how critical resources are for young organizations, and 
the implications of understanding how to facilitate access to these 
resources for suitable projects, there is a lack of research on decision-
making which combines commercial and prosocial identities (Shepherd, 
2015; Shepherd et al., 2015), and a specific lack of empirical research on 
social venture capital decision-making (Austin et al., 2006; Lyons & 
Kickul, 2013; Nicholls, 2010; Short et al., 2009). 
Originally inspired by the practical implications of research in this 
field, this thesis responded to these calls for more research on social 
venture capital decision-making by pursuing the following research 
question (RQ):  
        By which criteria and processes, do social venture capitalists 
(SVCs) identify promising social venture investments?  
Over the course of inductive fieldwork, this practically-oriented question 
evolved to: 
        How do social venture capitalists (SVCs) select and evaluate 
investment proposals?  
                                                                        
24 For rare exceptions, see: Miller & Wesley II, 2010; Miron-Spektor et al., 2018; Zhang, Waldman, Han, & Li, 2015). 
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Finally, this research question, over the course of an in-depth, inductive 
research process, was later refined to the following, theoretically-motivated 
question, which has been the guiding focus of this thesis. 
 
 
RQ: How does social-commercial duality affect new venture 
evaluation and investor decision-making?  
 
 
This research question was pursued in three empirical studies, each 
addressing different aspects of the research question: 
 
RQ1:  How do SVCs translate their dual social and commercial 
identity into their own investment criteria? 
RQ2:  How do SVCs evaluate and shape duality in other 
(emerging) organizations? 
RQ3:  How do individual-level attributes affect hybridity in 
decision-making? 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12, these three research questions take place 
at multiple levels of analysis, each responding to an area on the theoretical 
framework which have not benefitted from as much scholarly attention (see 
Figure 6 in previous section). RQ2, for example, spans two sections in our 
theoretical framework (under Inter-organizational activities and processes). 
The lower “2” (under the processes box in Figure 12) has benefitted from 
scholarly attention, however, the higher “2” referring to inter-
organizational activities is sparser, in the context of hybridity research.25 
 
 
Figure 12: Visualization of thesis research questions in relation to constructs in the literature (see also: Figure 6) 
                                                                        
25 Pahnke and colleagues (2015) do discuss the influence of resource providers’ institutional logics in young firms, but do not address 
the question of hybridity. Wry and colleagues (2014) discuss hybridity and new venture evaluation, however, they do not address 
social-commercial hybridity, nor do they examine the evaluation process.   
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Summary of Thesis   
This thesis explores the question How does social-commercial 
duality affect new venture evaluation and investor decision-making? in 
three empirical studies involving holographic and ideographic hybrid 
organizations.26 The first two studies leverage the research setting of a 
single holographic social investment firm. The first study draws on a rich 
and unique dataset of 1,614 investment outcomes to examine specific 
investment decision-making criteria used by an SVC to evaluate early-
stage social-commercial organizations (“social ventures”). The second 
study draws on original fieldwork and interviews at the same investment 
firm, conducted to better understand the SVC’s behavior as it evaluates and 
acts upon investment proposals. These holographic organizations are 
involved in the evaluation of venture which are, or have the potential to be, 
either holographic of ideographic hybrids. The third study investigates the 
effect of individual-level attributes on assessments of venture hybridity in 
investment decisions using experimental data collected from 154 individual 
investors in the impact and VC investment industry. These investors 
include individuals from hybrid and non-hybrid investment practices, 
including both commercial and social investment firms. Table 13 
summarizes this theses chapters, research questions and contributions. 
Taken together, these studies shed light on how an important, yet 
overlooked actor in social-commercial organizing makes decisions, how its 
decisions shapes hybridity and performance in other firms, and how the 
individual attributes of decision-makers within such organization influence 
hybridity in decision-making. In doing so, this thesis expands scholarly 
understanding of identity duality in established and emerging 
organizations.  
An extended summary of each study, its implications for the 
scholarly literature, and its implications for practice are included in the 
next section. 
  
                                                                        
26 Holographic and ideographic organizations are defined under point four in the prior section, “Summary of research motivation.” 
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 Title Chapter RQs Main contributions 
Chapter 1 Why study identity 
duality and investor 
decision-making? 
Why study identity duality 
and investor decision-
making? 
- Literature review of social-commercial identity duality in 
organizations  
- Offers logic of appropriateness a path towards integrating 
theoretical views on organizational duality 
Chapter 2 Emergent research 
design 
What were the goals of the 
research project? 
N/A  
Chapter 3 Investing in Hybrids: 
A Longitudinal Study 
of Social VC 
Investment 
Selection Criteria  
(Study One) 
RQ1: How do SVCs 
translate their dual social 
and commercial identity 
into their own investment 
criteria? 
 
- First fine-grained development of social-commercial 
hybrid fund selection criteria based on longitudinal 
analysis of actual investment decision data 
- First large sample study of social VC decision-making, 
based on 1,614 investment decisions 
- One of few empirical studies on investment decision-
making of which analysis is based on both successful and 
failed investment outcomes (1,574 ejections)  
- Demonstrates how SVC evaluation of the same venture 
attribute helps the SVC inform both social and commercial 
potential  
Chapter 4 Heart Money:  
How Social Investors 
Shape and Evaluate 
Social-Commercial 
Duality in New 
Ventures (Study 
Two) 
RQ2: How do SVCs evaluate 
and shape duality in other 
(emerging) organizations? 
 
- First ethnographic study of social VC decision-making  
- First inductive, longitudinal study of dyadic relationship 
between social-commercial hybrids 
- First illustration of strategies used by hybrids to 
intentionally shape and influence hybridity in another 
organization 
- Rare empirical study studying hybridity in firms prior to 
hybridity emergence 
- First illustration of the positive role of third-parties in 
developing hybrid identity  
- One of few empirical studies where main research subject 
is a holographic (integrated) hybrid organization 
Chapter 5 From Both Sides 
Now:  
Microfoundations of 
Hybrid Decision-
Making (Study 
Three) 
RQ3: How do individual-
level attributes affect 
hybridity in decision-
making? 
- Rare investigation of individual-level organizational 
hybridity antecedents  
- Demonstrates that the attractiveness of social, 
commercial, and hybrid venture attributes is moderated 
by decision-makers’ mindsets 
- Largest experimental study of social investors  
Chapter 6 Matters of hybridity What are the implications 
of hybridity research? 
N/A  
Table 13: Summary of thesis chapters, research questions and contributions 
 
Summary of Study One   
Investing in Hybrids:  
A Longitudinal Study of Social VC Investment Selection Criteria  
 
The first study conducts an in-depth, exploratory, longitudinal case 
study of how an SVC translates its social and commercial identities into 
investment selection and evaluation criteria. The selected SVC offered four 
empirical advantages for conducting research in this space. First, it is a 
holographic firm that seeks to invest in other holographic social-
commercial organization, a perspective rarely examined in the literature. 
Second, by evaluating hundreds of investment proposals from social-
commercial organizations over five years, this firm developed considerable 
expertise in understanding the factors affecting performance in holographic 
forms of hybridity, making its perspective intriguing and informative (for a 
parallel, see: MacMillan et al., 1985). Third, data produced directly by an 
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SVC—pertaining to real investment decisions—offers access to data with 
high levels of internal validity and ecological validity, related to a large 
sample of early-stage social-commercial organizations—which prior 
literature has not yet had access to (Dacin et al., 2011; Gibbert et al., 2008). 
Fourth, the pool of investment proposals evaluated by this investor 
includes both accepted and rejected investment proposals from early-stage 
organizations. By also including younger companies that do not receive 
funding, their dataset reduces survivorship bias (Denrell, 2005). Finally, 
funding outcomes from this expert social investor provides a simple proxy 
for performance (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Ter Wal et al., 2016).  
Drawing on the firm’s detailed archival records, this Study One 
builds a database of 1,614 investment decisions made by the SVC over five 
years, including both successful investment outcomes (19) and 
unsuccessful investment outcomes (1,574).27  Through inductive, iterative 
analyses of these qualitative data on a deal-by-deal basis, this study opens 
up the black box of SVC decision-making, identifying six categories of 
selection criteria used by the investor to assess investment proposals from a 
social and a commercial perspective, including 14 criteria of particular 
importance to the investor from a social perspective. Interestingly, while 
these criteria confirm prior literature’s findings on minimum thresholds 
sought by other social and/or commercial investors, this study illustrates 
another way in which SVCs translates their dual social-commercial identity 
into its investment selection and evaluation process. The study 
demonstrates how SVCs use components of a venture’s “objective” social 
attributes to inform its understanding of the venture’s overall commercial 
potential (and vice versa for “objective” commercial attributes). Finally, an 
analysis of these criteria’s application over time (e.g. over the due 
diligence-negotiation period) suggests that the social investor evaluation 
process is fundamentally different from the traditional investment process 
in the relationship that is formed with the investor.  
These findings offer an in-depth, detailed understanding of social 
venture selection criteria, providing the first taxonomy of such criteria as 
derived from actual investment decisions. Moreover, they suggest that, 
counterintuitively, the SVC may not immediately be seeking a positive 
investment outcome when evaluating investment opportunities. This study 
indicates that, given the length of the SVC’s engagement with 
“uninvestable” ventures (e.g., ventures not currently seeking equity 
investment), and the number of open-ended decisions made, the SVC is 
rather, evaluating its capacity to work with, and support the venture. From 
a research methods perspective, this study suggests that relying only on 
post-positivist methods to understand value-laden judgements are not 
sufficient, and that, still more inductive and social-constructivist 
approaches are also required. Practically speaking, for entrepreneurs, the 
                                                                        
27 And 40 proposals still under consideration. 
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number of venture rejections due to firm-specific preferences suggests that 
entrepreneurs should research and prioritize the general concept of venture-
investor fit. Moreover, this study demonstrates that SVCs do take into 
consideration mission-related venture attributes, without necessarily 
viewing these as threats to the venture’s commercial potential. Therefore, 
when approaching investors which appear to be socially-motivated, 
socially-motivated ventures should actively develop and articulate this 
component of their investment offer, and, if applicable, its commercial 
benefits. 
 
Summary of Study Two  
Heart Money: How Social Investors Evaluate and Shape  
Social-Commercial Duality in New Ventures    
 
The second study uses the same firm to delve deeper into the 
question of how SVCs evaluate and act upon investment proposals, 
focusing on the inter-organizational interactions that take place between a 
venture’s submission and the final investment outcome. Drawing on 25 
months of ethnographic fieldwork, including seven consecutive months on 
the SVC’s premises, I uncover five strategies, defined as “patterns in a 
stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1982, 1985) that the investor intuitively applied to engage with 
ventures that request funding from them. These venture-investor 
engagements affect the development of the new ventures’ hybrid identity 
and their performance, as measured through funding outcomes (Navis & 
Glynn, 2011; Ter Wal et al., 2016).  
Inductive analysis of a selection of transcribed interviews, 
fieldnotes, and other documents (Gioia et al., 2013; Miles & Huberman, 
1994) revealed five strategies used by the investor to understand and shape 
the plausibility of the new venture’s identity, defined as “the constellation 
of claims around the founders, organization, and market opportunity of an 
entrepreneurial entity that gives meaning to questions of ‘who we are’ and 
‘what we do’” (Navis & Glynn, 2011: 480). First, the study illustrates how 
the investor upholds its dual mandate by seeking investments in ventures 
which were more market-driven and growth-oriented than traditional 
nonprofits, but more socially conscious than traditional businesses, and 
therefore with the potential to have profound impact on social issues 
through profitable sales of its product or services (Höchstädter & Scheck, 
2015; Rheingold, 2017).  
In the first strategy applied by the investment firm, ventures which 
were assessed as having extremely plausible commercial and social claims 
in its emerging new venture identity were directly pursued by the SVC 
(provided that the venture also fulfilled the SVC’s VC-focus and context-
specific preferences, e.g., relation to portfolio, deal structure). Ventures 
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with social claims with a strong level of plausibility, but commercial 
claims with a low level of plausibility, on the other hand, elicited a series 
of urgent, technical and iterative interventions this study refers to as 
Tinkering (Strategy 2). When successful, this strategy allowed the SVC to 
co-create investment opportunities not previously available to them.  
In a third strategy, ventures with social claims with an average level 
of plausibility, but commercial claims with a strong level of plausibility 
motivated a series of less urgent, more cautious interventions on behalf of 
the SVC, intended to determine how close the venture’s emerging identity 
was to the social cause, and consequently, the likelihood that this venture 
might develop a plausible (pro)social identity claim. This strategy is 
referred to as Rapprochement (Strategy 3). In its most successful cases, 
Rapprochement and Tinkering allowed the SVC to increase the plausibility 
of the evaluated ventures’ emerging identities, co-creating attractive, 
investible social venture investment opportunities. However, while several 
cases where the SVC was unable to help the venture increase the 
plausibility of its emerging identity were emotionally challenging, at times, 
failure to increase the plausibility of the evaluated ventures’ emerging 
identity helped the SVC to avoid investments in ventures at higher risk of 
hybridity collapse. In these ventures, the SVC believed, that hybridity 
would not be sustainable due to a risk we term, “Trade-off Hazard.” 
 Finally, the SVC’s two other strategies were applied to ventures 
with average levels of plausibility in their social and commercial claims. 
This pattern of engagement, referred to simply as “Be as helpful as 
possible,” was less frequent, although still regular, and, notably, driven and 
maintained by the SVC (Strategy 4). While the SVC did not expect to 
create an investment opportunity from these ventures, they still wished to 
build rapport, and gained indirect investment- and non-investment-related 
benefits from this strategy. For example, our data interestingly suggests 
that these strategies helped the SVC to reinforce its own hybrid self-
concept in a context that demanded many commercial-identity-dominant 
actions. Finally, ventures with very weak levels of plausibility in their 
social and commercial claims were Filtered Out (Strategy 5). 
These findings have implications for early-stage investing, hybrid 
organizing, and entrepreneurship research. First, these findings suggest that 
offering time and attention prior to making a financial investment may be 
key to creating investment opportunities which perform well along both 
social and commercial dimensions. This stands in contrast to the dominant 
transaction-based relationships discussed in the general management and 
venture capital decision-making literature (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). 
Indeed, the investment firm demonstrates that a less transactional 
approach—offering support to a venture prior to an investment decision, 
or, from the investor’s perspective, prior to being allocated a place in the 
investment round—can provide investors access to exclusive deals and 
help improve performance via an enhanced venture-investor relationship.  
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Second, the findings imply that investors may be able to combine 
helpful behavior towards ventures which do not have a clear path to 
investment with activities that can still benefit the investor in the medium-
term (e.g. from a public relation’s perspective). Finally, our data allowed 
us to develop a model of how variance in new venture identity plausibility 
led to different engagement strategies on behalf of the SVC. These SVC 
strategies helped new ventures confront aspects of their emerging identity 
to the market, aiding both the venture and the Firm in evaluating the 
plausibility of the new venture’s overall identity. Thereby, this study 
addresses the processes through which resource providers influence and 
shape new venture identity, suggesting that early intervention (at the 
startup stage) from competent and motivated third-parties may be key to 
creating a greater number of sustainable hybrid organizations.  
 
Summary of Study Three 
From Both Sides Now:  
Microfoundations of Hybrid Organizing and Decision-Making 
 
The third study of this thesis extends the literature on hybrid 
organizing by going beyond (mostly) firm-level research to investigate the 
microfoundations of hybrid organizing—how individual-level attributes 
shape social-commercial hybrid outcomes in decision-making. To gain a 
better understanding of the individual-level antecedents to hybrid decision-
making in the context of early-stage investments, we investigate the role of 
individual mindsets in influencing the perception of hybridity 
attractiveness.  
We do this by employing an experimental investment assessment 
exercise from the tradition of conjoint analysis, adapted to reflect and test 
findings from Studies One and Two. In this exercise, 154 investors at 
commercially-dominant, socially-dominant and hybrid firms were asked to 
make investment decisions based on a set of hypothetical venture 
proposals, resulting in a dataset of 3,388 hypothetical investment decisions. 
The social and commercial orientations of the investors’ mindsets were 
captured using an adapted social identity scale (Sieger et al., 2016), while 
the hybridity of the investment decision was calculated based on the 
emphasis individuals implicitly assigned to individual venture attributes 
when assessing the overall attractiveness of a hypothetical investment 
decision. 
The study’s findings demonstrate that social and commercial 
orientations in decision-makers’ mindsets moderate the relationship 
between venture attributes and the overall attractiveness of the investment 
decision. We found statistically significant findings that for individuals 
with socially-dominant mindsets, as the importance of the venture’s social 
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mission increases, and, as the hybridity of the venture’s revenue model 
increases, the overall attractiveness of the investment decision increases.  
Furthermore, this study found that there is a statistically significantly 
more positive relationship between the extent of the venture’s social 
mission and its overall investment evaluation when mindsets are socially-
dominant versus when mindsets are hybrid or commercially-dominant. We 
found the same result for the relationship between the hybridity of a 
venture’s revenue model and its overall investment evaluation (a more 
positive relationship when mindsets are socially-dominant versus when 
mindsets are hybrid or commercially-dominant).  
Regarding the relationship between a venture’s commercial 
investment value and the overall investment valuation, this study found 
that when mindsets are hybrid, the slope for the commercial investment 
value and the evaluation of the investment decision was in fact 
significantly more positive than the slope created when mindsets were 
socially-dominant versus when mindsets are hybrid (no statistically 
significant finding in relation to individuals with commercially-dominant 
mindsets). 
These findings have implications for strategic decision-making, 
hybrid organizing, and hybridity at the level of the individual. First, this 
study responds to calls to investigate the role of social orientation in 
decision-making by offering evidence on how social orientation within 
individual mindsets systematically shapes investment decisions related to 
hybridity, through the specific venture attributes (Shepherd, 2015; 
Shepherd et al., 2015).  
Second, while the hybrid organizing literature offers rich insights 
into the behavior of social-commercial hybrid firms, and how managers 
embedded in these firms can shape organizational processes which 
maintain or break down hybridity in organizations over time, because the 
majority of this research does not provide counterfactuals, it is unclear to 
which extent the behavior of these individuals is driven by the 
organizational context or the individual’s own mindset. In this study, we 
present 154 individuals the same 22 investment profiles designed in a 
simplified way in order to better generalize across settings. What we find is 
that differences in the attractiveness of investment decisions is significantly 
affected by, not the proposal itself (since all respondents received the same 
set), but the goals, frames of reference and values held by individual 
decision-makers. The importance of individual-level attributes suggests 
that tensions often associated with hybrid organizing, may not be due to the 
structure of hybridity itself, but rather, the recruitment and assignment of 
specific individuals to specific roles within the organizations.  
Third, while the social investing literature offers rich insights into 
the behavior of social investment firms, we extend this research by 
investigating data on investment decisions made by individuals in those 
firm. Interestingly, despite the fact that 52% of our sample indicated that 
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commercial returns were the main priority of their firm, 73% of our sample 
were classified as general social-commercial hybrid. This opens up 
discussions on the conditions which enable individual hybridity to be 
expressed in organizational contexts, and how work-related organizational 
contexts enabling hybridity expression contrast with non-work-related 
organizational contexts which enable the expression of hybridity. 
Moreover, this study sheds light on the different types of hybridity which 
may exist in an individual.  
 
Thesis document structure 
 
This last section details the structure of this thesis.  
 
In the following chapter, Chapter 2, I provide a summary and 
overview of the emergent research design, and the philosophical research 
perspectives adopted in this thesis. 
In Chapter 3 is the first empirical study in this thesis, titled 
“Investing in Hybrids: A Longitudinal Study of Social VC Investment 
Selection Criteria.” This study investigates how SVCs translate their dual 
social and commercial identity into their own investment criteria on a deal-
by-deal basis. 
Chapter 4 is the second empirical study in this thesis, titled “Heart 
Money: How Social Investors Shape and Evaluate Social-Commercial 
Duality in New Ventures.” This study investigates how a social-
commercial hybrid fund, an SVC, evaluates and shapes duality in other 
(emerging) organizations. 
Chapter 5 is the last empirical study in this thesis, titled “From Both 
Sides Now: Microfoundations of Hybrid Decision-Making.” This study 
investigates how individual-level attributes affect hybridity in decision-
making.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical findings and discusses practical 
implications of this research.  
 
All following chapters can be read independently. All necessary 
contextual information is contained within the chapters. 
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Chapter II             
Emergent research design 
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II. Emergent research design 
- Designing and developing research with the goal of being useful 
 
Do not worry if you have built your castles in the air. They are where they 
should be. Now put the foundations under them.  
                                                                      ― Henry David Thoreau 
Every day is a winding road / I get a little bit closer.  
                                                                                     ― Sheryl Crow 
Introduction28 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the research process which 
led to the research design of the thesis, notably, the order of the three 
empirical studies presented. In the first section, I describe my initial 
research interests and research goals. In the second section, I detail the 
research process I took to pursue these interests. I describe how, during this 
process, I discovered theoretical constructs that provided a lens I was able 
to adapt to better understand and study my phenomena.  
In the last section, I present an overview of research activities 
pursued and comment on the philosophical and epistemological 
perspectives adopted in each study, as well as the overall work. In this last 
section, I follow the practice of reflexivity (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Finlay, 
2002a), addressing the role and impact of the researcher in the research 
process, a practice indispensable to effective research (Calas & Smircich, 
1999).29
This chapter is intended to be brief. For more details on the research 
design of each study, please refer to the methods section in the respective 
chapters in which each empirical study is presented. These begin in 
Chapter 3.
                                                                        
28 This chapter represents the author’s own work.
29 I am indebted to Matthias Finger and Guido Palazzo whose courses helped me develop and come to terms with the lens through 
which I see the world. 
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Research goals 
 
The goals of this thesis are fourfold: two practical and two research 
related goals which unfolded as the project progresses. 
The first goal of the thesis is practically motivated; interest in 
furthering the fields of entrepreneurship, innovation, economic 
development and prosocial organizing. The second goal is broader, driven 
by praxis (Steffy & Grimes, 1986), intended to improve the social system 
we find ourselves in. In any powerful, unitary discourse, many other 
narratives are lost. The thesis became a pragmatic effort to shed light on 
lesser discussed topics, to reveal values hidden in what is considered 
amoral, neutral, non-ideological or normal and to consider social outcomes 
within and outside of the firm as “ends in themselves” (Kant, Wood, & 
Schneewind, 2002), rather than as means for further profit generation, or 
revenue growth for growth’s sake. 
The research-related goals are as follows. The first research-related 
goal was to pursue verstehen, an interpretive, naturalistic understanding of 
the entrepreneurial and managerial phenomena based on human experience 
(Lindlof, 2008). Conversely, the second goal was to build testable 
hypotheses from these experiences; to build on these understanding-
oriented experiences (and the experience of others) to create generalizable 
(and falsifiable statements) with the potential to contribute to broader 
theories in social science (Popper, 1985). From these statements, I join 
scholars in pursuing erklären and developing causal explanations for 
phenomena (Lindlof, 2008). 
Goals one and two are discussed in this section, while research goals 
three and four are explained in the following two sections. 
 
Goal 1: Exploratory readings driven by a practical interest 
Social ventures―new firms or organizations that combine a social 
welfare mindset with a commercial mindset―were of great interest to me 
even before pursing this PhD, having worked with entrepreneurs leading 
such initiatives in startups, non-profit organizations and multinational 
corporations.30 By 2013, I had developed an interest in how privately 
organized action (i.e., private initiatives and collective action) could help 
provide basic, or essential goods and services (e.g., water, education, 
energy) to marginalized populations. I became interested in Base of the 
Pyramid models (intended to serve those at the “base” of the global 
socioeconomic pyramid) and wished to discover how these could operate 
most efficiently and effectively. I began to see that there were different 
industries and revenue models that may be more conducive to venture 
                                                                        
30 For an in-depth description of social ventures see the following section in Chapter 1: social ventures as social-commercial hybrid 
organizations. 
 
99 
success than others. Privately organized action seemed to be a promising 
solution to established, institutional, and often unsuccessful initiatives 
(Collier, 2008; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). I wanted to better understand 
the conditions that enable private social initiatives to be successful, as a 
complement or alternative to current solutions. 
In 2014, my advisor, Marc Gruber suggested that I look at the 
funder’s perspective as a way to better understand which venture attributes 
might be indicative of fundraising and potential longer-term success. Marc 
suggested conjoint analysis to understand investor decision-making. This 
was a method he had used before, and it seemed to be a particularly 
promising way to overcome multiple cognitive and methodological 
limitations (e.g., recall errors, impression management, etc.), and to 
understand how social investors―the funders of social ventures―truly 
make investment decisions (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006, 
2008; Gruber, Kim, & Brinckmann, 2015). Recent work has specifically 
called for the use of conjoint analysis to better understand how investors in 
double- or triple-bottom line investing trade off different venture criteria 
(Lohrke et al., 2010).  
 However, for a conjoint experiment to be successful, “the key is to 
identify what information is critical to the decision being studied” 
(Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999: 207). I had an idea of what these criteria 
might be from my professional experiences and the literature but had also 
collected numerous conflicting samples and was sensitive to the 
“immature” nature of the industry. I wrote in my initial research proposal, 
Fragmentation of the market compounds issues with the market’s 
immaturity, the lack of market infrastructure, and the mismatch 
between supply and demand (Freireich & Fulton, 2009). Social 
ventures and investors alike have to make up for the lack of legal, 
banking and information services usually present in developed 
capital markets (Simon & Barmeier, 2010). However, even in more 
developed markets, impact investment suffers from the challenges of 
being in between two established institutions (philanthropy and 
commercial finance). This is reflected [at times] in securities 
regulations which are misleading when applied to the smaller and 
riskier impact investment. Investors also claim there are not enough 
entrepreneurs launching social businesses, [to enable] a few to 
succeed, and allow investors to continue to invest in small ventures 
down the line. The lack of coordination prevents investors from 
successfully exiting by selling off shares to larger funds. Experts fear 
there may be a chicken and egg issue of investors staying away due 
to lack of successes, and low successes due to low numbers of 
investors (Center for Global Development, 2010). 
My plan was to conduct fieldwork and semi-structured interviews with 
social investors and informants in order to design my conjoint experiment, 
asking them to make retrospective judgments about their evaluation and 
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investment selection process. I attended related industry and academic 
conferences to this aim (see Figure 13 for an overview of research 
activities conducted during the dissertation). 
 
 
Figure 13: Overview of research activity during dissertation 
 
Goal 2: Topic selection as an attempt at praxis 
 
I recognize that all human behavior is embedded in a historical 
context and driven by individual motivations, and that I cannot truly escape 
my historical situation. However, I can exercise my own judgement given 
my limited vantage point on what might be more or less “useful” 
(Freeman, 2004; Rorty, 1981) and continue to critically reflect on my 
stance, including whether my research assumptions are really good or bad 
for practice (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996). To allow the reader to do the same, I present reader with 
more data on the context in which this research was carried out. These 
excerpts (including the cover letter sent to my supervisor when I applied 
for this job, in Appendix C) are not presented as proof affirming or 
rejecting the objectivity of the researcher, but as an indication of the 
reflection process I have taken to understand my own “historical vantage 
point” (Gadamer, 1989: 302) and its limitations.  
The following is an excerpt from a reflection written for a course 
two years into this research project. It reflects my own motivation to 
pursue praxis, edited for clarity, 
If I must be biased, and have a choice in my bias, then I choose to 
side with research which promotes the betterment of society. By 
choosing this side, I hope to have provoked the other (Horkheimer, 
1972: 229), encouraging scientific discourse – in this case, around 
the possibility of more organizational pluralism in our current 
economic system. On one hand, I hope that the commercial activity 
of the socially-motivated ventures which I study will help firms and 
individuals with commercial ambitions, also consider the obligations 
we have to each other as fellow members of society, as well as, what 
larger, socio-political role entrepreneurship can play in society. 
What might today’s firms look like if we prioritized outcomes in what 
Habermas (1965) referred to as our practical world rather than the 
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most immediate goal our legal form or governance incentivizes (e.g., 
commercial-profit for for-profit firms)? How should management 
and public policy facilitate and guide the creation of prosocially-
motivated, commercial ventures?31 
On the other hand, I hope the prosocially-motivated, 
commercial ventures can also challenge individuals in traditional 
charitable sectors to reconsider what truly constitutes positive social 
activism, civic duty and civic responsibility? What organizational 
form can it take? As the legitimacy of numerous institutions wane, 
and old values take on new skins, this research project asks what a 
more pluralistic approach to achieving positive social outcomes may 
look like. 
I ask myself if illustrating how for-profit structures can 
achieve social outcomes facilitates opportunistic behavior from 
singularly profit-orientated individuals (Williamson, 1979), e.g., 
through “social-washing” or “green-washing.” Am I strengthening 
an abusive system by working within it, or am I, through praxis, 
making small, incremental changes which will one day influence a 
larger system? However, I do not let the act of being critical prevent 
me from trying or producing anything. With the means I have, this 
project naively seeks hope, harmony, progress, and increased utility 
for humanity (Steffy & Grimes, 1986). I expect to soon to find my 
assumptions and reality were false but look forward to learning from 
the knowledge that I was wrong and continue to expand my vantage 
point. 
 
Identifying a theoretical and empirical context 
 
As mentioned, although this research had practical goals, it also 
sought to pursue interpretive understanding and contribute to testing and 
developing causal explanations for phenomena (Lindlof, 2008). However, 
when this project began, I had no specific theoretical empirical setting for 
my research. In this section, I explain the theoretical lenses which I 
investigated prior to discovering a more suitable fit, as well as how I 
identified a suitable empirical setting wherein to collect data. 
Socio-cognitive beginnings 
My original motivation to contribute to the practice of social 
venturing led me down several research paths before I discovered investor 
decision-making. I read research on opportunity identification in 
                                                                        
31 In fact, countries have introduced a legal form which allows for-profit companies to include social welfare-oriented activities, in 
addition to its commercial goals. An independent study found that these benefit corporations—the name of this legal entity in the 
United States—has grown exponentially since 2010 (Bannon, 2015). 
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established firms, entrepreneurial, and innovation contexts (Afuah & 
Tucci, 2012; Felin & Zenger, 2014; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), 
microfoundations of organizational design (Csaszar, 2012; Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Puranam et al., 2014; Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009), 
prosocial organizing (Grant, 2012, 2013), as well as, of course, research on 
social entrepreneurship (Austin et al., 2006; Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010; 
Dacin et al., 2011). 
Since I had begun the research process by adopting a cognitive 
perspective to the social venturing phenomenon (Fauchart & Cowan, 2013; 
Miller et al., 2012)—as is the predominant practice in entrepreneurship 
research (Shane, 2003; Venkataraman et al., 2012)—it was not until much 
later in my dissertation process, through my inductive work (presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4), that I began to see this research as a potential illustration 
of what is referred to as hybrid organizing (Battilana et al., 2017; Battilana 
& Lee, 2014), or organizational duality, in the literature (Ashforth & 
Reingen, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2017). The following figure (Figure 14) 
illustrates the original theoretical toolkits I had at my disposition, and my 
vantage point in the middle of my dissertation research process (Freeman, 
2004; Rorty, 1981).  
 
 
Figure 14: Example of an early attempt to plot research interests 
 
Introduction to empirical research setting 
After over a year of interaction with different social VCs at various 
impact investing and social entrepreneurship conferences, I developed a 
relationship with several firms whose dual commercial-social identity, 
multi-industry focus, and investment experience with early-stage 
companies made them ideal candidate partners with whom to explore the 
evaluation and investment selection processes of social VCs. In late 2015, 
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in collaboration with Marc, I formally presented a research proposal to one 
social VC based in a major city in Western Europe whose stated purpose 
was to invest in early-stage, high-potential businesses seeking to generate 
not only compelling financial returns, but also societal returns ([Redacted], 
2016a). Our proposed research question revolved around the idea of 
venture qualities and investment processes which would indicate to an 
SVC that it had identified a promising venture, What must happen, what 
must come to light, be discussed, or be understood before a prosocial 
investor believes that a venture is sufficiently promising to invest in? and 
we proposed grounded, ethnographic methods to pursue this research 
question.   
 
Emergence of a theoretical lens 
Although this thesis is situated in the literature of organizational 
identity and identity duality (Battilana et al., 2017; Pratt, 2016), this study 
was originally motivated by phenomenological curiosities. As mentioned at 
the end of Chapter 1, inspired by the practical implications of research in 
this field, this thesis responded to these calls for more research on social 
venture capital decision-making by pursuing the following research 
question (RQ):  
By which criteria and processes, do social venture capitalists 
(SVCs) identify promising social venture investments?  
Over the course of inductive fieldwork, this practically-oriented question 
evolved to: 
How do social venture capitalists (SVCs) select and evaluate 
investment proposals?  
In the early stages of this thesis, as recommended by scholars who 
conduct inductive research, I was unaware of the details of the debates in 
the literature on organizational duality (Suddaby, 2006). I began broadly 
with the view of SVCs as boundedly rational actors evaluating social 
ventures through information processing techniques (Simon, 1955, 1979). 
Since SVCs have a social mandate, as well as a fiduciary responsibility to 
provide a financial return to their investors, I became interested in the 
evaluation framework that they developed to understand and assess the 
likelihood of conflict, sustainability, and performance in hybrids. The 
original motivation was; if we are able to understand how hybrid 
organizations evaluate the relationship between social and commercial 
outcomes, then we may be able to contribute to a better understanding of 
how organizations can manage and overcome drawbacks in the joint 
pursuit of multiple goals, yet we did not perceive SVCs as “hybrids.” 
However, after establishing a research partnership with an SVC, and 
analyzing data on their evaluation processes, it became clear that the SVC 
was not simply enacting a prosocial mandate in a commercial context, but 
rather the SVC’s hybrid organizational self-concept was an important part 
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of the way in that it defined and evaluated its behavior. These findings led 
me to situate my study in the context of organizational identity and shift 
our analysis to the following, theoretically-motivated question. 
 
 
RQ: How does social-commercial duality affect new venture 
evaluation and investor decision-making?  
 
 
Situating this thesis in the theoretical setting of organizational 
duality fit well with its capacity to explain the phenomena of interest, its 
capacity to lead to useful research, and its theoretical interest to the 
management research community. Moreover, this theoretical lens 
highlighted “unanswered questions, unexplored areas” and “areas of low 
agreement” in the literature (Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1156) that 
such research would have the potential to address. More detail is included 
about the emergence of this theoretical framing in Chapter 5’s analysis 
section. 
 
 
Identifying a philosophical knowledge framework 
 
Philosophy makes progress not by becoming more rigorous but by 
becoming more imaginative.  ―Rorty and Rorty (1998) 
 
 
In keeping with the dual aim of this thesis, to pursue verstehen 
(interpretive understanding) and erklären (causal explanation) (Lindlof, 
2008), I employed different philosophical and epistemological approaches 
across my three empirical studies. I begin by offering propositions and 
models inductively derived from observations of patterns in the world 
(Delanty & Strydom, 2003), which I follow up with a deductive approach, 
employing falsifiability as a way to determine the “explanatory potential” 
or “predictive adequacy” (Bacharach, 1989) of my inductive findings 
(Popper, 1985). 
 
Study One: Investing in Hybrids ― Grounded, post-positivistic approach 
 Although this study began in an exploratory and inductive fashion, 
seeking to understand how social VCs select and evaluate investment 
proposals, the perspective of reality I adopted in this paper was that it was 
knowable, objective, and measurable. I entered our research setting with 
the desire not to “intervene,” “bias,” or “alter” the setting where I 
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conducted my observations and measurements. The presence of the 
researcher is seen as potentially disruptive. This post-positivistic view 
aligns with the scientist’s view of reality, a process of knowledge discovery 
that depends on the accuracy and unaffectedness of measurement 
instruments. In this same vein, emotions, intuitive processes and 
interpretations are viewed as untrustworthy. 
 One reason perhaps why I took this approach was due to the strong 
norms of quantification present in the financial research setting. Evidence 
of this perspective can be seen in the way I assure the reader that the 
information in documents I collected were not driven by my questioning. 
Other evidence of this perspective can be seen in the reliance on a second 
coder, to verify the replicability, reliability (and by proxy, the objectivity) 
of my coding. Interestingly, despite the post-positivistic approach, the 
inductive nature of the research process allowed me to find patterns in the 
data that suggested a less objective view of venture attributes (I was 
studying the evaluation of venture attributes). In particular, the dualistic 
investment firm studied interchangeably applied a commercial-value-laden 
lens and a social-value-laden lens to interpret an “objective” venture 
attribute (i.e., existing in the real world).32 In this sense, the “true” nature of 
the venture attribute is less important, since the perspective of the SVC 
assigns or “gives” value to that which is being observed―thereby, 
constructing reality. These emergent findings helped to motivate the 
adoption of a more social constructivist research approach in the second 
study, which builds on this study’s emergent findings. 
 
Study Two: Heart Money  ― Inductive, naturalistic, in-depth case study 
Analyses in Study One informed the ontological view targeted in 
Study Two, which is the view of reality as socially constructed. In this 
study, the goal was to pursue verstehen, an interpretive, naturalistic 
understanding of the entrepreneurial and managerial phenomena (Lindlof, 
2008). This goal reflects the importance that I place on experiences, 
observations in the real world, and the indispensable role of my human 
cognition―in concert with others in my social field―in making sense of 
reality, as described by Neurath (1929) (Delanty & Strydom, 2003).  
As such, this view of reality led to inductive, qualitive research 
methods illustrated by Gioia et al., (2013) and Charmaz (2008). This 
approach allowed for the understanding of duality and hybridity to emerge 
from the data. Moving between our data and the literature, I was also able 
to identify parts of the data relating to the venture identity plausibility 
assessments referred to by Lounsbury and Glynn (2001) and Navis and 
Glynn (2011).  
 
                                                                        
32 The term dualistic refers to the dual nature of the organizational identity. 
 
106 
Study Three: Both Sides Now ― Testing theoretically derived, causal statements 
As mentioned, the idea to conduct a deductive test of criteria favored 
by SVCs developed very early on in the research process, inspired by 
Marc’s suggestion.33 However, after investigating the targeted 
method―conjoint analysis―I discovered that for this technique to be 
effective, the criteria to be tested in the conjoint experiment needed to be 
core to the decision-making process. Without this, results of the conjoint 
experiment would not be reliable. Yet, consultations with the literature 
revealed that the key criteria used by social investors was contested. 
Therefore, this study was conducted last, only after a considerable portion 
of the analyses in Studies One and Two had been completed, and key 
dimensions could be derived from data collected from key informants (see 
Appendix I for a short-list of criteria considered). Insights from these 
qualitative data revealed gave the co-authors of this paper and I the 
confidence that the dimensions selected would adequately represent the 
overall decision-making criteria and processes of SVCs. Moreover, in a 
way, this experimental test would provide an indirect quantitative test of 
the inductively derived insights from Studies One and Two. Finally, these 
would indicate the generalizability of these findings.  
Study Three, as with Studies One and Two, was developed based on 
the assumption that a better understanding of how the world works is 
possible, and that it is only a matter of collecting enough evidence and 
analyzing it (Friedman, 1953). While philosophical perspectives on what 
constitutes as acceptable data and adequate data analysis methods still 
vary, this thesis operates on the assumption that both inductive and 
deductive methods are necessary for progress in social science research. 
Neither method is superior and in fact are deeply related. One scholar 
whose name currently escapes me points that in one case, the researcher 
quantifies qualities (quantitative research), while in the other, the 
researcher qualifies quantities (qualitative research). However, they should 
be applied according to the degree of theoretical maturity of the 
phenomena being studies (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Despite 
knowing the limitations of the scientific method (Lakatos, 1970), since 
there is no such thing as “truthifiability” (yet?), this study develops testable 
hypotheses from the literature and our prior fieldwork and tests them.34 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
33 Conducting a conjoint analysis was a large component of my research plan, presented to members of my Candidacy Exam 
committee roughly one year into my research process, on November 25, 2014. In this mandatory exam imposed by the EPFL 
doctoral school, I was tasked with presenting my plans for my PhD research. 
34 Excerpts of respondent comments in Chapter 5 were not used to develop these hypotheses. 
 
107 
 
 
 
Chapter III             
Investing in Hybrids:  
A Longitudinal Study of Social VC Investment Selection 
Criteria (Study One) 
 
 
  

 
109 
 
 
 
III. Investing in Hybrids 
- A Longitudinal Study of Social VC Investment Selection Criteria (Study One) 
 
Social Venture Capitalists are “VCs first that intend to generate market-
beating financial returns because of, not in spite of, a [social] 
impact-oriented investment thesis.” 
                                                — Ted Rheingold (2017)35 
 
Introduction36 
In 2011, sportswear company Patagonia simultaneously confused 
and delighted readers when it took out full-page ad in The New York Times 
with the headline “Don’t Buy This Jacket” (Knafo, 2015). Underneath the 
bolded title was a photo of one of the company’s best-selling jackets, and a 
description of its production byproducts (e.g., the jacket required “135 
liters of water” to produce and created at least 24 times its weight in waste 
during transport) (Patagonia, 2011). Bloomberg.com called the ad a 
“confusing and effective campaign to sell stuff” (Stock, 2013). The New 
Yorker found the marketing strategy “confounding” (MacKinnon, 2015). 
But in the following years, Patagonia brought in 414 million USD in sales 
(Stevenson, 2012), doubled its scale of operations, and opened forty new 
stores worldwide (MacKinnon, 2015).  
Businesses like Patagonia, along with new studies singing praises of 
the competitive financial performance of ethical funds (Tasman-Jones, 
2015; Wall, 2013), provide compelling evidence that companies can 
achieve commercial success alongside bold social or environmental action 
(Cambridge Associates & The Global Impact Investing Network, 2015). 
This claim has not gone unnoticed by the proliferation of both private and 
public capital seeking to “back the next Tesla or Patagonia” (Kolodny, 
2017). One report estimates that these impact investment funds, whose 
investment logic equally blends both financial and social/environmental 
identities or logics (Miller & Wesley II, 2010; Nicholls, 2010), will 
                                                                        
35 The term “social VC” is used in this thesis is used to refer to what Ted Rheingold and a growing number of practitioners refer to 
Impact VCs. 
36 Data collection and analyses in this study were led by the author of this thesis. The author benefited from the help of a second 
coder in Phase I of the analyses, as well as from constructive comments from colleagues. Thank you especially to Marc Gruber, 
Christopher Tucci, and Julia Binder for their comments. All errors are the authors’ own. 
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manage 500 billion to 1 trillion US dollars in assets by 2020 (Acumen 
Fund & Monitor Institute, 2012).37 Another report estimates that, since 
2010, social venture capitalists have raised 10 billion USD to invest38 in 
social ventures—early-stage companies that use commercial revenue 
models to pursue social and/or environmental missions (Randjelovic et al., 
2003; Rheingold, 2017; Santos et al., 2015). 
What is striking about these investors is, as cited at the beginning of 
this document, they believe that a positive relationship between social 
responsibility and financial profit is not only possible but may be key to 
financially outperforming investors with a singular commercial focus 
([Redacted], 2016b). However, while impact investors—which tend to be 
later-stage investors—are increasingly studied in the literature, social 
venture capital—which focuses on the early-stage—has, with a few 
exceptions, been rarely discussed (Miller & Wesley II, 2010). Even when 
using similar terms to describe the crossover of different logics (e.g., 
“philanthropic venture capital”), these terms, used by scholars—and 
practitioners—still refer to different things. For example, philanthropic 
venture capital refers to early-stage investing which takes commercial 
considerations into account, but prioritizes social outcomes (Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014; Scarlata & Alemany, 2010; Scarlata, Gil, Zacharakis, 
& others, 2012)—i.e., while there is variability in commercial return 
expectation, social outcomes are a constant focus (Freireich & Fulton, 
2009).39 Alternatively, the literature on funders who place social and 
commercial concerns on equal footing refer mostly to later-stage investors 
(The European Venture Philanthropy Association, 2016).  
Indeed, it is puzzling why, as the number of impact investors 
continues to rise—counting celebrity influencers like Bono and Al Gore 
among their ranks (Fallows, 2015; Sorkin, 2016)—the literature has 
primarily focused on the breadth of terms and definitions which abound 
across firms, rather than looking at the diversity of criteria present within a 
set of firms (Nicholls, 2010; Perrini & Vurro, 2006). As a result, there is 
much we still do not understand about how the combined goals of social 
impact and financial return manifest in investment practices, particularly 
on a deal-by-deal basis. Thus, the goal of this study is to begin to open up 
the black box of decision-making by investors espousing a commercial-
social hybrid identity, starting by conducting a deep dive into the decision 
criteria actually used by social venture capitalists (SVC) to select and 
evaluate investment proposals. Intrigued by how the hybrid, or blended 
identity of impact investors manifests in their investment practice, we ask: 
                                                                        
37 For reference, this is five to 10 times the amount of overseas development aid in 2008 (Yasmin, 2009). The MoneyTree Report 
estimated venture capital investment in the United States in 2015 at over 58 billion USD (National Venture Capital Association, 
2016). 
38 Patagonia itself—still privately owned—manages a corporate venture capital fund that invests in “start-ups that offer solutions to 
the environmental crisis” (Tin Shed Ventures, 2018). 
39 Another related term, community development venture capital, refers to “the use of venture capital investing principles to finance 
small businesses in inner cities and depressed rural areas” (Jegen, 1998: 188). 
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How do early-stage impact investors (i.e., social venture capitalists) select 
and evaluate investment proposals? 40  
Moreover, we believe that answering this question could contribute 
to a larger scholarly debate on the cognition of hybrid organizations—
organizations that jointly adopt dual “identities” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; 
Glynn, 2000), “organizational forms” (Tracey et al., 2011), “logics” 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), or other “core 
organizational elements” that would not normally be expected to go 
together (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017). 
To understand which constructs are important in the investment 
selection and evaluation process of social-commercial investment funds, 
we adopted an in-depth, exploratory, longitudinal case study design of a 
social VC—a type of impact investor which makes equity investments in 
early-stage social ventures, or, young, growth-oriented companies which 
rely on commercial revenue models to pursue social and/or environmental 
missions (Randjelovic et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2015; Yin, 2013). We 
negotiated access to five years of archival data documenting actual 
decision-making from a social VC based in a major city in Western 
Europe. Drawing from this real-time data—produced at the time each 
investment decision was made—we identified 1,614 unique venture 
investment decisions made by this investment fund, which we matched to 
seven inductively derived categories of selection criteria.41 
 Inductive analysis revealed that the VC rejected investment 
proposals using traditional VC criteria found in the VC literature, related to 
the attributes of a venture’s product or service, target market, revenue 
model, or team (Petty & Gruber, 2011; Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; 
Shepherd, 1999; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998), which we detail in our 
findings. But it also rejected ventures using other exclusionary criteria—
related to the Firm’s specific mandate (e.g., no international deals, no deals 
outside of thematic focus areas)—as well as, circumstantial criteria—
related to the practicalities of closing a deal (e.g., failure to negotiate an 
investment ticket).  
At first, these social mission and circumstantial criteria—which the 
literature refers to as “VC-specific” criteria (Petty & Gruber, 2011)—did 
not appear related to traditional VC criteria. However, additional analyses 
of criteria related to the venture’s espoused social and/or environmental 
mission revealed that these social-mission-related criteria also serve as a 
lens that informs traditional VC criteria. We find detailed evidence that the 
Firm adopts alternative lenses to view the same attribute in their selection 
and evaluation process, likely due to the VC’s view of mission-related 
venture attributes as linked to commercial success. These findings 
                                                                        
40 In this chapter, the use of the term investor refers to the investment firm as an organization. Analyses are at the level of the firm. 
41 The remainder of this chapter will refer to the SVC studied as “the SVC,” “the Firm” and “the VC” interchangeably. The terms 
“venture,” “proposals” and “deal” will be used to refer to the young companies in the investment proposals reviewed by the social 
VC. 
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demonstrate the specific ways in which investors simultaneously pursuing 
two goals translate their dual purpose into selection and evaluation criteria. 
We provide a brief overview of existing research on social investors, 
followed by an overview of the study’s research design. Next, findings 
from the study are presented, followed by theoretical and practical 
implications, as well as suggestions for further research. 
 
 
The emergence of social investors  
Theoretically-driven research on social-commercial organizations 
has developed significantly in the past few decades (Battilana & Lee, 
2014), building on pioneering conceptual (Miller et al., 2012; Nicholls, 
2010) and smaller-n empirical studies (Dacin et al., 2011). The majority of 
research on social venturing has focused on the social enterprise itself, its 
founding team, and social goals (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Powell & 
Baker, 2017; Short et al., 2009). Yet, despite the importance of early access 
to resources for young companies (Baum & Silverman, 2004; MacMillan 
et al., 1985; Starr & MacMillan, 1990), research on the preferences and 
fundraising processes of social investors lags behind practitioner research 
in terms of productivity (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2015). This means we know little about the social venture 
fundraising process from the investor’s perspective. In fact, numerous 
scholars call for research on decision-making that combines social 
motivations with commercial goals (Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 
2015), particularly in the social investing context (Austin et al., 2006; 
Nicholls, 2010; Short et al., 2009: 181). 
This study takes an interest in a subset of impact investors we refer 
to as social VCs. These firms are for-profit investment firms that make 
equity investments in early-stage companies, intending to “generate 
market-beating financial returns because of, not in spite of, an impact-
oriented investment thesis” (Rheingold, 2017).  
However, since research on social VCs is scarce, this section 
presents an overview of the broader literature on two types of investors: 
social investors, investors who integrate social considerations into their 
investment activities; and impact investors, a subset of social investors who 
embrace financial and social impact investment goals with equal fervor.  
Figure 15 illustrates the overlap of investors of interest to this study. 
Before covering the literature’s stance on the precise methods social 
investors use to make investments, we situate our discussion into the field 
of social investing. Social investing can be seen as a byproduct of 
increased pressure on two ends of the investment-philanthropy spectrum 
(Daggers & Nicholls, 2016), similar to the pressures which led to the 
popular rise of social ventures, which we detail below (Battilana & Lee, 
2014).  
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Figure 15: Visualization of ideal investment targets and investment target overlap in the investor-philanthropy fund spectrum 
On one end, among the social funds depicted in Figure 15, scholars 
argue that philanthropic practices have shifted due to external pressure to 
justify funding behavior from the perspective of finance and efficiency. 
Namely, the section has received increased criticism of the charitable 
industry’s inadequate prioritization of resource efficiency or the long-term 
(financial) sustainability of their grantees/investees. The literature depicts 
past donors in the charitable funding sector as responding to increasing 
demands along the project management and social performance evaluation 
framework, from measuring financial input, to the activities funded, to the 
goods and services produced (“output”), to the effect of these goods and 
services on the beneficiary (“outcome”), to the broader community or 
society level impact (i.e., input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact) 
(Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014).
The literature suggests a shift from initial monitoring and evaluation 
on financial “input” to charitable projects only (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014), 
to perhaps, whether these financial grants were actually spent by the 
grantees they were addressed to (i.e., managerial accountability), for which 
“activities” and at times, to which ends (i.e., Which “outputs” were 
created? Were their funded programs effective?) (Letts et al., 1997). New 
pressures appear to force social funds on one hand, to go further down the 
line of consequences and take a more hands-on approach (Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014; Scarlata & Alemany, 2010), while on the other hand, 
the demand for metrics has simultaneously influenced the funds to be more 
modest in the outcomes they aim for. For example, they are increasingly 
asked to explicitly address the (financial) viability, growth and scaling 
potential of their grantee/investee, and defend how (efficiently) they have 
been allocating their funds (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Frumkin, 2003; 
Kendall & Knapp, 2000; McGoey, 2012).  
On the other end, among the commercial funds depicted in Figure 
15, traditional investors are also changing their practices due to external 
pressure to justify their funding behavior from the perspective of social 
welfare. The literature describes both “push” and “pull” factors. On one 
hand, stakeholders demand more from companies (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 
2004; Matten & Moon, 2008; Walsh et al., 2006), pushing them to 
reconsider their activities, and seek new ways to incorporate social and/or 
environmental considerations into their practices. On the other hand, new 
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evidence of competitive financial returns from socially responsible 
investments are drawing investors into the domain of investing with 
regards to social and/or environmental outcomes (Cambridge Associates & 
The Global Impact Investing Network, 2015; Tasman-Jones, 2015; Wall, 
2013). As a result, the investment industry is being nudged to expand their 
original conception of fiduciary responsibility, taking it beyond profit-
maximization at any (legal) cost (Friedman, 1970). Increasingly, investors 
are looking for ways to incorporate and integrate emerging social 
preferences into their practices (Jansson, Sandberg, Biel, & Gärling, 2014; 
Richardson, 2011), and offer their clients and limited partners social 
investments expertise alongside their more traditional offers (Sparkes & 
Cowton, 2004).  
So, while the literature provides a comprehensive picture of 
investment selection criteria used when goals are singular, and suggests a 
trend towards the center, from both traditional commercial and traditional 
social funds, it is still unclear how the combination of social and 
commercial goals translates into selection criteria, particularly when tasked 
with evaluating ventures with little track record. In the following section, 
we highlight the specific unknowns related to espoused commercial and 
social investment preferences, their selection and evaluation processes, as 
well as potential reasons why empirical studies of this phenomenon have 
eluded researchers thus far. 
 
Social investors and their espoused investment preferences 
Perhaps due to challenges in negotiating access to finer-grained data 
from actual decision-making scenarios, research on the evaluation and 
selection processes of social investors tends to operate at a higher level of 
abstraction, depicting the social investor decision-making as similar to 
traditional investing, with the addition of broad filters (Daggers & 
Nicholls, 2016). For example, the literature describes social investors as 
using exclusion criteria (“filtering out”) and/or inclusion criteria (“filtering 
in”) (Irvine, 1987).  
Social investors using the “filtering out” method (also called 
exclusionary or negative screening), are described as having selection and 
evaluation processes that resemble those of other investors. The main 
difference proposed is that these investors refrain from investing in (i.e., 
exclude) companies or industries that generate significant proportions of 
their sales from harmful products like alcohol, weapons, or tobacco 
(Freedman et al., 2016). This type of investing is often associated with 
later-stage funds such as Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds, 
whereby investment managers will invest liberally across all assets and 
public companies except in investments deemed to be harmful for the 
environment or society. The exact list of companies and industries may be 
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expanded on or tweaked according to the preferences of clients or limited 
partners (Irvine, 1987; Yan et al., 2018).  
Some SRI funds may implement a “best in class” approach in which 
they compare potential investment opportunities to competitors in the 
market (Randjelovic et al., 2003), while others may add an additional filter 
in which they invest only in firms that have set up environmental or social 
monitoring procedures (Avantage Ventures, 2011). Funds applying this 
additional filter (i.e., requesting reporting and governance data from their 
investees) are usually referred to as Environmental-Social-Governance 
(ESG) funds (Spiess-Knafl & Achleitner, 2012). 
Social investors using inclusion criteria (“filtering in” criteria) invest 
only in companies or industries the Firm believes can drive measurable 
social and/or environmental outcomes alongside financial returns. 
Associated industries include the natural environment, clean energy, and 
education. While this is called “inclusion criteria” or “investment 
targeting” (Rudd, 1981), specializing in certain geographies or themes 
could also be seen conceptually as excessive filtering, refusing investments 
in other domains.  
Although the concept of filtering provides useful cognitive aid for 
understanding social investor decision-making, the majority of the 
evaluation and selection process is not understood. Even if we consider 
applying inclusionary or exclusionary criteria to be a core step of the 
decision-making process, what happens before this? How does filtering 
occur? What happens after the criteria have been applied? What happens 
up until an investment has occurred? In the following section, we detail 
what is currently known about impact investors and their stated investment 
preferences. 
 
Impact investors and their espoused investment preferences  
Moving towards the center of the spectrum are impact investors, a 
subset of social investors. Impact investors define their investment as an 
impact investment with their intention to “do good” (Cambridge Associates 
& The Global Impact Investing Network, 2015; Freedman et al., 2016).42 
This intentional decision to invest in order to fund specific “positive 
outcomes” is a defining feature of the impact investing phenomenon, since 
most would agree that most forms of investment inherently have positive 
and/or negative impacts (Impact Management Project, 2017; O’Donohoe et 
al., 2010).  
                                                                        
42 Terms include blended value investing, double-bottom line or triple-bottom-line investing (Harold, Spitzer, & Emerson, 2007), 
community development venture capital (Jegen, 1998), developmental venture capital (Rubin, 2009), mission-driven investing 
(Kolodny, 2016), patient capital (Novogratz, 2010), philanthrocapitalism (McGoey, 2014), philanthropic venture capital (Scarlata & 
Alemany, 2010), social investing (Nicholls, 2010), social venture capital (Miller & Wesley II, 2010), sustainable venture capital 
(Bocken, 2015), or venture philanthropy (Healey & Hoyt, 2013; Pepin, 2005). 
 
116 
However, what the term “positive outcomes” entails varies 
significantly (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016). According to the literature, 
impact investors aim to generate “social,” “social (or environmental),” 
“public benefits” or “benefits for society” (Chiappini, 2017; Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2015); terms whose meanings cannot systematically be translated 
into specific social-mission-related investment selection criteria. 
One prominent Silicon Valley impact investor uses the United 
Nations Sustainable Development goals as a framework for filtering in 
potential investees (Fifty Years, 2018), while industry associations such as 
the Global Impact Investing Network (the GIIN) develop comprehensive, 
quantifiable, and comparable metrics for investors to understand the social 
“outputs” and “outcomes” of their investments (Bouri, 2011; Brandenburg, 
2012; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Impact Management Project, 2017). 
However, for the most part, these measures are designed to track the 
performance of (investments into) social ventures in the post-investment 
and/or post-investment decision social impact measurement and 
management stage (Jackson, 2013). It is unclear to which extent standards 
such as IRIS and GIIRS (developed by the GIIN) are integrated into 
investor practices, particularly at the front-end of the process, the 
investment proposal evaluation stage (see Table 14 for an illustration of the 
existing literature). Moreover, in the social VC space, investment targets 
may have yet to establish product-market fit or the resources to track and 
report complex metrics. In general, few studies address how impact 
investors measure or test, at the pre-investment stage, for the ability of 
ventures to generate social outcomes. 
On the commercial side, the same uncertainty prevails. Impact 
investors are credited with being more focused on measuring performance 
and progress than traditional funders of social organizations (Letts et al., 
1997; O’Donohoe et al., 2010). We know some impact investors seek 
revenue-generating social ventures because their firm must eventually 
return cash to their43 investors (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010). However, the 
literature has described impact investing as a “profitable investment 
activity,” as well as an activity that aims for financial returns ranging from 
“at least the return of the principal” to “principal to market return” to 
“below market to risk-adjusted market rate” (Chiappini, 2017; Evenett & 
Richter, 2011; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). Therefore, we do not know 
what is expected of organizations seeking financing from social investors, 
from a commercial performance and scalability perspective (Miller & 
Wesley II, 2010). Moreover, in the social VC space, the front-end of the 
investment process is characterized by the same lack of “hard facts, 
extreme uncertainty, and significant pressure” faced by early-stage 
entrepreneurs (Mueller & Shepherd, 2016: 465), making it unclear what 
                                                                        
43 We focus on this prominent business model, but financial expectations may differ depending on the social VC’s structure. 
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early-stage impact investors expect from a commercial standpoint in actual 
selection and evaluation contexts. 
While the literature offers inconclusive remarks on what impact 
investors actually seek in their investments from a commercial perspective 
and from a social perspective, it is also unclear whether or not these 
demands are competing with each other—and how they might prioritize 
these demands in practice. Researchers suggest that some social investors 
will prioritize a certain outcome over another (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008). 
For example, investors must either sacrifice rigor in the evaluation of a 
venture’s potential social contribution (“finance-first” investors) 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015) or—if they truly wish to enable meaningful 
social outcomes—they must accept below-market-rate financial returns 
(“impact-first” investors) (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). 
Writing on community development venture capital, Jegen (1998: 
189) argues: 
“Inevitably there will be a tension between social and financial 
goals, and at some point[,] every [social venture capital firm] will 
have to choose between higher financial returns and the fund's 
social agenda.” 
Generally, we understand that social VCs “provide capital and value-added 
activities” to “social enterprises [that] exhibit a potential for a high social 
impact” (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010: 123–124), but how these activities 
proceed in practice remains unclear. Pointing to the importance of dual-
purpose decision-making and resource acquisition, particularly for young 
companies (Baum & Silverman, 2004; MacMillan et al., 1985; Starr & 
MacMillan, 1990), scholars have called for more research in this field 
(Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2015), particularly in the social investing 
context (Austin et al., 2006; Nicholls, 2010; Short et al., 2009: 181). 
 
 Social investment target 
Early-stage ventures Late-stage companies 
Investment process 
Front-end, pre-investment evaluation Our study Investigate past performance metrics of investment targets 
Back-end, post-investment monitoring Future research opportunity Use of established metrics such as IRIS or GIIRS 
Table 14: Focus of study 
 
Prior impediments to understanding social VC-decision-making  
Scarcity of data and definitional confusion today represent the 
greatest impediment to understanding this field (e.g., Daggers & Nicholls, 
2016). Historically, the large checks issued by social investors have tended 
to be issued in later-stage, less risky investments. As a result, most research 
on social investments in fact refers to investments in pure assets (e.g., real 
estate) or later-stage (e.g., publicly listed) companies.  
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This definitional confusion is exacerbated by the empirical 
challenges that constrain current research coordination efforts (Chiappini, 
2017; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). Information on the selection and 
evaluation processes of firms investing into younger companies, like those 
targeted by social VCs (Rheingold, 2017), is scarce. In fact, investments 
into seed, Series A or Series B rounds are often not reported publicly. This 
has encouraged researchers to pursue more conceptual work (Miller et al., 
2012; Nicholls, 2010) or rely on smaller datasets (Dacin et al., 2011) or 
more easily accessible data, such as public or self-reported data 
(Cambridge Associates & The Global Impact Investing Network, 2015; 
Freireich & Fulton, 2009; Harji & Jackson, 2012). These data tend to be 
more abstract and less rich, whereas data derived from actual selections 
and evaluations, though more appropriate for understanding the dynamic, 
uncertain early-stage setting, is more difficult to access.  
In particular, we lack a finer-grained understanding of how higher-
level expectations and espoused criteria translate into in-use evaluation 
criteria across each deal (see Figure 16 for our constructs of interest). 
Figure 16: Visual summary of the literature on the social VC selection and evaluation process 
 
An opportunity for inductive research based on rich, real-time data 
Essentially, what the broader literature suggest is that there is room 
for a larger scale, inductive, empirical, longitudinal research effort on the 
decision-making of impact investors (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016). Such an 
effort could help to develop robust constructs, which can contribute to 
future research on how social investors make investment decisions. Given 
the lack of, and the importance of, inductive work carried out in this 
context, this study has avoids extrapolating social VC criteria from other 
sources (e.g., successful44 cases of social venture fundraising, or espoused 
criteria sets). The prior sections have instead focused empirical findings of 
research on impact investing and social investing to date.
To better understand how the combined goals of social impact and 
financial return manifest in investment practices, we investigate: How do 
                                                                        
44 This may not be the most suitable approach to begin with, due to dangers of sampling on the dependent variable, i.e., 
overrepresenting ventures that achieve fundraising success (Berk, 1983; Denrell, 2005). 
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early-stage impact investors (i.e., social venture capitalists) select and 
evaluate investment proposals? Due to their dual-purpose identity and their 
early-stage investment focus, findings from SVC processes may have 
significant implications for other dualistic organizations seeking funding, 
and other funders seeking later-stage investments.  
 
Methods 
Research design 
The two rare empirical studies on social investing point to the need 
for research that develops internally valid constructs from longitudinal, 
inductive, empirical work (e.g., Fried & Hisrich, 1988). 45 An inductive 
approach is suitable in this setting because it pairs well with our 
exploratory research question, the theoretical maturity of the field, our 
primary data source, and the complex, fast-paced nature of our research 
setting (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Single-case case studies enable 
the researcher to better understand the complex, fast-paced environment of 
venture capital decision-making by focusing on a single, in-depth case 
(e.g., Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011). Moreover, 
contextual, fine-grained data is useful for shedding light on poorly 
understood contexts in less mature theoretical fields (e.g., we were 
uncertain of exactly how the financial and social impact goals of social 
VCs translate into their evaluation and investment selection processes) 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2013). A 
fine-grained inductive approach which stays close to the original data can 
establish high levels of accuracy and construct validity (Langley, 1999), 
often lacking in this research stream. Next, inductive, grounded approaches 
usually demand “a fairly large number of comparable incidents that are 
richly described” which our data and setting provide (Langley, 1999: 700). 
Finally, a longitudinal single-case case study based on detailed archival 
data allows a qualitative researcher to reconstruct actual investment 
decisions from data produced at the time each decision was made. We 
elaborate on this latter point in the next section.  
Research precedence46 has indicated archival data to be particularly 
complementary to other data sources and research methods in the field, 
helping to avoid issues present in post-hoc data and the experimental 
methodological approaches that investor decision-making research usually 
relies on. For example, a number of studies rely on survey responses 
(MacMillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987), experimental data 
                                                                        
45 Prior to designing their quantitative study, Miller and Wesley II (2010: 716) made efforts to stress construct validity by conducting 
interviews with two social investors. Similarly, before conducting their survey on social investors, Scarlata and Alemany (2010: 129) 
relied on interviews to establish construct validity, asking equity, debt- and grant-based impact investors about deal structuring at the 
portfolio level. But while Scarlata and Alemany’s (2010) work delves into how impact investors structure deals with social ventures, 
they ignore how these impact investors arrive at the deal structuring stage in an investment process to begin with. 
46 Single-case case studies have been used before in investor decision-making research, with an equally heavy reliance on archival 
data (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
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(Lohrke et al., 2010; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999, 1997), or interview 
data (Wells, 1974; Muzyka et al., 1996). While these methods might be 
suitable for other contexts and research questions, even specifically in 
investment decision-making research, these methods tend to be more 
vulnerable to common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), excessive abstraction (Heckman & Smith, 1995), post-
hoc rationalization (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), retrospective sense-making 
(Golden, 1997, 1992), recall errors and other reporting errors (Franke et al., 
2006; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990).  
When it comes to matters related to prosocial or pro-environmental 
values, as is the case in social investing, social-desirability bias and 
impression management are particularly active sources of distortion 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Baron, 2013). Some 
researchers even suggest that investors are not fully conscious of their 
investment decisions or able to express them post-decision (Guler, 2007; 
Shepherd, 1999; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998, 2000). The right kind of 
archival data has the potential to shed light on important failures, which are 
a regular part of high-stakes activities (Denrell, 2005; Nag, Corley, & 
Gioia, 2007).47 Finally, as argued by Petty and Gruber (2011), because 
some archival data is produced in real-time—exactly at, or at least closer to 
the time the investment decision was made—longitudinal archival data 
offer researchers enduring indicators of sequential actions, allowing 
investment decisions and their antecedents to be clearly identified.  
 
Case selection 
To find a suitable research partner and setting, this author attended 
multiple industry events seeking out for-profit, socially-driven investors 
investing in social ventures. She developed a relationship with several 
firms who fit our sampling criteria of dual commercial-social identity, 
multi-industry focus, investment experience, and early-stage focus. In late 
2015, we formally presented a research proposal to one social VC firm 
based in a major city in Western Europe whose stated purpose was to 
invest in early-stage, high-potential businesses seeking to generate, not 
only, compelling financial returns, but also societal returns ([Redacted], 
2016a). Following our formal request to conduct research on their 
investment process, they agreed under the condition of anonymity and non-
interference.  
 
Research setting 
The Firm invested in roughly 1% of all deals reviewed, putting its 
selectivity on par with other non-social VC funds (Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
                                                                        
47 For example, it may shed light on entrepreneurial failures – rejected investment proposals – as well as less flattering reasons for 
investment, which come closer to reality (e.g., fear of missing out vs. strength or innovativeness of venture product. 
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The firm’s average investment ticket size in an investment deal was 
300,000 Euros. The reported size of the fund managed by the Firm is 32 
million Euros, within the 25th and the 75th percentile of known social VC 
fund sizes (Rheingold, 2017). While the timespan in which this research 
was conducted was too short to evaluate the Firm’s social and 
environmental performance (it is too early), the Firm applied for and was 
granted the B-Corp status, and the Firm’s partners experienced their first 
positive exit (a trade-sale) three years after their first investment. From this 
perspective, the operators of the Firm are ahead of, if not comparable to, 
other early-stage equity funds which typically begin to see exit results over 
the life of a 10-year fund (Feld & Mendelson, 2016; Zider, 1998). 
The founding partners of this firm entered the investment space as 
angel investors. Prior to launching their first fund, the investment Firm 
operated as a “Super Angel” or “Micro VC,” (Feld & Mendelson, 2016; 
Martino, 2015; Mattermark, 2015). Micro VC firms may manage actual 
funds (as a legal entity) or operate without an official fund, raising and 
investing money from angel investors and other organizations within a 
formal or informal network. If Micro VCs manage their own fund, they 
typically manage amounts under 100 million USD, and most often manage 
less than 50 million USD. CB Insights (2014) estimated that 250 Micro VC 
firms were operating in 201548, and numbers continue to rise (Kaji, 2015b).  
To clarify, this study includes the investment decision-making 
history of the Firm prior to the launch of their fund as part of the Firm’s 
overall decision-making history. This was because we did not observe any 
significant changes in their decision-making process. The Firm continued 
to centrally source, screen, evaluate, negotiate and build49 investment cases 
independently of their angel network. Unlike business angel groups where 
angel investor input is solicited early on and may represent the majority of 
the decision-making body (e.g., through voting or other forms of 
participatory governance), the decision-making of this firm, pre- and post-
fund launch, continued to be based on the due diligence and discussions of 
a stable investment committee. In addition, all investment activities were 
represented by the same single corporate identity that the partners had set 
up for this purpose. The following figure provides a simplified overview of 
the process and actors in which we are interested, detailing also the 
relationship between the Firm’s different moving parts (see Figure 17). 
 
                                                                        
48 Notable investments by micro VCs include Dropbox and Uber (Bloomberg Technology, 2014; Kaji, 2015a). 
49 Unlike many business angel networks which invite members to conduct due diligence and lead negotiations on deals, outsourcing 
or spreading the investment decision-making process among some or all members, the investment decision rests with the firm. Feld 
and Mendelson (2016, pp. 8–9) state that while Micro VC firms “often want to be thought of as angels instead of VCs, once they’ve 
raised money from other people they have the same fiduciary responsibility to their investors that a VC has, and as a result they are 
really just VCs.” The firm studied holds private investment committee meetings and has a fiduciary responsibility to their investors; 
business angel networks typically do not have a fiduciary responsibility to their members, as they are involved in the investment 
process as individual, pseudo-independent investors. 
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Figure 17: Illustration of organizations and constructs in research context (black rectangles are organizations of interest) 
During the period studied, the core decision-making team of the 
Firm remained stable, comprised of two founding partners and three 
employees who played the role of principal.50 As indicated in Table 15, 
they joined the partners in Year 3 and continued until Year 5.51 The Firm 
was supported by three senior associates, who joined in Year 3, as well. 
Operational members of the Firm are from five different countries, with 
some members holding double nationalities. The team’s composition was 
similar to the traditional VC studied in Petty and Gruber (2011: 5): 
“relatively small, with fewer than ten VCs, their support staff, and the 
original founders still active in the day-to-day operations of the firm.” In 
the final year of this study, 80% of the operational team held bachelor’s 
degrees, with 50% of those also holding graduate degrees. Team members 
had, on average, five years of industry experience. Together, this team 
made an average of 3.8 investments per year. 
 
 
Data collection  
In order to understand the actual selection and evaluation choices of 
social VCs on a deal-by-deal basis, we conducted an inductive, 
longitudinal single-case case study (Charmaz, 2008; Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Aside from the period in Phase I, where a 
second coder was invited to help assess the reliability of the coding 
scheme, the data collection and analysis were led by one person. Data was 
collected primarily in the form of archival documents, complemented by 
semi-structured interviews and several months of non-participant 
                                                                        
50 Formal titles fluctuated during the period studied and fund members in leadership positions sometimes denied that they held a 
leadership role. However, their role in investment selection and evaluation did not substantially change over the years. 
51 One principal left in Year 3 but remains an advisor to the SVC. 
Year of investment 
activity 
Partners Principals Associates 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 ✔ ✔       
2 ✔ ✔       
3 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
4 ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
5 ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Table 15: Overview of core decision-making team’s activity over duration of investment activity 
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observation. These served to contextualize and triangulate data from 
archival documents. All data sources are summarized in Table 16. 
Archival data. Access to the Firm’s archival data was shared with 
the author through specific requests via email. Later, when requests 
became more frequent, the author was given remote access to the Firm’s 
entire Internet cloud-based repository of venture-related documents, 
detailing investment decisions made since their investment practice was 
launched, covering five years of operations. These documents are 
summarized in the following table (Table 16).  
Of particular interest to this study are documents related to the 
Firm’s internal weekly investment committee (IC) meeting, in which the 
Firm’s key decision-makers would discuss new investment opportunities 
and organize follow-up activities for pending investments. Two documents 
related to the IC served as our primary data source: the IC minutes and 
pre-IC polls. The former was a living document that served as an agenda, a 
summary of the previous week’s decisions, and a framework to capture 
minutes produced by the Firm. The latter was circulated prior to the IC and 
included descriptive information on ventures to be introduced or re-
discussed at the meeting, detailed comments from each member of the 
team, and a vote (yes/no/abstain) on whether the SVC should continue 
pursuing these ventures. These IC documents painted a comprehensive 
picture of the journey of each investment proposal evaluated by the Firm, 
beyond an initial screening (or “filtering out”).  
Finally, our third primary data source included multiple versions of 
the Firm’s venture database, in which all investment proposals and 
corresponding investment statuses were tracked. Secondary sources among 
the archival data included minutes of meetings with all ventures in the 
Firm’s database, and other key venture-related documents, such as internal 
correspondence and fund-venture correspondence revealing exchanges on 
due diligence as well as “rejection emails.” 
Non-participant observation. Following our agreement, one author 
visited the Firm for three to four days every one to two weeks over 7 
months, where she sat in investment committee meetings, meetings 
between the investor and the entrepreneur, and regular office activities. 
While the author attended and observed these meetings, she did not play an 
active role. Whenever possible, meetings were recorded and transcribed 
and the author took extensive fieldnotes in notebooks or on her laptop. 
These meetings introduced us to the Firm’s investment process, 
allowing us to contextualize the documents and events we read about in 
archival records. For example, we observed vocal expression and body 
language that accompanied certain phrases, which helped us to understand 
the context of common expressions found in archival records. The author 
also observed the production of key archival documents (e.g., IC minutes), 
and developed an understanding of how each document related to each 
other. 
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Unstructured and semi-structured interviews. During our 
fieldwork, the author engaged in dozens of unstructured, informal 
conversations with the Firm members. These introduced her to the Firm’s 
investment process, allowing us to contextualize the documents and events 
we read about in archival records. In the latter part of our analysis, the 
author reached out to the Firm again to clarify missing or conflicting 
factual information (e.g., dates), and to request additional53 documents. 
These interviews were more structured, and questions systematically 
referred to the Firm’s recollection of an investment decision, dates, and 
descriptive contextual details. The author conducted eight of these latter 
                                                                        
52 All archival data presented were independently produced by the SVC. We did not ask the SVC to produce any document or engage 
in any kind of reflection for this study. 
53 I requested the firm’s email correspondence related to a selection of ventures. Some of these requests were due to the fact that the 
venture dates or outcomes were missing from other documents. Other requests were made at random to triangulate information found 
in other documents. All requests for documents were fulfilled. 
Type of data Use in study Description of data Quantity Year 1 2 3 4 5 
Archival data         
Investment committee (IC) 
minutes  
Primary data source Agenda and minutes covering 
weekly meeting on investment 
decisions and research activities 
758 pages   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Pre-IC poll results for 
shortlisted ventures  
Primary data source Shortlist of 1-6 ventures to be 
discussed at IC meeting, includes 
yes/no/abstain vote from SVC 
decision-makers and individual 
comments 
1,856 rows 
of entries 
  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Venture databases Primary data source Excel files tracking every venture 
proposal received by the Firm 
2,984 rows 
of entries 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Venture meeting notes Secondary data source Word documents created to store 
minutes, correspondence or 
research related to specific 
ventures 
850 files   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Email correspondence  Secondary data source Email correspondence with 
selected ventures 
93 pages   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Venture documents Triangulation of events 
and investment status  
Investment proposals submitted by 
ventures 
1,476 files   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Calendar files Triangulation of events  Calendar files indicating dates and 
times internal meetings and 
meetings with ventures 
2 files    ✔ ✔  
Internal documents Triangulation of events 
and investment status 
Internal documents (Excel, 
PowerPoint, Word) produced by 
the firm to reflect on52 past 
investment decisions and direct 
future activities 
56 pages   ✔ ✔  
Non-participant observation        
IC meetings fieldnotes and 
transcription 
Triangulation of events 
and investment status  
Notes and transcriptions compiled 
by researcher  
414 pages 
18 events 
   ✔  
Venture meetings notes 
and transcription 
Triangulation of events 
and investment status  
Notes and transcriptions compiled 
by researcher  
120 pages 
40 events 
   ✔  
Interviews        
Clarification interviews Secondary data source Interviews requesting additional 
information about specific ventures 
336 
minutes 
    ✔ 
Table 16: Overview of Study One data sources 
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interviews, which averaged 42 minutes in length, and were all recorded and 
transcribed. These served as a secondary data source. 
Inductive analysis of these documents resulted in information on 
1,858 individual investment decisions over a five-year timeframe, placing 
this research study in the ballpark of similar longitudinal studies54 on 
traditional VC decision-making.  
 
Data analysis  
Data analysis occurred alongside data collection in an iterative and 
inductive way (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia et al., 2013), and comprised 
four main phases. We describe these phases here in a linear fashion, but 
they were, in fact, composed of sub-phases that we returned to at different 
points of the analysis as we made sense55 of the data.  
Phase I.  In the first phase, the goal was to gain a broad overview of 
the investment process, with particular attention to emic terms in the 
subject’s voice (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999; Morrow, 2005). To 
do this, we began with internal documents that the SVC produced to 
describe and guide their own decision-making strategy. We used their 
language and linear description to construct data displays, which 
represented key milestones of a full investment proposal evaluation that 
resulted in either a rejection or an investment (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
An example of a data display in which key milestones were tracked is 
presented in Table 17. This Table helped to inform the data display of the 
empirical sequence of events presented in Figure 18 in the Findings 
section. 
 
 
Table 17: Example of data display created during Phase I of data analysis using emic terms (each row represents a venture’s journey through time) 
                                                                        
54 Petty and Gruber (2011) studied 3,631 investment decisions over 11 years; Carpentier and Suret (2015) studied 636 decisions over 
four-years. 
55 We adopted inductive, post-positivist techniques to interpreting and verifying most of the data. However, in Phase IV, the need for 
more constructivist, interpretative approaches emerges (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). 
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These displays were helpful in developing a high-level 
understanding of the different moving parts at play in an investment 
decision. We later adjusted these displays based on intermediary events or 
more ambiguous, less flattering outcomes described or observed in IC 
meetings (e.g., preparing notes, losing a deal). The non-participant 
observation helped the first author to establish confidence in the 
expressions used by the Firm. For example, during her fieldwork, the 
author observed that one or two lines about social impact in the meeting 
minutes were sometimes the result of 15 minutes of heated debate during 
the IC. These instances were sporadic and observed throughout the 7-
month period, giving us confidence that the written, archival data, which 
later served as our primary data source, were not performed to maintain a 
positive social image around the researcher, but rather reflected true 
concerns felt by the Firm throughout the evaluation process (Patton, 2002). 
Phase II. With a working understanding of the Firm’s general 
procedure, the author began tagging portions of text from a sample of IC 
minutes, transcripts and venture notes, according to an open coding56 
protocol (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia et al., 2013). A review of the tags 
revealed that they were related to venture attributes, deal attributes, actions 
the SVC should take towards the venture, potential consequences of these 
behaviors, open questions expressed about the Firm towards the venture’s 
attributes, and open questions expressed by the venture towards the Firm, 
among other things.  
Many of the tags with which the author annotated the data were 
intriguing, but after multiple rounds of tagging the data, re-reading our 
annotations, and re-rereading the tags on their own, she focused on the 
most recurrent ones. At this stage, it became clear that some tags could be 
grouped together, such as: 
1) Negative investment proposal statuses, indicating that the 
investment proposal was ejected the Firm’s evaluation process, 
e.g., “pass” (VC-side rejection), “we failed to get back and 
missed this round” (VC-side circumstantial rejection), “not 
raising” (venture-side rejection) 
2) Positive investment proposal statuses, indicating that the 
investment proposal was still under consideration and being 
pursued, e.g., “meeting scheduled,” “to proceed with [due 
diligence]” 
                                                                        
56 One aspect that became more apparent as the study progressed were the similarities between social VC decision-making and VC 
decision-making. The recognition of these similarities meant that my inductive analysis was not conducted with a completely blank 
slate, as is sometimes recommended in exploratory work (e.g., Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Suddaby, 2006). Still, despite some 
familiarity with the VC decision-making criteria, I avoided using existing etic terms upfront (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999). 
Discussions with other researchers reminded me to be mindful of bringing my own biases to the analyses, e.g., wanting to prove that 
my research subject was similar to or different from prior firms studied (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994). I 
cultivated healthy skepticism about what might be the natural way of organizing ideas, sensitive that there might be a new criterion or 
“lens” that prosocial VC firms might use which I could miss by forcing items into a category in the coding process.  
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At times, tags from the preceding groups would be closely followed by 
tags related to specific venture or deal attributes. At times, tags would 
contain two pieces of information: a negative investment proposal status 
(e.g., “pass”) and a negative venture or investment deal attribute (e.g., “Not 
a fit b.c: (1) Too advanced (raising 2.5m from [redacted]) and (2) Not a fit 
into our impact areas.”). The pairing of a status with a “negative” attribute 
occurred more consistently than a status with a “positive” attribute. 
Encouraged by the regular pairing of investment status updates and 
accompanying (negative) venture or deal attribute description, the author 
began to delve deeper into this, continuing with open coding, and moving 
into axial coding protocols, evaluating the similarities and differences 
between these pairs of tags (status and proposal attribute). The author 
placed these pairs into groups of similar concepts, similar to Gioia’s 1st-
order concepts (Gioia et al., 2013). Eventually, the author began naming 
these tags into a category of “Reason(s) for rejection.”57  
Phase III. Having identified tentative bucket categories, the author 
then began a more systematic analysis comparing small units of data from 
primary data sources: IC minutes, pre-IC polls, and archival data from 
venture database entries. She found that the SVC made notes about each 
investment decision in a succinct and organized way, making it easy to 
extract the complete remarks about a venture and set it aside. She created a 
spreadsheet to organize these excerpts, matching each venture to its 
associated excerpts. 
From these raw data on 500 investment deals, the author then began 
another round of open coding. The names used for these tags were inspired 
by direct quotes from the firm’s speech, meeting notes, or framework 
documents, and gradually contributed to the construction of categories 
describing what the author was observing. The author followed the 
literature’s recommendation of tagging the same data in separate “rounds,” 
in order to compare and contrast the consistency of tags applied to the data 
between coding rounds (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Through this iterative 
process, the author eventually began to code in a more consistent manner 
and edit the tag names to reflect her new understanding of the data. The 
author began to notice that some groups had “several ‘subcategories,’ and 
associated ‘dimensions’ and ‘properties,’” which the author “gradually 
elaborated and refined as specific incidents [were] examined, 
systematically coded, and compared” (Langley, 1999: 200). While 
arranging different tags together to create these sub-categories and larger 
descriptive groups, the author was careful not to over-affiliate tags (the 
author kept tags and sub-groups under a large “Other” umbrella, until 
sufficient evidence suggested it should be merged with another group). In 
                                                                        
57 Later on, I changed this category to reason(s) for ejection which served as a broad umbrella group for all ventures removed from 
the SVC’s evaluation process, thus “reasons for ejection,” as a category, covers both the ventures intentionally removed from the 
evaluation process by the SVC, as well as ventures which were removed from the SVC’s selection process, but not as a result of an 
intentional rejection on behalf of the SVC (see Table 18). 
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Table 18, we present examples of categories and sub-categories that 
emerged in Phase II and Phase III. Additional data on our coding can be 
viewed in this Appendix G. 
 
As sub-categories and sub-sub-categories began to emerge (i.e., 
“code groups”), the author began to assign each code, code group, sub-
category and overarching category a unique number. The author described 
each number in a codebook, which served as her coding guide. She 
continued to refine the codebook over a 6-month period, while consulting 
related literature. At this point the research process “might be viewed as 
transitioning from ‘inductive’ to a form of ‘abductive’ research, in that data 
and existing theory are now considered in tandem (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2007)” (Gioia et al., 2013: 21).58 Consulting with the literature revealed, for 
example, a parallel between items such as “venture mission,” and 
“geography.” Geographic focus had been classified in the literature under 
the heading “VC-specific criteria” to describe how investment from certain 
geographies may not necessarily represent less attractive investments but 
may still be rejected due to being outside of a VCs’ strategic focus (Petty & 
Gruber, 2011). The same thinking was applied to venture mission in this 
                                                                        
58 I then delivered three presentations of this preliminary analysis to three groups: entrepreneurship researchers, the firm, and 
affiliated investors. Their feedback helped me to fine-tune my codebook but did not drastically change it. My codebook expanded 
from 130 to 139 codes. To facilitate comparison with prior work, I renumbered the top-level categories to match prior work. I kept 
the hierarchy levels the same for all but one top-level category, “Commercialization Strategy.”  This top-level category was changed 
to a sub-category placed under Product/Service, in the tradition of Petty & Gruber (2011). However, other sub-categories and codes 
were not changed and remained true to the data. One of the changes I made was to rename my top-level categories using the labels of 
the five main categories presented in Petty & Gruber’s (2011) coding scheme. For example, I changed my category “Venture Offer” 
to “Product/Service,” which had been used in the literature. 
Time of 
emergence 
Emergent 
category 
Sub-category Description Example 
Phase II Investment 
status 
Negative Deal is ejected from the 
selection process 
e.g., “pass,” “not a fit” 
  Positive Deal is still under 
consideration  
e.g., “meeting scheduled” “to proceed with DD” 
 Reason for 
ejection-VC 
rejection 
Firm passes Intentional VC-side 
rejection 
e.g., “Not a fit b.c: (1) Too advanced (raising 2.5m 
from [redacted]) and (2) Not a fit into our impact 
areas.” 
 Reason for 
ejection-
various 
Firm loses 
deal 
Reasons for ejection 
not intentionally driven 
by VC 
e.g., venture not fundraising, “we failed to get back 
[to the venture] and missed this round” 
Phase III Time under 
consideration 
Entry date The date when the VC 
first considers the 
investment proposal 
e.g., Date indicated under “Date Deal Created” in 
venture database, cross referenced with file 
metadata, initial meeting date, initial appearance 
in IC documents (if applicable) 
  Exit date The date when 
investment proposal is 
ejected  
e.g., Date of IC minutes when SVC decided to pass 
on a venture, as indicated by the note: “pass”  
  Re-entry date The date when 
investment proposal is 
re-submitted to VC 
e.g., Date of IC minutes when, in the space of a 
week, venture moves from “On the Shelf” section of 
IC minutes to “Existing Opportunities” with 
confirmatory comment 
  Re-exit date The date when 
investment proposal is 
re-ejected  
e.g., Date of IC minutes when “What’s changed 
since we last spoke? What is justification for 
revisiting?” 
Table 18: Emerging categories guiding Phase III 
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codebook, which was eventually placed under “VC-specific criteria: 
strategic focus”. It became clear that some investment proposals were 
coming from strong ventures which did not in any way represent an 
inferior investment, but due to their primary commercial mission and 
inability to contribute to the social and environmental investment themes 
identified by the SVC, had to be rejected. 
Five major iterations later, the author had a relatively stable 
codebook which she verified with a second coder who was not previously 
involved with the study but was briefed on its purpose and given full 
access to the archival data (with the Firm’s consent). To verify the validity 
of the coding scheme, the second coder was asked to study the main 
venture database and investment committee notes, code a selection of 
documents, and produce a codebook. When codes differed, we debated 
about the need for and difference between specific codes. We repeated this 
process until we felt comfortable in our shared interpretation of the data, 
creating a common codebook, which we used to test the reliability of our 
coding. For our test, we separately coded excerpts of documents pertaining 
to 100 randomly selected investment decisions. Our task was to identify the 
main reason for ejection, and any additional reasons for ejection. We were 
able to establish a high level of interrater agreement at the category and 
sub-category levels (90.42% and 85.45% respectively). By discussing the 
coding scheme with a second coder, we developed a robust approach to 
analyzing the data, which gave us more confidence in our final coding 
scheme, presented Table 19. 
The codebook illustrates the result of our iterative coding process 
and consultation with literature. Similar studies suggested a clear pathway 
for categorizing codes related to traditional VC criteria but offered less 
clarity on how to organize codes related to the Firm’s application of their 
social-mission-related criteria. We erred on the side of caution, thinking it 
would be consistent with existing literature to group SVC preferences 
outside the traditional codes of product/service, market, finances, and team 
under Venture Mission (a sub-category of VC-specific criteria, as indicated 
in the previous table).  
Having established a high level of interrater reliability for this new 
descriptive coding scheme, the author coded three versions of a venture 
database shared with us by the SVC, as well as the IC meeting notes and 
pre-IC poll results. All relevant excerpts related to venture dates and 
outcomes were then organized in a spreadsheet, which facilitated the 
coding and re-coding process. It also allowed us to systematically 
crosscheck the entry and exit dates indicated by different documents and 
verify the correct number of times specific ventures entered, re-entered, 
and exited the SVC’s selection process.59 In cases where the SVC’s 
                                                                        
59 Throughout the process, the uniqueness and richness of longitudinal data on early-stage ventures became more apparent. For 
example, we were able to distinguish between the two ventures which had the same, or very similar names, due to the richness of the 
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database, IC and poll notes presented conflicting or insufficient 
information about the venture investment status or reason for ejection, the 
author relied on secondary data: IC meeting transcripts, venture notes, 
correspondence, other internal documents, and clarification interviews.60
  
Table 19: Snapshot of codebook used in Phase III (81 of 127 codes) 
Out of 1,858 individual investment decisions identified, 244 
investment decisions were dropped due to missing information about the 
period in which the SVC evaluated these investment proposals (13% of all 
                                                                        
SVC’s data, which included dates, locations, and personally identifying information. Alternatively, some ventures had different 
names, but were in fact a similar offer by the returning entrepreneur, under a different brand—another distinction that would have 
been lost without said data access. 
60 In the less than 10% of cases where interviews were used as a supplemental source, 84% of the cases mentioned in the interview 
served to confirm with the firm that information was indeed missing from the firm’s databases. Hence, retrospective sense-making 
remains a minimal influence on the outcomes of this study. 
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investment decisions). Twelve of the 244 dropped decisions appeared to 
date from 2013 (5% of all dropped decisions), 57 of them from 2015 (23%) 
and 8 from 2016 and 2017 (4%). Among the dropped decisions, 167 did 
not indicate a clear year of entry or exit (77% of all dropped decisions). 
Our final spreadsheet yielded entry dates, exit dates, investment statuses, 
and reasons for ejection for 1,614 investment decisions, resulting in the 
application of 127 codes from our codebook (see Table 19 on the previous 
page for a snapshot of the codebook). 
Phase IV. In order to further increase the trustworthiness of our 
emergent findings, we performed numerous “member checks” with the 
SVC (Nag et al., 2007; Van Maanen, 1979). A member check conducted in 
this phase confirmed that our empirical themes were indeed venture 
attributes of interest to the SVC’s social mission, commercial mission, and 
firm-specific preferences. However, in this phase, we began to be aware of 
our bias as researchers. As explained in the previous phase, we had viewed 
the SVC’s social-mission-related considerations as a separate filter from 
the SVC’s commercial mission and applied separately. What we identified 
as purely “mission-related” criteria in the previous phase represented the 
largest sub-category assigned to investment decisions (25%), however, 
additional fieldwork and efforts to reflect on the biases that we brought to 
the research suggested that quotation marks may need to be added around 
the concepts “mission-related” and “non-mission-related” (Finlay, 2002a, 
2002b). Specifically, comments from the firm suggested that mission-
related criteria were not an agnostic VC mandate of the firm, but in fact, a 
lens which informed their view of “non-mission-related” venture attributes, 
and the application of “non-mission-related” criteria. Having consulted the 
literature on social investment decision-making, we realized that we 
viewed the SVC evaluation process as a “concrete process,” and 
investment proposal qualities as objective social or commercial attributes, 
which could be systematically (and objectively) identified by anyone (a 
claim further supported by the inter-coder reliability rating) (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980).  
 
 Core ontological 
assumptions 
Assumptions about 
human nature 
Research methods  
Phase III - beginning Reality as a concrete 
process 
Man as an adaptor Historical analysis Objectivist approaches 
to social science 
Phase III - end Reality as a contextual 
field of information 
Man as an information 
processor 
Contextual analysis of 
Gestalten 
 
Phase IV - beginning Reality as a realm of 
symbolic discourse 
Man as an actor; the 
symbol user 
Symbolic analysis  
Phase IV – end Reality as a social 
construction 
Man as a social 
constructor; the 
symbol creator 
Hermeneutics Subjectivist 
approaches to social 
science 
Table 20: Research assumptions over different phases of data analysis (adapted from Morgan & Smircich, 1980: 492)  
 
However, during the final stages of our coding process, doubt began 
to emerge about to which extent the SVC was processing or responding to 
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stimuli (i.e., the investment proposals), versus taking established meanings 
(about the commercial and social qualities of ventures) and adapting them 
for their own use in novel ways. Table 20 shows the perspective shift 
between Phase III and IV.  
Taking the practice of reflexivity seriously (Finlay, 2002a), we 
realized that findings from Phase III framed the SVC as a traditional 
commercial actor applying a social-mission-filter in its information 
processing. Much like hardware investors apply a hardware/software-filter, 
or much like European-based investors apply a geographic-filter, these 
factors were not related commercial outcomes. The emergent framing 
appeared motivated to cast SVCs as “normal,” “legitimate” investors, “who 
just so happen to be jointly pursuing a social mission.”  
However, returning to the data, and to the field, it became clearer 
that this framing was not adequate for explaining the process that we were 
observing. It became evident that the data was portraying the SVC’s 
evaluation process as less of an objective application of two separate sets 
of filters, but rather as a dualistic, subjective and symbolic activity, in 
which the concerns of one identity informs the other, and in which both 
identities interact to inform the evaluation outcome. The SVC appeared to 
leverage, or attempt to leverage, the public’s cultural associations with 
social impact and business, combining attributes of both to create new 
cognitive associations as tools to help them further their cause (Smircich, 
1983). 
In this final phase, we conduct preliminary analysis on an emergent 
relationship between the VC’s mission-related criteria and the other criteria 
it employed, and namely the extent to which each criterion was mission-
related. The author returned to primary and secondary data related to all 
venture rejections pertaining to mission-related criteria (420 decisions) and 
reengaged with the coding process. In this phase, the author realized that 
the prior coding effort had been comparatively narrow-minded, when in 
fact, the codes of the VC-specific mission-related sub-codes lent 
themselves to being grouped under other categories.61 Findings from these 
coding efforts are critiqued and discussed in the following section. 
 
Findings 
The goal of this study was to answer the question: How do social 
venture capitalists select and evaluate investment proposals?, which we 
addressed by conducting a deep dive into the decision criteria actually used 
by social VCs to select and evaluate investment proposals on a deal-by-
deal basis. We examined data beyond post-hoc sources, conducting an in-
                                                                        
61 Note: Phase IV did not invalidate our prior coding efforts. Data were still grouped with the same data they were grouped in during 
prior phases. However, what changed was the name of the code group sub-category and top-level category. We explain this in more 
detail in the Findings. 
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depth, exploratory, longitudinal case study of a social VC. Figure 18 
illustrates the multiple points at which investment proposal could fail 
(intentionally, due to the SVC’s rejection, or unintentionally). 
 
Figure 18: Investment evaluation process: sequence of empirical events 
 
Year  Milestones Deals (cumulative) Investments (cumulative) Annual investment rate  
Received Reviewed Total (incl. 
follow-ons) 
New 
investments 
Total (incl. 
follow-ons) 
New 
investments  
1 Begins angel investing 16 14 1 1 7% 7% 
2 Operates full-time 90 61 4 4 6% 6% 
3 First exit 770 711 6 6 0% 0% 
4 32M Euro fund launch 1489 1436 16 12 1% 1% 
5 1614 deals reviewed 1614 1614 19 14 2% 1% 
Annual average (non-cumulative) 322.8 322.8 3.8 2.8 3% 3% 
Table 21: Milestones and deal statistics of the SVC Firm62 
 
This study’s analysis of decision-making data produced in real time 
revealed 1,614 investment evaluations by the SVC over the course of 4.5 
years, with an average of 323 decisions per year, as indicated in Table 21 
and Table 22. As indicated in Table 22, each of these decisions took an 
average of 4.9 weeks to make, relying on six main categories of venture 
criteria. 
 
Overview of decision-making criteria applied to investment proposals 
In our final sample, 21 investment proposals were still under 
consideration (1.3%) and 19 investment proposals had been accepted for 
investment (1.2%).  
  
62 For expanded version see Table 28 in this Appendix G. 
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Year Reason for ejection (main reason only)63 Other statuses Average 
duration 
(weeks)  
Total 
decisions Product
/service 
Market Finance Team VC focus VC 
context 
Other64 Under 
review 
Invested 
1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 92.9% 0.0% 7.1% N/A 14 
2 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 40.4% 0.0% 51.1% 0.0% 6.4% 1.8 47 
3 6.5% 4.2% 1.8% 0.3% 31.8% 16.2% 38.9% 0.0% 0.3% 5.1 650 
4 11.2% 5.9% 3.0% 1.0% 39.2% 11.9% 25.8% 0.7% 1.4% 5.7 725 
5 10.7% 5.6% 1.7% 0.6% 24.2% 5.6% 41.0% 9.0% 1.7% 6.8 178 
Avg. 5.68% 3.14% 1.72% 0.38% 27.12% 6.74% 49.94% 1.94% 3.38% 4.9 322.8 
Total 8.8% 5.0% 2.4% 0.6% 34.3% 12.5% 34.1% 1.3% 1.2% N/A 1614 
Table 22: Reason for ejection over 5 years of investment 
Sixty-one investment proposals were in limbo (3.8%), where the SVC’s 
decision was a “soft pass” or “let’s not fully pass.” These “in limbo” 
ventures often occupied a section in the IC minutes called “on the shelf,” 
and enjoyed regular interaction with the Firm. The literature refers to a 
similar concept, called an “open door rejection” (Petty & Gruber, 2011), in 
which the VC does not reject the venture, but encourages the venture to 
return at a later date. A similar phenomenon was found in the SVC data—
e.g., “Wait for prototype” (IC Minutes)—however, the SVC data also 
revealed instances in which the Firm did not rely on the venture to return 
but assigned itself the task of proactively reaching out to the venture and 
re-introducing the venture back into the evaluation process.  
Cases in the literature tend to depict the precarity of these “in limbo” 
ventures as due to the VC firm’s lack of conviction in the venture, wherein 
it is the venture’s responsibility to return with greater proof of future 
success. This would suggest that the status of these proposals is “rejected” 
but with the possibility of being re-opened. In this study, evidence suggests 
the SVC takes a more proactive approach towards reconsidering the 
investment proposal, although the status of the proposal itself indicates it is 
not currently under consideration, hence, we use the term “soft pass” from 
the IC notes to denote this category of investment outcomes. Moreover, 
soft passes are considered as ventures which are not being actively 
considered in the evaluation process, narrowing our sample of ventures no 
longer under consideration to 1,513. 
Looking only at the sample of investments no longer under 
consideration (n=1,513), we find that ventures were rejected due to 
attributes related to their product/service (9.3%), their targeted market 
(5.5%), their finances (2.8%), their team (1.6%), and other attributes 
specific to this VC’s strategic focus/preferences (36.0%). This breakdown 
is shown in Figure 19. 
                                                                        
63 Exemplary data for each category and sub-category is included in Table 42, in Appendix F. Figures in Table 22 indicate the main 
reason for rejection, for figures on all reasons for rejection, see Table 42, in Appendix F. 
64 As indicated in the codebook in Table 19, this category includes investment evaluations which did not reveal a clear reason for the 
investment proposal’s failure. This topic is addressed in the following section. 
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Figure 19: Reasons for ejection (weighted) 
Out of the 32.4% of the sample rejected by the Firm without a specific 
reason, roughly 10% were investment proposals received from university 
students for a university event. Fieldwork revealed these were often early-
stage projects not currently seeking equity funding.  
Among the VC-specific criteria, we differentiate between those VC-
specific reasons that are specific to the Firm’s venture focus and deal 
preferences (i.e. “strategic focus”), and those VC-specific reasons that are 
specific to the VC’s context. The former are rejections of the investment 
proposal by the SVC; the result of (intentional) investment decisions, while 
the latter are simply ejections, i.e., the venture is no longer under 
consideration due to VC-specific circumstances, outside of the VC’s 
control. One hundred ninety-one (191) ventures were unintentionally 
ejected from the evaluation process (12.6%) due to VC-specific 
circumstances. These ejections include practical, context-specific reasons 
which explain why a positive investment outcome did not occur from the 
side of the VC and the venture. On the venture side, some of these context-
specific reasons are triggered by the venture for practical reasons (e.g., the 
SVC interacts with the venture at a time when the venture is not currently 
raising).65 However, sometimes the venture’s decision were sources of 
disappointment for the Firm (e.g., SVC was not offered an allocation). 
Exemplary data for each category and sub-category in Table 42, in 
Appendix G. 
Delving deeper into the sub-category of the VC-specific criteria (VC 
focus), we find that 78% of all 545 VC-focus reasons for rejection were 
related to the venture’s social mission (see section in the table below 
labelled VC-specific criteria), followed by the following sub-categories: 
                                                                        
65 As indicated by Figure 18, the VC sourced and evaluated investment proposals from numerous sources, first, on behalf of pitching 
competitions in which the prize is not equity investment, second, through their website, third, via referral, fourth, via email or in 
person, or fifth, in response to a request by the SVC to the venture. This diversity of sources partly explains why investment 
proposals failed in this sample due to the fact that the venture is not pursuing equity investment, however, as explained in the 
following section, at times, the venture changes its mind and entirely withdraws its investment proposal from the market. 
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venture stage (16.9%), venture location (3.4%) and deal structure (1.7%). 
These four sub-categories (see left side of following figure) groups cases of 
ventures which could be extremely appealing to the Firm, but are outside 
of the Firm’s scope (e.g., too late-stage, unfamiliar location) or investment 
strategy (e.g., no preferred share allocation).  
 
 
Figure 20: VC-specific reasons for rejection 
Criteria related to a venture’s social mission were of particular 
interest to this Firm and were applied in roughly a quarter of their rejected 
investment proposals (for exact breakdown, see data table Appendix G, 
Table 42). As indicated in the pie and bar graph in Figure 20 (see bar 
section at right), and in Table 23, seven unique code groups represent how 
social VCs actually assess the potential of investments with regards to the 
social performance.66 
In the first code group related to social-mission-related attributes, 
“social mission (general)”, we found evidence that the social VC applies 
both inclusion and exclusion criteria to achieve their desired social 
outcome. First, the Firm excludes venture proposals related to controversial 
domains, such as stem cell research or alcohol consumption, viewing these 
as potentially harmful to the venture’s social mission, and, by extension, 
harmful to the SVC’s cause as a firm. 
  
66 See Table 42 in Appendix F for additional exemplary data as tied to themes and top-level categories. 
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Reason 
for 
rejection  
Sub-
category 
Themes (sub-sub-
categories) (4) 
Code groups 
examples (7) 
Exemplary data67 
VC-
specific 
reason for 
rejection 
Venture 
mission 
(A) Venture’s 
social issue 
selection  
1. Social mission 
(general) 
- Action Area=N/A (20, SVC Database) 
- Social (Yes/No/Maybe): No (28, SVC Database) 
- P2 relayed message: pass on investing due to lack of 
fit with our impact framework (67, SVC Database) 
- Very intersting idea [sic], but not clear what social 
outcome here is (564, Poll) 
2. Problem scope  - I'm not sure there is a clear enough fit with our 
investment areas and impact focus, but we do wish 
you all the best (179, Correspondence with venture) 
- not clear on idea/problem. Excited by the functionality 
but not the problem? (348, Poll) 
(B) Venture’s 
contribution 
to a social 
issue 
3. Venture 
contribution 
(general) 
- Team does lack an education lead. Founder brings 
advertising and student-friendly content, but the real 
""meat"" here appears to be how good the tech is in 
engaging the students and how effective this is as an 
educational tool (1270, Poll)68 
- Ultimately helping coaches better manage and grow 
book of clients is not a 'bad thing' [by] any means, but 
am not convinced that this fits with our impact 
framework. To argue this drives increased and more 
regular physical activity from this who are not already 
playing these sports (especially de novo) seems 
tenuous. (1307, Poll) 
4. Venture 
contribution 
(measurability) 
- We believe the venture is currently not analogous 
with our broader portfolio, as we seek to measure the 
pre-determined social outcomes generated by the 
product or service of the company. (141, 
Correspondence with venture) 
- We could not arrive at a consensus in how [venture] 
fits into our investment framework, particularly in 
how we aim to measure the social outcomes 
generated by the products over time. (1322, 
Correspondence with venture) 
(C) Venture’s 
approach to a 
social issue 
5. Relationship of 
social activity 
to core 
revenue-
generating 
activity 
- last minute delivery is very competitive, what makes 
these guys better? Why does employing people with 
disabilities make sense from a business perspective? 
Price and service are everything in last mile and I 
struggle to see these guys competing on either. (98, 
Poll) 
6. Not-for-profit 
approach 
- NFP [not-for-profit]- not for us (277, SVC Database) 
(D) Founder’s 
role in 
executing 
venture’s 
plan 
7. Founder social 
motivation 
- DM1: Interesting to hear back from them. We invited 
them to [upcoming February event at a business 
school]. [DM2] did you see that? 
[DM2]: Yeah, I saw they were like, "I’m a bit too big 
time for this." […] “They were basically like this is 
beneath us. 
[DM1]: Yup. To our event. I tried to be really positive 
in the email  
[DM2]: I know. I saw. [I guess their idea is cool] but 
they just are not the people to do it, I don't think. 
There's just no ... they have just hacked this, there's 
no, sort-of like "I care" at all... 
[DM1]: Judging from the email it sounds like that's 
true. (595, IC Transcript) 
Table 23: Attributes related to SVC’s social-mission-related reasons for rejection 
                                                                        
67 All data in this table are direct quotes from archival data. Each number refers to a different investment proposal. See Table 42 in 
Appendix F for additional exemplary data on venture mission. 
68 Note: the entire quote in this investment decision suggests a dual purpose for rejection (venture contribution to social mission and 
value proposition). 
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Second, they engage in “investment targeting” across five explicit 
investment themes, excluding every venture investment proposal which 
does not address poverty alleviation, education, environmental 
sustainability, social relationships in the family and community, or 
healthcare. This provides a simple framework the Firm can use to quickly 
assess a venture as having “no impact” (Venture 1391, SVC Database), or, 
more objectively, “not a fit with impact framework” (Venture 983, SVC 
Database). At times, these evaluations were expressed with regret. As a 
member of the Firm (Founding Partner) wrote in the Firm’s internal poll, 
“No social impact. But [very] impressive venture. What do we do with 
such ventures??? (strong, but not a fit)” (919, Poll). In another poll he 
wrote, “love the concept, but dont [sic] see the impact outcome that is 
relevant to us.  Shame.” (730, Poll). 
Over half of the Firm’s social impact assessments were linked to the 
“social mission (general)” code group (55%), while the other 45% of 
investment evaluation related to the venture’s mission were concerned with 
the following: 
(A) the venture’s social issue selection (problem scope) 
(B) the venture’s contribution to a social issue 
(C) the venture’s approach to a social issue, and, 
(D) the founder’s role in executing the venture’s plan.  
 
In the first theme (A), the social VC devoted significant portions of text in 
their polls and meeting notes to understand whether a venture had 
identified a socially meaningful issue (within the five investment areas). 
Ten percent of all ventures rejected for mission-related reasons were 
rejected due to problem scope. On the contrary, at times the VC seemed to 
conclude that the venture targeted an important problem with an inadequate 
solution, bringing us to the second theme (B). Regarding the venture’s 
solution, the social VC rejected ventures in two code groups: cases in 
which the venture’s contribution was deemed insignificant (13% of 
ventures rejected for mission-related reasons) or potentially significant, but 
not measurable (10%). However, the relationship between the venture’s 
social contributions and its revenue model was also key, which covers the 
third theme (C). The SVC sought revenue models that mutually reinforced 
commercial and social performance, using the term “lock-step.” Using this 
set of venture criteria, the SVC avoided ventures who had—due to their 
revenue model—a high risk of prioritizing commercial outcomes at the 
expense of the social activity, or vice versa (6% of ventures rejected for 
mission-related reasons). This included cases of the SVC rejecting ventures 
who adopted a not-for-profit approach (4%). Finally, in a fourth theme (D), 
the founder’s social motivation was also seen as key to driving social 
outcomes within the venture. Cues of uncertain or primarily commercial 
motivation were seen as unfavorable by the SVC (2% of ventures rejected 
for mission-related reasons).  
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The findings from this section were a result of numerous coding 
iterations in dialogue with the data and the literature. Interestingly, the 
latter phases of analysis and reporting (Phase IV) revealed an interesting 
pattern with regards to the venture-mission-related investment proposal 
attributes identified by the SVC and how they compare to the commercial 
investment proposal attributes discussed by the SVC. The following 
section describes the overlap between the two and the dualistic lens applied 
to these attributes by the SVC. 
 
Do you see what I see? Social-mission-related criteria as a lens  
This section describes findings from Phase IV of the analysis. As 
indicated in the prior sections, Phase III’s rigorous inductive analysis 
placed the venture-mission-related criteria used by the SVC in the same 
top-level category as venture-location-related criteria and venture-stage-
related criteria. That is to say, the venture-mission-related criteria were 
categorized under VC-specific criteria, thus, by design, these criteria were 
intended to be independent from other criteria used by the VC. In Phase III, 
investment proposal attributes highlighted by the venture-mission-related 
criteria were mostly independent from investment proposal attributes 
highlighted by the commercial categories of criteria (e.g., market, finance, 
team, etc.). Phase IV, on the other hand, returns to these same data coded 
as venture-mission-related criteria, and finds that a subset of these data, 
originally coded as venture-mission-related investment evaluations, may 
also be categorized under other top-level categories. This is explained in 
the following section. However, there are two immediate consequences to 
this finding. 
First, this casts VC-specific criteria related to preferences and foci in 
a strategic light. Without Phase IV’s findings, it is more likely that these 
VC-specific criteria would be considered arbitrary preferences, or solely 
path-dependent outcomes. Hence, as indicated in Table 19 and the findings 
section of this study, VC-specific criteria are divided into two sub-
categories: VC-specific strategic foci and VC-specific context. Venture 
mission as a strategic focus and thus, social mission as a potential lens for 
understanding commercial performance is discussed in the following 
section. The second implication is more philosophical; the bridge between 
venture-mission-related criteria and “non-venture-mission-related” criteria 
calls into question the nature of venture attributes. The initial assumption in 
this study was to consider venture attributes objective constructs, and 
assess VCs’ evaluation of these constructs, however, the patterns 
uncovered in Phase IV suggest that venture attributes in a selection of 
evaluations can be interpreted subjectively, by the researcher, as well as by 
the VC, as demonstrated in Figure 21. These findings and implications are 
elaborated upon in the following sections. 
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Venture mission as a lens for understanding commercial 
performance. In selected investment decisions, the VC’s understanding of 
ventures’ social mission offered a framing device (i.e., lens) with which to 
understand ventures’ commercial potential. A positive understanding of the 
venture’s social mission was able to reinforce performance expectations on 
a commercial side. For example, in Phase III, the code group venture 
contribution to social issue (measurability) was classified under VC-
specific criteria (focus), essentially viewed as a revenue-irrelevant filter 
(e.g., like geographic scope). However, fieldnote excerpts suggest that in 
selected venture evaluations, attributes captured by social-mission-related 
criteria, such as the ability to measure a venture’s contribution to a social 
issue were in fact, tied in the VC’s evaluation to more traditional venture 
attributes captured by VC criteria. The data suggest that the VC believed 
these were not revenue-irrelevant and should actually drive revenue. As a 
member of the Firm explained, 
“[Our metrics] should be relevant from an impact perspective, so 
you know, you can use “units sold” for anything. I could say that's a 
pack of cigarettes. We want to be actually saying: how [socially] 
effective is that company being with that number? Therefore, 
[asking] what is the revenue with our view [means asking how much 
positive social change are you creating? And] that if you're really 
creating positive social change, your revenue should increase. It all 
ties back to our belief that doing good generates an attractive 
return” (VC3, Fieldwork). 
Taking a more constructivist approach with our data suggested that the 
Firm’s venture-mission criteria were not intended to be commercially 
agnostic, but, in fact, help the VC to inform their view of “non-mission-
related” venture attributes.69 Phase IV offers an alternative top-level 
category coding, not to replace the initial coding, which was validated, but 
to draw attention to a complementary classification of the lower-level code 
groups.  
In another example, the SVC considered a premium health gadget, 
targeting the high-end market (row 7 in Table 24). Representative data 
from the SVC on this investment decision reads, “No impact, but a 
potentially lucrative high margin business if the sales strategy can be 
accurately executed” (724, Poll). While this comment indicates that the 
Firm rejected the venture due to social-mission-related characteristics and 
not traditional market-related characteristics, we received pushback from 
the SVC during a “member check” (Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007; Van 
Maanen, 1979), where they insisted, “No, it is because the venture is not 
                                                                        
69 As explained in Phase IV, during the development of our codes, we attempted to consistently interpret the codes in one way for 
post-positivistic scientific rigor (Morrow, 2005; Rynes & Gephart Jr., 2004). However, in adopting this singular and segregated 
perspective (i.e., traditional VC criteria in one set, and mission-related criteria in another set), we realized we may have masked the 
data’s occasional dual meaning. 
 
141 
helping that many people, that we do not think it’s a good deal. They 
exclude a large part of the population” (VC3, Fieldnotes).  
Dualistic feature of venture attributes allows dualistic VC to 
inform its understanding of the ventures’ social and commercial 
potential. This section attempts to come closer to the actual, dualistic way 
in which the Firm views venture attributes in selected investment 
proposals. In some of the Firm’s evaluations, it views venture attributes 
traditionally associated with commercial outcomes as indicators of 
commercial potential, which is captured by individual code groups (see 
Table 42 in Appendix G for a breakdown). Likewise, other investment 
evaluations draw attention to venture attributes traditionally used to 
indicate social potential, also captured by the venture-mission-related code 
groups used (see Table 23, above). However, what is striking is that these 
two separate sets of venture attributes at times overlap and appear to be 
used by the VC to make decisions about both the venture’s commercial and 
social potential. The following figure illustrates how coding protocols from 
Phase III and Phase IV relate to each other (Figure 21).  
 
 
Figure 21: Reasons for ejection revealed in Phase III and Phase IV (per top-level category) 
In other words, while some of the VC’s investment evaluations build 
on commercial venture attributes to predict commercial potential, and other 
investment evaluations build on social-mission-related attributes to predict 
social potential, some venture attributes evaluated by the VC were used to 
make decisions about both the venture’s commercial and social potential. 
Returning to the evaluation of the premium health gadget, targeting the 
high-end market (row 7 in Table 24), an excerpt from the SVC’s message 
to the venture indicating their investment decision indicates its use of 
“objective” venture attribute (a high-end customer target) to predict both 
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commercial and social value, related to the venture’s ability to address a 
lucrative market, and its ability to fulfill an important social mission. The 
Firm writes to the venture, 
“The feedback from the [SVC] team this morning was that whilst the 
technology was fascinating and the team compelling, we could not 
get comfortable with the following points: 
1). The high price point excluded large parts of the population, and 
therefore limited the positive social outcome generation. 2). The go-
to-market strategy was not diversified or differentiated enough to 
really excite us.”  
Data on this particular investment evaluation was treated in the following 
way: the data remains under the code group of problem scope (high-end 
customer target), as indicated in code group 2, in Table 23. However, in 
Phase III of the coding, this code group would be classified under the VC-
specific criteria (strategic focus): venture mission, while in Phase IV, as 
row 7 in Table 24 indicates, this code group can also be classified under 
the top-level category of Market.  
As these data and as Figure 21 illustrate, both coding protocols are 
reliable and justified. The data remain consistently grouped together 
through rigorous reliability tests; however, the top-level category changed 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). However, while data in Table 24 
makes a philosophical point about how the dualistic nature of the venture 
attribute and the viewer’s perspective may question the objective and 
“real” nature of investment proposal attributes, the data also reveals 
practical consequences.  
First, as seen, the dualistic nature of the venture attribute, combined 
with the SVC’s dualistic mission renders the Firm sensitive to possibility 
that an evaluate venture will only serve niche markets (even if these are 
high-value markets). Second, one striking consequence of transferring 
venture mission-related code groups from the broader venture-mission 
umbrella to specific venture categories, is the five-fold increase in market-
related reasons for rejection, as indicated in the Figure 21. For example, 
one of the SVC’s decision-makers remarked that a particular investment 
proposal’s vision was “Hard as being crowded out by NGOs and govt 
[sic]” (Venture 368, SVC Database). While this finding inherently makes 
sense since dualistic ventures may face more competition than ventures 
with single identities, needing to defend and differentiate themselves form 
multiple angles (Livengood & Reger, 2010), the empirical data provides a 
sense of the magnitude of the shift in evaluation practices due to the 
presence of social-commercial organizational duality.70  
 
                                                                        
70 Note, the act of lens switching differs from the act of rejecting a venture for both commercial and social reasons. The SVC did the 
latter in 44 percent of the instances in which it cited a social-mission-related reason for rejection, and the former in 10 percent of the 
instances. 
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Exemplary Data Indicating Reason for Rejection71 
(Note: decisions may have multiple reasons) 
Phase III Coding (original) Phase IV Coding (alternative) 
Sub-
category 
Code group Category Sub-category 
I'm not sure there is a clear enough fit with our 
investment areas and impact focus, but we do wish you 
all the best (179, Correspondence with venture) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Social 
mission 
(general) 
Market Social impact 
area 
Discussed at IC on 16.01 - not a fit due to testing of stem 
cells (258, SVC Database); 
Don't think we should be investing in company using 
human stem cell research. Personal views aside, this is 
still controversial area. (258, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Social 
mission 
(general) 
Market Social approval 
risk 
I did not buy into the idea of selling to rich and then 
subsidizing the solution for the poor.  This is not lock 
step. It should make money by servicing the poor.  Can 
they change to make this more accessible? 
More detail on the business plan and revenue model? 
(815, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Relationship 
of social 
activity to 
core revenue 
generating 
activity 
Revenue 
model  
Relation to 
social activity 
"Not a fit for venture (more NFP)" (1560, SVC Database) VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-
profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
DM1: Can they sustain and grow as a for-profit? Seems 
more like a (great) nfp [not-for-profit] model. Again, 
$1.50 is quite expensive for a wash and reading session 
(I paid about the same for 3-4 weeks of washing - soap 
and water, my own two hands).  
[venture offers washing machines for rent, inside a 
community library]  
P1: Nice idea, but I really struggle to understand the 
business viability. (790, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-
profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
Team: Average - the team has extensive business 
experience (particularly the CEO) but seems to have 
limited focus on generating real social impact. (93, 
Venture Meeting Notes) 
 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Founder/tea
m social 
motivation 
Founder 
/team 
Commitment 
(to generating 
positive social 
outcomes) 
VC2: Too niche and high-end for the moment, perhaps 
we can revisit if they look to broaden their appeal? 
VC1: [Vote no.] I think the impact case here is weak. 
VC3: [Vote no.] from an impact perspective.  
VC4: [Vote no.] No impact, but a potentially lucrative 
high margin business if the sales strategy can be 
accurately executed. (724, Poll) 
 
 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Problem 
scope (high-
end 
customer 
target) 
Market  Size (niche 
premium 
market) 
[We] struggled with the product's ability to be a truly 
differentiated and 'game changing' technology within 
the accessibility market. (785, Correspondence with 
venture) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Venture 
contribution 
(general) 
Product 
/service  
Differentiation 
of (social) 
proposition 
How can you measure that and what is actually a leading 
indicator? Also, because we don't measure impact and 
for the sake of measuring impact. You measure impact in 
the belief that it should be driving your financial story. 
[…]  We'd need to think about what is a driver of success 
for your business alongside delivering a positive social 
outcome. (777, Fieldwork notes) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Venture 
contribution 
(measurabilit
y) 
Product 
/service  
Competitive 
advantage 
(social 
proposition 
effectiveness) 
Table 24: Exemplary data of alternative coding of SVC’s mission-related decisions, revealing SVC’s use of dual lens72  
                                                                        
71 All are direct quotes; each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
72 Additional exemplary data of alternative coding is included Appendix F under Table 43. 
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The first section of the findings confirms and elaborates what the 
literature on social investor decision-making says about the use of social 
and commercial filters in the venture evaluation process. The second 
section extends understanding of how impact investors translate their dual 
goals into the evaluation process and illustrate their use of criteria as 
lenses, and not only filters. This section also illustrates an overlap between 
the “objective” venture attributes used by the SVC to understand ventures’ 
commercial and social potential.  
While these prior sections provide a richer understanding of social 
investing with regards to the social and commercial concerns of impact 
investors and social VCs, the main message is that both social and 
commercial venture attributes are important, independently and in relation 
to each other. However, investigating the frequency of the application of 
investment criteria over time offers an opportunity for more nuanced 
understanding. Findings from this analysis is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
Criteria at different stages of evaluation  
This section analyzes the top reasons for ejection at different stages 
(with stages being defined by the number of weeks a proposal was under 
review prior to leaving the process).73 In the following table (Table 25), 11 
reasons for ejection are identified, all of which ranked in the top five 
reasons for ejection in at least one of the week segments (e.g., ejection 
during weeks 1-2; weeks 3-6). As indicated in rows 2 and 3 of the 
following table, the two most common reasons for rejection in our 
sample—value proposition, one of the most common commercial reasons 
for rejection (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011), and 
venture mission (social) (ranking in the top 5 reasons for rejection across 
all but one week segment)—confirm what is known from the traditional 
VC decision-making literature, as well as from the social investing 
literature. However, what the week-by-week analysis of reasons for 
ejection interesting reveals is high variation in the length of the evaluation 
period (for ventures in the pipeline for greater than two weeks), even when 
holding the reason for venture rejection constant. As indicated in Table 25, 
ventures are removed from the pipeline for reasons related to the venture’s 
social mission (general)74 over 1-2 weeks of evaluation, 3-6 weeks of 
evaluation, 7-12 weeks of evaluation and 25+ weeks of evaluation. This 
high variation, coupled with data on the VC’s engagement with ventures 
suggest that the SVC prolongs the formal evaluation period to help 
                                                                        
73 “Reasons for ejection” is the umbrella category for all ventures removed from the SVC’s evaluation process. Since Table 25 
includes both SVC-driven reasons for ejection (the SVC rejected the investment offer) and non-SVC-driven reasons, the term 
ejection is used. 
74 Social mission (general) is a criterion which emerged from data which indicated that the venture, for unstated reasons, is 
inadequate with regards to its social mission. Tables 23, 24, and 42 (in Appendix F) provide exemplary data on this code group. 
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improve evaluated ventures despite understanding the venture’s immediate 
investment potential. 
 
 
Figure 22: Most frequent criteria applied at different stages of evaluation 
Results from regarding another reason for ejection suggest provide 
evidence for this narrative. For example, in all week segments in which the 
SVC makes rejections, the top reason for rejection was that venture was 
not currently fundraising. This is surprising, because unlike social impact-
related, or even some commercial attributes, whether a venture is pursuing 
an equity fundraising round is an easy attribute for the SVC to test for (i.e., 
does not require weeks). The data provide two explanations for this 
outcome, although there may be more. First, the SVC often wrote notes 
such as, “Not raising. Stay in touch for raise in Q3” (IC Minutes). This 
suggests that the SVC engages with ventures, and reaches out to ventures, 
prior to a real investment opportunity. The second explanation is a 
possibility that SVCs are misled by ventures. In one internal document 
prepared by the SVC, they wrote, “Venture decided to not take [VC] 
investment [after we] connected to grant making bodies, legal counsel, 
advice, connections to potential clients” (795, Internal document). These 
data provide evidence for the finding that the SVC’s goal in evaluating 
investment proposals is, surprisingly, not to identify immediate targets for 
investment. The criteria set applied by the SVC suggests they have high 
standards for investment, but that the investment proposal evaluation 
process itself is not for the sole goal of identifying immediate investments. 
This fundamentally challenges the assumed parallel between  social VC 
and VC decision-making. We elaborate on this finding in our discussion.  
Another surprising finding, among the top reasons for ejection, is the 
Firm’s use of the “soft pass.” The data reveals that, in this case, the Firm 
would indicate “no further [investment] action,” and simultaneously 
continue to support and engage ventures, staying in “close touch,” 
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conducting “monthly check-ins” (SVC database). Fieldwork revealed that 
these engagements benefited some ventures, helping them to access 
incubation, grant-funding, or other connections, but might have led to false 
hope in others—an outcome the SVC was particularly attentive to. 
One of the SVC’s decision-makers expressed the following 
sentiment regarding an exchange with a venture, “They were like, ‘you 
could have made the decision earlier.’ Like they kind of felt led down the 
garden path” (VC3, Venture 803, Fieldwork). This comment was part of a 
larger spontaneous reflection, observed during fieldwork,  
“When we say that we just want to help, like are we actually being 
hugely negative? Are we actually having… Are we not being 
helpful? Because if we’re not truly committed to the deal, should we 
say that we’re not truly committed to the deal? […]  I thought 
[Venture 1241] could be interesting if they pivoted. But not so much 
that I would back and bat for them no matter what. […] So, should 
we do that? Right? Where we’re actually trying to be helpful, but we 
actually do more damage because they waste their time speaking to 
us where we think that this could be interesting to us, but we’re not 
sure. [Then again,] I think that if we had started this conversation 
with ‘I want to help you but we’re never going to invest.’ They would 
tell you, well, [buzz] off then, why are you wasting my time?” (VC3, 
Fieldwork). 
 
Frequency 
rank Reason for ejection by code group 
Top Five Reasons for Ejection 
Overall Week segment 1-2 3-6 7-12 13-24 25+ 
1 Venture not currently raising ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
2 Social mission (general) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
3 Value proposition (general)   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
4 Soft pass ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  
5 Venture did not respond  ✔ ✔  ✔  
6 Venture stage (too early) ✔ ✔     
7 Venture stage (too late) ✔  ✔    
8 Product-market fit (limited traction)    ✔  ✔ 
9 Venture stage (valuation too large)     ✔  
10 Finance (revenue model)      ✔ 
11 Investment made     ✔ ✔ 
 Total number of decisions 1,614 1,078 219 127 96 94 
Table 25: Most frequent criteria applied at different stages of evaluation  
To check if this social VC was leading ventures on longer than other 
VCs, we compared our results with the only other example of a 
longitudinal study of a traditional VC, and we find that the pace of 
evaluation is roughly similar, and even faster, particularly for the last 8% 
of the pipeline. In the 8 months it took the SVC to decide on 98% of all its 
investment proposals (see Figure 22, above), a traditional VC studied by 
Petty and Gruber (2011) decided on 90% of submitted investment 
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proposals from their evaluation process (see Figure 46 in Appendix G for 
comparative graph).  
This extension to the analysis demonstrates how the the social VC’s 
dualistic orientation affected evaluation at different stages of the evaluation 
process. Interestingly, this section indicates clues into the evaluation 
process of the VC and which types of investment proposals they may be 
receiving. Overall, our findings indicate that social VCs do not only use a 
different evaluation criteria set in their decision-making, but perhaps due to 
their different investment proposal sourcing techniques (see Figure 18), 
they may receive much earlier-stage, and more malleable ventures, which 
demand a style of engagement fundamentally different from traditional 
VCs. 
 
Discussion 
This study conducted an in-depth, exploratory, longitudinal case 
study of a social VC based in a major city in Western Europe. Leveraging 
the “front-row seats” we received through privileged data access in applied 
inductive, qualitative analysis—with a high degree of reliability—we were 
able to identify 1,614 investment outcomes, and investigate, in each case, 
the fine-grained reason for ejection. These reasons for ejection included 
intentional reasons for rejection related to commercial concerns and social 
mission concerns—intentionally driven by the evaluation and decision-
making process of the SVC—as well as, circumstantial reasons for 
ejection, and, finally, venture-driven reasons for ejection (i.e., the venture 
declines the offer).  
In doing so, this study offers the first nomenclature of impact 
investing derived from a large sample of actual decisions—data which is 
not only high in internal and ecological validity, but also, generalizable to 
early-stage investors (which has not usually been the case in impact 
investing research). Our coding process confirms what the literature says 
about the use of social and commercial filters. We uncover fine-grained 
data on the SVC’s use of both commercial and social filters and find that 
the rate at which the SVC applies non-social-mission-related criteria is 
three times75 the rate at which it applies social-mission-related criteria.  
Moreover, in the latter phases of our coding process, informed by 
researcher reflexivity, the study uncovers additional evidence of how 
SVC’s translate dual commercial and social concerns into its selection and 
evaluation process. In particular, social mission concerns do not only 
translate to the decision-making process in the form of filters (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2015; Rudd, 1981), but also serve as lenses which help the SVC 
to better understand the venture’s potential from a commercial perspective. 
Moreover, the study reveals that the SVC’s dualistic approach allows 
                                                                        
75 This 3x multiple includes circumstantial reasons for rejection and VC-firm specific reasons in non-social-mission-related. 
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“objective” venture attributes to inform both venture-mission-related and 
commercial criteria.  
Lastly, among ventures under consideration for greater than two 
weeks, the study finds high variation in the length of the evaluation period, 
even when holding the reason for venture rejection constant. The 
evaluation outcomes uncovered in this study suggest that the SVC prolongs 
the formal evaluation period to help improve evaluated ventures despite 
understanding the venture’s immediate investment potential. These 
findings have implications for the literature at the crossroads of venture 
capital decision-making and hybrid organizing. 
 
Implications for hybridity and venture capital decision-making 
Our study complements and contrasts traditional studies on investor 
decision-making in several ways. With regards to venture capital research, 
this study challenges the view of venture capitalists as rational and 
objective information processors (Khan, 1986). While the venture 
capitalist’s imagined role was to assesses an opportunity existing in the real 
world, and to make decisions based on what the opportunity might yield 
for herself and for the firm (Chrisman, Hoy, & Robinson, 1987; Hall & 
Hofer, 1993; MacMillan et al., 1985, 1987; Poindexter, 1976; Wells, 
1975), this study demonstrates, first of all, that commercially-driven 
decision-makers may explicitly choose to integrate social concerns into 
their evaluation criteria and practices. Moreover, this study shows that the 
SVC may do this both at a commercial cost to itself, as well as, as a way to 
improve its commercial prospects. 
Second, this study demonstrates how investors do this. The literature 
indicates an SVCs’ role is to “provide capital and value-added activities” to 
“social enterprises [that] exhibit a potential for a high social impact” 
(Scarlata & Alemany, 2010: 123–124). However, what exhibiting potential 
for a high social impact actually means in terms of selection criteria and 
investment proposal attributes has, until this study, remained unclear. 
Moreover, the degree to which SVCs— who claim to be driven by a dual 
social-commercial identity—actually apply these criteria has not 
previously been confirmed. This study, however, reveals the specific 
commercial and social venture attributes sought by impact investors, and 
the frequency at which they reject ventures which do not fulfill these 
requirements.  
The commercial criteria applied by the SVC mirrors traditional 
criteria present in the traditional VC decision-making literature, including 
the venture’s offer—how compelling the product, service and underlying 
technology is—(Silva, 2004); finances—current cash flows, revenue 
sources and financial projections (Petty & Gruber, 2011); market—the 
size, growth rates and level of competition in targeted markets and 
industries (Gruber et al., 2015); commercialization strategy—venture 
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strategy and route to market; team—founding team commitment and 
relevance of management and technology experience (Franke et al., 2008; 
Goslin & Barge, 1986; Robinson, 1987; Zopounidis, 1994); as well as 
valuation—price of equity and other deal characteristics (Muzyka, Birley, 
& Leleux, 1996). The latter social-mission-related criteria also confirm 
what we know from the social investing literature, including inclusionary 
criteria (“investment targeting” across focus areas) and exclusionary 
criteria (the avoidance of potentially harmful business sectors).  
These contributions join work by other scholars considering the 
social and psychological characteristics of investors, such as passion 
(Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012; Shepherd, 2015) and social motivation 
(Allison et al., 2014), by offering rich data on how investors who are 
socially motivated select and evaluate investments. Generally, the inclusion 
of multiple (non-financial) perspectives has not been embraced in the 
investor decision-making literature, considering social motivation as a 
factor that hinders objectivity and accuracy.  
Our study, however, differs from past studies in our extended 
empirical illustration of how social and commercial identities translate into 
decision-making—in our case, these were not only translated into filtering 
criteria, but also used as framing devices (“lenses”), which “gave” value to 
“objective” venture attributes. Our findings on lenses have two 
implications. The first implication relates to cognitive framing as an 
evaluation tool. In particular, the study finds that social-mission-related 
criteria are not only a set of exclusionary criteria applied to investment 
proposals prior to, or following, a “traditional” evaluation, but that these 
criteria also serve as a lens that can be used by socially-motivated 
managers who are considered to be important traditional business actors. 
These findings suggest that viewing traditional business attributes through 
the lens of a social mission can help managers understand the degree to 
which a business’s social mission provides an advantage in traditional 
business areas, as well as the contrary, that viewing social attributes 
through the lens of traditional VC criteria can help managers determine 
whether a business can compete in a traditional commercial sense. 
The second implication combines philosophy with practical 
implications. The social-constructivist perspective we bring when 
discussing the use of social and commercial concerns as lenses somewhat 
aligns with recent work revealing bias in investor decision-making (Franke 
et al., 2008; Gompers, Mukharlyamov, & Xuan, 2012; Kanze, Huang, 
Conley, & Higgins, 2017). This stream of research argues that experience 
shapes the interpretation of the opportunity before a decision-maker’s eyes 
(Baron & Ensley, 2006). Likewise, we also challenge the traditional 
paradigm in investor decision-making wherein investors evaluate 
“objective” venture attributes that exist in reality. These venture attributes 
may not only be fluid and changing, but their actual presence may be 
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shaped by the perspective of evaluator, and their individual or firm-specific 
worldviews (Freeman, 2004; Rorty, 1981). 
Finally, by illustrating how SVCs use components of a venture’s 
“objective” social attributes to construct a narrative about the venture’s 
overall commercial potential, and by illustrating how SVCs use 
components of a venture’s “objective” commercial attributes to construct a 
narrative about the venture’s overall social potential, we join researchers 
looking at the role of narratives and sense-making in the investment 
process (Navis & Glynn, 2011). But while others studying venture 
narratives have tended to look at the narrative spun by the entrepreneur 
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007), we take the investor’s 
perspective.  
These two distinctive features of our study empirically address a 
longstanding debate on the ability of organizations with dual identities, 
particularly, resource-providers, to integrate the concerns of both identities 
(Jegen, 1998).   
 
Practical implications 
From a practical perspective, this study represents the first decision-
making nomenclature of social venture selection criteria derived from 
actual investment decisions. In theory, we have illustrated the key 
attributes which can enable innovative, social ventures to obtain funding 
and contribute to economic, technological and social development 
(Baumol, 1990; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986; Zacharakis, Shepherd, & 
Coombs, 2003). 
 For entrepreneurs, the number of failed investment outcomes 
(rejections and ejections) due to firm-specific and circumstantial reason, 
suggests that entrepreneurs should research and prioritize the general 
concept of venture-investor fit. Moreover, mission-related venture 
attributes suggest that socially-motivated ventures should actively develop 
and articulate this component of their investment offer when approaching 
social investors. 
Finally, our study also uncovers numerous circumstantial reasons for 
rejection, which have not received much information from the literature 
(for rare examples, see: Achleitner, Spiess-Knafl, & Volk, 2014; Petty & 
Gruber, 2011), despite playing, in our setting (and likely in others), a large 
role in the venture fundraising experience. For example, these contextual 
factors—related to venture responsiveness or the practicalities of closing a 
deal (e.g., failure to negotiate an investment ticket)—were responsible for a 
large portion of venture outcomes in our sample (12.6%). These findings 
suggest that entrepreneurs may be able to differentiate themselves beyond 
the traditional commercial or social and venture attributes by paying 
attention to other factors not emphasized in the literature, e.g., following up 
with unresponsive investors, finding creative investment terms or 
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incentives for investors, becoming better negotiators. On the investor side, 
implementing efficient follow-up and capacity management systems may 
help them to attract—or at least, not lose—promising ventures despite not 
having a strong reputation in either the social investing or venture capital 
industry (Hsu, 2004). 
 
Limitations and further research 
Although inductive, exploratory research designs are not chosen for 
their representativeness (Siggelkow, 2007), we know that “many, if not 
most, organizations are hybrids composed of multiple types” (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985: 270). Moreover, despite scholarly and managerial interest 
in this phenomenon, the field’s conceptual and quantitative research have 
not been derived from longitudinal, inductive, empirical efforts. While we 
do investigate 1,614 investment outcomes from data with high internal and 
ecological validity, these investment outcomes still pertain to the decisions 
of a single investment firm, one that is based in Europe. Therefore, we 
cannot generalize our findings to respective industries of early-stage 
investors, social venture capitalists, or impact investors. While the impact 
investing community is a close-knit, international group (Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014), our setting still reflects the realities of a European 
firm, rather than, for example, a North American firm—the setting of most 
early-stage investment research (Berglund, 2011). This creates an 
opportunity for future comparative investor decision-making research, 
particularly research on investor decision-making across different cultures 
(Han & Shavitt, 1994; Harb & Smith, 2008), institutional contexts (Grilli & 
Murtinu, 2014; Li, Vertinsky, & Li, 2014; Nofsinger & Wang, 2011), and 
geographies (Manigart, Wright, Robbie, Desbrieres, & De Waele, 1997; 
Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). 
Moreover, while we were present for seven months of non-
participant observation, our sample covers four additional years for which 
we were not present. If there were lapses or inconsistencies in the SVC’s 
documentation of investment decisions in prior years, our sample would 
not have reflected this. On this note, it is likely that the SVC we studied 
kept a perfect log of each venture encounter, and each reason for rejection. 
In fact, 75 percent of our sample lists only one main reason for rejection. 
While we incorporated other reasons for rejection when data allowed and 
while we analyzed these data according to the main reason and according 
to a weighted distribution (if the venture had multiple reasons for 
rejection), we lack a precise and consistent ranking of rejection reasons 
from the investor. Once constructs of interest to the investment decision 
have been established through internally and ecologically valid data, this 
creates an opportunity for research on social investor decision making 
using experimental methods wherein investors can systematically rank 
preferences (Gruber et al., 2015; Miller & Wesley II, 2010). 
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Finally, while this study found intriguing results for the top reasons 
for rejection when viewed by duration of engagement in weeks, given that 
we focused our analysis on the investment decision outcome, we were 
unable to fully explain why one of the top reasons for ejection in the 
evaluation process was related to the venture’s decision not to raise equity.  
We discuss two possible reasons. First, the SVC may be developing 
relationships with ventures prior to a real investment opportunity. Second, 
SVCs may also be more likely to be misled by ventures. However, perhaps 
SVCs are less “aggressive” than VCs, engage with ventures prior to 
checking and confirming that there is an investment opportunity. The SVC 
may be engaging with the venture without the expectation of participating 
in the investment round. Perhaps SVCs are interacting with a different pool 
of potential ventures than traditional VCs—e.g., ones that are earlier stage, 
or who intend to target grant money (due to their social mission). Or, 
finally, perhaps interacting with the SVC has changed the venture’s mind 
about raising equity financing.  
This suggests that in order to truly understand how early-stage 
impact investors select and evaluate investment proposals, we must 
investigate the process more deeply over the length of the evaluation 
process. While investigating the investment outcomes has shed light on the 
criteria used and how they are applied, analysis of the application of 
criteria over time suggests that, in order to truly understand the priorities 
and decision-making of SVCs, we need more data points in between the 
time at which a venture enters SVC consideration and the time a venture 
leaves the SVC’s consideration; we also need to examine the micro-events 
between submission and investment outcome.76  
An ethnographic investigation of venture-VC interactions prior to 
the investment decision (cf. Croce, Martí, & Murtinu, 2013; Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989) represents a future research opportunity which may 
address intriguing questions emerging from this study. Research on 
venture-VC relationship development suffers from the same lack of access 
to data as research on investor decision-making (Huang & Knight, 2017). 
However, given the importance and difficulty of accessing resources for 
young (especially young dual-identity) organizations (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Harding, 2007; Lyon & Ramsden, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013), we 
join scholars who call for more research on investor decision-making that 
combines commercial and prosocial identities (Austin et al., 2006; 
Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2015; Short et al., 2009). 
 
Conclusions 
For supporters of social projects, the emergence of impact investors 
presents an exciting source of new financial and non-financial resources. 
                                                                        
76 For a variance model of this process, see Figure 36 in the Findings section of Chapter 4. 
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Research has documented criteria and processes related to socially-
dominant (Scarlata et al., 2012) and commercially-dominant investors 
(Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Wells, 1975). However, little is known about for-
profit investors who invest at the “frontier” of social engagement, that is, 
emphasizing commercial outcomes and social outcomes in their 
investments, beyond legal requirements or mainstream market trends, and 
investing at an early stage. Moreover, empirical investigations based on 
longitudinal, fine-grained data from actual decision-making data remain 
rare and without strong empirical or theoretical grounding (Daggers & 
Nicholls, 2016; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Suddaby, 2006). 
This study responds to this opportunity by investigating beyond 
high-level “espoused” preferences described in past work on social and 
commercial investing (Argyris & Schon, 1974), developing a fine-grained 
study of actual impact investor decision-making in its rich context. In 
addition to separately understanding how social VCs translate their social 
and commercial preferences into actual selection criteria on a deal-by-deal 
basis, this study sought to understand what actually happens when these 
two goal sets are combined, and how these social and commercial concerns 
relate to each other during the decision-making process. Finally, while this 
study may not have managed to fully open up the black box of impact 
investor decision-making, it has possibly made a hole in it, through which 
some light shines.  
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IV. Heart Money  
- How Social Investors Evaluate and Shape Social-Commercial Duality in New 
Ventures   
What I liked about [the Partner of our investment firm] is that he still 
maintained some margin of doubt… Like, if he really likes the 
entrepreneur but the business model is not robust, he would still 
bet on the venture and say, “let’s see if we can help him, let’s 
see if we can make it more investible.” And if that’s the case, 
we’ll take it forward, whereas I think most of the people, or 
maybe the people that I am used to, they’re not very visionary. 
Yes, so maybe visionary is a good way to summarize that.  
— Interview with analyst at social venture capital firm 
 
Identity is never a priori, nor a finished product; it is only ever the 
problematic process of access to an image of totality. 
                 — Bhabha (1994: 51), as cited by Howard (2000) 
 
 
Introduction77 
Popular television comedy Silicon Valley features a satirical 
promotional video of startup founders claiming to “make the world a better 
place” through their software companies. The minute-long segment is 
intended to be a critique what one of the show’s writers called “capitalism 
shrouded in the fake hippie rhetoric of, ‘We’re making the world a better 
place,’ [versus] ‘Hey, we’re crushing it and making money’” (Marantz, 
2016). Part of the segment’s appeal is the expert juxtaposition of a social 
welfare ethos and a commercial profit ethos. This pairing is a paradox 
which has intrigued scholars for decades (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pratt, 
                                                                        
77 Data collection and analyses in this study were led by the author of this thesis. A second author, Marc Gruber, provided 
constructive comments to the research proposal that was presented to the Firm (described in the Methods section of this chapter), as 
well as, invaluable suggestions during the fieldwork and data analysis period, notably serving as an external perspective or devil’s 
advocate. These suggestions served to reduce “over-imaginative” interpretations of the data (Van Maanen, 1979). This study also 
benefitted from feedback from Julia Binder, Shirah Foy, Giada Baldessarelli and Fernando Suarez. All errors are the authors’ own. 
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2016). Increasingly, both social and commercial identities can be found 
within a single firm (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 
2009) and yet, the combination surprises—and sometimes, entertains—
because these two identities are not expected to go together (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985).  
Recent texts argue that the surprising pairings found in hybrid—also 
called dualistic—firms create incompatible demands that make these 
organizations unstable and prone to conflict and tension (Ashforth & 
Reingen, 2014; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). In addition to these organizational outcomes, a firm’s 
hybrid identity itself has been theorized to be unsustainable and prone to 
collapse (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Jegen, 1998; Jones, 2007). 
However, these findings have not prevented public and private 
actors from investing in hybrid organizations and in particular, in social-
commercial hybrid organizations (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; The Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014). In some cases, the potential benefits 
of duality appear to be so crucial to top managers that organizations 
intentionally seek to create conditions of hybridity within their own 
structures (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2017).  
Moreover, a rich body of research has demonstrated that hybridity 
can be sustained within organizations for long periods of time, and has 
pointed to the role of organizational strategies, or “patterns in a stream of 
decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1982, 1985) in enabling these positive organizational 
and hybridity outcomes (e.g., Smith & Besharov, 2017). The role of 
organically-developed and internally-driven organizational processes on 
hybridity have led to great practical and theoretical insights (Besharov & 
Smith, 2014; Murray, 2010; Perkmann & Spicer, 2014; Pache & Santos, 
2010; Smith & Besharov, 2017). These processes shed light on why 
hybridity has been found to be beneficial to some organizations and not to 
others (Besharov & Smith, 2014). However, we still do not understand to 
what extent the effectiveness of these processes depend on being internally 
and/or organically driven, and consequently, to what extent third-party 
intervention can improve the stability and functioning of other hybrids. 
(i.e., outside the focal hybrid organization). Indeed, the majority of 
research on organizational outcomes of hybridity have focused on a focal 
hybrid firm, or set of firms (Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Roca, 2016; Jay, 2013; 
Tracey et al., 2011). 
The lack of research on how organizations may systematically and 
proactively deal with hybridity in other organizations is surprising given 
our practical and conceptual understanding of the influential role of third 
parties. Since organizations are socially situated, they depend on cross-
boundary processes for the transfer of key resources (Binder, 2007; Huang 
& Knight, 2017). These resources confer legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
and other markers of social status (Hsu, 2004)—so much so that the 
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literature encourages emerging organizations to seek “smart money,” 
financial capital that comes with value-adding activities (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004; Ingstad, Knockaert, & Fassin, 2014). Moreover, research 
has shown dyadic relationships to be critical to the development and 
maintenance of organizational identity, with the power to sustain contested 
identities in some organizations (Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 
2012). 
To extend our understanding of hybridity in organizations, this study 
builds on a 21-month in-depth inductive case study on a social Venture 
Capital (VC) firm, defined as an equity investment firm seeking 
investments in social ventures—early-stage, privately-owned companies 
who offer effective (and potentially profitable) solutions to critical social 
issues such as poverty, or environmental degradation (Dacin, Dacin, & 
Tracey, 2011; Santos et al., 2015). Like the social ventures78 they fund, 
Social VC firms (SVCs) exhibit a dual social welfare and commercial 
profit identity (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010; Scarlata, Zacharakis, & Walske, 
2016). In this context, frequent exchanges occur between one dual-identity 
organization (with considerable expertise in organizational duality, as a 
funder of such organizations) and a heterogeneous sample of other 
dualistic79 organizations (i.e., hybrids with varied approaches to generating 
revenue and pursuing social missions).  
Although this study is situated in the literature of organizational 
identity and identity duality (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017; 
Pratt, 2016), this study was originally motivated by the phenomenological 
curiosity: How do social VCs select and evaluate investment proposals? 
We explain in this paper how our exploratory, inductive and reflexive 
approach, combined with an iterative dialogue between our data and the 
literature, led us to refine our research question to: How do hybrid resource 
providers assess and influence the plausibility of new venture identity 
claims among hybrid ventures? 
To foreshadow our findings, we found that the studied SVC firm 
evaluates investment proposals and assesses new venture identities, as the 
literature implies (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Martens, Jennings, & 
Jennings, 2007; Miller & Wesley II, 2010). However, the SVC also plays a 
role beyond the assessment of emerging identities, and actually, helps to 
shape the identity of evaluated ventures. By way of creating an appropriate 
hybrid investment opportunity for itself, the SVC offers both smart 
money—money accompanied by value-adding activities that support a 
                                                                        
78 In the following pages “venture” or “new venture” will be used to refer to the ventures that submitted their investment proposal for 
evaluation by a Social Venture Capital firm. We may also refer to the venture’s “investment proposal.” 
79 Organizational hybridity occurs when “identities” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000), “organizational forms” (Tracey, 
Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), “logics” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), or “other core organizational elements” that 
would not normally be expected to go together (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017). This thesis is situated in the literature 
about a type of organizational hybridity that occurs as a result of dual organizational identities (Pratt, 2016), also referred to in the 
literature as identity duality, duality, dualistic identity, and hybridity (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2017). The 
term “hybrid” is used in most cases to refer to our focus: hybrids with a social-commercial duality. 
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commercial opportunity—and heart money, a term introduced to describe 
money accompanied by value-adding activities that support social 
opportunities embedded within commercial opportunity. In doing so, the 
SVC enables a legitimate hybrid identity to emerge in new ventures—a 
foundational development with cascading implications for the venture’s 
ability to establish additional exchange relationships and acquire resources 
which further support its hybrid identity (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury 
& Glynn, 2001; Navis & Glynn, 2011).  
This study distinguishes itself from research on hybrid organizing in 
two key ways. First, past work on hybrid organizing featured in-depth 
studies of research subjects selected because of what these few 
organizations, with pre-established hybrid qualities, could demonstrate 
about organizational management of duality (Ramus, Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 
2017; Smith & Besharov, 2017). This study, on the other hand, conducts a 
cross-sectional study of a focal hybrid firm’s interactions with hundreds of 
emerging organizations, with emerging and varied hybrid qualities. Indeed, 
the investor’s perspective offers a window to a large heterogeneous pool of 
resource-seeking organizations with varying degrees of hybridity. 
Moreover, these organizations differ in their ability to obtain investment 
from our focal firm. From this vantage point we can observe which 
strategies are applied to which resource-seeking ventures, to which ends, 
and finally, tie hybrid outcomes and hybrid organizing strategies to a 
performance variable.80  
Second, while past work on hybrid organizing has documented how 
organizational duality leads to organizational conflict and tension (Binder, 
2007; Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002), this body of work has tended to feature 
ideographic hybrids—also called specialized hybrids (Albert & Whetten, 
1985). These are hybrids in which dual identities are harbored by two 
separate internal groups and thus, tend to experience conflict and tension 
(e.g., Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Golden-
Biddle & Rao, 1997). Fewer studies have been conducted on holographic 
hybrids—organizations in which all members jointly hold dual identities 
(Smith & Besharov, 2017)—and in which duality may be less conflict-
prone due to the two identities being “diffused evenly throughout the entire 
organization” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 271). The SVC selected for this 
study is a holographic hybrid seeking investments in other holographic 
hybrids. 
By taking this differentiated approach, this study contributes to the 
literature on organizational identity emergence, hybrid organizing and 
entrepreneurial bricolage. As the literature explains, organizational identity 
depends on member-agents’ responses to the question “who are we as an 
                                                                        
80 In this way, are able to access a larger sample and fuller spectrum of potential outcomes resulting from a single organization’s 
processes. We follow other scholars by using funding outcomes as an indicator of performance (Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 
2016). 
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organization?” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006). As such, past 
research has tended to focus on the organization itself, its internal 
processes, founding team, and social goals (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; 
Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Pache & Santos, 
2013). While this has allowed researchers to build a strong understanding 
of organizational identity and its evolution (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 
2000; Ashforth & Mael, 1989), a boundary condition of the relevance of 
past research is the initial ability of the emerging organization (including 
emerging hybrids) to survive the early stages. So, while Albert and 
Whetten’s (1985) conceptualization of organization identity does depend 
on internal organizational self-concept (Whetten, 2006), the startup phases 
of an organization’s life relies more than usual on external stimuli to 
confirm if claims about its capabilities and targeted market opportunity are 
plausible (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Navis & Glynn, 2011; Stinchcombe, 1965). Hence, by investigating the 
process through which investors determine that an identity is plausible, or, 
in the words of one of our research subjects, if “this venture has legs” 
(Interview with Partner of Firm), we intervene at a critical and foundational 
point in the organizational identity emergence phase.  
With regards to hybrid organizing, this study considers the role of a 
critical partner in the emergence of hybrid organizations. Notably, the 
study illustrates the influential role that third-parties can play in shaping 
organizational duality in other organizations, a role that has tended to be 
overlooked in the literature on hybrid organizing and investor decision-
making (for a rare exception, see: Ingstad et al., 2014). Our study considers 
the exchange networks in which ventures are embedded as more than a 
social context and shows that holographic resource-providers can actively 
join ventures in proposing, testing and developing claims about its 
emerging entrepreneurial identity. The study empirically traces the inter-
organizational processes through which this occurs, with attention to the 
large number of new (social) ventures that fail (Lyons & Kickul, 2013), 
catalyzing a discussion on which actors, relationships and partnerships are 
necessary for a plausible (hybrid) organizational identity to emerge.  
Finally, to the literature on entrepreneurship, we contribute to the 
understanding of entrepreneurial bricolage strategies by demonstrating the 
transferability of an effectual mindset (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 
2001). Social venture capitalists—although they do possess financial 
resources—are operating in contexts of higher uncertainty than later-stage 
funders in for-profit and non-profit funds. Moreover, their two-pronged 
criteria set further reduces their pool of investable targets to choose—as 
compared to traditional investors or philanthropists (Nicholls & Pharoah, 
2008). Therefore, competition faced by SVCs for an investment allocation 
in the pool of promising social ventures is intense. As a result, whichever 
resources possessed by an SVC are comparatively negligible, essentially 
placing SVCs in a resource-constrained position—albeit a different kind of 
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resource constraint. We observed regular perspective-taking on behalf of 
the SVC, taking on the mindset of the resource-strapped ventures they 
evaluated and “pursuing [investment] opportunities beyond resources 
controlled” (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). This perspective allows the SVC 
to engage in bricolage-like strategies. We show how the semi-directed 
process of bricolage, based on personal resources and values (Perkmann & 
Spicer, 2014), is conducted in dyads, across organizational boundaries. 
When successful, the SVC’s bricolage resulted in a co-created investment 
opportunity for itself and an entrepreneurial opportunity for the venture, 
supporting research suggesting that bricolage in (pro)social settings can be 
especially generative (Bacq, Ofstein, Kickul, & Gundry, 2015). 
The following section describes the theoretical and empirical context 
of this study in more detail, referring to prior work on the topic. We then 
present our methods, analyses, and our findings. The paper closes with a 
discussion of our findings, its limitations and directions for further 
research.  
Theoretical context 
In this section, we describe the theoretical context in which we chose 
to situate our study, which emerged through an inductive process. Of 
interest to this study are the challenges that duality poses for organizations, 
and the relationship between these challenges and the overall plausibility of 
new venture identities, which we define as “the constellation of claims 
around the founders, organization, and market opportunity of an 
entrepreneurial entity that gives meaning to questions of ‘who we are’ and 
‘what we do’” (Navis & Glynn, 2011: 980). 
 
The Trouble with Identity Duality  
Understanding organizational identity has long been seen as vital to 
understanding organizational action. Beliefs about “who are we as an 
organization” (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006) provide a “set of 
‘ultimate whys’ for planning, explaining and justifying [collective] action” 
(Whetten & Mackey, 2002: 396). When stories about “who we are” and 
“what we do” are simple and coherent, decision-making is easier for 
managers (Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Voss, Cable, & 
Voss, 2006). Top managers can draw from a clear and coherent shared 
cognitive template as they analyze issues, threats, conflicts, market 
opportunities, and strategic responses (Foreman & Whetten, 2002). Yet 
sometimes an organization is a hybrid, meaning that it “considers itself 
(and others consider it) alternatively, or even simultaneously, to be two 
different types of organizations,” combining two identities that would “not 
normally be expected to go together” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270).  
Hybridity in organizations is problematic because it challenges 
organizational identity as a reliable compass for managers to use to direct 
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organizational action. Hybridity creates uncertainty around which 
principles—or combination of principles—will guide organizational 
thinking or behavior at any given time (Battilana et al., 2017), an 
uncertainty which adversely affects organizational performance (Voss et 
al., 2006). 
Social-commercial hybrids, and social ventures in particular, have 
been theorized to face disadvantages as well. Straddling the two worlds of 
social welfare and commercial profit often means that these organizations 
do not benefit from prêt-à-porter business models (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010)—models of businesses which combine both social and commercial 
goals which can easily be applied to their situation. Frequently, these 
models are not cognitively available (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), are 
difficult to find, or require considerable work to adapt them to an 
entrepreneur’s goals (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977; Lok, 2010). Finding appropriate legal structures and forms of 
representation pose another issue and often require significant efforts to be 
adapted to the entrepreneur’s situation (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 
2012; Haigh, Kennedy, & Walker, 2015; Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008).  
In part due to the difficulty of addressing these challenges, prior 
work shows hybridity in organizaitons leads to tension (Pratt & Rafaeli, 
1997; Zilber, 2002), conflict (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Glynn, 2000), 
actual organizational failure (Tracey et al., 2011), or de facto failure, 
through the collapse of hybridity, whereby the organization survives but 
(either intentionally or unwillingly) must abandon one identity (Ebrahim et 
al., 2014; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015; Yue, Wang, & Yang, 2018). 
 
Making Duality Work 
Despite these challenges, not all organizations have shunned duality. 
In several cases, organizations, usually driven by their founder, view 
duality as somewhat indispensable and intentionally seek to create 
conditions of hybridity within their own structures, infusing the 
organization with two distinct, and at times, conflicting identities (Fauchart 
& Gruber, 2011; Powell & Baker, 2017). For example, the case of Alessi 
and Digital Data Divide, the founders respectively sought to integrate 
industry with art and a social mission with a business mission (Dalpiaz et 
al., 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2017). 
Moreover, extant research also suggests hybridity may not always 
lead to discord (Kraatz & Block, 2008), that conflict is an outcome of the 
organizational configuration (Besharov & Smith, 2014). The original 
conceptualization of hybrid organizations refers to two forms (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985). First, the specialized form—also called an ideographic 
form—hybrids in which two or more groups within the organization hold 
opposing, often emotionally-charged views on the appropriate source of 
action. Second, the holographic form—hybrids in which organizational 
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members jointly identify with the dual identities of their organization’s 
purpose and activities (Albert et al., 2000; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
Another classification put forth by Besharov and Smith’s (2014) 
conceptual study theorized that organizations can be classified into groups 
according to the compatibility and centrality of their dual identities (e.g., 
high-high, high-low, low-high, low-low) and that these features are 
responsible for explaining different levels of conflict experienced in hybrid 
organizations.  
Other empirical studies point to tools and strategies that hybrids can 
implement to reduce, avoid, or resolve conflicts arising from hybridity 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). For 
example, organizational structure (Perkmann, McKelvey, & Philips, 2018; 
Ramus et al., 2017; Smith & Besharov, 2017), processes (Ashforth & 
Reingen, 2014; Jay, 2013; Lok, 2010), language (Alvesson & Willmott, 
2002; Besharov, 2014; Fiol, 2002; Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 
2010), and other strategies (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pache & Santos, 
2013) have all been shown to be effective in managing the conflicts and 
tensions arising from the combination of two different organizational 
identities. 
Yet, despite this growing body of work, scholars point out that there 
is much we do not know about the “strategic and managerial consequences 
of trying to concurrently satisfy economic and social objectives” (Short et 
al., 2009: 176). For example, while Besharov and Smith’s (2014) 
framework on the implications of compatibility and centrality for 
performance in hybrid organizations makes intuitive sense, most managers 
and scholars struggle to translate how compatibility and centrality 
translates into organizational features and processes. Before these 
organizational features and processes can be changed, surely, organizations 
require an understanding of how to recognize and assess the relevant 
features and processes. 
 
Trouble, trouble, trouble 
In the first part of this section, we highlighted the possible negative 
consequences of hybridity, then we discussed potential organizational 
elements which can explain and/or reduce negative consequences. 
However, we face another hurdle in our understanding of hybridity. As 
mentioned, past work has suggested that hybrids can be classified into two 
groups (e.g., holographic/high compatibility hybrids versus 
ideographic/low compatibility hybrids). Yet, the literature remains unclear 
as to the malleability of these forms. Does scholarly classification of 
hybrids into these two groups refer to a pre-determined configuration of 
hybrids that, for convincing theoretical arguments, render certain hybrids 
(a) prone to conflict, tension, and other negative repercussions of hybridity, 
and renders others (b) immune to these repercussions? In other words, are 
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organizations sorted into groups (a) holographic/high compatibility, and (b) 
ideographic/low compatibility at “at birth” or, can compatibility be 
developed with good “parenting”? Or, do we have a combination of both 
“nature” and “nurture” effects, at least, within certain types of hybrids if 
not across all hybrids? 
If so, a number of relevant questions emerge. First, in the case that 
hybridity is pre-determined, how we might evaluate the plausibility that 
one organization belongs to group (b) and not group (a)? Second, in the 
case that there is no group (a) or (b), only low compatibility that can be 
developed and nurtured, which organizations are most qualified to be 
“caretakers,” and what are the boundary conditions around delivering the 
most effective “corrective” care? 
The literature has in fact already demonstrated that there are 
organizational strategies and processes which are effective in keeping dual 
identities in check (e.g., structured flexibility, safe spaces, lightning rods, 
hiring and socialization) (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014; Perkmann et al., 2018; Ramus et al., 2017). However, 
currently, the literature has depicted these corrective processes as 
organically-developed and primarily internally-directed (e.g., Ashforth & 
Reingen, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2017). We still know very little about 
the effect and effectiveness of directed, hybrid-identity-influencing 
processes between two firms (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Tracey et al., 
2011). 81  
Hence, in this study, we ask: How do hybrid resource providers 
assess and influence the plausibility of new venture identity claims among 
hybrid ventures? 
 
Empirical context 
This section introduces the broader empirical context of this study 
and points to qualities of theoretical interest.82 More detail on the study’s 
specific research setting can be found in the methods section. 
 
Social Venture Capital  
In the last few decades, expectations about who is responsible for 
addressing social and environmental problems has palpably changed 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014). On one hand, citizens are dissatisfied with 
traditional providers of social services, expressing record-levels of distrust 
in the government (Edelman Berland, 2014; Nye, 1997a, 1997b). On the 
other hand, businesses and investors understand the growing demand from 
                                                                        
81 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Pahnke and colleagues (2015) do discuss the influence of resource providers’ institutional logics in 
young firms, but do not address the question of hybridity. Wry and colleagues (2014) discuss hybridity and new venture evaluation, 
however, they do not address social-commercial hybridity, nor do they examine the evaluation process.   
82 An extended version of the study’s empirical context can be found in Appendix G. 
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stakeholders to engage in more prosocial (and more pro-environmental) 
behavior (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008; BlackRock, 2018; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Walsh, Meyer, & Schoonhoven, 2006). These 
combined two factors provide an opportunity for social ventures and social 
investors to interact. 
However, while social investors have been areas of great growth in 
the last few decades, they are also still a source of confusion, due to 
fragmentation in the overall industry, with multiple actors using the same 
terms to describe different approaches to investing and vice versa 
(Chiappini, 2017; Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Freireich & Fulton, 2009; 
Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015).83 Investing with the dual purpose of creating 
strong social and financial returns encompasses a number of different 
financial preferences (Chiappini, 2017; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015), 
investment structuring approaches (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010)—including 
different investment targets (e.g. early-stage, later stage, social themes, 
legal structures)—and financial instruments (e.g., equity, loans). 
SVCs, the focus of this study, operate in traditional venture capital 
structures84 and target early-stage ventures in a number of industries, have 
raised 10 billion USD to invest in social ventures since 2010 (Randjelovic, 
O’Rourke, & Orsato, 2003; Rheingold, 2017; Santos et al., 2015). They are 
like traditional VCs in that they expect their portfolio companies to 
generate revenue and eventually return cash to their investors (MacMillan, 
Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Unlike traditional 
VCs, social VCs also expect their investees to deliver on social outcomes 
(Scarlata & Alemany, 2010). Some funds also self-impose a social 
performance requirement on the managing partners of the firm, which 
prevent them from touching the financial gains from their investment (e.g., 
“carry”) if social performance indicators are not met (alongside financial 
indicators) (Fieldwork). An independent study referred to SVCs as “VCs 
first that intend to generate market-beating financial returns because of, not 
in spite of, [a social] impact-oriented investment thesis” (Rheingold, 2017).  
This provides a contrast to prior literature in this area, which has 
tended to focus on the concept of trade-offs, that an investor must either 
sacrifice rigor in the evaluation of a venture’s potential social contribution 
or, if she truly wishes to enable meaningful social outcomes, accept below 
                                                                        
83 For example, what we refer to as “Social Venture Capital” (Miller & Wesley II, 2010) is also referred to as “impact investing” 
(Rodin & Brandenburg, 2014), “blended value investing,” “double-bottom line” or “triple-bottom-line investing” (Harold, Spitzer, & 
Emerson, 2007), “community development venture capital” (Jegen, 1998), “developmental venture capital” (Rubin, 2009), “mission-
driven investing” (Kolodny, 2016), “patient capital” (Novogratz, 2010), “philanthrocapitalism” (McGoey, 2014), “philanthropic 
venture capital” (Scarlata & Alemany, 2010), “social investing” (Nicholls, 2010), “sustainable venture capital” (Bocken, 2015), and 
“venture philanthropy” (Healey & Hoyt, 2013; Moody, 2007; Pepin, 2005). At times, these terms are also lumped together with 
related but separate social investment styles from the commercial side—such as “Socially Responsible Investing” and 
“Environmental-Social-Governance Investing,” whose decision rules are primarily based on selective filters applied to publicly 
traded companies and physical assets (Irvine, 1987; Rudd, 1981; Yan, Ferraro, & Almandoz, 2018)—as well as from the social side, 
whereby terms such as “investment” are used, but refer to a charitable grant without the expectation of financial return (The 
European Venture Philanthropy Association, 2016). 
84 A traditional venture capital structure refers to a fund managed by a General Partner on behalf of Limited Partners whose money is 
being managed. 
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market-rate financial returns (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Grabenwarter & 
Liechtenstein, 2011). Essentially, the literature implies that investors must 
prioritize either financial outcomes (acting as a “finance-first” investor) or 
prioritize social outcomes (acting as an “impact first” investor), but they 
cannot pursue both and achieve competitive outcomes (Achleitner, Spiess-
Knafl, & Volk, 2014).  
One of the reasons why competitive outcomes are thought to be 
unattainable is due to the assumed negative interdependent relationship 
between social activities and financial activities within a firm, as echoed by 
one stream of hybrid organizing research. In the context of social investing, 
scholars caution that resource providers can limit hybridity in the 
organizations they fund by encouraging “mission-drift,” a phenomenon 
whereby organizations gradually come to prioritize demands of the 
commercial identity over the social one (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jegen, 
1998). Yet, much like the research on ideographic hybrid organizations, 
empirical work on resource providers that combine commercial and 
(pro)social identities is rare (Lyons & Kickul, 2013; Shepherd, 2015; 
Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). The new nature of this phenomenon 
suggests that young, dual-identity organizations may simply not have 
managed to raise funds, or perhaps they have, to date raised funds from 
inappropriate partners (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Harding, 2007; Lyon & 
Ramsden, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013). Thus, it is not certain that third-
party support in hybrid organizing tends to lead to hybridity collapse.  
In fact, theoretically it would follow that a holographic hybrid 
organization would seek investments in other holographic hybrid 
organizations with qualities they believed essential to success. Moreover, 
SVCs in this context would represent an important source of financial, 
social, and knowledge capital which could improve organizational 
outcomes for new ventures (Huang & Knight, 2017; Lyons & Kickul, 
2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). 
As such, social investors represent a viable window into the 
complexities of duality, as they seek out dualistic organizations they 
believe to have the markers of sustainable hybridity. We detail the 
empirical advantages of our context in the following section. 
 
Social Venture Capital as a Window into Organizational Identity Duality  
The primary reason why SVCs are intriguing as an organizational 
setting is due to the specificities of its hybrid nature. Theoretically, SVCs 
have the capacity to be ideographic or holographic hybrids, as they can be 
inhabited by two groups of individuals: one that identifies mostly with the 
(pro)social identity85 of the firm and one that mostly identifies with the 
                                                                        
85 Our identity construct of interest in this study is organizational and new venture identity, not social identity, which is a social-
cognitive, individual level construct. Hence, from time to time, we use the prefix “pro” in front of social to indicate the type of 
identity we are referring to (i.e., social welfare-related, driven by the desire to help others, prosocial). 
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firm’s commercial identity. In fact, this is what we have seen modeled by 
other hybrid financial institutions in the literature (e.g., the microfinance 
institution studied by Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Alternatively, SVCs may 
be populated only by individuals who jointly identify with the dual sides of 
the firm’s activities, rendering their firm’s identity as holographic (Albert 
& Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Whetten, 2006). 
From another theoretical perspective, SVCs have the capacity to be 
structured in a way that places the social and commercial identities at odds 
with each other (low compatibility), or which incentivizes the 
manifestation of both identities, for example by integrating both identities 
in “core features that are central to organizational functioning” (high 
centrality) (Besharov & Smith, 2014: 7).  
The extensive experience SVCs have in evaluating duality, in 
addition to the incentives they have to accurately assess organizations, also 
makes SVCs a potentially promising setting for research. The literature on 
emerging organizations suggests that access to resources is an indicator—if 
not a determinant—of success (Baum & Silverman, 2004; MacMillan et 
al., 1985; Starr & MacMillan, 1990), especially in young hybrids (Lyons & 
Kickul, 2013). While there is some debate on endogeneity, i.e., whether 
these “winners” are selected or made (Baum & Silverman, 2004), it is 
likely that SVCs, by way of reviewing and working with hundreds of 
ventures per year, may be able to provide some insight into dualistic 
attributes which indicate stability and performance. Compared to any other 
actor, such firms are likely to have developed some expertise in 
understanding the factors affecting performance in holographic forms of 
hybridity, making their perspective intriguing and informative (for a 
parallel, see: MacMillan et al., 1985).  
Finally, the perspective of an SVC offers access to investment 
decisions regarding a large sample of early-stage social-commercial 
organizations, one with high levels of internal validity that prior literature 
has not yet had access to (Dacin et al., 2011). The larger sample, combined 
with the positive and negative outcomes (regarding the investment 
decision) allow us to reduce survivorship bias (Denrell, 2005), and use 
funding outcomes from this expert social investor as a simple proxy for 
performance vis-à-vis the new venture identity (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Ter 
Wal et al., 2016).86  
 
Method 
Research Design 
For this study, we were particularly interested in the processes 
undertaken by SVCs to evaluate and act upon investment proposals and 
                                                                        
86 To be clear, we still maintain an inductive interest in the SVC process; our interest in the larger sample in this study is not for 
purposes of hypothesis testing beyond the pseudo-replication methods undertaken in qualitative studies. 
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inspired by methods used by other scholars studying dualistic settings 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Jay, 2013; Smith & Besharov, 2017). 
Although scholars begin to know more about the evaluation processes of 
early-stage investors (Guler, 2007; Huang, 2017; MacMillan et al., 1985; 
Wells, 1975), we did not know what to expect about the evaluation 
processes of organizations that combine social and commercial objectives, 
given the dearth of empirical work on this subject (Daggers & Nicholls, 
2016; Lyons & Kickul, 2013; Shepherd, 2015). Because the constructs of 
interest to our study and the relationships between them are poorly 
understood, subtle, contextual, and potentially complex, we conducted an 
inductive, in-depth, longitudinal, cross-sectional case study (Langley, 
1999; Mair, Wolf & Seelos, 2016; Yin, 2013). Our goal was to maximize 
construct validity, observing events in their natural state, with the goal of 
enabling theorizing and hypotheses-testing research later down the line 
(Delanty & Strydom, 2003; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Pettigrew, 
1990).  
 
Case Selection 
In the selection of our case, it was important for us to select a firm 
with the experience and incentives to evaluate hybrid organizations 
according to the dictates of their dual identity. Interactions with our 
selected case at associated conferences suggested that investing in 
profitable ventures that pursue solutions to critical social problems was an 
important objective for them. They often spoke about their refusal to make 
a financial or social “trade-off” in their investment decisions (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2015), a claim that emphasizes both social and commercial 
motivations.87  By selecting a case in which the social and commercial 
expectations of the organization are visible (Siggelkow, 2007), we are able 
to observe the effects of both the social and the commercial identity on the 
evaluation process.88 
While it is customary for empirical research on investors to rely on 
proxy settings or convenience samples, given the access and scheduling 
challenges in this population of interest (Miles & Huberman, 1994), this 
study did benefit from some degrees of freedom due to the significant 
resources we spent in developing personal and professional relationships in 
our initial fieldwork. 89 As part of the exploratory research and pre-
                                                                        
87 As we describe in detail later on, we began the research without expecting to find hybridity, but to observe the impact of prosocial 
motivation in a commercial context.  
88 Past research on organizational duality has characterized their setting as “extreme cases” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006), 
however, we remain open-minded about our setting’s external validity (Gibbert et al., 2008). Although inductive, exploratory 
research designs are not chosen for their representativeness (Siggelkow, 2007), we know that “many, if not most, organizations are 
hybrids composed of multiple types” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270) , and are were particularly aware that this research comes came 
at a time of change in our dominant institutional paradigms of research and practice (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton, & Margolis, 2012; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). Thus, while past work may have characterized 
the joint embrace of both identities as “extreme” we do not believe this is a helpful label in this study. 
89 The first author began more directed conversations regarding the possibility of conducting a separate study focused on SVC 
decision-making, three years ago, and pursued this conversation with firms which fit our sampling criteria. 
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screening conducted for this study, the first author actively participated in 
communities of interest—as is usually the case for authors of ethnographic 
studies—attending social entrepreneurship and social investment industry 
conferences, developing relationships with social entrepreneurs and 
investors, participating in online fora, and conducting multiple exploratory 
interviews (Costello, McDermott, & Wallace, 2017; Hammersley, 2006; 
Tunçalp & Lê, 2014). This allowed her to meet and discuss early-stage 
evaluation methods and techniques with dozens of investors and other 
informants. Participant observation at industry events helped to 
contextualize observational data from the Firm and helped her stay in touch 
with emic terms used in the industry (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 
1999; Morrow, 2005). It was through this initial fieldwork that the first 
author serendipitously met a member of the studied Firm and began to 
follow its activities.  
We sought firms with a dual social-commercial identity seeking 
investments in other social-commercial firms,90 a multi-industry focus, and 
extensive investment experience with early-stage companies, preferably 
with internal records on both accepted and rejected investment proposals in 
order to avoid, in our analysis, over-representing ventures that succeed in 
funding (Berk, 1983; Denrell, 2005) and allow us to draw some 
conclusions about evaluation processes and funding outcomes.  
Eventually, after discussing with the second author, the first author 
presented a formal research proposal to one social venture capital firm 
based in a major city in Western Europe. The Firm accepted our research 
proposal under the condition that the first author conduct regular onsite 
fieldwork, undergo a trial period, refrain from interfering in their 
processes, and protect their anonymity. (Hereafter, we use the terms “the 
Firm” or “the SVC” to refer to the investment firm’s organizational entity.)  
 
Research Setting 
The Firm is a social investment firm based in a major city in 
Western Europe in the 2010s making equity investments into early-stage 
social ventures. Their stated purpose is to invest in early-stage, high-
potential businesses seeking to generate not only compelling financial 
returns, but also societal returns ([Redacted], 2016a). They employ social 
investing strategy called investment targeting across five themes (Rudd, 
1981), associated with 10-year outcomes related to each theme 
([Redacted], 2017a). Any venture investment proposal that did not address 
poverty alleviation, education, environmental sustainability, healthcare or 
social relationships in the family and community were not considered for 
investment. 
                                                                        
90 We inferred social-commercial hybridity from a strong intent to address social issues, and high expected financial returns. This 
firm measures social output of ventures across social and environmental themes and has fidicuiary responsabilities to its investors. 
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Initial fieldwork confirmed that promising financial returns were not 
enough to encourage the pursuit of a venture. Venture investment decisions 
were conducted in a group setting in events centered around the weekly IC 
meeting. The Firm used—and insisted internally that they used—
consensus-based decision-making. Although the key decision-makers (the 
two partners and two principals) held greater informal sway, their regular 
weekly evaluation and discussion sessions make it unlikely that our 
findings would be a result of individual bias. 
If a venture did not meet their social potential threshold, the Firm 
would not necessarily pursue it. Likewise, if a venture’s identity claims 
were not commercially plausible, the Firm would not necessarily pursue it. 
In both instances, we observed how the Firm was initially impressed by 
one “side” of a venture and, as a result, debated the merits of the venture’s 
other “side” at length, but never proceeded to investment prior to 
determining an adequate fit of both “sides.” As one member of the Firm 
commented in an internal document, “No social impact. But [very] 
impressive venture. What do we do with such ventures??? (Strong, but not 
a fit.)” (Internal Pre-Investment Committee Poll on [Venture #919], Year 
4). 
The two founding partners of this firm entered the investment space 
as angel investors before establishing a dedicated angel investing network, 
hiring a team and launching a venture fund under the same corporate 
identity—operating an emerging hybrid91 investment model increasingly92 
referred to as the “Super Angel” or “Micro VC” model (Feld & 
Mendelson, 2016; Martino, 2015; Mattermark, 2015).  
Through the Micro VC model, the Firm invites members of its 
exclusive and fee-paying angel investor network93 to join each investment 
round that the Firm chooses to participate in, though members of the angel 
network are under no obligation to join. Unlike traditional business angel 
groups where angel input is solicited early on in the evaluation process, 
and where angel input may represent the majority of the decision-making 
body (e.g., through voting or other forms of participatory governance), this 
Firm sources, screens, evaluates, negotiates and builds their investment 
cases in a centralized94 manner which mostly95 resembles traditional VC 
processes. However, contributions from the Firm’s designated angel 
                                                                        
91 We refer to the angel network-investment fund hybrid in this sentence. 
92 A VC authority, CB Insights (2014), estimated that 250 Micro VC firms were operating in 2015, and numbers continue to rise 
(Kaji, 2015a). 
93 Angel investors refer to independent investors who invest their own money into ventures. 
94 Unlike many business angel networks that invite members to conduct due diligence and lead negotiations on deals, outsourcing or 
spreading the investment decision-making process among some or all members, the investment decision rests with the firm. Feld and 
Mendelson (2016, pp. 8–9) state that while Micro VC firms “often want to be thought of as angels instead of VCs, once they’ve 
raised money from other people they have the same fiduciary responsibility to their investors that a VC has, and as a result they are 
really just VCs.” The firm studied holds private investment committee meetings and has a fiduciary responsibility to their investors; 
business angel networks typically do not have a fiduciary responsibility to their members, as they are involved in the investment 
process as individual, pseudo-independent investors. 
95 We refer to the centralization as the commonality.  
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network to each of the Firm’s investment tickets96 allow the Firm to 
increase its representation in nearly every investment round. 
In return, members obtained access to pre-vetted deals and the 
opportunity to support social ventures. Prior to the launch of their first 
fund, contributions of the Firm’s investor network comprised the majority 
of its investment tickets. However, the decision-making of this firm, pre- 
and post-fund launch, continued to be based on the due diligence led by its 
internal investment committee, and continued to operate under the same 
single corporate identity that the partners had set up for this purpose. 
In addition to the angel network, the SVC managed a 32 million 
Euro fund, which they launched in the third year of operation. The reported 
size of the fund places it between the 25th and the 75th percentile of known 
comparable SVC fund sizes (Rheingold, 2017) and in the typical range of 
Micro VCs funds (i.e., typically under 100 million USD and usually less 
than 50 million USD) (CB Insights, 2014; Kaji, 2015b, 2015a). The Firm’s 
average ticket size is 300,000 Euros. Up until the end of our study period, 
the firm had evaluated roughly 1,750 investment proposals and invested in 
13 (see Table 26 for portfolio companies). During the onsite fieldwork 
period, they funded three ventures (and made three follow-on investments) 
out of 350 evaluated investment proposals. As Figure 23 indicates, their 
extremely rigorous and selective funding ratio (0.8%) was thus comparable 
to selection ratios observed at finance-first investment firms (e.g., Petty &
Gruber, 2011).  
 
Figure 23: Waterfall chart of investment proposals considered during the fieldwork period 
The Firm’s partners experienced their first positive exit (a trade-
sale/acquisition) three years after their first investment, which places the 
results of the Firm operators ahead of (if not, in) the same ballpark as other 
early-stage equity funds that usually begin exit their investments towards 
the end of their 10-year funds (Feld & Mendelson, 2016; Zider, 1998). 
From a social standpoint, the Firm applied for and was granted the B-Corp 
status and reported the following outcomes after five years of operation. 
96 Investment tickets refer to the amount, in cash, that the Firm contributes to each investment round. 
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Theme 
 
Venture97  Description Social outcome 
metric 
Industry 
Categorization 
Investment Follow
-on 
Economic 
development  
Ocean Collects and analyzes data on an 
emerging financial asset class. 
Pending 
(number of 
game-changing 
opportunities 
created) 
Financial, 
Consulting, 
Services  
✔ ✔ 
Dart Designs high-end women’s 
apparel and accessories 
benefitting survivors of human 
trafficking. 
8,184 hours of 
employment 
created 
Consumer 
Products, 
Retail 
✔  
Captain Offers nonprofits, companies, and 
individuals an intuitive way to 
communicate a location, even in 
areas without house numbers and 
street names. 
26.7m people 
with addresses 
recognized by 
their local 
government 
Software and 
IT 
✔ ✔ 
Education 1286 A nation’s first online resource 
and application portal for 
students seeking university 
education. 
Pending (years 
of academic 
education) 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, 
Transportation, 
Media, 
Education 
✔  
Environmental 
sustainability 
 
Sand Offers a hardware and software 
solutions to businesses to help 
them reduce food waste. 
5,200 tons of 
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
reduced 
Software and 
IT and 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔ ✔✔ 
Rose Produces high-end preserves 
from discarded fruits and 
vegetables. 
102 tons of 
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
reduced 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔  
Rain  Manufactures a device that 
monitors and adjusts energy use 
for comfort and savings on energy 
costs, designed for low-income 
housing. 
31 tons of 
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
reduced; 
300,000 Euros of 
savings for 
tenants 
Energy, 
Environmental 
Technology, 
Utilities 
✔  
1291 Offers online peer-to-peer food-
sharing platform aiming to reduce 
wasted food. 
34 tons of food 
waste saved 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔  
Healthcare Oak Pairs qualified and work-seeking 
doctors with patients seeking at-
home care from doctors with high 
reviews. 
282 doctor 
appointments 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔  
Mountain Develops biotechnology to deploy 
medical treatment for a common, 
recurring, and painful condition 
often experienced by women. 
Pending (human 
life days 
improved) 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔  
Cloud Offers a cheap and easy-to-use 
hardware to conduct early 
diagnosis of a commonly 
occurring cancer. 
567 diagnoses 
(positive and 
negative) 
Agriculture, 
Health, Food 
✔  
Relationships 
 
531 Private social networks for 
families. 
Undisclosed 
(meaningful new 
connections 
created) 
Software and 
IT 
✔  
Mammoth Offers an online social network 
for mothers, founded by two 
middle-aged mothers. 
70,000 
meaningful 
connections 
created 
Software and 
IT 
✔ ✔ 
Table 26: Investment portfolio at the end of the fieldwork period 
                                                                        
97 All names are pseudonyms. Each venture decision was assigned a number between 1 and 1614. 
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When the study began, the SVC industry was roughly 15 years old 
and the Firm had completed nearly four years of investment evaluation, 
making it one of the later entrants to the field. Yet in Europe, our context 
of interest, the Firm is among the earlier entrants to social investing 
(Rheingold, 2017) and new funds continue to be raised by newer entrants 
each year (Butcher, 2016; de la Merced, 2016; Kolodny, 2017). For 
example, 76% of the capital raised by comparable firms was raised in the 
last 10 years (Rheingold, 2017). Thus, these age factors suggest that the 
Firm might be a promising window into the emerging social investing 
trend and current SVCs in the market. 
 
Data Collection 
In order to understand and capture the process used by the SVC to 
evaluate new venture hybridity in investment proposals, we relied 
primarily on qualitative data collected using ethnographic methods over a 
25-month period, including seven consecutive months of near-weekly two- 
to three- day field visits (18 total, as shown in Table 27). Due to “the 
importance of being there” in understanding tacit knowledge (Gertler, 
2003) and, with the encouragement of the studied firm (Finlay, 2002), we 
collected data through interviews, non-participant observation, and 
transcribed recordings of meetings. At first, these data were used only to 
triangulate findings from archival documents but, as new insights emerged, 
we emphasized ethnographic approaches in greater amounts to uncover 
more about the evaluation process. The data collection and data analysis 
were led by one person, with the second author, playing the role of the 
devil’s advocate. Our focal data refer to 350 investment decisions made 
during our onsite fieldwork period. We detail all of our data sources in 
Table 29.   
Non-participant observation. Over 200 hours of non-participant 
observation over a 25-month period in which the lead author followed 
multiple events hosted by the Firm. Following the knowledge that both 
front-stage and back-stage events are key to understanding how identities 
are combined in new projects and organizations (Mair & Hehenberger, 
2014), the lead author attended public-facing, venture-facing and internal 
events of the Firm every 1-2 weeks, for seven consecutive months.  
Guided by our interest in the Firm’s evaluation of hybridity in new 
venture investment proposals, we focused our attention on the Firm’s 
weekly Investment Committee (IC) meetings during which it made 
investment decisions and organized investment research activities (n = 18). 
These meetings usually lasted 1.5 hours and were attended by key 
decision-makers in the Firm. The lead author recorded these meetings 
whenever possible and produced extensive fieldnotes in notebooks or on 
her laptop. Attending these meetings enabled observation of vocal 
expression and body language that accompanied certain phrases, which 
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helped to understand the context of common expressions found in archival 
records. In our analysis, we designated a number to each member of the 
Firm, referring to Partner-level members of the Firm with the prefix P and 
other key decision-makers with the prefix DM. Other analysts in the 
decision-making team were referred to with the prefix A. To facilitate 
reporting, we refer to key decision-makers as SVC and to others as A. 
The first author was also invited to attend meetings between 
resource-seeking ventures and the Firm (n = 40), which lasted between 15 
and 60 minutes and took place on premises. She was introduced to third-
parties at first as a researcher observing and studying the investment 
process, and later, as trust developed, as a junior associate of the firm to 
help reduce the impact of her presence as an external observer (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Finlay, 2002). 
Other events the lead author was able to observe included formal 
public pitching events hosted by the Firm with various partners, formal 
private pitching events hosted by the Firm for its extended network, 
internal meetings, and other formal gatherings. The lead author also 
attended dozens of informal events such as coffee breaks, meals, drinks, 
and collaborative work sessions, during which members of the Firm 
conducted research, drafted documents and discussed and joked with each 
other. These were key in indicating the purpose that each document served 
and how they relate to each other. Members of the Firm had been informed 
of the purpose of this study by the Firm’s Partners and were cordial, 
professional and cooperative. Informal interactions allowed for dozens of 
ethnographic informant interviews to occur over the course of the 
fieldwork (Spradley, 1979). Halfway through the research period, the first 
author was referred to as an “honorary member” of the team, increasing 
confidence in authenticity of the data. 
 
Year of study98 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Contact with Firm - No contact 
with Firm 
- First contact 
with Firm 
- Research 
proposal 
submitted 
- Research 
proposal 
accepted 
- Official 
fieldwork 
period 
- Interviews 
continue 
- Interviews 
continue 
Field visits (18) 0 4  12 2 0 
Table 27: Timeline of engagement with Firm  
 
To further reduce the risk of excessive partiality, following each 
visit, the first author returned to the university office environment to reflect 
on and analyze the data collected that week (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2013: 19). Additionally, she regularly discussed emerging questions and 
observations with a second author, who served as a “devil’s advocate.” He 
                                                                        
98 Year refers to year of Study, not to be confused with year of the Firm’s operations. 
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did not conduct fieldwork with our informants and offered a fresh 
perspective that limited over-imaginative writing (Hammersley, 2006; Van 
Maanen, 1979).  
Semi-structured interviews. Prior to beginning this project with the 
SVC, we conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with other Social 
Venture Capitalists, VCs, philanthropists, social entrepreneurs and other 
informants, to help us understand the different evaluation processes 
employed in this industry and the varying perspectives on social and 
financial return. Once the project with this Firm began, these interviews 
helped to contextualize data collected at the Firm and were not used in our 
analysis (hence they are excluded from Table 28). 
At the Firm, we conducted over 50 semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews with the Firm, following the ethnographic interviewing protocol 
proposed by Spradley (1979: 55), in which we relied on members of the 
Firm to inform us of their experience in assessing and acting upon new 
venture proposals. These interviews were used primarily to help 
contextualize each member’s contribution to the evaluation process and 
allowed us to compare and contrast observational data and archival data 
with our informants’ perspective (Patton, 2002). We conducted these 
interviews in the following two settings. 
The first consisted of formal scheduled meetings between the first 
author and members of the Firm that were 20-70 minutes long and took 
place in person or through a video conferencing tool, wherein the 
interviewer made clear the purpose of the interview and the objectives of 
the study (and doctoral dissertation, for which this data was originally 
collected). In these settings, she asked each member descriptive questions 
from a set of pre-established questions related to the member’s professional 
history, their history at the Firm, their role in the evaluation process, and 
their engagement with ventures. These straightforward background 
questions and experience and behavior questions provided context and 
eased the Firm members into the rest of the interview. From here the 
questions became more structural in nature, aiming to understand cognitive 
and interpretive processes (e.g., goals, intentions, desires, and 
expectations). Questions regarding evaluation processes, types of venture 
engagement, types of selection criteria, and types of challenges emerged 
from analysis of ongoing data collection, including previous rounds of 
interviews (she conducted multiple rounds of interviews with each 
member). 
 The second type of interview conducted differed in formation and 
formality. They occurred without a prior appointment, varied in length 
from one or two minutes to 20 minutes, and became more frequent over the 
course of the research period. When such an interview occurred, additional 
members of the Firm sometimes joined in, creating a group discussion 
interspersed with rapport-building “friendly conversations” (Spradley, 
1979). If a 1-on-1 conversation evolved into a group conversation, the lead 
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author generally stepped back to observe the spontaneous conversation, 
stepping in only to ask clarifying questions. She also conducted interviews 
with members of the Firm’s angel network, partners of the Firm, and 
entrepreneurs with investment proposals under consideration. 
 
Interviews over year of study99 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Partner (11) 0 1 8 0 2 
Principal (46) 0 5 35 6 0 
Analyst (12) 0 1 10 0 1 
Collaborators (4) 0 2 0 1 1 
Other informants (38) 7 15 7 9 0 
Table 28: Overview of interviews conducted over the research period  
Archival data. The Firm’s archival data is stored on a cloud-based 
server and was, at first, shared with the lead author on a document-by-
document basis through specific requests. When requests became more 
frequent, she was given remote access to the Firm’s entire repository of 
venture-related documents. Of particular interest to this study was the 
Firm’s IC minutes, pre-IC poll, venture databases and other internal 
documents. The IC minutes were a living document that contained an 
agenda, a summary of the previous week’s decisions, and the minutes of 
each meeting. Prior to each IC, the Firm also circulated an internal survey, 
which included information on ventures up for discussion and solicited 
comments from each member of the team, including a vote (yes/no/abstain) 
on whether the Firm should continue pursuing these ventures. The Firm’s 
venture database included all investment proposals and corresponding 
investment statuses. The lead author also consulted the minutes of the 
Firm’s meetings with ventures, submitted venture documents, publications 
from the Firm, internal correspondence and fund-venture correspondence 
revealing due diligence exchanges and investment statuses. When more 
context was required in selected investment cases, additional e-mail 
correspondence was requested from the firm. All document requests were 
honored. 
  
                                                                        
99 Year refers to year of Study, not to be confused with year of the Firm’s operations. 
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Type of data Use in study Description of data Quantity Year
100 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Participant observation  
Industry events 
 
Secondary data 
source 
Conferences and private events 
focused on corporate social 
responsibility, technology startups, 
philanthropy and social 
entrepreneurship  
17 events ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Secondary data 
source 
Interviews with SVCs, VCs, 
philanthropists, social ventures and 
other informants 
38 interviews   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Non-participant observation 
Investment 
committee (IC) 
meetings  
Primary data source SVC’s weekly meeting on investment 
decisions and research activities, 
fieldnotes and transcriptions 
compiled by researcher  
414 pages 
27 hours 
18 events 
   ✔   
Venture meetings  Primary data source Meetings between the members of 
the Firm and ventures seeking 
funding, field notes and transcriptions 
compiled by researcher  
120 pages 
40 events 
   ✔   
Formal and 
informal events  
Primary data source Private pitching events, public 
pitching events, sponsored events, 
lunch, dinner, coffee breaks, and 
internal meetings hosted by the Firm, 
fieldnotes and transcriptions 
compiled by researcher  
200+ hours   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Interviews    ✔ ✔ ✔  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Primary data source Interviews with SVC’s key decision-
makers on their personal history, 
their history at the Firm, their role in 
the evaluation process, and their 
engagement with specific ventures 
50+ 
interviews 
  ✔ ✔ ✔  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Secondary data 
source 
Interviews with SVC’s collaborators  4 interviews   ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Archival data (compiled by the Firm)  
IC minutes  Primary data source Agenda and minutes covering weekly 
meeting on investment decisions and 
research activities 
758 pages   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Pre-IC poll results 
for shortlisted 
ventures  
Primary data source Shortlist of 1-6 ventures to be 
discussed at IC meeting, includes 
yes/no/abstain vote from fund 
members and individual comments 
1,856 rows of 
entries 
  ✔ ✔ ✔  
Internal documents Primary data source Internal documents (Excel, 
PowerPoint, Word) produced by the 
Firm to reflect on past investment 
decisions and direct future activities 
56 pages   ✔ ✔   
Venture databases Secondary data 
source 
Excel files tracking every venture 
proposal received by the Firm 
2,984 rows of 
entries 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Venture meeting 
notes 
Secondary data 
source 
Word documents created to store 
minutes, correspondence or research 
related to specific ventures 
850 files   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Email 
correspondence  
Secondary data 
source 
Internal email correspondence with 
or regarding selected ventures 
93 pages   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Media and 
publications 
Secondary data 
source 
Newsletters, blog posts and reports 
published by the Firm  
111 pages   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Venture documents Triangulation of 
events and 
investment status 
Investment proposals submitted by 
ventures 
1,476 files   ✔ ✔ ✔  
Table 29: Overview of data sources 
                                                                        
100 Year refers to year of Firm operation, not to be confused with year of study/research period. 
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Data Analysis 
As is customary in inductive fieldwork that employs ethnographic 
approaches, data analysis began the moment that data collection occurred 
and continued alongside data collection over the length of the research 
project in an iterative and reflexive way (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia et 
al., 2013). Guided by a broad research question about the evaluation 
criteria and processes of SVCs, we engaged in constant comparison of 
collected data (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Suddaby, 2006) and in descriptive 
and theoretical coding, which then guided theoretical sampling (O’Reilly, 
Paper, & Marx, 2012). As recurring themes began to emerge, we turned to 
the iterative dialogue between the literature, the data and our informants 
(Pratt, 2009). Throughout this process, we recognized emergent findings 
that were potentially pertinent to developing our understanding of the 
phenomena and so shifted our attention in the data gathering, analysis and 
questioning as appropriate. Below, we describe the phases of our data 
collection and analysis process in four discrete, linear phases and how they 
modified our research question incrementally. However, as is the case in 
exploratory, inductive work, in reality, these phases overlapped and were 
returned to out of order.101  
 
Initial RQ:  How do social venture capitalists (SVCs) select and evaluate 
investment proposals?  
 
Phase I: Identifying empirical themes—evaluation phases and 
venture attributes of interest to SVCs. The goal of Phase I was to 
empirically understand the evaluation process, immersing ourselves in the 
research setting with particular attention to our informants’ emic terms 
(Morris et al., 1999; Morrow, 2005). Guided by the question: How do SVCs 
select and evaluate investment proposals?, we focused on understanding 
the investment attributes of interest to the Firm and the main events leading 
to the simple investment outcomes: “still under consideration,” “no longer 
under consideration,” and “invested.”102 For more details about Phase I, 
please refer to Appendix H. 
Phase II: Expanding empirical themes—understanding the 
relationship between venture attributes of interest. In the next phase of 
our coding, we leaned into the recursive process of data collection and data 
analysis, allowing emergent findings to guide our attention in the following 
weeks’ fieldwork and interview questions. Our main documents of interest 
here included our fieldnotes, the IC minutes and meeting transcripts, and 
interview transcripts. We employed both open coding and axial coding 
                                                                        
101 These phases were led by the author of this thesis, despite the occasional use of the “we” pronoun. 
102 In a separate study, we continued with the coding process described in Phase I, analyzing 1,614 investment decisions from this 
SVC.  
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(Corbin & Strauss, 2008), looking for relationships beyond the empirical 
themes found in Phase I.  
In order to further increase trustworthiness in our interpretive 
scheme, we performed numerous “member checks” with our informants 
(Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007; Van Maanen, 1979). A member check 
conducted in this phase of our fieldwork period confirmed that our 
empirical themes were indeed venture attributes of interest to the Firm’s 
social-mission (including hybridity-related attributes), the Firm’s 
commercial mission, and firm-specific preferences. 
However, it is in this second phase that we became more aware of 
our bias as researchers. Until this point, we had viewed the SVC’s social-
mission-related considerations as a separate filter from the Firm’s 
commercial mission and applied them separately, utilizing the model of 
“man as an information processor” (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Yet after 
additional rounds of coding, it became clear that our original framing of the 
Firm as a traditional commercial actor applying a social-mission-filter 
(e.g., how hardware investors apply a hardware/software-filter, how 
European-based investors apply a geographic-filter) was less helpful in 
explaining the process that we were observing.  
It became evident that the data was portraying the Firm’s evaluation 
process as less of an objective application of two separate sets of filters and 
more of an interrelated activity, in which the concerns of one identity 
informed the other and in which both identities interacted to inform the 
evaluation outcome.  
Their dualistic perspective is particularly evident in one interview 
excerpt, in which we asked a member of the Firm to comment on a specific 
investment case and suitable impact measurement metrics:  
“If you're really creating positive social change, your revenue 
should increase. It all ties back to our belief that doing good 
generates an attractive return” (SVC4, Fieldwork). 
In a later publication, another member of the SVC wrote: 
“Understanding the social dimension of business in a millennial age 
will be key in assessing competitive differentiation, and thus, 
economic outperformance. […] Our hypothesis is that such a 
relationship between social responsibility and financial profit is not 
only possible, but that companies who commit to this approach can 
ultimately outperform those solely focused on revenue generation” 
([Redacted], 2017a). 
Re-examining this data led us to place more emphasis on interpretive 
methods in our research, which might have enabled us to better understand 
the hybridity of the SVC. Our research question evolved from how do 
social investors select and evaluate investment proposals? to How does 
SVC duality affect how it evaluates and acts upon investment proposals?  
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Figure 24: Summary of data structure 
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This shift reflected links we found between the ventures’ social claims and 
commercial claims, as we illustrate in Figure 24 with the aggregate 
dimensions labeled J, K and L in our Data Structure.  
Moreover, once we began looking for signs of duality, we found that 
the emerging empirical themes related to hybrid revenue characteristics 
could stand alone as a conceptual category (we separated conceptual 
category D, from B in our Data Structure). The conceptual categories and 
aggregate dimensions labeled (2) in our Data Structure illustrate the new 
categories that emerged in Phase II (Figure 24). 
Continuing in this vein, engaging in a constant comparison between 
different representations of our identified empirical themes, we began to 
note a distinction in what we assumed to be the strength of duality 
represented in these investment proposals. Our thinking in Phase I 
represented these dualistic attributes more as one-dimensional filters, yet 
when revisiting different investment proposals from our fieldwork period, 
attempting to understand the qualities of these attributes, and conversing 
with the literature and our research colleagues, we realized that we might 
be able to qualify the strength of the dual dimensions and identify patterns. 
Drawing on our codes from Phase I, we followed the suggestion of creating 
data displays (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to visualize the Firm’s rating of 
ventures, according to axes of financial and social potential (see, in the 
Data Structure, conceptual category labeled B and E, respectively).  
Many of these ventures had already been coded in Phase I, 
facilitating our task. But even when the Firm provided a clear indication of 
their rating in over 100 investment proposals (see Table 33 for examples), 
we triangulated every case plotted in our data display with observational 
data, fieldnotes, and archival data authored by other key decision-makers 
of the fund.  
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Phase III: Expanding empirical themes — SVC actions towards 
ventures. In Phase III we continued constructing our data displays venture 
by venture, adopting a replication logic as we plotted each venture on the 
axes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2013). We began with the investment 
proposals evaluated during our fieldwork period, and those that had come 
up in our interviews, building on the results of axial coding suggesting a 
link between venture attributes and actions taken by the Firm throughout 
the evaluation process.  
While in the previous phases we focused on investment proposal 
attributes and investment outcomes—essentially viewing attributes as 
direct determinants of investment outcomes (and maintaining three large 
umbrella groups of investment outcomes: “still under consideration,” “no 
longer under consideration” and “invested”)—in this phase, we gave more 
attention to those recurring SVC actions found in our data, digging deeper 
into the heterogeneity of actions assigned to ventures in the umbrella 
groups “no longer under consideration” and “still under consideration,” 
which we had essentially viewed as binary groups. To help us in this 
process, we returned to old coded interview and meeting transcripts, IC 
minutes, and fieldnotes, and coded these documents again with attention to 
venture attribute dimensions, as interpreted by the SVC, and the different 
types of actions assigned to these ventures between the Firm’s initial 
meeting with them and the investment outcome. 
Although at times, our data only indicated a distinction between 
“weak” and “strong” venture dimensions (rather than “weak,” “average,” 
and “strong”) these dimensions sufficed in alerting us to the distinctions in 
how the Firm engaged with these ventures, based on perceived dimensions. 
For example, we continued plotting the investment cases we had 
encountered during our fieldwork in a method resembling theoretical 
sampling, drawing from our trove of archival and observational data in a 
way in which we could “test” emerging insights about which venture 
attributes led to which SVC actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). These sets of 
investment proposals acted like replications and highlighted contrasting 
qualities of each venture case (including the dimensions and associated 
actions).  
Over the course of making several data displays and adding 
additional venture cases, patterns of venture engagement strategies used by 
the Firm for different types of ventures began to emerge. We continued 
adding ventures and verifying if our patterns of venture engagement still 
held, stopping once we reached theoretical saturation, and the 
consideration of a new case no longer challenged our observed patterns. A 
sample of data displays we created in this phase is presented in the 
following figure (Figure 25). As this figure illustrates, the preferred 
investments for the SVC can be found in the top right-hand quadrant of the 
landscape. Although the commercial potential of these investments is 
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slightly discounted, the SVCs investment and engagement efforts are 
concentrated along the top-right quadrant of the graph. 
The observed SVC strategies are labeled as conceptual categories A, 
F and I in the Data Structure summary (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 25: Example of data display created during Phase III of data analysis104 
Phase IV: Developing a variance model between conceptual 
categories. In the final phases of our data analysis, we sought to complete 
the aggregation of our conceptual categories into theoretical dimensions 
capable of explaining how SVC duality affects the evaluation of and 
engagement with new ventures. In this stage, we considered the role of the 
venture attributes and actions in shaping and developing investment 
outcomes. Approaching the data from this perspective, we observed that 
certain strategies were used to evaluate ventures as they were presented, 
and led to behaviors such as “filtering out,” “be as helpful as possible,” and 
“pursue.” “Filtering out” and “be as helpful as possible” served the purpose 
of allowing the Firm to enact and reinforce its own hybridity without 
leading to an investable outcome. “Pursue,” though rarer (due to the rarity 
of venture-fund fit and strong hybridity claims all around), at times led to 
an investable outcome. Finally, other strategies were applied when the 
Firm was convinced by a portion of the venture’s identity claims (e.g., the 
social claims or the commercial claims) and sought to explore the venture’s 
hybridity potential. When successful, these latter strategies allowed the 
Firm to co-create an investment opportunity not previously available.  
This recursive process revealed an intuitive set of strategies the Firm 
applied to evaluate and shape investment proposals along social and 
commercial dimensions and nudged us towards the literature on the 
104 Drafts of earlier data displays are included in the appendix of this chapter. 
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plausibility of identity claims (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), new venture 
identity assessment (Navis & Glynn, 2011), and new venture duality 
(Smith & Besharov, 2017). We refined our model with the research 
question: How do hybrid resource providers assess and influence the 
plausibility of new venture identity claims among hybrid ventures? 
 
 
Findings 
In this part of our study we detail five strategies used by a dualistic 
early-stage investment firm to understand and shape identity duality in 
evaluated ventures. We demonstrate empirically how the assessment of 
new venture efficacy across social and commercial identity claims led—or 
did not lead to—capital acquisition (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Navis & 
Glynn, 2011). We organize the patterns of decisions we observed into five 
strategies: Cautious Pursuit, Tinkering, Rapprochement, Helping, and 
Filtering Out. When successful, these strategies allow the investor to 
identify and avoid investments in ventures with a high risk of hybridity 
collapse, termed “Trade-off Hazard.” They also enable the SVC to increase 
the plausibility of ventures’ social and commercial identity claims and co-
create attractive hybrid investment opportunities. However, these strategies 
are costly in terms of time, social capital, and emotional labor. 
First, in the section on social and commercial identity claims 
baselines, we present the initial ways in which the Firm expressed and 
assessed duality, highlighting the venture attributes most important to the 
Firm and how this affects SVC behavior (Cautious Pursuit and Filtering 
Out Strategy). Next, in the section on hybrid identity reinforcement, we 
further detail its understanding of new venture hybridity (“Trade-off 
Hazard”). In the third section, we detail additional strategies the Firm 
applied to improve the plausibility of evaluated ventures’ hybrid identity 
claims, inadvertently shaping new ventures’ hybrid identities (Tinkering 
and Rapprochement Strategy). Here, we present a variance model detailing 
the actions taken by the Firm when evaluating investment proposals, as 
well as the influence it has on new venture identity. In the last section, we 
discuss a strategy we observed the Firm using without the intention of 
accessing an investable deal (Helping Strategy), and point to the hybridity-
buffering effects these strategies had on the Firm’s own duality.  
 
Baseline Social and Commercial Identity Claims and Implications for 
Venture Assessments  
We know from the literature that social investors use social and 
commercial filters in their selection and evaluation process (see white 
space in the following figure, Figure 26). These filters act as “floors” that 
demarcate the minimum social or commercial potential that a venture can 
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claim before being denied funding (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). 
Depending on the fund, the level of these floors changes. The amount of 
capital (plus interest) expected in return, as well as the extent of social 
outcomes delivered, changes according to each fund’s baseline commercial 
expectations (Chiappini, 2017). 
 
Figure 26: Expectation of investment firm behavior based on literature  
 
As illustrated in the following section, our data confirms this concept 
of floors and goes further by qualifying the demarcation threshold in SVCs. 
We find a parallel structure in terms of social and commercial baseline 
(which is expected due to our sampling criteria). However, while these 
baselines exist, we do not observe a consistent action based on the 
baselines, as we will explain when presenting the SVC’s shaping strategies 
(see: Helping Strategy) later in the Findings. Investment deals are only 
immediately Filtered Out if plausibility is judged to be low-low across both 
claims, but the Firm’s evaluation process extends beyond this initial 
assessment. However, we do observe the SVC using both social and 
commercial considerations as independent filters to assess objective 
venture attributes—and essentially plot ventures on a mental model of two 
axes (as shown above).  
Our data illustrates that the Firm also uses social and commercial 
considerations as lenses to assess the long-term plausibility of the venture’s 
social and commercial identity claims (i.e., where the ventures are on the 
axes), which we termed “Trade-off Hazard.” Finally, we also illustrate the 
types of preferences the Firm upheld which were not specifically related to 
either their social or commercial mandate. We detail how these 
considerations were applied by the Firm in the following section.  
 
189 
Filtering Out Strategy: The Firm did not consider ventures whose 
commercial claims did not meet baseline plausibility expectations. The 
Firm prioritized the plausibility of a new venture’s commercial identity 
claims in the early stages of the evaluation process. Its behavior towards 
new ventures’ commercial claims was triggered by venture attributes 
commonly discussed in the venture capital and investor decision-making 
literature (MacMillan et al., 1985; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Wells, 1975). In 
their investment proposals, ventures made claims about (1) their offer, (2) 
target market and market response, (3) financial model, and (4) founding 
team qualities, which were together intended to affect the overall 
plausibility of the commercial identity claims. 
However, over the course of our fieldwork, the Firm found fault in 
one or more of these venture claims in multiple venture proposals. For 
example, they were concerned about one of the following: production risk, 
value proposition effectiveness and differentiation, commercialization 
strategy (offer); competition, size, market response, product-market-fit 
(market); high capital requirement, ineffective revenue model (financial 
matters); or the founder’s personality, commercial motivation, business 
expertise or technology expertise (founder/founding team). Strong concerns 
in one or more of these claims decreased the overall plausibility of the new 
venture’s commercial claim, which we and/or the Firm then rated as a 
weak or average commercial claim.  
We observed that the Firm consistently filtered out ventures that had 
significant commercial concerns, i.e., ventures whose commercial claims 
had weak plausibility. For example, in a Pre-Investment Committee (IC) 
Poll on investment opportunity 756, which uses coffee grinds to produce 
energy, the Firm’s Partner wrote: 
 
“[vote no].105 with current v low energy prices in question their 
ability to generate cheap enough energy.  here's the rub - this is 
basically a biofuel generator.  There are LOTS of biofuel 
generators, and people dont need to be as elaborate as collecting 
coffee from coffee shops - you can create biofuel from all sorts of 
agri[cultural] waste - cuttings, offal etc.  I dont [sic] see the 
economic logic, UNLESS the energy conversion coefficient is 
MEANINGFULLY higher than other sources of biofuel, which I am 
certain it is not.  FOLLOW UP QUESTION - how does energy 
conversion of coffee compare to other biowaste?” 
 
The Firm reiterated concerns with a venture’s commercial claims in 
another example, which is a message from the Firm to the venture 
explaining their investment decision. The Firm pointed to four main 
                                                                        
105 The SVC drew on its branding to indicate a “yes” or “no” vote. Hence, we omit the actual term to protect the Firm’s identity. 
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concerns: market competition, venture competitive advantage, revenue 
model, commercialization strategy: 
 
“First, the competitive landscape has become quite saturated over 
the past few years, with corporates facing an increasing spectrum of 
similar propositions for their employees. The team struggled to see 
what the competitive edge is for corporates to choose [venture] over 
these propositions. Additionally, the team has found that the revenue 
models in this space are quite difficult to get right, especially when 
seeking to scale across multiple clients. The complexity here may 
[be] caused by the "lumpiness" of revenue from [Corporate 
Responsibility] budgets and long sales cycles associated with 
corporate entities with [our firm] having preference for business' 
that are less 'contract' based.” (720, Correspondence with venture). 
 
Baseline social and commercial requirements helped to inform the overall 
assessment of social or commercial plausibility of a venture (as indicated 
in Figure 27). As illustrated in this section, an investment decision was 
often based on concerns about multiple aspects of the venture’s 
commercial claim, however, the Firm also expressed concern for both 
commercial claims and social claims in the same investment decision. We 
detail the Filtering Out strategy for social claims in the following section. 
 
 
Figure 27: Conceptual visualization of baselines of plausible social and commercial identity claims 
 
Filtering Out Strategy: The Firm did not consider ventures whose 
social claims did not meet baseline plausibility expectations. The Firm 
prioritized the plausibility of a new venture’s social identity claims in the 
early stages of the evaluation process as well, seeking investment in 
ventures with strong and persuasive social identity claims. As illustrated in 
the conceptual visualization above, these social claims acted as the mirror 
image to the commercial claims and provided the baseline required to 
enable an emergent hybrid identity. Our data revealed that for new venture 
identities to be socially plausible to the Firm, the venture needed to (1) 
target an important social issue, (2) provide a significant contribution to the 
issue, and (3) approach the issue in a way in which progress towards the 
issue would be easily measured.  
When selecting an important social issue, the venture needed to 
achieve two things. First, the venture needed to address a theme of interest 
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to the Firm. This finding confirms a social investment strategy that the 
literature has termed “investment targeting” or “filtering in” (Rudd, 1981), 
whereby funds focus on one or more critical issues, such as the natural 
environment, or education. In our case, though the SVC was a generalist 
investor, they explicitly identified five action areas, including economic 
development, education, environmental sustainability, healthcare and 
relationships. Filtering Out ventures, according to these guidelines, was 
fairly easy for the Firm to execute. For example, the Firm explained in an 
email describing the investment decision of one venture, “I'm not sure 
there is a clear enough fit with our investment areas and impact focus, but 
we do wish you all the best” (179, Correspondence with venture). 
Second, the Firm also expected ventures to address a significant 
problem within these themes. For example, with regards to a health-
oriented device, the Firm explained its first reason for not investing as “1). 
The high price point excluded large parts of the population, and therefore 
limited the positive social outcome generation” (1243, Correspondence 
with venture)—suggesting that while the venture was addressing an 
important issue (namely, health) the Firm considered it to be addressing a 
problem felt by a small portion of the population, including a demographic 
whose needs were perhaps less urgent. 
Next, after selecting an important issue to address, the Firm expected 
the venture to make a significant (and overwhelmingly positive) 
contribution towards the problem. In one case, the Firm was considering a 
venture addressing an important problem in education, one of their target 
areas. However, the Firm was conflicted about the venture’s actual 
contribution towards improving children’s education. One viewed the 
contribution as not significant (i.e., not addressing a root problem), while 
others viewed the venture as having potential negative outcomes. 
Comments from their internal, Pre-Investment Committee Poll on 
investment opportunity 872 read: 
 
“I want them spending less time on the screen!” (SVC2); 
“Agree. Would rather direct children away from screen time” (A2);  
“interesting,” (SVC1); 
“[vote no]. I can possibly be convinced that educational viewing 
content generates more positive outcomes than existing media out 
there for children, but I don't believe this addresses root cause of 
problem” (SVC3); 
“The business makes sense to me as well as the reasons for why they 
can win (focus on smaller independent producers, timeless content, 
etc), however I think the critical issue is the ethical one - are we 
supportive of 'healthy' (ad-free, educational) screen time? Is some 
screen time necessary evil and therefore re-directing kids from one 
type of platform/content to another is worthwhile? Or are we more 
radical than that (screen time is fundamentally wrong)?” (A3). 
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Although the Firm eventually makes a judgment on a venture’s claim to be 
providing a significant contribution to an issue, it is sometimes less 
straightforward to determine. In the following example, the Firm assesses 
the significance of a venture’s contribution to an issue, which they pair 
with a concern relating to the venture’s commercial claims as well. In a 
message to the following venture (#1321), the Firm explained its reason for 
not investing: 
 
“1). The production of the goods by skilled artisans reduces the 
social impact of the business, as these are people who almost 
definitionally have other employment opportunities (as you 
mentioned in regards to them working for [luxury retail brand] 
amongst others). Therefore, we struggled to apply our investment 
process in a way that was analogous with our other investment 
decisions. 
2). The low run rate of the business is likely to be challenging from a 
cash flow management perspective in the short-term.” 
 
Next, in addition to targeting an important social issue and providing a 
significant (positive) contribution to the issue, the Firm also sought a final 
component prior to Filtering Out investments for social reasons: Ventures 
needed to approach a social issue in a way in which progress would be 
easily measured.  
 
“I like the company but raise two questions: 1) How does it fit in our 
impact metric? [It’s] education, but there are no clear impact 
metrics defined and they do not use any KPIs [Key Performance 
Indicators] 2) Very competitive market […] (229, Poll)” 
 
Yet, despite the importance of these three components in helping the 
fund to determine a venture’s baseline social plausibility, a failure to 
satisfy these three baseline qualities would not immediately eject the 
venture from the evaluation process. The Firm often exchanged with 
ventures and gave them time to augment weak elements of their claims. In 
one case, the Firm waited two weeks for a contact “to send pipeline and 
impact measurement data” (IC Minutes). As we will describe in the section 
on shaping social and commercial claims, once ventures passed a threshold 
of plausibility (e.g., average), the Firm also took a more active support 
role. However, by and large, this Filtering Out strategy we observed at the 
Firm was consistently applied for ventures that displayed significant issues 
with their social and commercial claims (i.e., their social and/or 
commercial identity claims were assessed as having low plausibility). We 
enclose additional exemplary data in Table 31, at the end of this section. 
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Filtering Out Strategy: The Firm did not consider ventures whose 
other claims did not fit contextual Firm preferences. The Firm 
encountered a number of different attractive ventures that they decided not 
to pursue due to a lack of fit with contextual and VC-specific preferences. 
Like other investors, the Firm had preferences in terms of location, venture 
stage, deal structure, venture industry, fund capacity and the venture’s 
fundraising timeline. Although the Firm’s investments at the end of our 
fieldwork period included companies in three countries and two continents, 
the Firm preferred companies headquartered nationally. The Firm preferred 
the valuation of companies in which they were investing in for the first 
time to be between 1-3 million Euros, and their average investment ticket 
was 300,000 Euros. In terms of deal structure, the Firm was comfortable 
with minority ownership, if complemented with a board seat, and usually 
preferred preference shares,  
Though the Firm invested in a range of industries, the venture could 
not conflict with ventures in the Firm’s existing portfolio, should be the 
most attractive venture under the consideration by the Firm at that time, 
and should be operating in a field in which the Firm had some expertise 
and network connections. The fit with the Firm’s expertise was a key 
aspect of how they understood their investment strategy ([Redacted], 
2017b). Since investing in early-stage ventures is inherently risky, the Firm 
sought to substantiate as many of the venture’s claims as possible through 
their expertise and network. They viewed this, as “de-risking,” i.e., 
reducing (though not eliminating) risk in as many of the venture’s tasks as 
possible (e.g., by reducing the risk of unsuccessful production, inadequate 
distributors, etc.). They explain this in the following Pre-IC Poll (#872), 
 
“I don't know the children's content space to fully appraise why / if 
this is needed - it seems very similar to [another venture] in terms of 
specialised [sic] content channels for children. I'm not sure how we 
would look to de-risk this in a meaningful way - as our media 
contacts are limited” (SVC4). 
 
And regarding another venture,  
 
“Does this actually change consumer behavior significantly enough 
for recurring use at high enough volumes? Would like to see what 
assumptions they've tested here to see if they can actually achieve 
revenue growth that matches free initial adoption (ie: [Lifetime 
Value vs. Customer Acquisition Costs]). There's a lot of competition 
(and already some failures!) - what extraneous/uncontrollable 
variables exist in this space, and can we de-risk through our 
network?” (SVC3) 
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Finally, the Firm had limited capacity and could only conduct deep due 
diligence on 3-4 ventures at a time, hence, timing was crucial for ventures 
to be considered for investment. Moreover, the Firm required extensive due 
diligence before feeling comfortable enough to pursue an investment, 
giving an advantage to ventures which approached the Firm early on in (or 
even prior to) their fundraising period. We include these considerations 
because while they did not have any direct bearing on the plausibility of 
new venture hybridity—or new venture identity in general—these claims 
did affect the Firm’s overall assessment of investment proposal 
attractiveness, and in many cases represented the baseline requirements for 
being considered for investment. 
 
Conceptual category Empirical Themes Exemplary data106  
Baseline commercial 
claims 
Offer (product or 
service) 
- [We] struggled with the product's ability to be a truly differentiated and 
'game changing' technology within the accessibility market. (785, 
Correspondence with venture) 
- I ultimately think this service is still a little ahead of its time and not a holistic 
enough solution (i.e.: nice to have for those who can afford it, but limited 
prospect of continual engagement and mass adoption). (1104, IC Poll) 
- Concerns around willingness to [pay] for separate handset (885, IC Poll) 
- A huge market but this business doesn't seem to address the main issues that 
all ventures in this space struggle with - recruitment of quality carers and 
preventing disintermediation. (592, IC Poll) 
Market - First, the competitive landscape has become quite saturated over the past 
few years, with corporates facing an increasing spectrum of similar 
propositions for their employees. The team struggled to see what the 
competitive edge is for corporates to choose [venture] over these 
propositions. (720, Correspondence with venture) 
- Pass on investing due to competition (836, Database) 
- I like the company but raise two questions [sic]: 1) How does it fit in our 
impact metric? [It’s] education, but there are no clear impact metrics defined 
and they do not use any KPIs 2) Very competitive market. DD [due diligence] 
has to reveal a clear competitive advantage (What do they have that no one 
else can mimic? (229, Poll) 
Finance - Significant capex and lead time to market (1503, Database) 
- Interesting idea, but no idea how to monetize (1450, Database) 
- NFP [not-for-profit]- not for us (277, Database) 
Team - Key questions are […] founder: can she attract top talent to work with her 
and is she taking our feedback?" (1303, Venture meeting notes) 
- [SVC5] met 22/7: [SVC2] and [SVC5] agree - not convinced with founder 
[founder]'s intentions/strategy/capability. (193, Database) 
- Lost co-founder. To stay in touch as reforms team and be helpful. (1249, 
Database) 
Baseline social claims Selection of social 
issue (problem 
scope) 
- Action Area=N/A (20, Database) 
- Social (Yes/No/Maybe): No (28, Database) 
- SVC2 relayed message: pass on investing due to lack of fit with our impact 
framework (67, Database) 
- I'm not sure there is a clear enough fit with our investment areas and impact 
focus, but we do wish you all the best (179, Correspondence with venture) 
- Very intersting idea [sic], but not clear what social outcome here is (564, Poll) 
- Too niche and high-end for the moment, perhaps we can revisit if they look 
to broaden their appeal? (VC2). [Vote no.] I think the impact case here is 
weak. (VC1). [Vote no.] from an impact perspective. (VC3). [Vote no.] No 
impact, but a potentially lucrative high margin business if the sales strategy 
can be accurately executed. (VC4) (724, Poll) 
                                                                        
106 All are direct quotes; each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
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- Followed up post-event. Team discussed on 4/6 on impact angle. Conclusion: 
Not clear on how differentiates, lack of impact -> No action. (791, Venture 
database) 
Significance of 
venture 
contribution to 
targeted social 
issue 
- [Vote no.] Impact appears limited, and much more interesting would be 
creating capsules to be used in existing Nespresso machines. (VC4). [Vote no.] 
I don't think this is actually that impactful (yes, it saves time for parents, but I 
find the health effects tenuous). The idea seems interesting and anecdotally 
(and instinct) tells me there is [low] initial willingness to pay (esp among 
upper middle class) until price points fall over time. (VC3) (723, Poll) 
- [We] struggled with the product's ability to be a truly differentiated and 
'game changing' technology within the accessibility market. (785, 
Correspondence with venture) 
Measurability of a 
venture’s 
contribution to a 
social issue 
- How can you measure that and what is actually a leading indicator? Also, 
because we don't measure impact and for the sake of measuring impact. You 
measure impact in the belief that it should be driving your financial story. […]  
We'd need to think about what is a driver of success for your business 
alongside delivering a positive social outcome. (777, Fieldwork notes) 
- I like the company but raise two questions [sic]: 1) How does it fit in our 
impact metric? [It’s] education, but there are no clear impact metrics defined 
and they do not use any KPIs 2) Very competitive market. DD [due diligence] 
has to reveal a clear competitive advantage (What do they have that no one 
else can mimic? (229, Poll) 
Venture-fund fit filter 
 
Location -  [vote no]. Can we help this particular business in [emerging-country]/target 
markets? 
Stage, valuation 
and targeted raise 
- Too big for us (8) 
- Pass due to size. (784) 
- The team was impressed with the product and traction to date; however, the 
business has progressed to a later stage than the current focus of FIRM's 
investments. (1009, Correspondence with venture) 
-  Take off table for now due to: valuation (617) 
- [SVC4] and [SVC4] met with [founders]. Venture is still idea stage. (221) 
- Interesting what they're building but quite early. (315) 
- Pass due to stage (lack of proof of concept). (549) 
- Too early to invest in (1179) 
Deal structure 
(round allocation, 
control offered, 
share grade) 
- We were going to be the largest ticket, but we weren’t going to have a board 
seat, and there were some other concerns around the terms (149, Interview) 
- [No.] We should be either in great value deals/leading, and/or a minority of 
'access' deals, where we have a v strong partner who can lead and 
underwrite for a long time (eg [lead investor] in [5564]). Note also [deal 
structure], with pref 8% cum [dividend] structure, which is typically not quite 
right for us. (373, Poll) 
Venture industry 
(fund expertise, 
relation to 
portfolio) 
- Biology is too advanced for me. (279, Database) 
- There may be a similar venture with more traction/better model - [venture 
616 which we are in touch with] (907, Database) 
- Interesting tech but too similar to other parts of portfolio (722, IC Minutes) 
Venture 
fundraising 
timeline 
- I think given your timelines it'll be difficult for us to close an investment 
(1032, Correspondence with venture) 
- Closing too soon (1603, Database) 
Table 31: Conceptual categories, empirical themes and exemplary data for codes related to baseline claims and venture-fund fit 
 
Founder Disposition and Revenue Model Design as Hybrid-Identity-
Reinforcing Claims 
Although the Firm might be persuaded by a venture’s ability to meet 
baseline requirements of venture’s social claims, commercial claims, and 
other claims; the plausibility of some claims was not ends in itself but were 
tools which the Firm used to interpret the likelihood of sustainable 
hybridity over the long term. Below we describe the role of both social 
claims and commercial claims in helping the Firm assess the plausibility of 
each venture’s hybridity claims. 
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Hybridity-reinforcing claims: The SVC used (pro)social and other 
identity claims to assess hybridity plausibility. The social claims the Firm 
employed as lenses included the Founder’s commitment to executing social 
contribution, as well as the qualities of the Founder enabling flexibility 
around methods to achieve the social goal. We characterize the latter as 
founder openness, curiosity, and interest in learning, humility and 
vulnerability. As indicated in Table 32, we group these claims with other 
hybridity-reinforcing qualities related to founder disposition, such as: trust 
and respect between venture and SVC, as well as, founder willingness to 
consider, improve and implement proposed changes. 
 
Hybrid-identity-reinforcing claims: Founder disposition 
Related to plausibility of social claims Related to venture-fund relationship 
- Commitment to executing social 
mission 
- Qualities enabling flexibility around 
methods to achieve the social goal: 
founder openness, curiosity, interest 
in learning, humility and vulnerability 
- Trust and respect between venture 
and fund and founder  
- Willingness and ability to consider, 
improve and implement proposed 
changes 
Table 32: Summary of hybridity-reinforcing claims related to founder disposition 
 
Hybridity-reinforcing founder dispositions were important to the 
Firm because they believed this warded off the risk that the venture might 
“make a trade-off,” i.e., prioritize commercial performance in lieu of 
achieving social outcomes—what the literature refers to as “mission-drift” 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jones, 2007; Santos et al., 2015). A founder’s 
commitment to executing a social contribution through the venture was 
important because even if a venture offers a compelling set of baseline 
social and commercial claims, without a founder’s commitment to see the 
execution of the social mission to its full potential, the plausibility of 
hybridity in this new venture identity remained low.  
In one IC meeting, members of the Firm discussed their engagement 
with a venture (#595): 
 
“What does the venture do?” (A3); 
“Block chain transactions for refugees being handed cash by 
government, so you can track what’s being spent when and where” 
(SVC4); 
“It’s pretty cool” (SVC3); 
“Yeah, I really liked that idea when we talked about it last” (A2); 
“Yeah, I guess it’s cool, but they just are not the people to do it, I 
don't think. There's just no ... they have just hacked this [public 
interest in the problem], there's no, sort-of like ‘I care’ at all...” 
(SVC4);  
“Judging from the email [they sent us] it sounds like that's true” 
(SVC3). 
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A member if the Firm elaborated on this point in an interview: 
 
“[Once, we had] someone who I thought was interesting and 
genuinely motivated by that [social mission]. When I was like, 
‘What's success for you?’ they were like, ‘Oh, you know, do this and 
this and this.’  
Then I was like, ‘But, you know that's not very scalable,’ [and they 
responded] ‘No, you're right, that's not very scalable so we'll just 
have to...’ Then… it's like if at this critical point you're so willing to 
say what I want you to say, then you don't have that much conviction 
in what you want to do. […] They're going to encounter that 
[hardcore investor] in the future, [so,] you need to understand their 
motivation from the start.”107 
 
We illustrate the Firm’s point in the following conceptual diagram (Figure 
28), whereby weak founder commitment to executing a social mission 
allows commercial demands within hybrid ventures to take precedence. On 
the contrary, with a strong hybridity-reinforcing founder disposition, the 
Founder can confront commercial demands within her organization and 
structure the commercial elements of her venture. 
 
 
Figure 28: Conceptual visualization of how weak founder disposition increases Trade-off Hazard by not guiding or confronting commercial demands 
 
Interestingly, although a founder’s disposition was seen to shape ventures’ 
(pro)social identity despite financial pressures, a founder’s disposition also 
enabled improvements in a venture’s commercial claims. This enabled 
commercial claims to be improved in the short-term (as we describe in the 
                                                                        
107 This portion of our interview with SVC4 has been shortened for brevity’s sake but it is included in this Appendix H in case of 
interest. 
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Shaping Strategies section), however, founder’s disposition also appeared 
to foreshadow long-term (commercial) value generation, by proxy of an 
improved long-term relationship with the Firm. The working relationship 
opens the door to tackling road bumps of the social or commercial kind, as 
a co-founder of the Firm explains: 
 
“It's more about who am I happy to work with, or would I want to 
work with, rather than ... That's like a prerequisite for us to have a 
successful working situation […] I think you can [work with 
founders to improve their business model]. You can always do it. It's 
not easy, but I think you can do it. What you can't do is the converse 
of that where you have to work on their [character]. Not just care, 
make someone that we can work with. Part of the character 
assessment is ‘Can we work with this person?’ or ‘Do they take 
feedback? To my very first point. That is a big red flag actually” 
(SVC1, Interview). 
 
In another conversation, we observed the Firm discussing their relationship 
with a venture still under consideration (#1329), 
 
“Here I feel we're taking a very binary outcome but we don't 
actually have any influence in it” (SVC1); 
“Why couldn't we influence it? We know senior corporate decision 
makers at lots of big companies. Why, knowing those people, could 
we not help them?” (SVC2);  
“I think it's a question of do we have that relationship with that 
management team? […] Is that a working relationship yet?” (SVC1) 
“No, I don't think so, no” (SVC3)’; 
“Not really. Not really. (A3). 
 
Interestingly, governance was not a major topic of discussion at the Firm, 
despite it being key in the literature on the management of social issues in 
business settings.  One reason for this might be that in the early-stages of a 
company, the board and relevant actors consist of fewer individuals, 
conflict resolutions may be more easily resolved in an informal setting. 
These data underline the importance of founder disposition and venture-
VC relationship quality. 
While the Firm was aware of the importance of alignment between 
stakeholders, principal-agent issues, social and fiduciary mandate, they 
appeared to view these topics as tools for codifying founder disposition 
then as legal safeguards from conflict. In an interview the Founder 
explained that they request an impact statement from founders to be placed 
in the venture’s articles of association, but emphasized through his tone 
that this represented a commitment from the founder to address the issue, 
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“In the articles of association, we want an impact statement. We 
want you to report on the 2-3 yet to be determined impact KPIs, 
which we'll work on. So: a commitment that they will work on that” 
(SVC1, Interview). 
 
As these examples illustrate, the venture’s (pro)social identity claims 
represented more than baseline thresholds of social identity claim 
plausibility, but also contributed to positive assessments of longer-term 
venture effectiveness around questions of hybridity, avoiding Trade-off 
Hazard and other road bumps.  
In the next section, we discuss a second Hybridity-reinforcing claim 
used to assess hybridity plausibility, followed by a venture-support strategy 
enabled by Hybridity-reinforcing founder disposition. 
Hybridity-reinforcing claims: The SVC used commercial identity 
claims to assess hybridity plausibility. In addition to using commercial 
considerations as independent filters to address objective venture attributes, 
the Firm also used commercial considerations as lenses to assess the long-
term plausibility of the venture’s social and commercial identity claims. In 
this hybridity plausibility assessment, the Firm sought to increase hybridity 
plausibility by selecting ventures whose social activities and commercial 
activities were as related and as complementary as possible. Seeing the 
Firm seek ventures with related/complementary activities (versus ventures 
with less-related/less-complementary activities) confirms the emerging 
distinction discussed in the literature between complementary hybrids (e.g., 
“market hybrids”), and contested hybrids (e.g., “bridging,” “blending” and 
“coupling hybrids”) (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Santos et al., 2015).  
Investigating the venture’s commercial claims in relation to their 
social activities, the Firm was able to distinguish ventures with 
incompatible versus venture with more compatible revenue models. Sand, 
one of their portfolio companies represented an ideal version of the 
hybridity-reinforcement the Firm sought in its revenue models. Sand offers 
a hardware and software solution to food businesses seeking to track and 
reduce food waste generated in their kitchens, and they charge their 
customers directly on how much food waste they save. In Sand’s 
investment proposal, they describe their value proposition: 
 
“Our proposition in a slide… 
$30k food waste per year in the average commercial kitchen; 
Sand is a revolutionary technology that cuts food waste in half; 
$15k food waste per year in 6 months after using Sand; 
Sand charges about 20% of recurring food cost saved + $7k upfront 
fee (or lease) (Venture Document) 
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By pricing their offer directly on the social outcome generated (an 
environmental outcome), Sand builds a proposition that creates a 
reinforcing relationship between social and commercial outcomes. The 
model is more integrated in that the client is also a beneficiary due to the 
food waste Sand helps her reduce. While this does not guarantee that 
mission drift will not occur, the hybridity-reinforcing revenue and social 
activity model does make it less likely (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
Unfortunately, the majority of the revenue models evaluated by the 
Firm were seen to be less compatible. Below, we detail three different 
concerns the Firm sought to avoid in evaluating the hybridity-reinforcing 
qualities of venture revenue models. 
The first type of concern related to revenue models that prioritized 
social outcomes over commercial outcomes (social > commercial). The 
Firm usually made sense of the venture’s intentional prioritization of social 
outcomes over commercial outcomes after engaging with the founders, 
accepting meetings with ventures legally designated as not-for-profit 
organizations, as well as, with venture without clear for-profit legal 
designations. Following these meetings, the Firm would debrief internally. 
In one Pre-IC Poll (#381), the Firm wrote, 
“On impact, the cross-subsidy model is against our lock-step. Yet, 
the economics won't make sense (according to founders) without this 
type of model. Pass based on this? (so core to our thesis as 
investors)” (SVC3); 
In another poll (#790), the Firm wrote, 
“Can they sustain and grow as a for-profit? Seems more like a 
(great) [not-for-profit] model” (SVC3);  
“Nice idea, but I really struggle to understand the business viability.  
Business plan please” (SVC1). 
In other cases, the Firm assessed the hybridity-reinforcing qualities of 
ventures directly from the revenue model described in the ventures’ 
investment proposal, using the term “lock-step” to describe the hybridity-
reinforcing nature of a venture, which may guard against premature 
hybridity collapse.108 In the following Pre-IC Poll (#103), the Firm 
discusses, 
 
“Is this actually lockstep? Is providing delivery job[s] addressing 
need for both consumer[s] (ie: better service?) or [is providing a 
delivery job to people with disabilities] more about [an] “empathy” 
purchase/choice to prefer [venture #103]?  (ie: is brand tied to 
impact, like [Dart]). Is brand sufficient differentiator vs. price?” 
(SVC1);  
                                                                        
108 The concept of lock step is described in more detail in the following section, using the term “Trade-off Hazard,” defined as the 
vulnerability of a new venture’s hybridity claims. 
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“[Vote no.] Last minute delivery is very competitive, what makes 
these guys better? Why does employing people with disabilities make 
sense from a business perspective? Price and service are everything 
in last mile [delivery] and I struggle to see these guys competing on 
either” (SVC4); 
“[Vote no]. Like the impact case here (aiming to provide 'dignified 
income' to those previously unable to be employed/unemployed). 
However[,] competition and barriers to entry seem quite low - the 
founder acknowledges a Nordic (?) competitor is entering the 
Spanish market with a similar model and [is] well funded to grow 
rapidly” (SVC3). 
 
In this case, which resembles what Santos et al., (2015) refer to as a 
“bridging hybrid,” the venture’s clients are not the beneficiaries of the 
venture’s social activity (i.e., employing individuals with disabilities), 
thereby making the venture more vulnerable to mission drift (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014). The social activity does not offer a positive source of 
commercial differentiation, and, in fact, hampers the performance of the 
venture in a competitive market. As a result, the social activity as tied into 
the revenue model thus is not reinforcing, but, on the contrary, challenging 
hybridity, and in particular, challenging the commercial claims in the 
venture’s new identity. In this case, the Firm envisions three possible 
scenarios. First, they briefly entertain the idea that the social mission may 
sway customers enough to support a less effective, more expensive service. 
Second, they take the view that the venture does continue abiding by its 
social mission but causes hybridity to collapse if a new source of revenue 
is not found (given the venture’s competitive market). Third, they take the 
view that the venture does abide to the social mission until commercial 
failure looms near, when the venture decides to pivot and drift away from 
the social mission. We provide a conceptual illustration of scenarios 2 and 
3 below (Figure 29), illustrating how revenue models that prioritize social 
concerns over commercial concerns may pave the way for hybridity 
collapse.  
 
 
Figure 29: Conceptual visualization of how social>commercial revenue models increase Trade-off Hazard  
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The second type of revenue model the Firm avoided in an attempt to 
reduce Trade-off Hazard includes revenue models at risk of prioritizing 
commercial outcomes over social outcomes (social < commercial). In these 
cases, the social activity does not depend on the revenue model, thereby 
allowing the venture to expand client sources and revenue-generating 
activities to include companies and activities associated with harm. In a 
message to a venture explaining the Firm’s investment decision (#83), they 
write: 
 
“The team discussed the [opportunity] at some length and were 
impressed with the clear innovation in design which would facilitate 
the delivery of aid with limited risk to human life. In addition, I 
wanted to flag how much I valued the opportunity to spend time with 
such high-pedigree and accomplished entrepreneurs.  
Despite the aforementioned points, ultimately the team could not get 
comfortable with the business model. [Our fund] looks to invest in 
companies whereby the revenue is generated from private companies 
or consumers, as this opens up a wider spectrum of 'payers' and 
therefore enhances the likelihood of success for the business. 
Therefore, assuming the need to expand the potential client basis, 
[our fund] had concerns around ensuring that the product was only 
used for social good.” 
 
In this case, this venture’s technology capabilities portrayed government 
militaries as attractive potential clients, providing an incentive to the 
venture to engage in actions beyond the original social activity. For 
instance, a venture could expand beyond its original mission of delivering 
aid, into multiple other revenue-generating activities (see expanded blue 
section in Figure 30). Since the social activity does not depend on the 
revenue model, and revenue-generating activities expand, the social 
activities become relatively less significant. The revenue model funds other 
activities that jeopardize the venture’s social task, and the social task may 
even be dropped. 
 
Figure 30: Conceptual visualization of how social<commercial revenue models increase Trade-off Hazard due to lack of interdependence  
(similar visualization to social≠commercial revenue models, described below). 
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The third type of revenue model the Firm avoided in an attempt to 
reduce Trade-off Hazard include similar cases, wherein the revenue models 
are entirely separate from the social outcome generation (social ≠ 
commercial). In these cases, the Firm viewed the locus of social outcome 
generation as external to the venture and the venture’s core- revenue-
generating activity. These investment opportunities usually consisted of 
platform social ventures, or traditional commercial ventures not aiming to 
address a social issue. In both cases, the social venture served as a 
connector or enabler of social outcome generation, directing capital and/or 
attention to a third party, such as a non-profit, which would be responsible 
for owning and driving the social outcome generation. 
In one Pre-IC Poll (#825), the Firm’s co-founder referred to the 
revenue model of shoe company TOMS, which popularized the Buy-One-
Give-One model (Mycoskie, 2016), 
 
“I don't think we can invest in this. 1) It is a Tom’s model. This is a 
high powered CSR program and is not a fit for us. If the ties were 
made by Africans then it would be more interesting, and brand 
closer linked to the impact. But in this instance, the impact is one 
step too far removed from the bottom line.”  
 
In this case, the venture donates a pair of ties for every sale made, but the 
two activities operate independently. Because the commercial activity 
operates independently of the social activity, the venture could drop the 
social activity in a number of scenarios, e.g., the venture encounters 
financial troubles, changes leadership, or is established enough to not need 
to be associated with a charitable social activity (see X in Figure 31).109  
 
Figure 31: Conceptual visualization of how social≠commercial revenue models increase Trade-off Hazard due to lack of interdependence 
 
                                                                        
109 The Partner points to the venture brand as a potential way to continue tying the venture identity to the social activity, the logic 
being that if a brand known for being social drops its social activities, its customers would stop supporting it. However, the Partner is 
only moderately convinced, moreover, the literature suggests that when this occurs, while some social brands may lose some 
supporters, the lost customers are not likely to represent a large part of their customer base (Bloom, Hoeffler, Keller, & Meza, 2006; 
Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Roca, 2016). 
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In another opportunity the Firm considered (#780), the venture 
offered a booking platform for corporate employees seeking volunteering 
opportunities. The Firm noted their investment decision in their venture 
database as follows, “Discussed at IC on 26.01 - pass on investing as does 
not fit impact framework - Not pre-determined, [not] owned by platform.” 
In this case, it is the social activity that operates independently of the 
revenue model (unlike the previous example where the venture’s revenue 
model operates independently of the social activity). In the latter case, 
although the venture’s value proposition somewhat depends on its ability to 
connect clients with social outcomes, the venture has no control on how the 
social outcome is carried out (see Figure 32). This venture’s social 
outcomes are dependent on a third party, and it is possible that the third 
parties could stop collaborating with the venture in question (e.g., venture 
partners with a non-profit which then ceases activities, or in the case of 
#780, perhaps non-profits develop an in-house volunteering platform). In 
both this case, and the former case, there is a hazard, a risk of trading off 
one activity for another since the two activities operate independently. 
Table 33 provides exemplary data for these hybridity-reinforcing 
mechanisms.  
 
Figure 32: Conceptual visualization of how social≠commercial revenue models increase Trade-off Hazard due to lack of interdependence 
 
Conceptual category Empirical Themes Exemplary data110  
Hybridity- reinforcing 
revenue model 
Venture approach 
to social issue  
- I did not buy into the idea of selling to rich and then subsidising [sic] the 
solution for the poor.  This is not lock step. It should make money by servicing 
the poor.  Can they change to make this more accessible? 
- Team discussed at IC on 27/7: No investment at this stage due to not fitting 
lock-step model. [SVC4] provided response on 1/9. (Tracker) 
- Will get bought by a big insurer - need to work out impact. (898, Database, 
Poll) 
- While we are aligned with respect to the social outcomes the business aims 
to achieve in supporting local and small-scale producers, we look for scalable 
for profit businesses which deliver sustainable social and commercial 
outcomes. (1550, Correspondence with venture) 
- Follow-up=pass; Meeting=No; Comment=Non-profit (1556, Database) 
- "Not a fit for venture (more NFP)" (1560, Database) 
- SVC3: Can they sustain and grow as a for-profit? Seems more like a (great) 
nfp [not-for-profit] model. Again, $1.50 is quite expensive for a wash and 
110 All are direct quotes; each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
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reading session (I paid about the same for 3-4 weeks of washing - soap and 
water, my own two hands).  
- [venture offers washing machines for rent, inside a community library]  
- SVC1: Nice idea, but I really struggle to understand the business viability. 
(790, Poll) 
- [We] had concerns around ensuring that the product was only used for social 
good. (83, Correspondence with venture) 
- I think for us we need to look at your base case and see how much food 
waste [your customer’s are] throwing out. It doesn't really fit into our health 
sweet spot, because it is but it's not measurable. […] So environment is 
probably how we would think about it. it's also worth thinking about carbon 
footprint, what does it actually mean in terms of carbon footprint, so we 
need to think about that. How many of your customers don't do this. Think 
about the food waste that doesn't happen, is that is driving better consumer 
behavior? (977, Venture meeting transcript) 
Hybridity- reinforcing 
founder disposition 
Founder 
disposition 
- Team: Average - the team has extensive business experience (particularly the 
CEO), but seems to have limited focus on generating real social impact. (93, 
Venture Meeting Notes) 
- Don’t seem that impact driven. (450, IC Minutes) 
- [I] worry that it's not lockstep. They could easily pivot away […] from 
empowering marginalized women thru their workforce, but if you trust that 
this is a core motivation for the founders, then I feel ok about it. (276, Pre-
Investment Committee Poll) 
- A good founder will probably want to be in the game for quite a long time. 
They will take a pretty long term view on things. Agency connects with 
horizon in that sense. Owners long term, managers-shorter term. There's still 
even a spectrum within owners. Some owners want a quick buck, others are 
taking a longer and longer view. You get a sense for that, I think, quite early 
on. In many ways I always think the impact is just good, long-term value 
creation. It's thinking about all the externalities healthy for the business 
longer term. That's tantamount to being a good owner and taking a long term 
view on your business and wanting to give it to your kids one day, that kind of 
thing. That's one of the first things I'll look at and think about when you meet 
the founder. Where we then talk more about impact, and I don't know if it's 
early enough to be honest, is when we get to terms. In the article of 
association we want an impact statement. We want you to report on the 2-3 
yet to be determined, impact KPIs, which we'll work on. So: a commitment 
that they will work on that. (SVC1, Interview) 
- When I see [founder of venture 1247], you know [she] cried yesterday in her 
pitch. Some people found that difficult. I thought that was amazing because 
she's clearly had a close experience with the effects of this, and she's really 
affected by it, like it is kind of gross. So she's really passionate about fixing it. 
(SVC1, Interview) 
Table 33: Conceptual categories, empirical themes and exemplary data for hybridity-reinforcing mechanisms 
 
Trade-off Hazard: Informed by baseline social claims, baseline 
commercial claims, hybridity-reinforcing founder disposition and 
hybridity-reinforcing revenue models. In the previous sections we 
discussed how venture (pro)social, commercial, and venture-fund fit 
identity claims led to a Filtering Out strategy on behalf of the Firm. 
Although baseline identity claims were assessed at times with regret — 
“Love the concept, but don’t [sic] see the impact outcome that is relevant 
to us.  Shame, as sounds like an interesting [investment]” (730, Pre-IC 
Poll) — and incredulity — “No social impact. But v impressive venture. 
What do we do with such ventures??? (strong, but not a fit)” — the venture 
assessment and resulting action from the Firm was relatively 
straightforward (Filtering Out). On the other hand, hybridity-reinforcing 
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claims related to founders’ disposition and ventures’ revenue model were 
more difficult for the Firm to interpret.  
The Firm’s IC decision-making procedures always allowed for a 
member of the team to challenge the outcome and prove prior assumptions 
wrong, and as a result, the Firm’s consensus-based discussions involving 
hybridity were made with varying levels of confidence. Having described 
the ideal forms of hybridity-reinforcing claims in the previous section, we 
now revisit the concept Trade-off Hazard as it usually appeared in the 
Firm’s evaluation process (i.e., hybrid identity vulnerability, or, risk of 
hybridity collapse). 
We introduce the term “Trade-off Hazard” because it is a more 
inclusive term that covers multiple types of trade-off. Mission-drift denotes 
a trade-off which prioritizes a venture’s commercial identity, over its social 
identity (Jones, 2007), but not the contrary (prioritizing the social outcomes 
over commercial outcomes). Also, while the Firm used the term “lock-
step” to refer to hybridity-reinforcing revenue models, as we illustrate, in 
this section, the Firm could become comfortable with a venture’s 
vulnerability to trade-off without a hybridity-reinforcing revenue model. 
The Firm independently assessed both types of hybridity reinforcing claims 
(founder disposition and revenue model), but these two assessments 
interacted to inform the Firm’s overall Trade-off Hazard assessment.  
For example, although ventures that adopted revenue models 
pursuing social and commercial goals independently of each other (social ≠ 
commercial) were not ideal representations of hybridity-reinforcing claims 
(revenue model), the Firm still could assess them as having adequate levels 
of Trade-off Hazard, due to the influence of the venture’s hybridity-
reinforcing founder disposition. In the case of Dart, a high-end women’s 
apparel companies which supports and advocates for survivors of human 
trafficking, one member of the Firm refers to her concern, in the Pre-IC 
poll, that the venture’s revenue model is not hybridity-reinforcing. 
However, she concedes that the founder’s disposition may make up for 
this,  
“[I] worry that it's not lockstep. They could easily pivot away […] 
from empowering marginalized women thru their workforce, but if 
you trust that this is a core motivation for the founders, then I feel ok 
about it.”  
In a sense, the founder’s disposition counters the commercial momentum 
brought on by the venture’s revenue model. Through the founder’s 
personal commitment to the social issue, the Firm believes that she will 
actively build ties between the commercial activity, the venture’s public 
image and the social cause, while also enlisting the help of the Firm to 
keep her on track. In this case, the Firm ended up financing the venture and 
taking on an operational business role, freeing up the founders to work 
more on advocacy roles. While this is not the ideal image of hybridity, “the 
constellation of claims around the founders, organization and market 
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opportunity” of the entrepreneurial entity amounts to a workable 
investment opportunity (Navis & Glynn, 2011). We conceptually visualize 
this opportunity, as identified by the Firm, below (Figure 33).  
 
 
Figure 33: Conceptual visualization of how social≠commercial revenue models manage Trade-off Hazard with founder disposition 
 
 In another case, members of the Firm debated intensely on whether 
the founder’s disposition could make up for a revenue models at risk of 
prioritizing commercial outcomes over social outcomes (social < 
commercial), and what this meant for the venture’s overall Trade-off 
Hazard. Some members of the Firm believed that the venture’s revenue 
model’s ability to reinforce hybrid social and commercial outcomes was 
low (category C in the Data Structure) but due to the founder’s disposition 
(category B) and other identity claims (category G), the Firm and the 
venture would still be able to keep Trade-off Hazard low. In an interview 
with a member of the Firm early in the year, SVC1 said, 
 
“I think [the founder of venture 341 has] genuinely become more 
mission-driven as he's come along. I think he might have been 
affected by us sitting right next to him and giving him a sense of 
license to talk more about that stuff. More and more people talk 
about impact. He's commercial about it too. That's great.” 
 
However, by summer, multiple IC meetings revealed discord within the 
team about the ability of the online and mobile platform to protect its low-
income users from being targeted by predatory advertisers offering selling 
potentially harmful products such as high-interest loans, or cigarettes. 
 
“The impact risk here is that as they get going and they hit the usual 
problems people have scaling businesses, that the shiny money from 
[lead generation] becomes really, really attractive and suddenly you 
move from helping granny to lower her electricity bill to actually 
helping granny pay the highest possible tariff.  
And that’s charity… so absolutely the best of intentions, but 30 
pieces of silver become too attractive. And this has that feel that at 
some point, you’re selling your customers and not actually providing 
a service” (SVC5); 
 
208 
“That’s a really important corporate governance route that we have 
to beware of if we progress with this” (SVC4);  
“It’s not a governance issue, it’s a business model issue… and 
money will dictate this. And actually this is a good discussion. One 
of our guiding principles is that we’re doing good so… what is the 
risk that we end up in businesses that are not doing good? 
One: this damages our brand, because we were naïve. And secondly, 
it’s going to jeopardize fundraising and all kinds of things. So we 
should be really careful not to end up in businesses that end up 
flipping to something that we don’t want to be associated with at 
all” (SVC5). 
 
In this case, SVC5 believed that venture’s revenue model’s ability to 
reinforce hybrid social and commercial outcomes was low (category C in 
the Data Structure), and that the commercial plausibility of the new venture 
identity was bound to be challenged with scaling efforts (category E), and 
that these two elements together had a greater impact on Trade-off Hazard 
than founder disposition (category B). In the end, the conflict assessments 
of the venture’s Trade-off Hazard delayed the Firm’s investment decision. 
When this venture’s funding needs became more urgent, the Firm 
ultimately did not pursue it due to its capacity (available funds, more 
attractive deals under consideration) and failed term negotiations (related 
to valuation).  
Until now, we have discussed mechanisms used by the Firm to 
determine whether to Filter Out or to keep a venture under consideration 
and take it through the key evaluation stages. However, as we describe in 
the following section, the Firm combined assessments of the venture’s 
social claims, commercial claims, and hybridity-reinforcing founder 
disposition to determine three other modes of engaging with ventures, 
which significantly influenced investment attractiveness and the 
plausibility of new venture hybridity.  
 
Improving the Plausibility of Social and Commercial Claims through 
Identity-Shaping Strategies 
While in the previous sections we discussed how baseline venture 
attributes shaped SVC assessments, and, at times, led to investment 
behaviors such as Filtering Out (when the plausibility of both social and 
commercial claims were low-low), in the following section we discuss 
venture engagement strategies applied to ventures with social-commercial 
plausibilities that were moderate-high (Rapprochement), high-moderate 
(Tinkering), and low-moderate, moderate-moderate, and high-low 
(Helping). While these are all identity-shaping venture engagement 
strategies used by the SVC, unlike the latter strategy (Helping), the former 
two strategies (Rapprochement and Tinkering) were employed with the 
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intent of exploring opportunities for investment (see Table 34 for a 
summary of venture engagement strategies).  
Ventures with highly plausible commercial claims and moderately 
plausible social claims tended to illicit efforts on behalf of the Firm to 
understand and potentially influence founders’ perception of their venture’s 
social claims. We call this strategy Rapprochement, which involved social 
motivation due diligence. Conversely, ventures with moderately plausible 
commercial claims paired with highly plausible social claims tended to 
illicit efforts on behalf of the Firm to improve the venture’s commercial 
model. We call this strategy Tinkering, a strategy resembling traditional 
bricolage processes described in the entrepreneurship literature. These 
strategies tend to take place after the Firm’s initial meeting with the 
venture and prior to any negotiation of terms.  
 When successful, these patterns of engagement directly increased 
the plausibility of the evaluated ventures’ emerging identities, shed light on 
the plausibility of the new venture’s hybrid identity, and co-created an 
investment opportunity for the venture and the SVC. When unsuccessful, 
the Firm withdrew their engagement, lost111 investment opportunities, and 
may have hurt the fundraising prospects of evaluated ventures. We 
summarize these patterns of engagement in Table 34. We detail the 
application of these two strategies in the sections below. 
 
 Plausibility of new venture’s social claims 
Weak Average Strong 
Plausibility of 
new 
venture’s 
commercial 
claims 
Strong Do not engage— 
Not for us 
Engage— 
Rapprochement (3) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Engage— 
Cautious pursuit (1) 
Avera
ge 
Engage— 
Be as helpful as possible (4) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Engage— 
Be as helpful as possible (4) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Engage— 
Tinkering (2) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Weak 
 
 
Do not engage— 
Filtering out (5) 
Engage— 
Be as helpful as possible (4) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Engage— 
Be as helpful as possible (4) 
(hybridity-shaping strategy) 
Table 34: Summary of the SVC’s patterns of engagement  
 
Rapprochement Strategy: social motivation due diligence. The first 
strategy was applied to ventures with highly plausible commercial claims 
and moderately plausible social claims, and which exhibited at least 
moderate plausibility in terms of venture-fund fit. With a strong team and 
business model, the Firm was convinced by the venture’s commercial 
claims. They saw potential for a strong (pro)social identity, but uncertainty 
remained around whether this was at all part of the venture’s founding 
team’s organizational self-concept. As a result, there was a high likelihood 
that “mission-drift” could occur prior to the venture even fully embracing a 
social mission. When unsuccessful, the outcomes of Rapprochement at 
                                                                        
111 Usually due to circumstantial reasons, but at times, due to their desire to apply for funding elsewhere. 
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times resembled Filtering Out, however, Rapprochement differs from the 
initial baseline evaluations that lead to Filtering Out, in that this strategy 
was applied only to venture with (pro)social identities judged to be 
moderate or higher (not low). Moreover, Rapprochement was a pattern of 
decisions in which the Firm more frequently engaged with ventures. Due to 
the moderate plausibility of a hybrid investment opportunity, the Firm 
engaged with the venture multiple times in a short period to develop 
confidence around the venture’s social plausibility. 
Rapprochement comprised three simple steps. First, the Firm would 
raise the question of (pro)social impact, directing attention to potential 
beneficiaries or target markets. The Firm would gauge the founder’s 
reaction and assess the founder’s emotional proximity to this or other 
social missions. This comprised the first part, resembling social motivation 
due diligence. Second, the Firm would (independently) assess if this social 
mission be further integrated into the organization’s ethos. Third, the Firm 
would invest into forming a rapport with the founder, and socializing 
founder to social causes over a longer period of time. In an interview the 
SVC4 said, 
 
“I saw [Dart] twice in a two-week timeframe really trying to 
understand what they were trying to achieve. Because key for me 
was are they really wanting to change women's lives or is it just the 
hook? […] it's actually, is that actually your motivation for it? I need 
to like the commercial, I need to like that from the start… but then [I 
want to figure out if the venture has] retrofitted this [commercial 
model] into this [social story]. I'll say stuff like, "Once you get 
upscale you'll stop doing that," to try and [provoke them]. Because 
it's easy. If you want money, you're just going to agree with me. [If] 
that's all you want is money you're going to agree with me.” 
 
In this case, the social motivation of the founders of Dart sufficiently 
convinced the Firm, and together, they were able to craft a venture strategy 
to enable the venture to substantiate its (pro)social identity claims. 
 In another case, the Firm was instrumental in directing a venture’s 
direction to a social cause and potential beneficiaries of their technology 
and enabling the hybrid identity to emerge.  
 
“[Captain, our portfolio company] is like that. When we first met 
[…] they were selling geolocation to [music] festivals. We were like, 
‘Listen, go to Bangladesh. Go to the Middle East. Go to favelas. 
That's where they need it.’ Now it's all he talks about, the over 4 
billion people who are unaddressed” (SVC1). 
 
However, the outcomes of Rapprochement more often do not lead to 
positive changes in assessments the venture’s (pro)social identity 
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plausibility, likely, due to the challenges of aligning social motivation for a 
social mission and the emerging venture identity. In one venture’s case 
(#750), the founder responded to the social questions raised by the Firm in 
a way which did not bolster the plausibility of the venture’s (pro)social 
identity,  
 
Email subject: Perspectives on Impact 
“Hi SVC1, 
It was a pleasure to meet you guys yesterday. I had a great 
time explaining the [project] and I hope that you enjoyed the 
presentation as well. I have been thinking about how to best 
address your concerns regarding the health angle of the app. 
The reality is that only you can interpret the limits of your 
investment scope so I think the best I can do is to state the 
facts and then help you answer any further questions. The 
facts are: 
1. [Our venture] helps those who are already eating healthier and 
facilitates and promotes healthy nutrition to those who do not eat 
healthy yet but are open to it. 
2. [Our venture] helps those who have a dietary restriction. Whether 
it is caused by an allergy, an intolerance or their own choice. 
3. [Our venture] does not restricts its content to just healthy 
products, since doing that would make the app less useful. Many 
healthy-eaters still buy products for their families that are 
unhealthy, as it is everyone’s choice to decide what they like to eat. 
That said, we will flag unhealthy things at the choice of the user. 
4. Is the ultimate goal of [our venture] to just help people eat 
healthier and have more info regarding their products? No, we also 
save everyone at least 40min every week, whether they choose to eat 
healthy or not. 
5. [Our venture] is positioned as an app that offers personalised 
[sic] nutritional recommendations and that helps consumers 
discover products that are good for them and we will continue to do 
so. We already have more than 25 nutritional experts in the 
platform. […] 
6. Will the app still help someone find and by the cheapest and 
unhealthiest crisps? Yes.” 
 
In another case, even though the venture was—in principal—responsive to 
the Firm’s social concerns, the Firm responded with the following message 
informing them of the investment decision (#978),  
 
“It's very promising (and exciting!) to see social mission becoming 
embedded in both the product offering and messaging of the 
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company. However, our team could not arrive to a consensus on 
whether this is a fit with [our fund’s] investment thesis. We look for 
businesses whose primary product or service is delivering a social 
outcome to their consumers in a pre-determined, lock-step model.” 
 
The Firm understands that founder disposition is not easy to influence. In 
one IC conversation, the Firm discussed among itself whether investment 
stake influences venture hybridity more than the relationship between the 
venture and the Firm, 
 
“If you think about with [Captain], we were never… we were tiny… 
tiny… [in terms of our investment stake]. And I think we've had a 
huge, outsize impact vs. the size of our investment. And we've been a 
real advocate for impact. You know, if you look at all their language, 
it’s changed radically over the past few years” (SVC1); 
“SVC1, is that partly due to SVC2’s relationship with [the founder]? 
…that you can have those conversations? We don’t have that 
relationship with [venture 1329]” (SVC4); 
“I don’t think so. To be incredibly objective, I don’t think [the 
founder of Captain] has changed because he’s buddies with SVC2” 
(SVC1); 
“I’m not saying that. I am saying that they are slightly more 
compelled. You can say, ‘Hey, have you thought about it this way? 
You have that relationship outside” (SVC4);  
[…] 
“We’ve always been about relationships, there’s a… it’s organic, 
whereas, like, obviously there is power in a bigger stake, but power 
is not really going to make people genuinely care about impact. They 
care about impact if they’re led by your vision of it, not necessarily 
by how much money you put it into it.” 
 
As illustrated, when successful, the Rapprochement pattern of engagement 
directly increased the plausibility of the evaluated ventures’ emerging 
identities, or, made the implausibility of the new venture’s hybrid identity 
clearer, helping the Firm to avoid an investment in a venture in which 
hybridity would not be sustainable. The graph in the following figure 
(Figure 34) demonstrates how the Firm conducts social motivation due 
diligence on evaluated venture A in order to gauge the venture’s 
orientation towards outcomes B1 and B2, which prioritize commercial 
outcomes over social outcomes. Successful cases inform the Firm not to 
invest in these cases or lead the Firm to discover an investable prospect 
(outcome B3). 
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Figure 34: Visual conceptualization of the impact of Rapprochement Strategy on venture identity claims 
 
Tinkering Strategy: under-the-hood revenue model intervention. 
The Tinkering Strategy appears at first to be a mirror image of the 
Rapprochement Strategy. While Rapprochement intervenes at the founder 
level, relies on the Firm’s soft skills and takes time, Tinkering appears to 
intervene at the revenue model level, and rely on the social network and 
technical skills of the Firm. Finally, Tinkering is always more urgent in 
nature, involving a rapid sequence of communication and tests (iterations) 
under time pressure (usually the venture’s funding deadline). The patterns 
of decisions we observed included: research and analysis, proposing 
changes in commercialization strategy, pricing, distribution; monitoring 
market response to venture changes; providing operational support; and 
network outreach (connecting to experts, partners and distributors). 
The Firm appeared more at ease with these tasks than those in 
Rapprochement, likely due to the objective cover that the market-related 
nature of these tasks provided (in the case of Rapprochement, the 
subjective and personal nature of the evaluation is more apparent). In an 
interview with a co-founder of the Firm, he says,  
 
“Of course, we can on the margin, through our example and work, 
affect integrity, but we can affect the impact [business] model much 
more […] because then it becomes a commercial discussion. It's less 
of a values-based discussion. People respond to commercial 
incentives much more easily and readily than they do to what I have 
to say about their character” (SVC1) 
 
However, despite the objective, technical cover of this strategy, soft skills 
are also crucial to its execution. Tinkering relies on a baseline assessment 
of the founder’s disposition, including their commitment to executing 
social mission; their flexibility around methods to achieve the social goal; 
their willingness and ability to consider, improve and implement proposed 
changes; and the relationship between venture and fund. SVC4 gave his 
perspective on the founder disposition required,  
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“I mean you wouldn't get that with every entrepreneur, like. 
someone’s trying to tell you that ‘you're an idiot and you're wrong 
and that's not how it works’ but he was like ‘Okay this is actually 
really interesting’ on the part of the entrepreneur. […] I challenged 
him on a new model that I'd worked on, he took it and redid over a 
weekend and then I took it over the following weekend and redid it. 
We basically went back and forth a few times.” 
 
Moreover, Tinkering relies on the Firm’s ability to look past the current 
plausibility of the venture’s claim and believe in the possibility of a more 
plausible venture claim. As mentioned in the introduction of our study, 
when discussing reasons why one of the analyst decided to join the Firm, 
she said,  
 
“What I liked about SVC1 is that he still maintained some 
margin of doubt… Like, if he really likes the entrepreneur but 
the business model is not robust, he would still bet on the 
venture and say, ‘let’s see if we can help him, let’s see if we can 
make it more investible.’ And if that’s the case, we’ll take it 
forward, whereas I think most of the people, or maybe the 
people that I am used to, they’re not very visionary. Yes, so 
maybe visionary is a good way to summarize that.  
 
The SVC engaged in Tinkering when ventures were assessed as having 
moderately plausible commercial claims and highly plausible social claims, 
and which exhibited at least moderate plausibility in terms of venture-fund 
fit. These ventures that were clearly passionate about a social problem, but 
lacked general business know-how, particularly around how to price and 
distribute their offer. These ventures needed help finding a commercial 
model that worked in conjunction with their mission, and at times, also 
needed support in execution. For the Firm, they viewed this as “an exercise 
in lateral thinking” (SVC1, Interview). 
When successful, Tinkering increased the plausibility of the 
evaluated ventures’ emerging identities and co-created an investment 
opportunity for the venture and the SVC. When unsuccessful, the Firm 
withdrew their engagement, lost112 investment opportunities, and may have 
harmed the fundraising prospects of evaluated ventures. Interestingly, 
when unsuccessful, the outcomes of Tinkering were particularly regretful 
because the Firm shared in the venture’s failure to identify compatible 
revenue models for important social missions. Below, we provide 
examples of each outcome. 
                                                                        
112 Usually due to circumstantial reasons, but at times, due to their desire to apply for funding elsewhere. 
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In the case of Oak, the Firm’s successful execution was enabled, 
first, by the Firm’s iterative approach to decision-making (i.e., revisiting 
venture decisions multiple times), but also by the venture’s hybridity-
reinforcing founder dispositions and its flexible fundraising timeline 
(which gave the Firm time to help the venture iterate and see results). The 
social and commercial claims of this venture, which pairs qualified doctors 
with patients seeking at-home care, received moderate claims of 
plausibility initially, as indicated in the IC minutes, 
 
“-Not clear how to measure impact.  
-Where are the [doctor’s] hours coming from? [Free time?] 
-What is competitive advantage? Test the competition.  
-Is this interesting impact model?  
-Right market size and opportunity?  
-How much of a pain point are they solving for [doctor’s] admin 
[needs]? Interview doctors.” 
 
However, these notes also suggest key steps the Firm could take to 
substantiate the venture’s claims. As the investment decision progressed, 
the investment decision hit more roadblocks, but the Firm persisted given 
the potential that they saw. SVC1 describes motivating his team to pursue 
ventures with less plausible claims, 
 
“I'm not very good at it, but [rather] than me going, ‘No, no, no. I 
think X, Y, Z is why you're wrong…’ More like taking a problem-
solving perspective, ‘Ok, so SVC4, I get it. You really don't like that. 
What would you need to see happen for that to be better?  
In Oak’s case, we had a real issue on the price point. [We asked,] 
‘What do you need to make it better?’ and the response was we need 
to make the price point lower. Let's work on what that price point 
needs to be and how can we get there” (SVC1). 
 
    SVC4 also gave his perspective in a separate interview,  
 
“I wasn't convinced and SVC1 sort of challenged me to say what is it 
that doesn't make this interesting to you? I said, ‘I think it's very 
expensive and I don't think it has a lot of impact,’ these kinds of 
points and he sort of said ‘Well okay can you make it investible?’ 
[It’s] an interesting business and I think they're nice guys and it's a 
nice team but I didn't think the business was really exciting. I think 
he was just like ‘Well all I hear from you is you don't like the model 
so what would you want the model to look like?’  
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SVC4 then, in conjunction with the venture founder, simulated which 
markets the venture would need to enter, and at which price points, in order 
to reach available doctors, incentivize them, meet patient demand, and fund 
the venture’s growth. The founder successfully implemented this new 
model and they continued to monitor the effects. We overheard one 
conversation soon after this intervention, 
 
“[to SVC4] We should really back these guys, right now. It’s getting 
at a point where---” (SVC3); 
“It’s hockey-sticking right now” (SVC4) 
 
In the fundraising document they drafted on Oak, they wrote, 
 
“Since [Oak’s first presentation, we] have worked closely to refine 
the proposition which has resulted in 335% growth in appointments 
since February (now a total of 68) and 20% growth in downloads 
(now a total of 2,847).” 
 
This case shows how significant Tinkering is as a strategy for the SVC, as 
it let the Firm to access an investment opportunity where there was none 
before. As shown in Figure 35, a visual conceptualization of the Firm’s 
Tinkering Strategy, whereas Oak may have initially inhabited point C in 
following the Firm’s engagement with Oak, its plausibility moved to point 
D, an area of attractive and investable ventures—making Oak attractive and 
investible. 
 
 
Figure 35: Visual conceptualization of the impact of Rapprochement and Tinkering Strategy on venture identity claims 
 
This data raises questions about what it means to evaluate an 
investment opportunity as an objective opportunity that exists in the world. 
Has the Firm has co-created this opportunity with the venture, or has it 
simply made the path between the venture’s current state and the venture’s 
identity claims clearer? In the latter case, Rapprochement and Tinkering 
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could be considered evaluation strategies that allow the Firm and venture to 
“stress test” an investment’s identity claims. As SVC1 said in an interview, 
 
“I wanted to really exhaust our ability to try... You have this 
great idea so you want to try and really help that idea get off 
the ground. [It’s] an exercise in lateral thinking. You have to 
think out of the box. And that takes a bit of time, you have to 
talk through things several times, and it's not good because it 
means the feedback loop gets long and people get the wrong 
message, and they're like, "You guys aren't giving us due 
attention.” [There's] a tension there. We have to get back [to 
the venture] reasonably quickly, but we also have to give things 
due attention. 
 
Yet, while these interventions are sometimes successful, often, despite the 
best efforts on behalf of the venture and the SVC, this strategy fails. In the 
case of one venture tackling behavioral change (#1241), the Firm assessed 
the venture’s social claims as highly plausible, while its commercial claims 
were assessed as having low plausibility. Given this lukewarm assessment, 
SVC4 engaged with the venture, proposing a strategic change the venture 
could take to improve the plausibility of its commercial claims, 
 
“I thought that [the venture] could be interesting if they pivoted. But 
not so much that I would back and bat for them no matter what. […] 
Someone who is looking at this from an investable standpoint would 
say, ‘this is uninvestable for me, because of these reasons, but maybe 
if you can do this pivot and maybe incorporate my feedback, this 
may become investable. But right now, it is not investable.’” 
  
However, in this case, the venture did not effectively execute the pivot, 
causing the Firm to withdraw their engagement. This action potentially 
also jeopardized the venture’s ability to fundraise elsewhere, as we discuss 
in the following section. The Firm’s letter informing the venture of their 
decision reads as follows,  
 
“The team liked many aspects of the business specifically the impact 
you are having by changing people's day-to-day behavior for the 
good, and your traction to date is impressive. However, the team 
were unable to get comfortable with the following: 
1). The business' ability to pivot to a new revenue model and the 
short time frame that we have to see the necessary traction. 
2). Whilst we (and I) personally think you are very impressive, we 
struggled with the ability of the current team to execute efficiently 
and accurately on this pivot. 
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Therefore, it is with a very heavy heart that I have to tell you that 
[our fund] will not be investing in [#1241] in this round. I fully 
understand how disappointing this must be for you, and that you 
need time to digest this; however when you are ready I am more 
than happy to provide more detailed feedback. 
We really are rooting you for to be successful, and I hope we can 
keep in contact.” 
 
The founder replied, 
 
“Thank you for letting me know promptly. Clearly this is 
disappointing news for us, but I can honestly say that the changes 
you have instigated through our conversations thus far could have a 
pretty transformational impact on [our venture], so I am glad we at 
least got this far. I just wish that timeframes weren’t as they are.” 
 
While in this case, the Firm viewed the venture as largely responsible for a 
not being able to further substantiate its commercial identity claims, in the 
following case, the Firm also felt responsible for the failure its Tinkering 
efforts. In the following interview, SVC1 refers to a venture offering a 
solution to an urban environmental issue (#773),  
 
“Very often there it doesn't connect with the network. We can't find 
the right connections. That happens the whole time. Pretty much 
every IC there's some venture where we haven't been able to create 
that connection. That… One of the ventures this week where… we've 
been in and out with them, discussing quite a lot, and we haven't 
found a distribution model for them… because they don't have one. 
 
I feel like he's at the Beta Max/VHS moment where he's got a great 
idea. Everyone understands that there's probably going to be a lot 
more of this stuff around. […] But can he get it to market? The VHS 
beat Beta Max, even though Beta Max is way better, because VHS 
got to market. We don't have an answer for how we can help him get 
to market, and he doesn't either yet right now.”  
 
After spending nearly five months considering the venture’s initial 
proposal, the Firm eventually had to withdraw their engagement, informing 
the venture of their decision by email, 
 
“We could not get comfortable with the business' ability to create 
the robust, multi-faceted and highly scalable distribution channel 
that we look for in potential investments. This appears to us to be 
systemic within the industry (except for business' delivering huge 
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quantities of materials / goods) and not idiosyncratic to your 
proposition.  
 
In addition, the long sales cycles associated with this industry 
presents a further headwind to the [venture] business, as cash flow 
management will likely present a real challenge. 
 
Therefore it is truly with sadness that we have to inform you that 
[our fund] will not be investing in this round of funding. The team 
felt that it was important to provide clarity around this now, as we 
fully understand that the time horizon113 for you is very short. I am of 
course available to discuss this feedback with you if you feel that 
would be beneficial in some way.” 
 
In this section we illustrated strategies applied by the Firm when ventures 
were assessed as having moderate-high pairings of commercial and social 
claim plausibility. We illustrated how these strategies shaped the 
plausibility of the evaluated ventures’ emerging social and commercial 
identities for the Firm, and for the venture itself. When successful, the 
strategies indicated to the Firm whether or not to pursue an investment, 
sometimes even directing the Firm towards an investment not previously 
available prior to their engagement strategies, but which emerged (e.g., 
through co-creation).114 Together, the Rapprochement Strategy and 
Tinkering Strategy are unique because they provide examples of what the 
literature calls “smart money” as well as, what call smart “heart money.” 
With their expertise and connections, the Firm actively tries to improve the 
claims of ventures upwards on along both the commercial plausibility and 
across on the social plausibility. Finally, another distinctive factor we 
observe is that the SVC conducts these two strategies prior to making an 
investment decision.  
However, in this section we also observed how failures led the Firm 
to withdraw its engagements, sometimes after multiple introductions to 
trusted contacts, and after many months of effort. On the other hand, 
sometimes the venture would withdraw its funding request, causing the 
Firm to lose the investment opportunity. Before we expand on the negative 
outcomes of the Firm’s dualistic assessment of ventures, we introduce a 
third and final strategy used by the Firm to engage with ventures. 
Identity-buffering Strategy: “Be as helpful as possible.” In this 
section we introduce the third and final hybridity shaping strategy that we 
observed the Firm applying to ventures (out of five total venture 
                                                                        
113 The founder was considering quitting his job and relied on the Firm to indicate whether funding would be available for his 
entrepreneurial pursuit. 
114 We remain agnostic as to whether the investment opportunity was actually co-created or whether co-creation simply refers to the 
venture and SVC’s ability to recognize the opportunity.  
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engagement strategies. Helping was applied to ventures with social-
commercial plausibility that was low-moderate, moderate-moderate, and 
high-low. This strategy consisted of providing detailed feedback to rejected 
ventures, helping and connecting rejected ventures to potential partners and 
resource providers, mentoring and staying in touch with aspiring 
entrepreneurs with very early-stage ideas (including by partnering with 
educational institutes). 
While the last two hybridity-shaping strategies involve urgent and 
intense engagement and were intended to push ventures’ identity claims 
towards the top-right corner of the social-commercial quadrant (high-high), 
this last strategy is less urgent, low-intensity, and were only intended to 
push the venture upwards. These ventures typically did not solve a social 
problem deemed to be significant enough, did not address a market which 
is large enough, did not have a hybridity-reinforcing business model, or 
was too early-stage. 
While the Firm did not expect to create an investment opportunity 
from these ventures, they still wished to build rapport, and gained indirect 
investment- and non-investment-related benefits from this strategy. Most 
importantly, our data suggests that these strategies helped the Firm to 
reinforce its own hybrid self-concept in a context that demanded many 
commercial-identity-dominant actions. 
The Firm’s employee handbook contained six key values and 
guiding principles, many of which were reflected in its interactions with 
ventures, 
 
“Stay Humble We are only successful through reliance on others 
with talents far greater than our own. 
Be grateful We express thanks in many ways, and constantly. 
See strength in weakness A perceived weakness masks a greater   
strength. We seek those strengths. 
Be kind and respectful To everyone, always. We do not talk down to 
anyone. 
Maintain our integrity We think holistically about our actions, the 
ventures we invest in, and the bigger picture. We do not take short 
cuts that cause harm down the road. 
Function as a meritocracy We reward results and operate fairly on 
this basis. 
Exhibit excellence in all that we do Work products are high quality. 
We set ambitious goals, strive to meet them, and reflect on results. 
We strive to keep ourselves current on information, to be curious 
and dig deeper, and to seek data and expert opinion to validate 
hypotheses.” (Handbook, Internal document) 
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We refer to the opening paragraphs of excerpts of the venture 
correspondence we included above, 
 
“Dear [founder], 
I hope you are well, and thank you for your email in regards to your 
[recent] trip which all sounds very exciting. I firstly want to say how 
great it has been to get to know you and learn more about the 
[venture] story” (1241, Venture correspondence); 
 
“Dear [founder], 
I hope you're well. Firstly, I really want to thank you for sharing 
your vision with us and your incredible patience throughout this 
process, it really does seem like yesterday that you came in to meet 
SVC1 for the first time. The passion and commitment that you have 
for this project is truly inspirational and we feel very privileged to 
have spent time with you” (773, Venture correspondence). 
 
In addition to providing detailed and dignified feedback to rejected 
ventures with which the Firm had begun to build a rapport, the Firm also 
invested efforts into helping and connecting ventures with which the Firm 
had had minimal prior interaction. The Firm implemented a short hand in 
their note-taking and calendar system which reminded them to reach out to 
ventures with which they had decided to “keep in touch,” or “keep in close 
touch,” or “keep in very close touch” on a monthly or bi-monthly basis.115 
  
“Offered to connect to [contact]. No other action at this time.” (150, 
IC Minutes) 
“Check with [contact] and [Dart] to connect with [investor]” (504, 
IC Minutes) 
“SVC3 to connect with A2’s friend in [city]” (454, IC Minutes)  
“On 28/5 [our] team decided [to take] no further direct action 
beyond: 
- SVC4 connected to [company] and A1 to get feedback from [her] 
friends.  
- SVC1 and SVC2 connected to [contact] and [Hotel C292] positive 
feedback from [contact’s hotel] (will connect with Bus Dev dept)” 
(1138, Venture Database) 
 
We enclose exemplary data of the Firm’s efforts to help recently met 
founders in the following table (Table 35), including efforts to connect 
                                                                        
115 These “stay in touch” statuses differed from “slow no” in which the Firm delayed an investment decision, e.g., “Not fully pass - 
keep making introductions.” (80, Venture Database). 
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ventures to potential partners and resource providers, as well as mentoring 
efforts for entrepreneurs with very early-stage ideas. 
 
Conceptual category Empirical Themes Exemplary data116  
Identity plausibility 
shaping strategies 
(social claims) 
Rapprochement  
Social motivation 
due diligence 
 
Meeting with founder in order to assess social motivation and openness to 
social cause 
 
Proposing changes in targeted market  
 
- Pass for us due to impact, but also ask the founder around expanding to 
other areas of financial literacy. (114, IC Minutes) 
- I would like to meet them, their focus on the accessibility market would 
need to be core in order for me to consider this going forward from an 
impact perspective. (529, Pre-IC Poll) 
- Is there a much bigger, broader application of this purification system for 
developing markets as part of their strategy and within a reasonable 
timeframe? (SVC2); The high price point means the potential impact is 
limited, as only the most affluent people will be able to afford the product. 
(SVC4) (1243, Pre-IC Poll) 
 
Directing attention to beneficiaries 
 
- [Captain, our portfolio company] is like that. When we first met […] they 
were selling geolocation to [music] festivals. We were like, ‘Listen, go to 
Bangladesh. Go to the Middle East. Go to favelas. That's where they need 
it.’ (Captain, Interview) 
 
Forming a rapport with founder, socializing founder to social causes over a 
longer period of time 
 
- I think [the founder of venture 341 has] genuinely become more mission-
driven as he's come along. I think he might have been affected by us sitting 
right next to him and giving him a sense of license to talk more about that 
stuff. More and more people talk about impact. He's commercial about it 
too. That's great. (341, Interview) 
- I mean, look at how founder’s language. He’s really, you know, he’s really. I 
think he’s been really, taken by his interaction with us. And I see in his 
rhetoric, you know, I’ve seen the language in his deck! It’s all changed quite 
a lot, and I, don’t think actually when it comes to impact that it is that 
related to the size of our stake. (341, IC Transcript) 
- If you think about with [Captain], we were never… we were tiny… tiny… [in 
terms of our investment stake]. And I think we've had a huge, outsize 
impact vs. the size of our investment. And we've been a real advocate for 
impact. You know, if you look at all their language, it’s changed radically 
over the past few years” (Captain, IC Transcript) 
- You can say, ‘Hey, have you thought about it this way? You have that 
relationship outside. (Captain, IC Transcript) 
- We’ve always been about relationships, there’s a… it’s organic, whereas, 
like, obviously there is power in a bigger stake, but power is not really going 
to make people genuinely care about impact. They care about impact if 
they’re led by your vision of it, not necessarily by how much money you put 
it into it.” (Captain, IC Transcript) 
 
Identity plausibility 
shaping strategies 
(commercial claims) 
Tinkering 
SVC’s efforts to 
improve 
commercial 
model 
 
Proposing changes in commercialization strategy, pricing, distribution  
 
- “‘this is uninvestable for me, because of these reasons, but maybe if you 
can do this pivot and maybe incorporate my feedback, this may become 
investable. But right now, it is not investable’” (1241, Interview) 
 
Monitoring market response to venture changes 
                                                                        
116 All are direct quotes; each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
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- “[to SVC4] We should really back these guys, right now. It’s getting at a 
point where---” (SVC3) “It’s hockey-sticking right now” (SVC4) (Oak, 
Fieldnotes) 
- “the team were unable to get comfortable with the following: 1). The 
business' ability to pivot to a new revenue model and the short time frame 
that we have to see the necessary traction” (1241, Venture 
correspondence) 
 
Providing operational support 
 
- Today I got a call from the [Dart] ladies [saying] I just got out of our meeting 
with our lawyer, where you were not supposed to be present, here are the 
notes, can you please explain them to me? (Dart, Fieldnotes) 
 
Connecting to experts, partners and distributors 
 
- Met with [founder] a couple times last week. Breakdown: very early still. 
Sent across revised business plan. Next steps are [A2] and [F-1116] are 
meeting 23/3 prior to [pitching event]. Need to walk through all 
assumptions following meeting with [contact] (supply chain at [major 
retailer]). A2 met with [major retailer] and founder. (984, IC Minutes) 
 
Rapid sequence of communication and tests (iterating) under time pressure 
 
- I challenged him on a new model that I'd worked on, he took it and redid 
over a weekend and then I took it over the following weekend and redid it. 
We basically went back and forth a few times. (Oak, Interview) 
Identity plausibility 
shaping strategies 
(early venture 
evolution) 
Be helpful 
SVC’s efforts  
to improve 
general 
plausibility of 
rejected ventures 
Providing detailed feedback to rejected ventures 
 
- After reviewing the materials, we've decided that [our fund] will not be 
pursuing an investment at this time. I understand this may be disappointing 
to hear, but I though[t] I'd share some of our thoughts with the view of 
being helpful. While we find the proposition intriguing (from both an 
educational[/]economic inclusion and commercial/corporate perspective), 
we had concerns around the following points: [1] Scaling content creation 
and how this evolves over time. I note that the ongoing discussion with the 
[Accountants Association] is intriguing, especially with how they've agreed 
to create their own "quiz" content. However, I'd like to better understand 
how the platform aims to utilize either technology or expand to other 
partners to create an evolving set of engaging content. [2] On the client 
side, we'd like to see further development and testing with universities or 
corporates in how they would potentially incorporate the [venture] 
platform into existing training/outreach programs. (620, venture 
correspondence) 
- “As we are quite early in our fundraising, if you would be willing to share 
areas of improvement or things you think other investors may get caught 
up on, I'd love to hear it.  I can take criticism, and won't hold it against you!  
I understand this would take some of your time and thought, but would 
really appreciate it.” “Absolutely no problem and I hope the below is helpful 
but please do take with a pinch of salt. I say this as there is no formula for 
fund raising successfully but these are the general points that we would 
have pushed you further on:  
Existing Slides: 
Distribution: 
- Slide 12 is not detailed enough for a distribution strategy - it shows 
that you have a willing potential audience but not how you are 
going to convince them to part with their money. 
-I wonder if you would be better off reversing your staging of 
distribution? Retailers such as […] etc. are trusted by mothers but 
you are an unknown quantity - perhaps piggybacking on the 
credibility of these larger retailers will help your sales. 
Traction: 
- p8 is interesting but obviously anecdotal - can you get people to 
sign up for a waiting list for the product? This will show investors 
that you have early traction and people want the product. 
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Competitive Landscape: 
- As an initial slide on competition p11 assumes some level of 
knowledge of the market that most investors will most likely not 
have - I would use a 2x2 matrix putting [your venture] in the top 
right box. 
Raise: 
- This is an aggressive raise target given your stage - what would a 
raise look like if you were only going to build a working prototype? 
Potentially you could then get some interest from wholesalers, 
which would make your next (larger) raise more attractive. 
Team: 
- The team page is impressive (p9) but your professional / academic 
backgrounds do not really jump off the page - maybe see how logos 
work instead? 
Missing Slides: 
Why Now: 
- Draw analogies with the broader wearable market. Really show 
investors that now is the time to do this. 
UX: 
- Really breakdown my experience of the product as a user - i.e. I 
buy the product, then what? 
Why Are You Doing This: 
- On your team page you show all your academic achievements but 
you are a mother and solving a problem that effects you [sic] - make 
more of this. 
I realise [sic] that this looks like a lot of negative feedback, but I can honestly say 
that this is one of the more interesting concepts and better quality decks that I 
have seen - however, as I said this just isn't a fit for us. I hope that this helps you 
on your ongoing fundraise and we are of course rooting for you to be 
successful!” (1273, Venture correspondence) 
 
Helping and connecting rejected ventures to potential partners and resource 
providers 
 
- Process of creating “badges” remains pretty much the same. Could [an] 
MBA [intern] help here? No active work - keep eye out for relevant 
MBA/interns. SVC1 to get back to her on not investing. SVC1 to stay in 
touch. (1338, IC Meeting Notes) 
- Offered to connect to [contact]. No other action at this time. (150, IC 
Minutes) 
- Check with [contact] and [Dart] to connect with [investor] (504, IC Minutes) 
- SVC3 to connect with A2’s friend in [city] (454, IC Minutes)  
- Passed at initial [Investment Committee meeting] – provide feedbacka [sic] 
and stay in touch (2 months from now) (1351, Venture Database) 
- Met [founders] on 5/8: Interesting what they're building but quite early. 
Connected to [contact] and will stay in touch once/month. (315, Venture 
Database) 
- Not a fit – to provide feedback and stay in touch. (1346, Venture Database) 
- “On 28/5 [our] team decided [to take] no further direct action beyond: 
- SVC4 connected to [company] and A1 to get feedback from [her] friends.  
- SVC1 and SVC2 connected to [contact] and [Hotel C292] positive feedback 
from [contact’s hotel] (will connect with Bus Dev dept)” (1138, Venture 
Database) 
 
Mentoring and staying in touch with aspiring entrepreneurs with very early-
stage ideas (including by partnering with educational institutes). 
 
- Hope you have had a good weekend. I have attached a summary of what 
[our venture] has achieved and some future projections.” “Great - looking 
forward to discussing later.” “Thank you so much for you yesterday 
evening. It was very kind of you and we were both very grateful for the 
advice you offered. We have started working on the presentation and will 
send you a copy when we have reduced it to 25words per slide.” 
“Absolutely no problem [founder] - I look forward to seeing an updated 
version!” “I was just wondering if I could take up your offer of some 
constructive criticism/ advice on the investor deck that we have put 
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together. We have tried to play by the rules that you set about 25 words 
and 20 slides. Any feedback would be greatly received.” “I am so very sorry 
that I have taken so long to reply. This is a really excellent deck - I am very 
impressed. Might it be good for you to come in and discuss this further with 
SVC3 (one of my colleagues) and myself?” (1567, Venture correspondence) 
- She was one of our [interns]. Not for us, but just trying to help her. (88, 
Interview) 
- Too early?  [But] how can we help. (673, IC Minutes) 
- SVC3 and SVC4 met with [founders]. Venture is still idea stage. (221, 
Venture database) 
- SVC3 and SVC4 had initial meeting […] too early: will stay in touch given 
compelling pedigree of founder. (195, Venture database) 
Table 35: Conceptual categories, empirical themes and exemplary data on identity-shaping strategies 
 
A Variance Model of Hybrid-Identity-Shaping Strategies and 
Implications for Investment Outcomes 
In the previous section, we presented data on the nature and 
outcomes related to the patterns in streams of decisions that we observed in 
the SVC’s investment evaluation processes. We present our variance model 
in Figure 36, below. The model illustrates how different types of new 
venture identity assessments lead to five different engagement strategies on 
behalf of the SVC. These SVC strategies help confront aspects of the new 
venture’s identity claims to different aspects of the market, which aid both 
the venture and the Firm in evaluating the plausibility of the new venture’s 
overall identity. 
 
Figure 36: Variance model of hybridity evaluation and shaping strategies applied to new ventures117  
 
Negative Externalities of Hybrid-Identity-Shaping Strategies 
As shown in the previous section, the prior hybridity-shaping 
strategies sometimes resulted in a pursuable venture investment 
opportunity, however, a VC’s pursuit does not guarantee an investment 
117 See also: Table 37 summarizing patterns of engagement. 
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deal. Despite the best efforts on behalf of the venture and the SVC, these 
strategies had high failure rates. Combined with the deviation of this 
strategy from the norm of early-stage investing (i.e., only engaging with 
ventures post-investment decision), failures of these strategies to deliver on 
the Firm’s desired outcomes can incur costs, including emotional costs.  
In this section, we revisit the negative and unintended consequences 
of prior strategies and the Firm’s duality in general. The negative and 
unintended consequences of prior strategies include the time investment 
required to execute these strategies in the context of limited SVC capacity 
and venture patience, and the emotional cost of failure. We illustrate how 
the costs incurred from the failure of hybridity-shaping strategies are not 
necessarily a result of the strategies themselves, but a larger illustration of 
the drawbacks of identity duality.  
Emotional costs of hybridity-shaping strategies: generating false 
hope. For example, in the previous section we introduced a failed case of 
Tinkering, where one venture tackling behavioral change was assessed as 
lukewarm by the Firm and encouraged to pursue a strategic change that 
might improve the plausibility of its commercial claims (#1241). However, 
when the venture was unable to successfully execute on the pivot, the Firm 
later expressed regret, worried that the Firm’s engagement sent a message 
of false hope that jeopardized the venture’s fundraising outcomes. We 
observed the following exchange in which he sought help from his 
colleagues to reconcile the contrasting demands of the Firm’s social 
identity (the pressure to help founders with their venture) and commercial 
identities (the pressure to find investable deals).  
 
“I think we should try to work out… Like… is helping a company 
sending a false message?” (SVC4) […]; 
“I don’t think so. I think we are genuinely helping… um, as we 
figure out whether or not we are going to [invest]. I think it is 
actually helpful. Is it a waste of time for us?” (SVC3); 
“But it’s a waste of time for them! Like… are they like reading this 
as “we’re really interested”? […] Like when we have a venture 
meeting, […] let’s say it goes bad, for example. For us, that was just 
another meeting. Just, like, we took another meeting, right? But for 
them, that was the meeting that they probably spent ages prepping 
for, so we probably end up with an asymmetry between, like, 
expectations. […] Do we end up—because they don’t know that 
we’re just trying to be helpful… The message isn’t there. What we’re 
really saying is ‘We really like you guys, we really want to make this 
work’. […] When we say that we just want to help, like are we 
actually, being hugely negative? Are we actually having… Are we 
not being helpful? Because if we’re not truly committed to the deal, 
should we say that we’re not truly committed to the deal? […] 
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Long-term I think that this would be a helpful pivot for them, but do 
they waste too much time trying to help us – trying to make this 
investable for us? […] So, should we do that? Right? Where we’re 
actually trying to be helpful, but we actually do more damage 
because they waste their time speaking to us where we think that this 
could be interesting to us, but we’re not sure. [Then again,] I think 
that if we had started this conversation with ‘I want to help you but 
we’re never going to invest.’ They would tell you, well, [screw] off 
then, why are you wasting my time? […]  
 
Moreover, the Firm’s prosocial policy of accepting meetings with anyone, 
and of allowing ventures to continually revise and resubmit their 
investment proposals may have added to a venture’s uncertainty on the true 
status of their proposal. SVC4 and SVC3 elaborate on the same case 
(#1241), 
 
“With [this venture] it is a specific case because it was out of the 
pipeline118 and it came back” (SVC4); 
“It didn’t really leave” (SVC3); 
“It never really left. We kept on, like… It’s difficult because some 
entrepreneurs are so persistent. They keep coming back. They keep 
coming back. So, they don’t allow themselves to leave the pipeline. 
Which is good and bad” (SVC4); 
 “So, you are just feeling a bit of… pain?” (Researcher) 
“Well, yeah, also because I know that their funding situation means 
that this basically goes to zero.  They – they just go bankrupt” 
(SVC4). 
 
Emotional costs of hybridity-shaping strategies: regular self-
reflection and criticism. As indicated in the section above, the 
juxtaposition of helping a venture to improve its standing versus helping a 
venture to create an investible deal resonated with both the social and 
commercial identities of the firm (and the individual), causing minor inner 
conflict. Because of this the Firm member engaged in a 15-minute 
discussion to determine whether he was being truly being “helpful” or a 
hypocrite. However, although this type of conflict was never named, it 
reappeared in many of the Firm’s decision-making processes, in the form 
of one member of the Firm challenging another, or, in the form of self-
criticism. For example, when considering ventures, the Firm often stepped 
out of their commercial identity (concerned with whether being in or out of 
an investment was good for them) and into its social, relational and bigger 
picture identity (concerned with whether being in or out of an investment 
                                                                        
118 The SVC refers to the fact that the ventures were never fully removed from investment consideration. Even after an making 
investment decision, the founders returned with new propositions and the Firm continued to engage. 
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was good for the venture, and for society). In one IC meeting, we observed 
the following conversation, 
 
“[Without us,] would our ventures get funding anyways?” (SVC4) 
“Good ventures would raise on their own. Perhaps people would 
have come in on their own, like [contact].” (SVC1) 
“What happens if we don't come in?” (SVC4) 
 
And again, in a separate IC meeting, 
 
“It's a really interesting kind of philosophical question because your 
point… you know, should we … we should be investing while we 
have a bigger impact and where we're more needed… Some people 
would say that means you're going to make bad investments, because 
you’re only getting involved in stuff that no one wants to get involved 
in but on the flip side, you can say, ok, look, the relationship that you 
create [with the venture], in being there at a very difficult time 
perhaps means that you've got a higher chance of success… You 
know, they’re going to just love us for a long time because he's going 
to feel like we really, really ... We really helped…We won't 
necessarily create the same rapport with [a venture like 1329] 
potentially. It is this … there is tension there isn’t there, for an 
impact investor? And I think A3 raised a really good point” (SVC1). 
 
The Firm’s awareness of its own impact, as illustrated above, meant that 
they allocated less effort into pursuing ventures in the top right section of 
our plausibility graph. The area where the top third of the graph and the 
right third of the graph overlap were areas of interest for the Firm; ventures 
in this area were heavily pursued by the Firm; however, the highest section 
of this overlapping part (see Figure 25 and Table 34), were not heavily 
pursued. The reason being that these were extremely competitive deals, 
which would be filled by competent investors regardless. 
Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: non-
reciprocal behavior and losing investment opportunities. In addition to 
the emotional discomfort that comes from walking away from a partially 
enticing opportunity and growing rapport with a founder, the Firm also 
suffered from the inverse. In a reflective document titled “Lessons 
Learned,” prepared by SVC3 and SVC4 for an upcoming employee retreat, 
SVC3 wrote that following about a venture developing a high-tech solution 
for separating chemicals in water (#795),  
 
“Venture decided to not take [VC] investment. We connected to 
grant making bodies, legal counsel, advice, connections to potential 
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clients - we did a lot of work for a small check119 and no terms 
negotiated. -I'm personally ok with this last point.” 
 
In this case, the Firm’s application of the Tinkering did not lead to the loss 
of the venture. Moreover, the loss itself should not be as emotionally 
impactful. However, due to the Firm’s non-transactional, community-
oriented (pro)social identity, the non-reciprocal behavior stings. However, 
the Firm does not plan to change its behavior, noting “I’m personally ok 
with this last point.” 
 The Firm struggled with the non-reciprocal attitude throughout the 
industry. In one conversation at their IC Meeting, SVC1 made a comment, 
 
“One observation about the refugee thing. I mean everyone around 
Europe is trying to get a buck from out of the public entities is now 
suddenly a refugee expert. [At one fund] it’s now becoming a focus, 
and now [another fund] has written this paper. […] A lot of social 
entities are trying to do stuff around the refugee crisis, because 
they're very aware that European Union is very open to opening its 
coffers for it. 
And you know, that's a cynical take of it, and you can take it for what 
it is, but obviously, [you have a crisis] and there is money floating 
around but it’s not quite as open source as one would expect. Like I 
know that ... you know like when we […] say we want to [do 
something] for the refugee crisis, they give us an answer and I saw 
the answer, but it’s actually a very unhelpful answer.” (SVC1) 
 
Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: losing 
attractive ventures due to need for plausibility on both axes. The Firm’s 
need to substantiate both social and commercial venture identity claims 
required significant information exchange with ventures and significant 
time investment on both parts. We overheard the following exchange and 
stepped in, 
 
“[to A3] We do so much work for our ventures compared to other 
venture [investment] firms” (SVC1);  
“Do you mean the events or the [investment] memos, SVC1?” 
(Researcher);  
“No, the memos, and at this stage in general, at this valuation... the 
amount of work that we do is a bit unusual” (SVC1);  
“Why do you so much work?” (Researcher); 
“That's the amount of work that we need to do to feel comfortable 
investing in these ventures… We think there's a gap, actually. We 
                                                                        
119 The SVC refers to the potential of being offered a small investment ticket in the venture’s fundraising round. 
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think that the reason that early-stage ventures are so poor is because 
the DD [Due Diligence] is so poor. But other firms don't do that 
much DD for early stage because the economics are not there. That's 
why we're trying to set up a model that works, with the member 
network. To do early stage you need a small fund, but if you have a 
small fund then the economics aren't there. So, the economics of 
members makes it possible. Well, it remains to be seen [if it works] 
but that's what we are trying to do.” (SVC1) 
 
While the extra work carried out by the Firm gave them and their angel 
network more confidence in each investment, there were drawbacks to the 
amount of due diligence carried out. For example, both the commercial and 
social claims of one venture, which offered a travel booking website 
targeted at individuals with disabilities, were viewed as moderately 
plausible by the Firm. A member of the co-founding team had left, a 
potential investor also withdrew their interest, and the Firm could not 
determine to what extent the venture’s (pro)social identity claims fulfilled 
their requirements on the problem scope and measurability. We overheard 
the following internal exchange, led by SVC3 who was drafting memo as 
part of their early due diligence, 
 
“Hey guys, what's a good KPI for measuring impact for [venture 
214]?” (SVC3) 
“Number of trips booked? Trips would not have happened?” (A2); 
“Number of days travelled?” 
“The hard thing is would those days have happened otherwise 
without them? SVC4, do you have any ideas? Oh, I know! I have an 
idea. Look.” (SVC3) 
“It's more around the number of people who would not be able to do 
so” (SVC4); 
“How about the number of people making trips who were not able 
to, like two years ago or something?” (A3) [...]  
“Ok. ok. We got this. It's weak. It's so weak. Ooh, what if I change 
this into, impact workshop scheduled?” (SVC3). 
 
As a result of the Firm’s concerns and delay, the venture walked away, as 
revealed in friendly email correspondence between the venture and the 
Firm. The venture’s reply referred to several contextual issues related to 
their decision to walk away, but they also mention the length and depth of 
the due diligence, 
 
“I'm disappointed that we were not offered an allocation in the 
round  alongside the other investors.  Perhaps you could drop me a 
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line this week to provide further context so that we can learn and 
improve as an investment firm for the future?” (SVC2). 
 “[I] felt the depth of the DD was something more suitable for larger 
investments in companies that have a much longer trading history 
and who have validated many more assumptions. Also, I was 
concerned that we've been speaking about investment since early 
January - and while I know you've invited me to [your private 
pitching event] I didn't feel confident that any investment could be 
turned around / done with the speed I'm looking for. 
Essentially, I think you may need to explore two separate investment 
processes. One for genuine high risk / seed stage / pre-revenue 
companies with a couple of team members (and that can be turned 
around in less than a month) and another for larger Series A style 
investments where an in-depth DD process can actually discover 
something useful. […] to be honest, in my experience with all the 
investors I've worked with over the years; most successful seed stage 
investments just involve backing one or two founders that 1) know 
how to build things 2) have some early customer validation; and 3) 
have genuine domain expertise / customer insight; along with hope 
that it turns out for the best - and that any further attempt at de-
risking tends to provide an illusory level of security.” 
 
17 months later, the venture ended up being acquired by a major actor in 
the travel and lodging industry looking to diversify its travel offers. 
Viewing this sequence of events from a commercial perspective, the Firm 
suffered an economic loss. Moreover, their surprise indicated the emotional 
cost, and being caught between two identities makes these losses painful. 
However, the Firm’s behavior here is true to the patterns that we have 
observed as being driven by their dual identity. Their internal reaction to 
losing the initial investment deal, 
 
“I don't think we should ever give money to 'smart' guys who want to 
play […] We can't / shouldn't compete for deals with people who 
throw money at the wall and see what sticks, and I think this 
response affirms a lot of the points we feared about [the founder]” 
(SV4); 
“I TOTALLY agree SVC4!! We led a robust DD process and this is 
the right outcome for us I'm sure.” (SVC1) 
“Well done guys. We made the right call” (SVC2). 
 
Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: additional 
pressures due to more tasks and limited fund capacity. In addition to 
regularly reaching out to ventures that were low-priority investment 
targets, the Firm also had a policy of never turning anyone away. While 
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this did not directly challenge their commercial ambitions, or their value to 
“Exhibit excellence in all that we do” (Handbook, Internal documents), it 
did contribute to feelings of being overwhelmed across members of the 
Firm. In the following conversation, an analyst checks with SVC3 before 
writing back to an email, 
 
“SVC3, what do I do if people want to meet me? Do I say no, I'm too 
busy?” (A3) 
“No, you have to meet them… you have to meet them… You have to 
meet every venture that wants to meet us” (SVC3) 
“Ok.” (A3) 
 
While this conversation was with an analyst who had been with the Firm 
for five months, we overhead variants of the following conversation from 
members of the team. After a day of back-to-back meetings, and a 
semblance of high productivity, SVC4 would sometimes exclaim, 
 
“I haven’t done any work today! Any. Work.” (SVC4) 
“Me neither.” (SVC3) 
“What kind of work did you need to do?” (Researcher); 
“A lot of work. Stuff for our ventures, introductions, [financial] 
modeling” (SVC4); 
 
Another member of the Firm disclosed to us, “Every time I feel like I’m 
ok, SVC2 and SVC1 add on more things.” Moreover, this limited capacity 
combined with the demands of the Firm’s portfolio companies led to the 
feeling of scarcity, 
 
“There's a lot of ventures on the table right now. I'm just trying to 
close them out, it's just tiring, just a lot of other stuff going on. Like, 
Mammoth, we're going to have to raise sooner than we thought they 
were going to. […] There's probably the most ventures that we've 
been serious about for some time. At least for me, there's three I 
would probably do if we had the capital.120 It's a bit like as going 
through a clothes shop, and being told that you can only take one or 
two when you've got like four or five in the shopping basket. It's a 
problem that everyone faces because obviously you have finite 
capital, but yeah, it sucks” (SVC4) 
 
Due to the moderate plausibility of a hybrid investment opportunity, and 
the high plausibility of the venture’s social claims, the Firm would engage 
with the venture multiple times in a short period to help the venture 
                                                                        
120 The SVC was fundraising for its own fund at the time.  
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substantiate its commercial claims. The following table (Table 36) 
summarized exemplary data of negative externalities associated with 
hybrid identity-shaping strategies. 
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Conceptual category Empirical themes Exemplary data121  
Negative externalities 
of hybrid identity-
shaping strategies 
Emotional and 
financial costs of 
dualistic 
approach 
Emotional costs of hybridity-shaping strategies: generating false hope 
 
- “I think we should try to work out… Like… is helping a company 
sending a false message?” (SVC4) […]; 
“I don’t think so. I think we are genuinely helping… um, as we figure 
out whether or not we are going to [invest]. I think it is actually 
helpful. Is it a waste of time for us?” (SVC3); 
“But it’s a waste of time for them! Like… are they like reading this as 
“we’re really interested”? […] Like when we have a venture meeting, 
[…] let’s say it goes bad, for example. For us, that was just another 
meeting. Just, like, we took another meeting, right? But for them, that 
was the meeting that they probably spent ages prepping for, so we 
probably end up with an asymmetry between, like, expectations. […] 
Do we end up—because they don’t know that we’re just trying to be 
helpful… The message isn’t there. What we’re really saying is ‘We 
really like you guys, we really want to make this work’. […] When we 
say that we just want to help, like are we actually, being hugely 
negative? Are we actually having… Are we not being helpful? Because 
if we’re not truly committed to the deal, should we say that we’re not 
truly committed to the deal? […] 
Long-term I think that this would be a helpful pivot for them, but do 
they waste too much time trying to help us – trying to make this 
investable for us? […] So, should we do that? Right? Where we’re 
actually trying to be helpful, but we actually do more damage because 
they waste their time speaking to us where we think that this could be 
interesting to us, but we’re not sure. [Then again,] I think that if we 
had started this conversation with ‘I want to help you but we’re never 
going to invest.’ They would tell you, well, [screw] off then, why are 
you wasting my time? […] 
- “With [this venture] it is a specific case because it was out of the 
pipeline  and it came back” (SVC4); 
“It didn’t really leave” (SVC3); 
“It never really left. We kept on, like… It’s difficult because some 
entrepreneurs are so persistent. They keep coming back. They keep 
coming back. So, they don’t allow themselves to leave the pipeline. 
Which is good and bad” (SVC4); 
“So, you are just feeling a bit of… pain?” (Researcher) 
“Well, yeah, also because I know that their funding situation means 
that this basically goes to zero.  They – they just go bankrupt” (SVC4). 
 
Emotional costs of hybridity-shaping strategies: regular self-reflection and 
criticism  
 
- “[Without us,] would our ventures get funding anyways?” (SVC4) 
“Good ventures would raise on their own. Perhaps people would have 
come in on their own, like [contact].” (SVC1) 
“What happens if we don't come in?” (SVC4) 
- “It's a really interesting kind of philosophical question because your 
point… you know, should we … we should be investing while we have 
a bigger impact and where we're more needed… Some people would 
say that means you're going to make bad investments, because you’re 
only getting involved in stuff that no one wants to get involved in but 
on the flip side, you can say, ok, look, the relationship that you create 
[with the venture], in being there at a very difficult time perhaps 
means that you've got a higher chance of success… You know, they’re 
going to just love us for a long time because he's going to feel like we 
really, really ... We really helped…We won't necessarily create the 
same rapport with [a venture like 1329] potentially. It is this … there is 
tension there isn’t there, for an impact investor? And I think A3 raised 
a really good point” (SVC1). 
 
                                                                        
121 All are direct quotes, each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
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Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: non-reciprocal behavior 
and losing investment opportunities 
 
- “Venture decided to not take [VC] investment. We connected to grant 
making bodies, legal counsel, advice, connections to potential clients - 
we did a lot of work for a small check  and no terms negotiated. -I'm 
personally ok with this last point.” 
- “One observation about the refugee thing. I mean everyone around 
Europe is trying to get a buck from out of the public entities is now 
suddenly a refugee expert. [At one fund] it’s now becoming a focus, 
and now [another fund] has written this paper. […] A lot of social 
entities are trying to do stuff around the refugee crisis, because 
they're very aware that European Union is very open to opening its 
coffers for it. 
And you know, that's a cynical take of it, and you can take it for what 
it is, but obviously, [you have a crisis] and there is money floating 
around but it’s not quite as open source as one would expect. Like I 
know that ... you know like when we […] say we want to [do 
something] for the refugee crisis, they give us an answer and I saw the 
answer, but it’s actually a very unhelpful answer.” (SVC1) 
 
Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: losing attractive ventures 
due to need for plausibility on both axes 
 
- “[to A3] We do so much work for our ventures compared to other 
venture [investment] firms” (SVC1);  
“Do you mean the events or the [investment] memos, SVC1?” 
(Researcher);  
“No, the memos, and at this stage in general, at this valuation... the 
amount of work that we do is a bit unusual” (SVC1);  
“Why do you so much work?” (Researcher); 
- “That's the amount of work that we need to do to feel comfortable 
investing in these ventures… We think there's a gap, actually. We 
think that the reason that early-stage ventures are so poor is because 
the DD [Due Diligence] is so poor. But other firms don't do that much 
DD for early stage because the economics are not there. That's why 
we're trying to set up a model that works, with the member network. 
To do early stage you need a small fund, but if you have a small fund 
then the economics aren't there. So, the economics of members 
makes it possible. Well, it remains to be seen [if it works] but that's 
what we are trying to do.” (SVC1)“Hey guys, what's a good KPI for 
measuring impact for [venture 214]?” (SVC3) 
“Number of trips booked? Trips would not have happened?” (A2); 
“Number of days travelled?” 
“The hard thing is would those days have happened otherwise 
without them? SVC4, do you have any ideas? Oh, I know! I have an 
idea. Look.” (SVC3) 
“It's more around the number of people who would not be able to do 
so” (SVC4); 
“How about the number of people making trips who were not able to, 
like two years ago or something?” (A3) [...]  
“Ok. ok. We got this. It's weak. It's so weak. Ooh, what if I change this 
into, impact workshop scheduled?” (SVC3). 
- “I'm disappointed that we were not offered an allocation in the round  
alongside the other investors.  Perhaps you could drop me a line this 
week to provide further context so that we can learn and improve as 
an investment firm for the future?” (SVC2). 
 “[I] felt the depth of the DD was something more suitable for larger 
investments in companies that have a much longer trading history and 
who have validated many more assumptions. Also, I was concerned 
that we've been speaking about investment since early January - and 
while I know you've invited me to [your private pitching event] I didn't 
feel confident that any investment could be turned around / done 
with the speed I'm looking for. 
Essentially, I think you may need to explore two separate investment 
processes. One for genuine high risk / seed stage / pre-revenue 
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companies with a couple of team members (and that can be turned 
around in less than a month) and another for larger Series A style 
investments where an in-depth DD process can actually discover 
something useful. […] to be honest, in my experience with all the 
investors I've worked with over the years; most successful seed stage 
investments just involve backing one or two founders that 1) know 
how to build things 2) have some early customer validation; and 3) 
have genuine domain expertise / customer insight; along with hope 
that it turns out for the best - and that any further attempt at de-
risking tends to provide an illusory level of security.” 
- “I don't think we should ever give money to 'smart' guys who want to 
play […] We can't / shouldn't compete for deals with people who 
throw money at the wall and see what sticks, and I think this response 
affirms a lot of the points we feared about [the founder]” (SV4); 
“I TOTALLY agree SVC4!! We led a robust DD process and this is the 
right outcome for us I'm sure.” (SVC1) 
“Well done guys. We made the right call” (SVC2). 
 
Financial and emotional cost of dualistic organizing: additional pressures due 
to more tasks and limited fund capacity 
 
- “SVC3, what do I do if people want to meet me? Do I say no, I'm too 
busy?” (A3) 
“No, you have to meet them… you have to meet them… You have to 
meet every venture that wants to meet us” (SVC3) 
“Ok.” (A3) 
- “I haven’t done any work today! Any. Work.” (SVC4) 
“Me neither.” (SVC3) 
“What kind of work did you need to do?” (Researcher); 
“A lot of work. Stuff for our ventures, introductions, modeling” (SVC4); 
- “There's a lot of ventures on the table right now. I'm just trying to 
close them out, it's just tiring, just a lot of other stuff going on. Like, 
Mammoth, we're going to have to raise sooner than we thought they 
were going to. […] There's probably the most ventures that we've 
been serious about for some time. At least for me, there's three I 
would probably do if we had the capital.  It's a bit like as going 
through a clothes shop, and being told that you can only take one or 
two when you've got like four or five in the shopping basket. It's a 
problem that everyone faces because obviously you have finite 
capital, but yeah, it sucks” (SVC4) 
Table 36: Conceptual categories, empirical themes and exemplary data of negative externalities of hybrid identity-shaping strategies 
 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to answer the question: How do hybrid 
resource providers assess and influence the plausibility of new venture 
identity claims among hybrid ventures? To answer this question, this study 
conducted an in-depth, longitudinal, cross-sectional case study of a social 
venture capital firm and its interactions with 350 evaluated ventures over 
the period of seven months.  
The study finds that the SVC evaluates investment proposals and 
assesses new venture identities according to their social and commercial 
claims as the literature implies (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Martens et al., 
2007; Miller & Wesley II, 2010). However, the study finds that the SVC 
goes beyond the pure assessment of emerging identity, helping to shape the 
identity of evaluated ventures. The study identifies five emergent strategies 
that describe the patterns of decisions taken by the SVC vis-à-vis evaluated 
ventures. These strategies—Cautious Pursuit, Tinkering, Rapprochement, 
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Helping and Filtering Out—were intuitively applied to each evaluated 
venture following an assessment of the venture’s general fit with the 
SVC’s more administrative requirements (e.g., stage, legal and physical 
base, etc.) and, an assessment of the plausibility of the ventures’ social and 
commercial claims. In the case of Tinkering, Rapprochement, and in rare 
cases, Helping—strategies applied to evaluated ventures that pass baseline 
identity claims—the Firm engages with the venture to further improve the 
plausibility of its (pro)social identity claims, commercial identity claims 
and overall hybrid identity claims (including its Trade-off Hazard).  
Following these initial assessments, the Firm’s eventual decision to 
pursue a venture investment opportunity is based on the observed market 
response to changes co-implemented by the venture and the Firm. This 
market response provides an input used by the Firm to re-assess the 
plausibility of the venture’s overall identity claims, which it does 
iteratively. When the SVC’s strategies—Tinkering, Rapprochement, and in 
rare cases, Helping—are successful, the SVC is able to improve the 
plausibility of evaluated ventures and at times, co-create investment 
opportunities for itself. However, these strategies are extremely costly, 
drawing upon the Firm’s reserves of time, social capital, technical expertise 
and interpersonal skills. Moreover, when these strategies fail, the SVC also 
incurs an emotional cost. 
 
Implications for the literature on hybrid organizing 
These findings have important implications for the literature on 
hybrid organizing, organizational identity and entrepreneurship. With 
regards to hybrid organizing; the literature has portrayed hybrid 
organizations as prone to organizational outcomes across the spectrum of 
conflict and complementarity (Besharov & Smith, 2014), and prone to 
hybridity outcomes in the dichotomous terms of hybridity maintenance or 
hybridity collapse (e.g., mission-drift). First, while this study does not 
solve the debate on whether organizational outcomes in organizations are 
pre-determined (by hybridity), this study—in its breakdown of social and 
commercial identity plausibility baselines, as well as in its illustration of 
Tinkering and Rapprochement—points to specific organizational attributes 
in new ventures responsible for influencing the likelihood of positive or 
negative internal organizational and hybridity outcomes.  
For example, the SVC judged a venture’s potential for developing a 
plausible, sustainable hybrid identity by assessing its trade-off hazard, a 
judgment informed by a venture’s hybrid-identity-reinforcing mechanisms, 
including its revenue model and founder disposition. These baseline and 
hybridity assessments support the idea that compatibility within hybrids is 
pre-determined, providing fuel to “nature” arguments. However, once 
hybrids pass this threshold, the study demonstrates that effective 
intervention strategies exist to further increase the plausibility of hybridity 
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within an emerging organization, providing evidence to support the 
“nurture” argument, as well. 
Together, these strategies demonstrate how hybrid organizations 
evaluate and act upon on hybridity in other firms, providing a rare look at 
hybridity in an inter-firm context. For example, the findings provide a 
parallel and extension of the work of scholars like Smith and Besharov 
(2017) and Ashforth and Reingen (2014) who demonstrated how 
holographic hybrid organizations maneuver within the limits of hybridity 
compatibility and, through the organic development of internal 
mechanisms, manage to find a sustainable configuration for their identity 
duality over time.  
This study extends their work by demonstrating first, despite the 
malleability of organizational and hybridity outcomes (illustrated in their 
studies), social-commercial hybridity is still more sustainable in some 
organizations than in others. Indeed, there are limits to improving hybrid 
outcomes; a fact understood even by optimistic, holographic, hybrid 
organizations. The SVC’s five emergent strategies are a response to 
variation in plausibility and malleability of identity among evaluated 
hybrid ventures. 
Second, beyond the SVC’s selection process, this study 
demonstrates how third parties with the appropriate expertise can provide 
guidance around the appropriate limits within which hybrid ventures 
should operate, i.e., Smith and Besharov’s (2017) “guard rails”. The study 
illustrates how this guidance from the SVC is applied—through the 
strategies of Rapprochement and Tinkering—to ventures with appropriate 
social and commercial identity claims (specifically: moderate social-high 
commercial, and high social-moderate commercial). 
In the hybrid context, this highlights the importance of dyadic 
relationships in establishing plausible and sustainable organizational 
identities in a dynamic context (Jones et al. 2012), including preventing 
mission drift and the commercial form of hybridity collapse (Ebrahim, 
Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Jegen, 1998; Jones, 2007). Interestingly, although 
the study identifies the venture attributes which can be molded by a third 
party, these findings also suggest that accurate assessments of identity 
compatibility in hybrid ventures may require information beyond the focal 
organization. Instead, hybrid firm viability must be considered in the social 
context in which they are found. 
This finding echoes Stinchcombe’s (1965) writings on the necessary 
ingredients to birth new organizational forms. He writes that “sufficient 
resources” must be concentrated “in the hands of an innovating elite [to] 
recruit, train, motivate, organize personnel on a structure that will function 
more or less continuously,” and that organizations “must have an elite 
structure of such a form and character that those people in the society who 
control resources essential to the organization’s success will be satisfied 
that their interests are represented in the goal-setting apparatus of the 
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enterprise” (1965: 241). Considering the inter-firm context when 
attempting to understand organizational-level outcomes provides nuance to 
the hybrid organizing literature, which has tended to focus on outcomes 
influenced by either industry-level factors or firm-level determinants. 
Finally, by tying the application of the SVC strategies to varied 
investment outcomes, this study offers insight into a spectrum of possible 
outcomes that arise from the pursuit of social-commercial hybrid strategies. 
While existing studies on the organizational outcomes of hybridity tend to 
feature a single set of organizational outcomes per in-depth case study on 
hybrid organizing and internal processes (e.g., equilibrium only, tension 
only, etc.), this study also includes failures, unintended consequences, and 
successes. Indeed, the cross-sectional research design—building on data 
from a resource-provider (e.g., equilibrium, tension, etc.)—offers a rare 
perspective to the hybrid organizing literature, painting a more complete 
picture of the potential outcomes of strategies implemented by hybrid 
organizations, including the drawbacks and benefits of combining social 
and commercial identities in organizing processes. 
These varied outcomes offer the hybrid organizing literature two 
boundary conditions for understanding the organizational outcomes (e.g., 
failure) and hybridity outcomes (e.g., hybridity collapse) associated with 
hybridity in emerging organizations. First, for selected ventures, 
improvements in organizational and hybridity outcomes are possible, but 
depend on early intervention at both the founder and business model level. 
Second, holographic third parties, even in their role as a financial resource-
provider, can be qualified sources of intervention, providing social, 
knowledge and human capital.  
These findings are particularly important in the hybrid organizing 
literature because they provide detailed empirical evidence addressing the 
pre-determined nature of organizational outcomes. By considering the 
antecedents and boundary conditions of hybridity outcomes, this study 
enables a more accurate estimate of the number of hybrids with 
incompatible identities, or that are at risk of tensions from the joint pursuit 
of two outcomes.  
 
Implications for the literature on new venture and organizational identity  
These findings have important implications for the literature on 
organizational identity as well, building on and extending the work of 
Lounsbury and Glynn (2001) and Navis and Glynn (2011). While these 
scholars theorize about how investors assess new venture identity and 
enable a legitimate venture identity to emerge (by offering funding), this 
study illustrates the mechanisms of new ventures which indicate new 
venture plausibility and offer an empirical illustration of strategies third 
parties can use to assess venture identity claims. The first assessment of 
whether evaluated ventures reach the baseline threshold for social and 
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commercial claims is relatively cognitive and straightforward, relying on 
what Lounsbury and Glynn (2001) and Navis and Glynn (2011) scholars 
refer to as “institutional primes,” established ideas against which the SVC 
can compare venture elements.  
However, evaluated ventures which pass the baseline threshold 
represent a more challenging assessment exercise. Since much of the 
social-commercial hybrid market refers to new products, services and 
market categories—the lack of prêt-à-porter models (Battilana and Dorado, 
2010)—there are few, if any, “taken-for-granted understandings of 
prototypical characteristics, roles and activities” that an investor can use to 
guide its thinking (Navis and Glynn, 2011: 487-488). The study shows that 
assessing complex identity claims, like hybridity, within venture identity 
claims as a whole, requires close inter-firm engagement and “stress-tests” 
of venture identity claims that rely on observation of market responses. The 
SVC guides the venture in confronting the market—in its two strategies 
Rapprochement and Tinkering—and in this way is able to assess new 
venture identity plausibility (see Figure 36). 
These findings provide evidence of how third-parties can help 
ventures in proposing, testing and developing claims about its emerging 
entrepreneurial identity. While the literature has theorized that events and 
partners in the first part of an organization’s life have a powerful effect on 
an organization’s identity and trajectory (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; 
Stinchcombe, 1965) and resource-providers are known as influential actors 
in this regard, empirical illustration of the processes through which this 
occurs is rare. Conversely, this study conducts an empirical investigation of 
which support strategies and at which levels of intervention venture 
identity. 
 
  
Implications for the literature on entrepreneurship and decision-making 
Finally, the strategies that the SVC employs have important 
implications for entrepreneurship, the VC decision-making literature and 
for practice. First, although we know that VCs and other early-stage equity 
investors (e.g., business angels) provide valuable support to their portfolio 
companies (Ehrlich, De Noble, Moore, & Weaver, 1994; Herron & 
Sapienza, 1992; MacMillan, Kulow, & Kholyian, 1989; Steier & 
Greenwood, 1995), the literature has thus far presented helping strategies 
applied after a positive investment decision. This study demonstrates 
that—even for “non-social” VCs—frequent and intense engagement with 
ventures prior to the investment, or even prior to the investment decision, 
may contribute to improving the important VC-founder relationship 
(Huang & Knight, 2017). By following the evaluation process prior to the 
investment decision, this study sheds light a key level the VC literature 
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may have overlooked, with implications for improving VC performance in 
its own investments down the line and, for increasing attractive dealflow. 
These findings are not only relevant to the social-commercial hybrid 
context but may be pertinent to other new venture and innovation contexts. 
With respect to the former, this study illustrates strategies that appropriate 
resource providers can use to transfer critical resources to ventures, 
including financial, human and social capital (Binder, 2007; Huang & 
Knight, 2017). As mentioned, these confer legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
and other markers of social status (Hsu, 2004) that may critically affect 
these new ventures’ abilities to operate and survive beyond their initial 
years. With respect to the latter, these findings on hybridity become 
relevant to innovation if hybridity is viewed as a proxy for the extent to 
which organizational activities cross established market boundaries. 
Boundary-crossing has been shown to be critical to introducing novel 
perspectives to industries with entrenched mindsets (Anthony & Tripsas, 
2016; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Haveman & Rao, 2006; Mars & 
Lounsbury, 2009; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). It thus follows that 
individuals and firms who wish to establish or manage hybrid 
organizations for innovative purposes (either commercial or social) will be 
more successful if they manage to obtain appropriate “hybrid” sources of 
support and capital. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
Despite the contributions of this study and its focus on the 
interactions of one hybrid organization with hundreds of other hybrid and 
non-hybrid organizations, it still shares many of the features of a single-
case case-study (i.e. of the SVC). Given prior arguments about the lack of 
prototypical characteristics, roles and activities in hybrid industries—this 
raises the question of the extent to which this study is generalizable to 
other resource provider-recipient relationships, including relationships in 
other types of institutional contexts (e.g., emerging markets, conservative 
industries, collectivist cultures) and regarding relationships with other 
types of hybrids (beyond social-commercial hybrids).  
As our model illustrates, in Figure 36, a strong determinant of the 
identity-shaping strategies’ success (in fact, a pre-requisite for their 
application) is an initial fit between the SVC and the venture. Due to the 
known importance of matching in VC-venture relationships (Valliere & 
Peterson, 2007; Zheng, 2011), it is not clear if the strategies observed can 
be applied by other VCs and by other resource-providers in the venturing 
and social venturing space with different assets and strategic foci. In 
addition to requiring ventures to achieve an initial basic fit with the VC, 
Tinkering, Rapprochement and Helping also depend on the resource-
provider having industry-relevant knowledge, social contacts (Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). Moreover, the social-commercial hybrid market 
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tends to lack prêt-à-porter models, relying on new approaches to delivering 
and commercializing social and environmental solutions. These industry 
requirements frame the SVC’s decision-makers’ cognitive flexibility and 
divergent thinking as assets in an exploratory evaluation process. While 
these may remain assets in the majority of markets targeted by venture 
capital, other investment contexts may require more systematic, efficient 
processes. 
Thus, one area for future research could be to investigate if the 
strategies uncovered in this study are found in other hybrid resource-
provider-recipient relationships, in different industries and, in different 
geographies. For example, the Helping strategy is time intensive. Which 
kinds of investment firm and fund structures can support this?  
Another example includes the Tinkering strategy. One perspective is 
that this strategy indicates uncertainty around future dealflow and dealflow 
quality.122 The Firm supports evaluated ventures without discussing 
investment decisions or terms, resulting in some ventures walking away 
once they have received help. Is the founder disposition which enables 
these high-trust engagement strategies a pre-determined quality (e.g., risk 
profile), or can it be developed by an entrepreneur during the fundraising 
process or in training programs? Can the venture-VC relationship 
overcome traditional principal-agent problems? Could working towards the 
same social-commercial goal decrease the opportunist nature of the 
entrepreneur? Or is venture and VC vulnerability (i.e., the risk of being let 
down) simply required in this context, and in the larger context of tackling 
critical social issues?  
There is still much to understand about the five strategies uncovered; 
under which conditions do they work how may they be optimized? 
Currently, the factors which invite the SVC engagement strategies are new 
venture identity plausibility, hybrid identity plausibility and identity 
malleability. This study only begins to understand the relationship between 
these constructs. Regarding the Firm, this study captures a set of behaviors 
from a relatively young investment firm in a relatively young industry. 
Although the Firm’s strategies may still be beneficial going forward, it is 
unclear whether such venture engagement strategies will continue to be 
enabled in more established firms. A natural part of the learning process 
(e.g., pressure to cut losses and be more efficient) may make the SVC more 
selective with which ventures they choose to apply the Tinkering and 
Rapprochement engagement strategies (costly strategies in terms of time, 
social capital and emotional investment). While this may lead to some 
optimization, firms may potentially engage in superstitious learning which 
may lead to false negatives and lost opportunities (Csaszar, 2012; Zollo, 
2009). 
                                                                        
122 On the other hand, it can also be a way of reducing investment risks prior to making an investment commitment. 
 
243 
Another promising area of research could be to investigate other 
“pivoting paths.” As indicated in graph shown in Figure 35, the SVC 
attempted to influence ventures to move towards the top-right corner of the 
social-commercial claims plausibility landscape (towards a high-high 
plausibility assessment), along the prototypical paths of A to B3, and C to 
D. Smith and Besharov (2017) demonstrated a zig-zag path between the 
two axes, driven by their focal hybrid organization. Further research could 
reveal other prototypical pivoting paths taken by hybrid organizations and 
the factors which lead to such pivots (e.g., Santos et al., 2015). 
Next, although we use established measures for performance, as 
used in the literature—funding outcomes (Ter Waal et al., 2016)—since the 
results of early-stage investing are not usually seen until 10 years after the 
launch of a fund, it is difficult to understand the long-term performance 
implications of these strategies for either the venture or the fund. To enable 
further research in this field, additional longitudinal data could be collected 
on the SVC and its evaluated ventures, to better understand the long-term 
performance implications. 
In closing, this in-depth field study of how social venture capitalists 
evaluate and act upon investment proposals has opened up multiple 
questions about hybrid organizing, venture capital decision-making and 
social challenges. What kind of support do new, hybrid organizations 
require? What are the boundary conditions they require to be successful? It 
is our hope that these findings are useful to practitioners and scholars and 
inspire more research on the potential benefits and downsides of tackling 
important social issues through business (Dacin et al., 2011; Hollensbe et 
al., 2014; Shepherd, 2015; Short et al., 2009). 
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V. From Both Sides Now  
- Microfoundations of Hybrid Organizing & Decision-Making (Study Three) 
 
When you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change. 
 ― Max Planck                     
Introduction123 
Hybrid organizations—and particularly, hybrid firms which jointly 
adopt a social welfare and a commercial-profit identity—have captured the 
public’s attention in the last few decades (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pratt, 
2016), with their feel-good stories of helping the needy (Short, Moss, & 
Lumpkin, 2009: 2), their promise of economic value creation (Healy, 2014; 
The Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014), and their potential 
complement to tax- or donor-funded social services (Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Mair et al., 2012). These developments have inspired a rich body of 
work in multiple research streams about factors affecting social-
commercial identities in organizations (e.g., Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; 
Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Tracey et al., 2011).  
However, much of the research sidesteps the question of hybridity 
antecedents. For example, although past studies investigate how processual 
and structural elements of organizing maintain or break down hybridity in 
organizations over time, the organizations in these studies are selected 
because of their pre-established hybrid qualities. Thus, despite providing 
deep insight into how firm hybridity changes or sustains itself over time, 
the starting point of these studies usually portrays hybridity as a fait 
accompli (e.g., Ramus et al., 2017; Smith & Besharov, 2017). 
In an organizational context, research is just starting to empirically 
“link individual actions and the influence of organizational subunits to the 
                                                                        
123 The design of this study benefitted from valuable inputs from co-authors Dean Shepherd and Marc Gruber. Data collection and 
cleaning was conducted by the author of this thesis. Initial analyses and drafts of this chapter were produced jointly by Dean 
Shepherd and Nettra Pan. Later analyses and framing were led by Nettra Pan and benefitted from inputs from Marc Gruber. This 
study was financially possible due to the support of the Chair of Entrepreneurship & Technology Commercialization at the EPFL 
College of Management of Technology. The participants of seminar series at the EPFL College of Management of Technology and 
the Mendoza College of Business Department of Management & Organizations also provided helpful comments. Thanks, in 
particular to Julia Binder. Finally, the authors are deeply grateful to each decision maker who made time to participate in our study, 
and to each of our kind contacts for putting us in touch with additional study participants.  
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implementation of strategic initiatives” (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008: 70). 
When hybridity antecedents are discussed, past studies usually emphasize 
context, referring to the blanket effect of field- or industry-level factors 
(Haveman & Rao, 2006; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). While useful for providing general industry insights, this 
approach does not provide managers much recourse, other than to 
discourage market entry into complex and problematic industries. From an 
analytical perspective, this perspective overlooks variance in the ability of 
managers to interpret and react towards hybrid (for rare exceptions, see: 
Miller & Wesley II, 2010; Miron-Spektor et al., 2018; Zhang, Waldman, 
Han, & Li, 2015).  
This is surprising, given that individual decision-makers play key 
roles in spearheading strategic decisions in organizations (Mason, 1969; 
Walsh, 1995), and that strategic decisions are of considerable importance 
to top management (Vroom, 1973), organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989a), and 
society (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Kaul & Luo, 2016; Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). We have seen that decisions made by individuals in hybrid 
organizations may lead to new organizational processes (Jay, 2013; 
Murray, 2010), language (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Besharov, 2014; 
Fiol, 2002; Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 2010) or, other 
strategies (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pache & 
Santos, 2013). These organizational tools are able to generate, perpetuate, 
or resolve conflicts arising from the combination of two different 
organizational identities (Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002). Yet, in very few of 
these studies do scholars address the characteristics of those who shape 
hybrid decisions. With few exceptions (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Pache & 
Santos, 2013), managers in past studies are observed immediately in hybrid 
settings, with little investigation into how or why these managers arrived to 
the hybrid setting, or sought out hybridity in the first place. 
Studying decision-makers is important because they are “sites of 
causation” (Abbott, 1995; Kraatz & Block, 2008: 43). They are responsible 
for making decisions, defined as “a specific commitment to action (usually 
a commitment of resources),” varying in importance “in terms of the 
actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set” (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976: 246). 
But despite the understanding that decision-making research is 
important and despite the acknowledgment of individual-level actors in 
hybrid contexts (Greenwood et al., 2011), we still lack a fine-grained 
understanding of decision-making at the individual level; what makes 
elements of hybridity appeal to some individuals and not others? In short, 
we lack an understanding of the individual-level antecedents to hybrid 
decision-making.  
To gain a better understanding of the individual-level antecedents to 
hybrid decision-making, we investigate the role of individual mindsets in 
influencing the perception of hybridity attractiveness. We asked 154 
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funders of commercial and social organizations to evaluate 22 investment 
scenarios with varying levels of hybridity, resulting in a dataset of 3,388 
hypothetical investment decisions made by individuals working in various 
funds. In each scenario, we varied the extent of the venture’s social 
motivation, the hybridity of the venture’s revenue model, as well as the 
pricing of venture shares. We measured the extent to which individuals 
held commercial or social mindsets, using a social identity scale we 
adapted for our setting (Sieger, Gruber, Fauchart, & Zellweger, 2016). 
Applying Hierarchical Linear Modeling to our dataset, we find, as we 
theorized, that the commercial or social dominance within individual 
mindsets moderates the attractiveness of hybrid investment decisions. 
However, we find surprising results for how the social-commercial 
hybridity of mindsets causes decision-making preferences to diverge from 
the dominant norm.  
The findings of this study offer three primary contributions. First, to 
the literature on identity duality and hybrid organizing, we extend these 
streams of (mostly) firm-level research by investigating individual 
mindsets—the theoretical and temporal antecedents of these organizations’ 
hybrid configurations. While this stream of literature offers rich insights 
into the behavior of firms investing in social-commercial organizations 
(Mair & Hehenberger, 2014; Randjelovic, O’Rourke, & Orsato, 2003; 
Scarlata & Alemany, 2010) and how managers embedded in these firms 
can shape organizational processes which maintain or break down 
hybridity in organizations over time, we lack an understanding of how 
different managers in the same context diverge in their decision-making. 
By investigating decision-makers with different characteristics, we can 
explain why individuals looking at the same hybrid scenario differ in their 
decision-making process and analyze how individual-level differences 
affect hybrid outcomes. 
Second, strategy researchers have made great strides in 
understanding decision-making in a commercial, rational context 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1982, 1985), shedding light on the complex, but 
directed attempts of organizations to match their “internal resources and 
skills” with “opportunities and risks created by its external environment” 
(Grant, 1999: 114). However, strategy research has tended to focus on 
deliberate strategies made with a singular, commercial, profit-oriented 
mindset, or, more recently, a singular, social-welfare-oriented perspective 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). 
There has been less research on commercial management approaches 
which attempt to integrate prosocial considerations within a commercial 
setting (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Kaul & Luo, 2016; Porter 
& Kramer, 2006). Thus, by analyzing the impact of social dominance 
within individual mindsets in the context of a financial transaction, we 
respond to calls to investigate the heterogeneity of individual decision-
makers in business settings, particularly, in the heterogeneity of their 
 
250 
prosocial orientation or, orientation towards helping others (Shepherd, 
2015; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). 
Finally, Mintzberg and Water’s (1985) seminal paper on emergent 
versus deliberate strategies has influenced scholars to include, in strategy 
research, the less intentional plans to match internal resources and skills 
with opportunities and risks (Grant, 1999: 114). But while we know more 
about emergent strategy, i.e., “a pattern in a stream of [actual] decisions” 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985: 
257), we know less about emergent hybrid strategy. We seek to expand this 
research by investigating a more proximal variable: the individual decision 
composing these strategies. Moreover, to capture the emergent aspect of 
strategy, we employ an experimental design which captures each 
individual’s implicit preferences; revealing decision-makers’ “theory in 
use” rather than their “espoused theories of action” (Argyris & Schon, 
1974; Lohrke, Holloway, & Woolley, 2010).  
These three perspectives—the role of individual mindsets, the 
combination of social and commercial mindsets in a financial setting, and 
the role of mindsets in shaping implicit decision preferences—open up new 
avenues of research on hybrid organizing and decision-making. This study 
aims to help us better understand why some managers and, consequently, 
why some firms are more comfortable with hybridity, while others are not. 
In the following section, we describe the model which we have developed 
and tested. Although we developed our model based on our understanding 
of the literature, prior to collecting data, we have—for illustrative purposes 
and to add richness to our theorizing—included the remarks made by the 
154 decision-makers during the investment proposal assessment exercise. 
Their comments are present throughout this paper, and in Appendix I 
(Table 45).124 
 
Managerial Mindsets and Strategic Decision-making 
We define managerial mindsets as the fundamental framework or 
lens through which individuals see the world. They are important because 
they are a product of an individual’s past experiences (Miller, 1993) and 
social relationships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979); they direct decision-makers’ 
attention (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2002; Miron-
Spektor et al., 2018); they allow individuals to be at ease in conflicted 
contexts (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018); and they comprise the “processor” 
that allows individuals to transform complex reality into action (Mintzberg 
et al., 1976; Schwenk, 1984). Management research has covered different 
types of mindsets over the years, such as abundance mindsets (Covey, 
                                                                        
124 Following the assessment portion, we offered each of our subjects the opportunity to elaborate on their decision-making process, 
and if applicable, their remarks. Although this study theorized from the literature prior to collecting data, we include this qualitative 
data in our theoretical development section to provide richness to our theorizing, following the example of Shepherd, Patzelt and 
Wolfe (2011). 
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1991), entrepreneurial mindsets (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000), global 
mindsets (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2002; Levy, Beechler, Taylor, & 
Boyacigiller, 2007), growth mindsets (Dweck, 2015), paradox mindsets 
(Miron-Spektor et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2015) and productive mindsets 
(Argyris, 2004), to name a few. This rich body of work has showed how 
the different goals, relevant actors and legitimate activities associated with 
these mindsets affect how individuals perceive and respond to reality.  
We selected this focus for the following reasons. First, we focus on 
individual mindsets because they are the theoretical (and sometimes 
chronological) antecedents of decision-making in organizations. Second, 
we focus on specifically on the self-focused (commercial dominant) versus 
other-focused (social-welfare dominant) qualities of their mindsets. We 
focus on these sets of qualities because of the contrast they provide in 
terms of motivations, frames of reference and their view of what is 
appropriate. Third, we focus on how these qualities affect the evaluation of 
a strategic decision—in this case—the decision to allocate resources to an 
investment.125 Finally, within the investment decision, we focus on the 
following investment decision attributes because of their theoretical 
relationship to elements of our decision-maker attributes (the mindsets). 
This allowed us to trace how variance in a mindset’s commercial and social 
dominance, in addition to variance in the hybridity of the mindset, affects 
an individual’s perception of commercial, social and hybrid investment 
decision attributes—three theoretically-motivated decision attributes that 
appeal to our mindsets of interest.  
In the following section, we describe our model of how we expect 
individual mindsets to moderate strategic decision-making in an equity 
investment context. In this context, we examine the relationship between 
objective investment decision attributes (see left side of following figure) 
and the perceived attractiveness of an investment decision (see right side of 
following figure). Our model in Figure 37 proposes that the nature of a 
decision-maker’s mindset—whether it is commercially-dominant, socially-
dominant or hybrid—will positively moderate the relationship between the 
objective investment decision attributes and the perceived attractiveness of 
the decision. We theorize how mindset orientation moderates the 
relationship between the perceived attractiveness of the decision and three 
investment proposal attributes: (1) the extent of the venture’s social 
mission—the extent to which the venture targets a highly important cause 
in the form of a social, cultural, medical or environmental problem, (2) the 
hybridity of the venture’s revenue model—the extent to which the 
venture’s main revenue-generating activity is co-dependent on the cause-
related activity and, (3) the venture’s commercial investment value—the 
extent to which the venture offers an attractive valuation.  
                                                                        
125 We define a strategic decision as a decision important “in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents 
set” (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976: 246). 
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In essence, our model proposes that individual mindsets, through a 
moderating effect, influence decision-makers’ assessment of hybridity in 
strategic decisions. In total, we propose that two aspects of an individual’s 
mindset affect strategic decision-making: mindset dominance and mindset 
hybridity. We focus on the decision-makers’ evaluation of these three 
investment decision attributes (controlling for other attributes), because the 
attributes are respectively, social, hybrid and commercial, appealing to 
each component of our mindset. We develop our model in the following 
sections. 
 
The Moderating Role of Mindsets on Evaluating Social Venture Attributes  
We theorize that individual mindsets will moderate the overall 
investment attractiveness via three different investment proposal attributes. 
Our first investment proposal attribute of interest is the venture’s social 
mission—the extent to which the venture targets a highly important cause 
in the form of a social, cultural, medical or environmental problem. For 
reasons which we explain below, we expect this attribute to be strongly 
aligned with socially-dominant and hybrid mindsets and less aligned with 
commercially-dominant mindsets. We argue that the decision-maker’s 
mindset moderates the relationship between investment proposal attributes 
and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment decision.  
Commercially-dominant mindsets and the extent of a venture’s 
social mission (investment attribute 1). Since management research has 
begun, it has been dominated by the concerns of commercially-dominant 
mindsets (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005). When studied in conjunction 
with socially-dominant mindsets, the commercially-dominant mindset has 
been referred to as a banking logic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), business 
mission (Smith & Besharov, 2017), client service logic (Jay, 2013), 
 
Figure 37: The role of mindsets in assessing hybrid investment decisions 
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commercial logic (Murray, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Ramus et al., 
2017; York, O’Neil, & Sarasvathy, 2016), an economizing logic (York, 
Vedula, & Lenox, 2017), pragmatism (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014) and a 
self-oriented social identity (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Miller, Grimes, 
McMullen, & Vogus, 2012), among others.   
However, despite originating from multiple theoretical sources, these 
terms all refer to organizing towards the goal of commercial profits (i.e., 
motivation, mission), conducted to address client needs and outperform 
competitors (i.e., relevant actors, frame of reference, target client 
population), and ideally conducted through efficient, centrally-governed 
business activities (i.e., legitimate activities, values, guidelines for self-
evaluation, rules of engagement) (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Fu et al., 2010; Pache & Santos, 
2013). In Table 37, we provide two examples from the institutional logics 
and social identity literatures to illustrate which motivations, relevant 
actors and legitimate activities a commercial mindset is likely to prioritize 
(see also: York et al., 2016). 
Pache and Santos (2013: 980), building on the institutional logics 
literature, describe commercial logics as related to “technical and 
managerial expertise,” structured around the “efficient” and “controlled” 
sales of “products and services on the market” (legitimate activities), and, 
carried out in order to achieve the goal of “an economic surplus that can 
ultimately be legitimately appropriated by owners,” i.e., organizing as “a 
means to achieve the profit appropriation goal” (motivation) (D’aunno, 
Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Fauchart and 
Gruber (2011: 924), building on the social identity literature, write 
similarly that for self-interested individuals, firm creation is a means to 
generating commercial profit: “firm creation enables the individual to 
pursue his self-interest (making money, creating personal wealth, building 
a business that will be inherited by the next generation)” (motivation). The 
legitimate activities of the firm comprise exercising “business-related 
competence” and “cost-effective and mass-production methods (which are 
necessary to reach profitability)”. In terms of relevant actors, Fauchart and 
Gruber (2011) point out that, in a venture founding context, self-interested 
people target “the average consumer” for “quickly growing segments (the 
criteria of likelihood and value drive the choice of market served),” and 
evaluate their activities vis-à-vis “competing firms” (relevant actors). 
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Characteristics 
 
Self-focused founder identity 
(Darwinian) (Fauchart & 
Gruber, 2011) 
Banking logic (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010) 
Commercial logic (Pache & 
Santos, 2013) 
Motivation, mission, goal - Self-interest as basic social 
motivation; firm creation 
enables the individual to 
pursue his self-interest 
(making money, creating 
personal wealth, building a 
business that will be inherited 
by the next generation) 
- Goal: Deriving a rent or 
profit 
- Goal: Sell goods and/or 
services on the market to 
generate economic surplus 
that can be legitimately 
appropriated by owners. 
Relevant actors, the goal 
of commercial, frame of 
reference, target client 
population 
- Produce for the average 
consumer or for quickly 
growing segments (the criteria 
of likelihood and value drive 
the choice of market served) 
- Tend to serve additional 
segments over time/extend 
applications to new segments 
to achieve firm growth 
- Competitors as relevant others 
in self-evaluation 
- Competing firms as the 
primary frame of reference 
- Venture target population: 
Clients are customers and 
seen as more or less risky 
sources of income 
- Market actors, company 
owners 
Legitimate activities, 
values, guidelines for self-
evaluation, rules of 
engagement)  
- Being a competent 
professional  
- Professionalism as basis of 
self-evaluation (as firm-
founder) 
- Business-related competences 
as the basis for self-
evaluation: being professional 
is perceived as critical. 
- Being distinct from other firms 
seen as core to the managerial 
process 
- Capabilities and resources 
deployed: focus on cost-
effective and mass-production 
methods (which are 
necessary to reach 
profitability) 
- International sourcing of 
production capabilities (if 
needed)  
- Value intellectual property 
rights protection/help in 
achieving business goals 
- Management principles: 
maximizing profit while 
fulfilling fiduciary 
obligations not only to 
investors but also 
depositors 
- Organizational form: the 
for-profit form is legitimate 
because its ownership 
structure allows it to 
channel human resources 
and capital to areas of 
higher economic return. 
- Governance mechanism: 
Hierarchical control is the 
appropriate way to monitor 
strategy and operations in 
a way that ensures 
consistency of products 
and services and efficient 
allocation of resources. 
- Professional legitimacy is 
driven by technical and 
managerial expertise. 
Table 37: Self-focused mindsets in the literature, as adapted from Fauchart and Gruber (2011: 924, 947), Sieger et al., (2016),  
Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1423), and Pache and Santos (2013: 980) 
Therefore, we theorize that due to what the commercially-dominant 
mindset indicates as appropriate goals, frames of reference and legitimate 
activities, commercially-dominant mindsets will moderate the relationship 
between the extent of a venture’s social mission and the attractiveness of 
the hypothetical investment decision, such that, as venture missions 
become more social—the venture in question moves towards addressing a 
highly important social, environmental, cultural or medical cause—the 
attractiveness of the potential investment decision will increase, but more 
so for individuals whose mindsets are not commercially-dominant, than for 
individuals whose mindsets are commercially-dominant. 
Socially-dominant mindsets and the extent of a venture’s social 
mission (investment attribute 1). To complement the existing literature on 
decision-making driven by commercially-dominant mindsets, management 
scholars have, in recent years, expressed greater interest in understanding 
how decision-makers integrate considerations of social welfare into 
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important strategic decisions (Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton, & Margolis, 2012; 
Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2015). This orientation towards the 
“welfare of human beings as members of society” (Merriam-Webster.com, 
2018) has been studied alone—as well as, in juxtaposition to commercial 
mindsets—in a variety of literature streams (Rynes et al., 2012). For 
example, scholars have referred to social mindsets using the terms: 
alertness to suffering (Dutton, Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006; Miller, 
Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012; Shepherd & Williams, 2014), 
ecologizing logics (York, Vedula, & Lenox, 2017), morality or social 
idealism (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014), other-oriented social identity 
(Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Zhang et al., 2015), prosocial orientation 
(Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2015), public service logic (Jay, 2013), 
social development logic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), social mission 
(Smith & Besharov, 2017), and social welfare logic (Pache & Santos, 
2013; Ramus et al., 2017), among other terms.  
Despite the diverse theoretical origins of these terms, they all refer to 
congruent motivations, relevant actors, and legitimizing activities. Unlike 
the commercially-dominant mindset which is oriented towards the self, the 
socially-dominant mindset directs individuals’ attention to another 
particular group of actors, in this case, others (Bierhoff, 2005; De Dreu, 
Weingart, & Kwon, 2000) (i.e., relevant actors, frame of reference, target 
client population). With regards to others, socially-dominant others are 
compelled to help them (Batson, 1987), alleviate their suffering (Batson & 
Shaw, 1991; Miller et al., 2012; Omoto, Malsch, & Barraza, 2009), 
alleviate poverty (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), “address local social needs” 
(Pache & Santos, 2013), “mak[e] a difference,” “reduc[e] harm” (Grant, 
2007), and “advance particular causes, generally of a social or 
environmental nature” (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011: 944) (i.e., motivation, 
mission, goal). As one of our respondents exclaimed during the exercise,  
“I have no time to waste on ventures that do not target the causes in 
which I am engaged in. I focus [first] on the [venture’s targeted] 
cause and on the cause-related experience of the founders” 
(Respondent #40, with socially-dominant mindset, Investment 
Boutique #22). 
Finally, because the socially-dominant mindset is oriented towards 
others, legitimate activities—the activities viewed as legitimate means to 
help others—change. The socially-dominant mindset favors “bottom-up” 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014), non-profit, democratic governance structure 
focused on the social mission (Pache & Santos, 2013). Because socially-
dominant mindsets take on a collectivist identity (Brewer & Gardner, 
1996), the traditional commercial perspective of loss and gain changes. 
Individuals are prepared to personally incur “substantial costs to promote 
other people’s interests (Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Rabin, 2002)” (Miller et 
al., 2012: 618). As Brewer (1991), from the social identity lens, explains 
“when the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-
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serving motivations also changes accordingly (p. 476, as citied in Brewer 
and Gardner, 1996), whereby “the self-utility that may accrue to the actor 
is affected by the utility accruing to others (Licht, 2010: 839)” (Miller et 
al., 2012) (i.e., legitimate activities, values, guidelines for self-evaluation, 
rules of engagement). We summarize perspectives from the social identity 
and institutional logics literature below in Table 38.  
 
Characteristics 
 
Unknown-other-focused 
founder identity (Missionary) 
(Fauchart & Gruber, 2011) 
Development logic 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010) 
Social welfare logic (Pache 
& Santos, 2013) 
Motivation, mission, goal - Advancing a cause: firm 
creation supports the political 
vision of the individual and the 
ambition to advance a 
particular cause (social, 
environmental, etc.) 
- Derived from what the founder 
would like the world to become 
- Goal: Development and 
poverty alleviation 
 
- Goal: Make products 
and/or services available to 
address local social needs. 
Relevant actors, the goal 
of commercial, frame of 
reference, target client 
population 
- Society as the primary frame 
of reference 
- Produce for those consumers 
where they expect the greatest 
social impact; ultimately 
society is their audience 
- May serve additional 
segments, if this allows the 
firm to leverage its socio-
political mission 
- Target population: Clients 
are beneficiaries and seen 
as more or less “deserving” 
of support 
- Others in the local 
community 
Legitimate activities, 
values, guidelines for self-
evaluation, rules of 
engagement)  
- Responsible behavior: 
Responsibility as the basis for 
self-evaluation: contributing to 
a better world is perceived as 
critical (truly responsible 
people do act) 
- Demonstrating that alternative 
social practices are feasible 
and leading by example seen 
as core to the entrepreneurial 
process 
- Tend to address new social 
practices (e.g., new modes of 
consumption or production) 
- Focus on socially responsible 
production methods 
- Sourcing from suppliers that 
match strict criteria (according 
to mission) 
- Demonstration of firm 
capabilities to diffuse the 
exemplary model 
- Management principles: 
Maximizing the impact of 
donor funds on 
development and poverty 
alleviation 
- Governance mechanism: 
The nonprofit form 
(association) is legitimate 
because of its ownership 
structure giving power to 
people who adhere to a 
social mission. The non-
redistribution constraint 
ensures a real focus on the 
social goal. 
- Democratic control, which 
is, by law, constitutive of 
the association status, is 
the appropriate way to 
monitor strategy and 
operations, allowing 
organizations to consider 
local social needs. 
- Professional legitimacy is 
driven by contribution to the 
social mission. 
Table 38: Other-focused mindsets as described in the Iiterature,  
adapted from Fauchart and Gruber (2011: 924, 947), Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1423), and Pache and Santos (2013: 980) 
Therefore, due to the emphasis that socially-dominant mindsets 
place on advancing a social mission and helping others (motivation, 
relevant actors), and, due to importance placed on the social mission, and 
how socially-dominant mindsets view and pursue gain (legitimate 
activities), we theorize that social dominance in mindsets will render a 
venture’s social mission—the extent to which a venture addresses a highly 
important social, environmental, cultural or medical cause—as the critical 
feature in an investment proposal. We anticipate that socially-dominant 
mindsets will moderate the relationship between the extent of a venture’s 
social mission and the overall attractiveness of hypothetical investment 
decisions, such that, as the importance of the social mission being 
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addressed increases, the overall attractiveness of hypothetical investment 
decisions will increase, but more so for individuals whose mindsets are 
socially-dominant, than for individuals whose mindsets are commercially-
dominant.   
Hybrid mindsets and the extent of a venture’s social mission 
(investment attribute 1). Although research on hybrid organizing has been 
of great interest to scholars for decades (Battilana & Lee, 2014), the 
majority of work remains at an organizational level (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014; Scarlata & Alemany, 2010), with little 
research conducted on how combining a commercial mindset with a social 
mindset affects decision-making. However, we find research on topics 
related to decision-making driven by social-commercial hybrid mindsets in 
studies of biculturalism (Moore & Barker, 2012; Tadmor & Tetlock, 2006; 
Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009), cognition (Laureiro-Martínez & Brusoni, 
forthcoming), and paradoxical management (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018; 
Zhang et al., 2015). We draw on hybrid decision-making research at the 
level of the organization, as well as from individual-level conceptual 
research (Wry & York, 2017), to develop theory on how hybrid mindsets 
influence decision-makers’ assessment of hybrid and other investment 
proposal attributes.  
One of the qualities of research on hybrid organizing is that it is 
contested, given that data is sourced from practitioners who operate on the 
boundaries of two ways of thinking which are often in opposition. In Mair 
and Hehenberger’s (2014: 1184) field study, which features funders 
operating at the boundary of traditional investors and philanthropists, one 
of their informant says,  
“Maybe the difficulty is this arrogance from the private sector that 
makes them believe that they can export their methodology, their 
ways of acting in the civil society sector. That is not so positively 
seen and is almost like a clash of cultures.”  
Another one counters,  
“The biggest problem in charity is inefficiency. . . . You can’t be 
egoistic and just look at what you want to do locally because egoism 
is inefficiency. In today’s world, philanthropy must be seen as a 
business, and you must look at how to get the best return on your 
investment, because the needs we’re trying to address are so big” 
(Mair & Hehenberger, 2014: 1185). 
Nevertheless, we can still summarize the motivations, relevant actors, and 
legitimizing activities of hybrid mindsets as follows. What this literature 
suggests is that hybrid mindsets are shaped by the dual goals of generating 
commercial and social outcomes (i.e., motivation, mission), conducted to 
address client needs, competing offers, as well as, beneficiary needs (i.e., 
relevant actors, frame of reference, target client population), and 
conducted through composite organizations. In many field in which hybrid 
organizations operate, there are often no prêt-à-porter solutions (Battilana 
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& Dorado, 2010; Wry & York, 2017), therefore individuals with hybrid 
mindsets will borrow elements and strategies from other organizational 
forms (Pache & Santos, 2013), working towards their goals “in ways that 
integrate both financial and social aims” (Wry & York, 2017: 549). (i.e., 
legitimate activities, values, guidelines for self-evaluation, rules of 
engagement). These activities may combine the decision rules of two 
forms, or emphasize different aspects over different time periods (e.g., 
Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2017).  
An example from the institutional logics literature indicates which 
motivations, relevant actors and legitimate activities a hybrid mindset is 
likely to prioritize. In Battilana and Dorado’s (2010: 1424) study of 
microfinance organizations, they show how an emerging commercial 
microfinance logic combines traditional banking logic and development 
logic. They state that the goal of the hybrid logic was not “deriving a rent 
or profit,” nor was it “development and poverty alleviation” alone, but 
these firms instead sought to increase “access of the disenfranchised to 
financial services while fulfilling fiduciary obligations toward depositors 
and investors” (motivation). Next, the authors discuss how the hybrid logic 
related to their relevant actors. The clients were not as “customers and 
seen as more or less risky sources of income,” nor were they only as 
“beneficiaries and seen as more or less ‘deserving’ of ‘support’,” rather, 
their clients were “customers and seen as microentrepreneurs.” In this way 
the hybrid mindset was able to combine both the financial lens in 
considering their clients (i.e., they were customers), as well as a social lens, 
(i.e., they deserved support, but as equal, agency-wielding actors) Finally, 
in the emerging organization’s legitimate activity, they sought to “strik[e] a 
balance between maximizing access of the disenfranchised to financial 
services and fulfilling fiduciary obligations to depositors and investors” 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010: 1423). 
Due to the emphasis that hybrid mindsets place on combining a 
social mission with a commercial mission (motivation), on addressing the 
needs of both their beneficiaries and their clients (relevant actors), and due 
to their efforts to comply by both social and commercial rules of operation 
(legitimate activities), we theorize that hybrid mindsets will moderate the 
relationship between the hybridity of a venture’s mission—the extent to 
which a venture addresses a highly important social, environmental, 
cultural or medical cause—and the overall attractiveness of hypothetical 
investment decisions. As the hybridity of the venture’s mission increases, 
we theorize that the overall attractiveness of hypothetical investment 
decisions will increase, however, due to the efforts of individuals with 
hybrid mindsets to operate “in ways that integrate both financial and social 
aims” (Wry & York, 2017: 549), we theorize that the attractiveness of 
hypothetical investment decisions will increase to a larger degree for 
individuals with hybrid mindsets, than for those whose mindsets are 
commercial-dominant, and, due to the efforts of individuals with hybrid 
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mindsets to strike a balance between commercial concerns and social 
concerns (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), we expect individuals with hybrid 
mindsets to discount the importance of the venture’s social mission relative 
to individuals with socially-dominant mindsets.  
We summarize our arguments in the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Social and commercial orientation in mindsets will 
moderate the relationship between the extent of the venture’s social 
mission and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment 
proposal, such that, as the importance of the cause targeted by the venture 
increases, the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment 
proposal increases. 
Hypothesis 1b: While the relationship between the extent of the 
venture’s social mission and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical 
investment proposal will be positive, relative to individuals with 
commercially-dominant mindsets, the relationship should be more positive 
for individuals with hybrid mindsets, and the most positive for individuals 
with socially-dominant mindsets. 
 
The Moderating Role of Mindsets on Evaluating Hybrid Venture 
Attributes  
Our second investment proposal attribute of interest is the hybridity 
of the venture’s revenue model—the extent to which the venture’s main 
revenue-generating activity is co-dependent on the cause-related activity. 
For reasons which we explain below, we expect this attribute to be strongly 
aligned with socially-dominant and hybrid mindsets, and less aligned with 
commercially-dominant mindsets. The decision-maker’s mindset will 
moderate the relationship between the hybridity of the venture’s revenue 
model and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment 
decision.  
Commercially-dominant mindsets and the hybridity of a venture’s 
revenue model (investment attribute 2). Individuals with commercially 
dominant mindsets will perceive the hybridity of a venture’s revenue 
model—the extent to which the success of the revenue model in the 
investment proposal co-depends on the success of the cause-related 
activity—through commercial goals, actors, and legitimizing activities. The 
goal of a commercial mindset is to pursue personal wealth generation 
(Fauchart & Gruber, 2011) and serve customers, clients and investors 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013) (motivation, relevant actors). Upon 
completing her investment evaluation exercise, one respondent took the 
time to add this additional comment, 
“If you're working at a fund, I feel like you have a responsibilities 
[sic] to the [fund’s limited partners—the shareholders], if they 
haven't told you to be focusing on a cause, then it's not my role to, 
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even if it's a cause I personally care about outside of work. 
Personally, I am cause driven, but beyond setting standards in day 
to day practice that's not something I think should come into the day 
to day decision-making.” (Respondent #123, with commercially-
dominant mindset, Firm #7) 
Her comment points to the relevant actor in her case (the fund’s limited 
partners), and how cause-related activities do not relate to the main 
legitimate activity of an investor, that is, to offer strong financial returns to 
the owners of the fund (Friedman, 1970; Jansson, Sandberg, Biel, & 
Gärling, 2014; Sternberg, 1997).  
 Moreover, because the guiding values in commercial mindsets are 
professionalism and business-related competence (Fauchart & Gruber, 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2013), individuals with commercially-dominant 
mindsets will be likely to take a traditional “business school” approach, 
which prioritizes “pragmatic business concerns (e.g., profitable 
management, saving money, increasing sales)” (Ashforth & Reingen, 
2014: 481), and views cause-related matters to be of secondary importance 
(Davis, 1973; Pettigrew, Thomas, & Whittington, 2001) —even a 
distraction  
Unlike socially-dominant or hybrid mindsets, who view commercial 
outcomes as a means to an end, commercially-dominant mindsets appear to 
frame commercial outcomes as the means and end. As one respondent who 
later scored highly on our measure for commercially-dominant mindsets 
said, “I don’t care about the cause,” he said, “I’m not emotionally attached. 
VC is completely unrelated to emotions. I’m looking at the size of the 
market” (Respondent #105, VC Firm #57). To clarify, we generally do not 
expect commercially-dominant individuals to shun hybrid revenue models, 
or social causes, however, we expect them to be much more comfortable 
with both activities in a segregated manner, since from their perspective, 
one does not bolster the legitimacy of the other. The following comment 
shows pursuing a social cause and financial gain should operate on two 
parallel tracks,  
“The cause is not important, however, if the company, in addition to 
their revenue-generating activity allocates resources to any social 
cause – personally, I lead the Women in Fintech group and lead 
gender diversity – but for me, when I evaluate the venture, [a cause] 
is an add-on. This is a nice-to-have, but it would never play a role in 
the decision of whether to invest or not. In that sense, the 
interdependence [of the revenue model and cause-related activity]… 
I don’t want to see that the revenue success is linked to a cause – I 
want them to be completely independent” (Respondent #69, with 
commercially-dominant mindset, VC Firm #39).  
Hence, we still theorize that, all else being equal, commercially-dominant 
mindsets will be more persuaded by ventures which have an interdependent 
revenue model. However, we theorize that the attractiveness of the 
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potential investment decision will increase more so for individuals whose 
mindsets are not commercially-dominant, relative to individuals whose 
mindsets are commercially-dominant. 
Socially-dominant mindsets and the hybridity of a venture’s 
revenue model (investment attribute 2). As mentioned previously, 
individuals with socially-dominant mindsets represent a highly 
collectivistic social identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Indeed, when these 
individuals see others suffering, they identify, view this as unfair and are 
socially motivated to reduce this suffering (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Lewin, 
1935; Miller et al., 2012) (motivation). Given this other-focused mindset 
(relevant actors), decision-makers with a socially-dominant mindset will be 
primarily concerned with advancing the collective welfare of these others, 
even at a personal cost to themselves (legitimate activities). Therefore, it is 
to be expected that individuals with socially-dominant mindsets will not 
only tolerate cause-related activities in a commercial venture, but as a way 
of prioritizing the social mission, they will expect cause-related activities to 
be considered in tandem with revenue-generating activities.  
One of our respondents with a socially-dominant mindset elaborated, 
“Basically, we're looking for businesses who have strong 
interdependencies, what we call ‘inherent impact’ The social success 
is tied to success of their product, addressing big causes or several 
big causes together (like the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals)” (Respondent #31, with socially-dominant 
mindset, VC Firm #16).  
Moreover, due to how hybrid mindsets render individuals alert to 
opportunities which combine the pursuit of both social and commercial 
outcomes (Wry & York, 2017), relative to individuals whose mindsets are 
commercially-dominant, we expect decision-makers with hybrid mindsets 
to be more opportunistic about the potential benefits that cause-related 
attributes can bring to a revenue-generating venture (Burt, 1983; Creyer, 
1997; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). While one decision-maker filled out our 
questionnaire, he paused to inform us of the link between his business 
activities and his social mission, 
“Instead of putting strongly disagree on ‘it is important for me to 
advance my career in the business world’ I only put ‘disagree’ 
because I somewhat care about it—it's a lever that helps me to 
achieve societal impact goals” (Respondent #52, with socially-
dominant mindset, Micro VC #31) 
Hence, we theorize that, as revenue models become more interdependent, 
the motivations, relevant actors and legitimizing activities of socially-
dominant mindsets will lead decision-makers to increase their ratings of 
potential investment decisions. In other words, as the hybridity of the 
revenue model increases, the overall attractiveness of the investment 
decision will increase, however, the relationship between the hybridity of 
the revenue model and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical 
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investment decision should be more positive for individuals with socially-
dominant mindsets than for individuals with commercially-dominant 
mindsets. 
 Hybrid mindsets and the hybridity of a venture’s revenue model 
(investment attribute 2). Individuals with hybrid will perceive the 
hybridity of a venture’s revenue model—the extent to which the success of 
the revenue model in the investment proposal co-depends on the success of 
the cause-related activity—through the concerns of both commercial and 
social mindsets. 
On one hand, the hybridity of a venture’s revenue model is an 
attribute likely to appeal to decision-makers with hybrid mindsets through 
a simple process of elimination. Individuals with hybrid mindsets view 
their business activity as tightly coupled with their social mission 
(legitimate activity). Since traditional non-profits are unsuitable since they 
tend not to generate revenue (motivation), and traditional for-profits are 
also unsuitable since they tend not to address an important social cause 
(motivation), ventures which have revenue models which are highly 
interdependent with the cause-related activity may simply be the remaining 
investment proposal destination to which all individuals with hybrid 
mindsets naturally go. As one of our respondents commented during our 
questionnaire,  
“I would disagree with [the statement that revenue-generating 
activities should have no effect on progress towards a cause]. I think 
it is helpful to have revenue-generating activities promote progress 
towards a cause” (Respondent #2, with hybrid mindset, Holding 
Company #1). 
On the other hand, the hybridity of a venture’s revenue model may also be 
viewed as the critical feature of an investment proposal for hybrid 
mindsets, sought out and targeted by the decision-maker since it represents 
the main mechanism through which individuals with hybrid mindsets can 
integrate conflicting motivations, demands from relevant actors, and types 
of legitimizing activities.  
One of our respondents elaborated on his decision-making process, 
referring to the Buy One-Give One marketing scheme whereby a company 
like TOMS (who popularized the practice) commits to giving one pair of 
shoes away per pair of shoes sold (Marquis & Park, 2014; Mycoskie, 
2016),  
“The one thing that we're really focused on is that interdependence 
between the revenue generating activity and impact. We'll never do a 
TOM’s-like model where it's a post-revenue-generating activity. 
We're really focused on the sustainability of impact through the 
commercial viability of the business” (Respondent #65, with hybrid 
dominant mindset, VC Firm #36) 
Here the respondent refers to the values and governance mechanisms 
important to him (legitimate activities). Unlike commercially-dominant 
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mindsets, which place a premium on professionalism, effectiveness and 
profit-generation, and unlike socially-dominant mindsets, which emphasize 
social mission and social change only, in the case of the hybrid mindset, 
the respondent refers to both impact, and the commercial viability of the 
business, as well as the result of the two combined: the sustainability of 
impact. 
Another respondent, when given the opportunity to elaborate on her 
decision-making process, explained the overlap in motivation, actors, and 
legitimate activities, 
“Interdependence was very important to me - I have something 
personally against impact that is ‘artificially’ created. So, being able 
to structure a company that has good correlation with business 
impact is very important. […] By artificially created, I mean - it is 
not a strong company. If you sell a product [with the promise that 
you’ll] donate breakfast to kids in Cambodia - for [every] 1 dollar of 
this [product’s revenue] - if management changes and is not a fan of 
this anymore they can easily drop it. So, by this I mean the impact is 
‘artificial’ because it is not being created by the product or service 
being sold. Also, on the flip side, if the product becomes so popular 
that no one looks at the donation portion anymore, the company may 
also feel comfortable with dropping this impact portion” 
(Respondent #160, with hybrid mindset, Not-for-profit #12).126 
Hence, we theorize that as the co-dependence of revenue-generating 
activity and cause-related activity increases, individuals with hybrid 
mindsets are likely to increase their overall rating of the hypothetical 
investment decision. Relative to individuals with commercially-dominant 
mindsets and individuals with commercially-dominant mindsets, the 
motivations, relevant actors and legitimizing activities of hybrid mindsets 
means that the overall rating of the hypothetical investment decision will 
highest among individuals with hybrid mindsets.  
We summarize our reasoning around this investment proposal 
attribute in the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Social and commercial orientation in mindsets will 
moderate the relationship between the hybridity of the venture’s revenue 
model and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment 
proposal, such that, as the interdependence between a venture’s core 
revenue-generating activity and their cause-related activity increases, the 
overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment proposal increases.  
Hypothesis 2b: While the relationship between the hybridity of the 
venture’s revenue model and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical 
investment proposal will be positive, relative to individuals with 
                                                                        
126 Only after analyzing the mindset orientation scores for these three respondents, we found that they had hybrid mindsets. 
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commercially-dominant mindsets, the relationship should be more positive 
for individuals with socially-dominant mindsets, and the most positive for 
individuals with hybrid mindsets. 
 
The Moderating Role of Mindsets on Evaluating Commercial Venture 
Attributes  
Our third investment proposal attribute of interest is the venture’s 
commercial investment value—the extent to which a venture offers a 
commercially attractive investment deal. The decision-maker’s mindset 
will moderate the relationship between the hybridity of the venture’s 
commercial investment value and the overall attractiveness of the 
hypothetical investment decision. Before explaining why we expect this 
attribute to be strongly aligned with commercially-dominant and hybrid 
mindsets and less aligned with socially-dominant mindsets, we clarify what 
we mean by commercial investment value and present our assumptions 
about its relationship between ownership and venture valuation. 
We conceptualize investment value as good “value-for-money” or 
the attractive pricing of venture shares.127 The pricing of venture shares—
the total price of the total number of shares (i.e., the price of the entire pie) 
divided by the total number of shares issued by the venture (i.e., number of 
pie pieces—relates to the venture’s overall valuation (Zider, 1998). 
Valuation is a critical attribute or equity investors since it is a key128 
determinant of how much of the company the investors will receive in 
return for their capital injection (Bowden, 1994; Hsu, 2004). Yet, despite 
its importance, a company’s valuation is difficult to calculate in early 
stages of a company due to their shorter track record and fewer objective, 
comparable benchmarks to predict future performance. Moreover, what is 
considered an appropriate valuation in one industry may be considered 
wildly unreasonable in another . Valuation is further affected by ephemeral 
industry trends, local practices and the value and fluctuation of local 
currency (Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2009). Hence, despite its key role 
that the cost of ownership (share price) and valuation have in informing the 
attractiveness of an investment deal, it is difficult to identify a numerical 
price threshold that will hold across venture stages, industries, currencies 
and geographies (Block, De Vries, Schumann, & Sandner, 2014).129  
Finally, in equity investing, founders sometimes disagree with third 
parties’ valuation of the company that they have developed. Generally, 
their higher appreciation of their company’s value leads them to inflate the 
                                                                        
127 Founders issue shares which represent partial ownership of a company. 
128 Valuation is also a function of how much new capital is being infused in the company. 
129 In public markets, the valuation of the company is calculated based on past performance and further affected by the purchasing 
and selling of company shares, which drives demand for the shares, and therefore drives the price up or down. Generally, in this 
context, companies with higher valuations are considered greater generators of commercial value for the economy. Moreover, a high 
valuation may signify willingness to participate in an investment round at this price. However, in our context—the context of early-
stage investing—venture valuations still vary despite holding venture quality constant (Bradley, Kim, & Krigman, 2015; Hsu, 2004).   
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valuation of their company (Pollack & Bosse, 2014), sometimes, in order 
to part with less of their company in exchange for capital investment 
(Sapienza, 1992; Smith, 2001) or, to signal the high future value of the 
company (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). 
However, a prematurely-claimed high valuation can hurt founders in the 
longer term (Feld & Mendelson, 2016). Even if a venture succeeds in 
raising money (i.e., selling shares) at this valuation, and hence has proof of 
their venture’s market value, if future sales and growth do not meet the 
targets with which the valuation was calculated, the venture may have to 
discount its valuation in a future funding round, sending a negative signal 
to potential stakeholders.130 On the other hand, if a valuation is too low, it 
may act as a red flag, indicating that the company has low value due to 
some undisclosed reason (Shane & Cable, 2002). Thus, as illustrated in 
Figure 38, valuation should not be plausible: not excessively high, nor too 
low.  
Although valuation depends also on the industry, stage, investment 
size, control rights offered and the investor’s preferences (Block et al., 
2014), in the US market at the time of this writing, this range of 
“plausibility” may cover hundreds of thousands, or, hundreds of millions of 
dollars (Cutler, 2012; Hsu, 2004; Scarlata & Alemany, 2010). Therefore, 
within this range of plausible valuations there is the notion of a commercial 
investment value, or value-for-money, wherein—holding the quality of the 
investment constant—investments pricing their company shares on the 
lower side of the plausible range are considered to have higher commercial 
investment value, or, value-for-money and, investments pricing their 
company shares on the higher side of the plausible range are considered to 
have less investment value, and represent less of a “good deal” (see figure 
below; Figure 38).  
                                                                        
130 Ideally, companies will: receive a modest valuation estimation during their first injection of capital; sell and grow according to 
identified targets; and then receive a greater estimated valuation in the next negotiated funding rounds. 
                                        
Figure 38: Commercial investment value and venture valuation in early-stage companies  
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Thus, without going into the details of investment performance, the venture 
investment itself, viewed jointly with its valuation, can have higher or 
lower commercial investment value, i.e., it can be expensive, or “a great 
bargain” (Bowden, 1994). This makes investment value an important 
commercial criterion in the evaluation of investment proposals, and in the 
study of investor decision-making. Hence, focusing on the range of 
plausibility, we include venture valuation in our theorizing. 
Commercial mindsets and commercial investment value (in 
relation to venture valuation) (investment attribute 3). Considering the 
role of motivations, relevant actors and legitimizing activities in a 
commercial mindset, we theorize a venture’s commercial investment 
value—the extent to which the venture offers an attractive valuation—will 
not only influence the overall attractiveness of an investment decision, but 
that for commercial mindsets, this attribute will be considered the critical 
attribute. 
First, we know that the goal of individuals with commercially-
dominant mindsets are to generate profit, and being efficient and pragmatic 
(D’aunno et al., 2000). In their frame of reference, they consider 
competitors (which they aim to beat), customers—or in this case, their own 
investors—(which they aim to serve), and themselves. Finally, investment 
value is directly related to the main legitimate activity of an investor, that 
is, to offer strong financial returns to the owners of the fund (Friedman, 
1970; Jansson, Sandberg, Biel, & Gärling, 2014; Sternberg, 1997). As 
Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1423) wrote, the goal indicated by the 
banking logic is to “maximize[e] profit while fulfilling fiduciary 
obligations not only to investors but also depositors.” 
Though we did not ask him about the culture in his firm, in reaction 
to one of our questionnaire items, one respondent with a commercially-
dominant mindset told us, “We have a very competitive culture. We say, 
‘we are going to be the best goddamn investors the world has ever seen!’” 
(Respondent #104, Family Office #4). Another respondent with a 
commercially-dominant mindset, elaborated on her decision-making, “The 
valuation is important to me because I don’t want to pay more than I 
should be paying” (Respondent #132, Angel Investor). This stands in 
contrast to how the literature describes the behavior of individuals with a 
prosocial orientation. A person with a socially-dominant mindset would 
“try to establish a decision that values and incorporates both own and 
other’s interests and ideas; they see the decision-making process as a 
collaborative game in which fairness, harmony, and joint welfare are key,” 
(De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008: 32). 
Commercially dominant decision-makers will be concerned about 
whether they are pursuing attractively-priced shares in a quality investment 
deal—e.g., “There's no point having a lot of ownership of a crap deal” 
(commercially-dominant respondent, #123, VC Firm #7)—however, 
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holding the quality of the venture constant, decision-makers with 
commercially-dominant mindsets will likely engage in a more aggressive 
assessment of the finance-related attributes of the proposal, wishing to 
reduce their costs and increase their benefits, in order to outperform their 
competitors (Pan et al., forthcoming; Sen, 2000).  
Hence, we theorize that individuals with commercially-dominant 
mindsets are likely to think, within the range of plausibility, “the lower the 
better” (commercially-dominant respondent, #148, VC Firm #79). They 
will be more sensitive to issues of pricing and venture valuation; generally 
seeking out more value-for-money in their venture investment deals. 
Specifically, holding the size of the investment and all other attributes 
constant, as the venture’s valuation decreases (within a reasonable range), 
the attractiveness of the hypothetical investment decision will increase 
more for individuals whose mindsets are commercially-dominant, relative 
to individuals whose mindsets are not commercially-dominant. 
Hybrid mindsets and commercial investment value (in relation to 
venture valuation) (investment attribute 3). As we know, the individuals 
with a social-mindset are not motivated by personal gain (motivation). In 
fact, research has found that participants who identify with a larger group 
are more willing to restrict individual gain to preserve a collective good 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & Van de Kragt, 1989) 
(relevant actors). One of our respondents with a socially-dominant 
mindset, laughed out aloud while responding to an item in our 
questionnaire about wealth ambitions, viewing the pursuit of personal gain 
as irrelevant (legitimate activities), 
“No [I do not invest to become rich], this is definitely a loss-making 
business. [...] Oh, it is… Anyone who does venture capital, who 
expects to make money is… is… is… doing the wrong thing. 
Especially in impact investment” (Respondent #2, with socially-
dominant mindset, Holding Company #1). 
So far is the motivation to make money from a socially-dominant person’s 
considerations that one respondent in fact expressed embarrassment that a 
large portion of her funds combined social goals with financial 
expectations, 
“10% of our funding does not allow any financial return [grants], 
40% of our funding seeks societal return and accepts financial 
return, while 50 percent, as sad as it is, is dedicated to projects 
which pursue financial and societal returns on equal footing” 
(Respondent #59, with socially-dominant mindset, Not-for-profit #5) 
Building on this motivation, we theorize that when considering valuation in 
investment proposals, those with a socially-dominant mindset will be more 
likely to accept higher venture share prices, to compensate another person, 
i.e., the founder. Their motivation and focus on others reveals their view of 
gain and loss, as being distinct from a self-interested process in which one 
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should attempt to gain more control for the self, and less for others, as well 
as distinct from the notion of commercial value.  
The following comment demonstrates, that, as expected, socially-
dominant mindsets will also consider social value creation (Kroeger & 
Weber, 2015; Lingane & Olsen, 2004; Wang & Bansal, 2012), when 
evaluating decisions,  
“If the [social] impact-related characteristics are high, I'd still be 
willing to look at a high-valuation startup. If the impact is low, but 
the valuation is high, I probably would not be willing to explore that 
further... unless the team was very strong. Then, clearly, high impact 
and low valuation is a conversation I'd like to keep going” 
(Respondent #136, VC Firm #42). 
The motivations, relevant actors and legitimizing activities associated with 
individuals with socially-dominant mindsets suggests that investment value 
will not be the most important venture attribute for individuals with 
socially-dominant mindsets. Nevertheless, we still expect individuals with 
socially-dominant mindsets to appreciate it when, holding the quality of the 
venture constant, the venture valuation decreases (within a reasonable 
range). Thus, we theorize that socially-dominant mindsets will positively 
moderate the relationship between investment value and the overall 
attractiveness of the hypothetical investment decision, such that as the 
venture valuation decreases (within a reasonable range), decision-makers 
with socially-dominant mindsets will increase their overall rating of the 
potential investment decision. However, given individuals with socially-
dominant mindset’s emphasis on non-financial—rather than financial—
venture attributes, we expect that the overall attractiveness of the 
hypothetical investment decision should be more positive for individuals 
with commercially-dominant mindsets than for individuals with socially-
dominant mindsets. 
Hybrid mindsets and commercial investment value (in relation to 
venture valuation) (investment attribute 3). Although hybrid mindsets 
underline the importance of achieving both social and commercial goals 
(motivation), of addressing the needs of both their beneficiaries and their 
clients (relevant actors), and of complying with the rules of engagement of 
both social and commercial mindsets (legitimate activities), in reality, this 
task remains challenging. In the same way that we expect individuals with 
hybrid mindsets to slightly discount the importance of a venture’s targeted 
social cause (relative to individuals with socially-dominant mindsets), we 
theorize that, when it comes to venture valuation, decision-makers with 
hybrid mindsets will slightly discount the importance of venture valuation 
(relative to individuals with commercially-dominant mindsets). Like 
individuals with socially-dominant mindsets, even if venture valuation is 
on the higher side of the plausible valuation spectrum, individuals with 
hybrid mindsets may be willing to pay the price to support and be part of a 
socially meaningful venture (motivation). This discounting behavior 
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represents the balancing act pursued by those with hybrid mindsets 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith & Besharov, 
2017).  
We see a mix of the two motivations in one of our respondents’ 
spoken reaction to a questionnaire item,  
“I want to be financially successful – earn fair pay, etc., but I don't 
want to get rich for myself. I don't have a problem being rich but for 
me, it's about being an example of a successful woman in business. 
[And showing others that] backing women in venture [has made] me 
successful.” (Respondent #138, VC Firm #72). 
As this quote illustrates, individuals with hybrid mindsets do not reject the 
activity of financial gain, and even view it as a symbol of success, 
however, they do not prioritize it either (legitimate activity). On the other 
hand—as with individuals whose mindsets are socially-dominant—it is 
clear that the financial attribute is a means undertaken to support their 
mission, like, in this case, the female entrepreneurs (relevant actors). Like 
individuals with commercially-dominant mindsets, individuals with hybrid 
mindsets view financial matters, with some degree of pragmatism, while, 
like with individuals with socially-dominant mindsets, individuals with 
hybrid mindsets evaluate financial matters with some degree of morality 
(Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986).  
Based on our reasoning on what the social-commercial hybrid 
mindset indicates as appropriate goals, relevant actors, and legitimate 
activities, we expect hybridity in mindsets to positively moderate the 
relationship between the venture’s valuation and the attractiveness of the 
hypothetical investment decision. Namely, we theorize that as the venture’s 
valuation decreases—within the range of a plausible valuation—the 
attractiveness of the potential investment decision will increase; however, 
the attractiveness of the potential investment decision will increase the 
most for individuals whose mindsets are commercially-dominant, followed 
by individuals with hybrid mindsets, and then by individuals whose 
mindsets are socially-dominant. We present our reasoning for this venture 
attribute in the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Social and commercial orientation in mindsets will 
moderate the relationship between the venture’s commercial investment 
value and the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment 
proposal, such that, as the venture’s valuation increases (within a plausible 
range), the overall attractiveness of the hypothetical investment proposal 
increases. 
Hypothesis 3b: While the relationship between the venture’s 
commercial investment value and the overall attractiveness of the 
hypothetical investment proposal will be positive, relative to individuals 
with socially-dominant mindsets, the relationship should be more positive 
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for individuals with hybrid mindsets, and the most positive for individuals 
with commercially-dominant mindsets. 
 
Data and Methods 
Research Design 
To understand how individual mindsets affect the emphasis that 
different decision-makers place on investment proposal attributes, we 
asked over 150 respondents to assess a set of hypothetical investment 
decisions which we designed according to the conjoint experiment method 
(to be explained in this section).  Accompanying this exercise was a pre- 
and post-assessment questionnaire, which allowed us to collect control 
variables and our moderating variables (the decision-maker’s mindset 
orientation).  By adopting this method, we address several critiques of 
empirical research on decision-making in organizational contexts. First, 
that it relies excessively on post-hoc methods—leading to recall bias and 
social-desirability bias (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Golden, 1992). Second, that 
decision-making research suffers from strong survivorship bias, i.e., 
“sampling on the dependent variable” (Berk, 1983; Denrell, 2005). Third, 
that decision-making research has struggled to demonstrate causation. And 
finally, that decision-making research is based on abstract experiments 
with low internal validity (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008).  
We address the first potential risk—that decision-making research 
relies excessively on post-hoc methods—by using conjoint analysis, a 
method often used in marketing (Green, Krieger, & Wind, 2001; Green & 
Srinivasan, 1990) and investor decision-making (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 
1999, 1997). In a conjoint experiment, we are able observe, in a controlled 
setting, how respondents react to complex scenarios (Green & Srinivasan, 
1990), thereby shedding light on decision-making which is often quick, 
subconscious, and intuitive (Evans, 2003; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 
2008). We can also observe potentially contentious decision-making where 
individual preferences might challenge contextual norms (e.g., a 
commercial perspective in a social environment), and therefore may be 
subtler, and harder to identity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd, 
Patzelt, & Baron, 2013). 
Used in decision-making studies across a variety of disciplines—
e.g., energy (Byun, Shin, & Lee, 2018), nursing (Chester et al., 2018), 
management (Wang, Xu, & Wang, 2018), entrepreneurship (Warnick, 
Murnieks, McMullen, & Brooks, 2018)—as well as in a number of 
industry applications—e.g., the “next video” recommendation on video 
hosting websites (Orme, 2006)—conjoint analysis is useful because it 
allows us to go beyond what decision-makers think they do, and why 
decision-makers think they do what they do—the “espoused theories of 
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action”—bringing the research closer to capturing the decision theories 
guiding decision-making while they are “in use” (Argyris & Schon, 1974).  
Conjoint studies work by presenting respondents with a number of 
different scenarios varying along dimensions of theoretical interest (in our 
case: we designed investment proposals varying along specific investment 
proposal attributes). Respondents are asked either to indicate which 
scenario (i.e., rank)—or, to which extent a scenario (i.e., rate)—satisfies a 
certain condition. This output allows researchers to identify the weight 
each respondent places on a certain dimension. In our case, we followed 
the metric conjoint approach, asking respondents to directly rate each 
scenario (hypothetical investment decision) according to its attractiveness 
(Rao, 2014). We selected this type of conjoint method since it is consistent 
with our decision-making context of interest, in which decision-makers 
usually consider investment proposals deal-by-deal (Orme, 2006; Wittink 
& Cattin, 1989).    
Although we used the metric conjoint approach, regardless of the 
type of conjoint experiment, scenarios are designed to be identical in every 
way except along 4-8 dimensions, selected for their centrality in the 
assessment task (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999). In one scenario, a 
respondent may view one dimension expressed in its “highest” form (e.g., a 
hypothetical investment decision is described as involving a venture that 
addresses a cause of high importance), or its “lowest” form (e.g., a 
hypothetical investment decision is described as involving a venture that 
addresses a cause of low importance). In our scenario, we heeded the 
recommendation to use a smaller number of categories (Shepherd & 
Patzelt, 2018), varying our dimensions only across the two categories, e.g., 
“high” and “low.” However, other conjoint experiments sometimes feature 
three or four categories (also called “levels”), such as “low,” “medium,” 
“high”.131 
In our study, we asked respondents to assess the attractiveness of 
multiple investment proposals across the following six dimensions: four 
general venture-level attributes (importance of cause targeted by venture, 
interdependence of revenue-generating and cause-related activity, ease of 
measurement of cause-related progress, and venture valuation), and two 
team-related venture-level attributes (team business experience and team 
cause-related experience). As recommended in the literature, we selected a 
symmetric design, meaning that each attribute varies according to the same 
number of levels (in our case: two); consequently, there were 64 possible 
profile combinations.   
To avoid decision fatigue among respondents, we did not show all 
possible combinations of each scenario, as is recommended (Kuhfeld, 
2005), instead, we followed the common practice of using a fractional-
                                                                        
131 There is also an emerging method, called adaptive choice-based conjoint, which continually proposes new categories with the use 
of a learning algorithm, however, to have full control over our parameters, we did not use this method. 
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factorial experiment design. The exact number of scenarios presented to 
the respondents—and which scenarios (also called “runs”)—depends on: 
the number of dimensions selected, the number of levels in each 
dimension, the type of conjoint experiment conducted (e.g., ratings-based 
conjoint, discrete choice-based conjoint, adaptive choice-based conjoint, 
hybrid types, etc.), and the type132 of statistical analysis the research wishes 
to run on the data (Elrod, Louviere, & Davey, 1992). There are multiple 
experiment designs available, which can be adapted to each studies’ needs, 
however, an orthogonal design is ideal. This ensures parsimony (only the 
scenarios statistically required to make a prediction about the respondents’ 
decision-making), zero covariance between dimensions, and balance (each 
dimension level is expressed with levels of other dimensions an equal 
number of times). To select which scenarios to include in our study we 
followed the recommendation to consult catalogs of orthogonal designs 
(also called an “atlas”), and selected an experimental plan from the Hahn 
and Shapiro (1966) catalog (Green & Srinivasan, 1990; Rao, 2014). 
Following the conjoint method, we thereby address the second 
critique of empirical decision-making research—survivorship bias 
(Denrell, 2005). Our fractional-factorial design, based on an established 
experimental design (Hahn & Shapiro, 1966) is balanced, meaning that the 
16 scenarios viewed by the participants expressed each dimension in its 
“high” form and its “low” form an equal number of times, including 
scenarios which were all “high” or all “low.” This is important because it 
means attractive scenarios and unattractive scenarios were presented in 
equal measure, allowing us to observe decision-making in situations which 
may be less likely to “survive” long enough to be observed in other 
research settings, thereby avoiding survivorship bias.  
Third, our experimental design allows us to infer causation between 
investment proposal attribute variation and respondent decision-making. 
First of all, our experimental design allowed us to control for each 
dimension’s main effects in estimating each respondent’s overall 
attractiveness assessment (for all hypothetical investment decisions) (Rao, 
2014). Secondly, by using a within-subject/repeated measures design, we 
are able to isolate and observe the direct effect of each dimension on 
decision-makers’ investment proposal assessments. To eliminate scenario-
order effects from our design, we programed our software to randomize the 
order in which the investment proposals appeared (Chrzan, 1994; Rao, 
2014). 
Fourth, while we were not able to re-create the full investor-
entrepreneur relationship in each of our scenarios, we went to great lengths 
to increase the ecological validity of our scenarios, as recommended by 
Rao (2014). We conducted extensive fieldwork prior to designing our 
investment decision scenarios across a number of different firms and 
                                                                        
132 Key to making this decision is determining the number of interactions the researcher wishes to run between the dimensions. 
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industries (45 semi-structured interviews with investors, entrepreneurs and 
other informants, with an average duration of 41 minutes), in order to 
determine the venture attributes considered to be key to an investment 
decision (required for the effectiveness of the method) (Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1999). This process, for example, led us to add venture 
valuation, an ecological validity-enhancing detail which was not 
highlighted in the literature. Moreover, we believe we strike a balance 
between achieving ecological validity and conducting the assessment 
exercises in a consistent, abstracted way, allowing us to increase our 
external validity. 
For example, 95% of the exercises were conducted by the first 
author,133 wherein each respondent was introduced to the assessment 
exercise and the first three investment proposals in the same way. I 
presented respondents with written instructions on my touch-screen laptop 
and walked them through each point. I said “in this section, please imagine 
that you are reviewing information on venture investment proposals 
compiled by a trusted source”; “you can assume all of the ventures in this 
exercise are exactly the same in every way, and would fit in well in the 
context of your own investment activities and the current economic 
environment”; “specifically, the ventures in the investment proposals are 
from a trusted source, have reputable co-investors (if you need them), there 
are no conflicts of interest with your current portfolio”; “all the ventures 
are in an appropriate location and have appropriate risk levels”; “however, 
the ventures will vary across these six attributes” [scroll to display all six 
attributes and levels]; “each of these attributes will be expressed along two 
levels, only, for example, ‘low’ and ‘high’ or ‘weak’ and ‘strong’”; “after 
viewing each proposal, we will ask you to rate it according to its 
attractiveness from ‘extremely low’ to ‘extremely high’”; “here is an 
example of what a proposal will look like”; “here is the first assessment 
exercise.” It took participants as little as 25 minutes to complete both the 
assessment exercise (22 proposal assessments [including 6 replications]) 
and the pre- and post- assessment questionnaires (45 minutes on average). 
However, one respondent, wishing to elaborate on each aspect of his 
decision-making spent 2 hours with the first author. 
Next, we also tested our respondents for internal consistency 
(reliability) by including replications of six of the 16 scenarios in the 
assessment exercise without the respondents’ knowledge (in total we 
presented 22 scenarios, plus 1 practice scenario at the beginning [excluded 
from analysis]). The original scenarios were located at the beginning of the 
exercise and the replicated scenarios at the end. Our overall sample had a 
mean-test-retest reliability of .91; our lowest value of 0.56 is still above the 
0.30 threshold used in a recent study (Shepherd et al., 2013). 
                                                                        
133 Five percent of our sample opted to complete our survey on their own using the online portal. 
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Finally we also conducted numerous manipulation tests to determine 
whether our respondents understood the nature of the exercise and the 
content of the cues. We asked respondents to comment on their experience 
following the assessment exercise, and asked them, following the exercise 
to rate the extent that each venture attribute was important to them on a 
Likert scale (1 = “Extremely unimportant”, 7 = “Extremely important”), 
 
Sample 
Our sampling frame included individuals who directly financed 
young, privately-owned (i.e., unlisted), revenue-generating organizations 
addressing explicit or implicit social missions (e.g., venture capitalists, 
impact investors, foundations, etc.). Given the elusiveness of this 
population, we relied on personal relationships and warm introductions 
from the study participants and other mutual contacts to access this 
population (Orme, 2006). Respondents were first- or second-degree 
contacts of this author, attendees of social business and technology startup 
events (European Venture Philanthropy Association 2017, Global Impact 
Investing Network Investor Forum 2016, Hello Tomorrow Conference - 
Paris 2017, Sandbox Network Summit 2017, Slush - Helsinki 2017, 
TechCrunch Berlin 2017), or participants of Swiss social entrepreneurship 
or technology startup networks , such as the >>venture>> competition 
(third-degree contacts of this author).  
We contacted the respondents and their contacts, in-person, by 
email, LinkedIn and Facebook over a 3-month period, explaining the 
purpose of the study and asking whether they—or someone they knew—
would be interested in participating in the study. Although we relied on 
online survey software to administer the questionnaires and assessment 
exercise, to increase participation, maintain respondent interest, and ensure 
high reliability (Rao, 2014), 95% of respondents participated in our 
assessment exercise in-person, or, by video-conference with screen-sharing 
with the first author. Respondents who agreed to participate, but did not set 
an appointment were re-contacted by email or LinkedIn every 2 weeks. 
Unresponsive individuals were thereafter re-contacted by email every 3 
weeks. Respondents were assured that their responses would be fully-
anonymized. In return for their voluntary participation, we offered the 
respondents the possibility of receiving a report of their decision-making 
preferences, an executive summary of this study, and public 
acknowledgement on the website of the first author’s research group.  
Out of 270 decision-makers contacted, 70 did not respond, 182 
agreed to participate (67%), 160 began the questionnaire (59%), and 154 
completed it within our data collection timeframe, resulting in a 57% 
response rate, and a sample which meets the guidelines for a robust 
analysis (Orme, 2006). For reference, a recent conjoint analysis published 
in the Academy of Management Journal was based on 83 respondents. A 
 
275 
review of conjoint analyses published in top journals between 1999 and 
2009 indicates a range of 31-300 respondents (mean = 82). 
 Five respondents completed part of the assessment exercise and 
post-assessment questionnaire independently due to technical or scheduling 
issues, while eight respondents (5%) preferred to complete the entire 
exercise independently. Twelve people refused to participate citing lack-of-
fit (not involved in screening decisions, not investing anymore), lack of 
time (deadlines, travels), or the length of the survey. One of these 12 
people referred us to his colleague instead. At the end of our data collection 
period, we cancelled upcoming interviews (10%) and stopped following up 
with unresponsive individuals. We tested for differences in reliability 
between early and late respondents, and between respondents who were 
walked through the survey versus those who completed it independently, 
and found that they were insignificant (p = .171, p =.592, respectively). 
Moreover, social desirability bias which may have occurred during our 
walkthroughs did not have a significant effect on any of our measures for 
mindset orientation (p > .05). 
The respondents’ average age was 37 (s.d.= 10) and 30 percent of 
the sample were women. In our sample, 65 percent held a master’s degree 
or higher; 51 percent studied business management; 39 studied finance, 
accounting or economics; 27 percent studied science and technology; and 
31 percent studied humanities, or another field (note: our respondents may 
have had more than one specialization). On average, respondents had 9 
years of managerial working in investment (s.d. = 8.4); 4 years of 
experience working in the social sector (s.d. = 5.3) and 8 years of 
experience in investment (e.g., finance, banking, public or private markets) 
(s.d. = 6.8). 69 percent of our respondents had entrepreneurial experience 
(mean = 6, s.d. = 7.2), as well. 70 percent of our sample’s investment 
activity was based primarily in Europe, although their investment activities 
were usually not limited to a single continent. Our sample was comprised 
of 31 independent investors (20%), and 123 decision-makers representing a 
fund (80%). The average firm in our sample was 13 years old (s.d. = 27.2) 
and had 20 investment professionals (s.d. = 42.1). The range of industries 
of interest to our respondents included software, hardware, medical devices 
and consumer products, with the majority of respondents citing no area of 
specialization (83%). 52 percent of respondents indicated that the priority 
in their investment mandate was to prioritize financial returns, while 40 
percent of respondents said they allocated at least part of their funding 
investments which pursue a social mission mandate and a financial return 
mandate on equal footing. 
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Variables and Measures  
Level 1: Attractiveness of hypothetical investment decision. We 
obtained 22 assessments of investment proposal attractiveness for scenarios 
varying across the following 6 investment proposal attributes (16 original 
profiles and 6 replications): (1) Importance of cause targeted by venture, 
(2) Interdependence of revenue-generating and cause-related activity, and 
(3) Venture valuation, which were the dimensions of theoretical interest to 
this study, and we controlled for (4) Team cause-related experience, (5) 
Team business experience and (6) Ease of measurement of cause-related 
progress (for more details on our level-1 controls, see the controls section 
below). Using 22 attractiveness scores indicated by each respondent for 
each hypothetical investment decision, we calculated the weight which 
each respondent implicitly assigned to each investment proposal attribute, 
which served as our level-1 
variables (e.g., weight assigned 
to attribute 1, to attribute 2, 
etc.). 
We detailed the three 
dimensions of interest for 
respondents at two levels, and 
coded them according to 
standard conjoint practice:  
 (1) Importance of cause 
targeted by the venture was 
high—the venture targets a 
cause of high importance 
(coded .5); or low—the venture 
targets a cause of low 
importance (contrast coded -
.5).  
 (2) Interdependence of 
revenue-generating and cause-
related activity was high—the 
main revenue generating 
activity is highly dependent  on 
the main cause-related activity, 
and vice versa (e.g., cause is 
addressed through primary 
business activity, integrated in 
use of product/service, or its 
production, delivery, and marketing) (coded .5), or low—it is unclear 
whether the success of the main revenue generating activity is dependent 
on the success of the main cause-related activity, and vice versa (e.g., cause 
  
Figure 39: Example of hypothetical investment decision we asked respondents to evaluate  
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is addressed through post-sale donation from venture, or revenue is 
generated through advertisements) (coded -.5).  
(3) Company valuation is low—your participation in this round, 
holding the investment amount constant, will lead to 15% ownership of the 
company (coded .5); or high—your participation in this round, holding the 
investment amount constant, will lead to 7% ownership of the company 
(coded -.5).134  
The following text was presented to each participant on a laptop, and 
read out for the first investment proposal assessment: “please imagine that 
that you are reviewing information on venture investment proposals 
compiled by a trusted source. All of the ventures in these profiles, in 
addition to generating an economic benefit to society, also address a cause 
(e.g., a social, environmental, medical or cultural issue). During your 
review, you come across an investment proposal with the following 
attributes:” The first author then indicated to the respondent that they 
would be reviewing the following proposal. Once they were done reading 
the proposal, the first author pointed to the 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
“Extremely low”, 7 = “Extremely high”), and asked them, “Given these 
attributes, how attractive do you find this investment proposal?” (see also: 
Figure 40). 
Level 2: Decision-maker mindset orientation. To avoid priming our 
respondents before their assessment exercise (Molinsky, Grant, & 
Margolis, 2012; Welsh & Ordonez, 2013), or revealing the identity-related 
focus of our study, which can lead to social desirability bias, we asked 
respondents to respond to mindset-related questions in our post-assessment 
questionnaire. Seeking to capture how decision-makers viewed the world 
and their place in the world, we relied on a validated scale, created to 
measure founder social identity (Sieger et al., 2016). The original scale 
offers 6 items for each social identity: the self-focused identity, other-
focused identity (known others), and, other other-focused identity 
(unknown others). Because of the prevailing norm among investors that 
focusing investment activities in your friends’ companies is bad (Gompers, 
Mukharlyamov, & Xuan, 2012), we focused only on items for the self-
focused identity (Darwinian), and, the unknown-others-focused identity 
(Missionary). Because the key constructs of this social identity scale are 
social motivation, frame of reference and basis for self-evaluation, we felt 
confident using this scale to capture the key constructs present in the 
literature on social and commercial mindsets across social psychology and 
institutional theory, namely, the constructs of motivation (e.g., goal, 
mission), relevant actors (i.e., relevant actors, frame of reference, target 
                                                                        
134 We coded low company valuation as .5 (rather than -.5), because, as per our theoretical development, lower company valuation, 
holding other venture attributes constant, indicates higher investment value, an attractive feature (hence, coded positively). Moreover, 
we use a plausible range of ownership share for our target respondents as a proxy for valuation in a denomination, to avoid having to 
factor in factors such as, currency risk (an evaluation criterion for investment funds investing in emerging markets) or valuation 
differences between investment ecosystems.  
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client population), and legitimizing activities (i.e., values, guidelines for 
self-evaluation, rules of engagement). 
 For each social identity, the items captured the extent to which 
participants agreed with statements related to why they invest (basic social 
motivation), what is very important to them as an investor (basis for self-
evaluation), and what is important to them when managing their 
investment practice (frame of reference). We used a balanced 7-point 
Likert scale to capture their sentiments (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = 
“strong agree”). We adapted the items by changing the statements to the 
present tense (our participants were already decision-makers, not in the 
process of becoming decision-makers), and replacing terms like “create my 
firm,” “firm,” and “firm founder” with “invest,” “investment practice,” and 
“investor”. When discussing with the creators of the social identity scale, 
we decided to incorporate an additional item into the commercial mindset’s 
social motivation measures from the authors’ updated, expanded version 
(see Appendix). We ran our analyses with the original 18-item scale and 
our 19-item scale and did not find any substantial differences. The scale 
was internally reliable (Cronbach’s alpha =.74 [commercial mindset], and 
=.81 [social mindset]). 
For our moderating variables, we created three dummy variables 
indicating if a mindset was socially-dominant hybrid, commercially-
dominant hybrid or a general hybrid. These variables were calculated using 
the decision-makers’ mean item scores for their self-focused identity and 
their unknown-other-focused identity (separate measures, continuous 
variables). If decision-maker’s unknown-other-focused identity score was 
greater than 4 (out of 7), we considered them to be socially-dominant 
hybrids, assigning them a value of one. To further increase the robustness 
of this measure, we replaced this value with zero if the difference between 
 
 Figure 40: Sources of data for constructs in theoretical model 
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the unknown-other-focused identity score and the self-focused identity 
score was .5 or less (as this would have indicated a high level of hybridity). 
If a decision-maker’s self-focused identity score was greater than 4 (out of 
7), we considered them to be commercially-dominant hybrids, assigning 
them a value of one. Similarly, to further increase the robustness of this 
measure, we replaced this value with zero if the difference between the 
unknown-other-focused identity score and the self-focused identity score 
was .5 or less (as this would have indicated a high level of hybridity). We 
also created a dummy to indicate that the decision-maker had a general 
hybrid mindset. In this case, we assigned this dummy a value of one if the 
difference between their mean item scores for their self-focused identity 
and their unknown-other-focused identity was less than 2. 
Control variables. In our analysis, we introduced a number of 
individual-level and firm-level controls, including: gender, years of 
investment experience, geography, type of firm and decision-makers’ 
resources. We controlled for gender due to known differences towards risk-
taking (Powell & Ansic, 1997). We control for years of investment 
experience because experience can affect decision-making (Franke, 
Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008; Patzelt, zu Knyphausen-Aufess, & 
Fischer, 2009; Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003). To control for 
cultural factors (Han & Shavitt, 1994; Harb & Smith, 2008) and other 
institutional factors (Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Li, Vertinsky, & Li, 2014; 
Nofsinger & Wang, 2011), we control for geography and firm type (more 
details to follow). Finally, because past studies have tended to control for 
firm size due to the variation in access to resources, and because our 
population of interest increasingly relies on distributed teams, contractors, 
or firm affiliates which are not technically employed by the fund, we chose 
to control for the resources that decision-makers directly have on hand, via 
the mean investment amount (also called “ticket size”). 
Given that these are common topics usually present in the decision-
maker’s investment context, we felt comfortable collecting the following 
control variables in the pre-assessment questionnaire: their gender (0 = 
female, 1 = male), years of investment experience, country in which they 
or their firm (if applicable) was based (0 = non-European base, 1 = 
European base), and their usual ticket size. To increase respondents’ 
willingness to share financial figures with us, avoid social desirability bias, 
and better capture the range of ticket sizes deployed by decision-makers, 
we avoided directly asking respondents their ticket size. Instead, we asked 
respondents to indicate, on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “never,” 7 = “almost 
always”), how frequently their investment tickets have fallen within the 
following buckets (all amounts in Euros): “Under 15,000”; ‘15,001-
50,000”; “50,001-300,000”; “300,001-1,000,000”; “1,000,001-5,000,000; 
5,000,001-7,000,000. We then matched the decision-maker’s highest rating 
(e.g., 6 = “very often”) to the appropriate bucket, took the middle point of 
that range as the average ticket size, and divided by 1,000. In the case that 
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respondents indicated the same highest rating across multiple buckets, we 
took the average of each of the buckets indicated and divided by 1,000. 
Four out of 154 respondents indicated equal levels of engagements in both 
European and non-European locations. Given that they did cover European 
areas, we coded these four respondents as European-based (the other 
respondents had their base or headquarters wholly in or out of European 
countries). To control for the different social expectations and financial 
expectations decision-makers may feel due to financial instruments used or 
the source of their investment capital (e.g., donors or investors), we created 
a dummy variable indicating respondents who responded to our survey as a 
representative of a VC, micro VC, or Private Equity firm (0 = all 
others/non-VC-type firm, 1 = VC-type-firm). 
In this study we focused on three investment proposal attributes 
because of their general relevance and salience to the three mindsets under 
investigation. However, we also control for the respondents’ evaluations 
for the following venture attributes at level 1, described to the respondents 
in the following ways:  
(1) Founding team experience with targeted cause was strong—
Founding team has strong experience with the cause they are trying to 
address (coded .5); or weak—Founding team has weak experience with the 
cause they are trying to address (contrast coded -.5).  
(2) Founding team business experience was strong—Founding team 
has strong business experience (coded .5); or weak—Founding team has 
weak business experience (coded -.5).  
(3) Ease of measurement of cause-related progress was easy to 
measure—The venture’s approach towards addressing their cause makes it 
easy to measure and monitor their contribution towards it (coded .5); or 
difficult to measure—The venture’s approach towards addressing their 
cause makes it difficult to measure and monitor their contribution towards 
it (coded -.5).  
Analysis and Results 
154 respondents evaluating 22 proposals yielded 3,388 observations 
on Level 1 (investment proposal assessment) and 154 observations on 
Level 2 (individual attributes). Because one level of our data (the 
assessment) is nested within a second level (the individual), we estimate 
our model using Restricted Maximum Likelihood in our Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling software to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity which can result from using multiple ratings from the 
same user (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). As per the recommendation for 
studying the impact of a Level-2 predictor on a Level-1 outcome, we 
centered Level-1 variables (weight assigned to attribute 1, 2, etc.) around 
the group mean, and added Level-2 variables as a raw metric, uncentered 
(Enders & Tofighi, 2007: 132–134; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998: 636–637).  
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 Table 39 displays the mean, standard deviations and correlations of 
the individual-level variables (i.e., Level 2; given the orthogonal design, 
there is zero correlation among Level-1 variables). Most of the correlations 
are low (under |0.4|). Given some significant correlations, we calculated the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and the conditions statistics. The highest 
VIF is below the suggested threshold of 10.0, at 1.77 (mean = 1.27 
(Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004), and the condition index is below the 
suggested threshold of 30.0 (Belsley, 1991), at 11.1. 
In Table 40, we report the results of our analysis. Row 1 indicates 
the intercept for each model. In rows 2-6 we report the main effects of 
Level-2 controls (individual level variables) on decision-makers’ 
evaluations of investment decisions. In rows 7-9, we do the same for the 
main effects of Level-1 controls (investment proposal attributes). In rows 
10-12, we report the main effects of our three mindsets of interests on 
decision-makers’ evaluations of investment decisions, followed by the 
main effects of our proposal attributes of interest—extent of venture’s 
social mission, hybridity of revenue model, and investment value—in rows 
13-15. In the last section, rows 16-24, we report the moderating effects of 
the mindset orientations on the relationship between the attributes of 
interest and the overall investment decision evaluation. In Model 1 and 
Model 2, the coefficients for all six venture attributes (rows 7-9 and 13-15) 
are positive and significant (p < .001), indicating that all six dimensions 
play a positive, important role in increasing the attractiveness of the 
investment proposal. For the focal attributes, this indicates that a 
significant majority of respondents preferred investment proposals which 
featured ventures which addressed a cause of high importance, had a highly 
interdependent revenue-generating and cause-related activity, and offered 
high investment value, thereby validating our selected dimensions and 
research design. 
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Gendera 0.701 0.459  
      
2. Investment 
experience (years) 
7.760 6.769 0.1639*    
   
3. Average ticket size 
(1000s of Euros) 
1523 2023 0.0548 -0.0114   
   
4. Firm Typeb 0.383 0.488 0.0182 -0.0709 0.284***     
5. European-basedc 0.734 0.443 0.1205 0.1027 0.0498 -0.1297    
6. Commercially-
dominant mindsetd 
0.195 0.397 0.0702 0.0758 0.332*** 0.1183 -0.0005   
7. Socially dominant 
mindsete  
0.584 .494 0.0254 -0.03 -0.1768* -0.1756* -0.0012 -0.58***  
8. Hybrid mindsetf 0.727 0.447 -0.0811 -0.0175 -0.0066 -0.0273 0.027 0.0067 -0.28*** 
n = 154 (socially-dominant = 90, commercially-dominant = 30, hybrid = 112) 
Note: a1=male, 0=female; b1=VC, micro VC or Private Equity Firm, 0 = Other firms, or no firm; c1=Base in Europe, 0=Base outside 
Europe; d1=commercially-dominant, 0=not commercially-dominant; e1=socially-dominant, 0=not socially-dominant; f1=hybrid, 
0=not hybrid; *p < .05, **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Table 39: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Level 2 Variables 
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In Model 3, with regards to the moderating impact of individual 
mindsets on the relationship between the extent of a venture’s social 
mission and the evaluation of the investment decision, we find the 
following: Providing partial support for Hypothesis 1a, simple slope 
analyses indicated that the relation between the venture attribute and the 
overall evaluation of the investment decision is positive and statistically 
significant from zero for individuals with socially-dominant mindsets, but 
not for hybrid mindsets, or commercially-dominant mindsets, as indicated 
in rows 16-18. As illustrated in Figure 41, this indicates that as the extent 
of the social mission increases, so does the attractiveness of the evaluation 
of the investment decision, however, it does so more for individuals with a 
socially-dominant mindset, than for individuals without a socially-
dominant mindset. This lends partial support for Hypothesis 1b, which 
proposes that individuals with socially-dominant mindsets would be most 
affected (i.e., the slope would be most positive) by a change in the 
venture’s social mission from low to high. 
 
 
Figure 41: Interaction effect of mindset dominance on the extent of a venture's social mission 
Hypothesis 1b further postulates that when mindsets are socially-
dominant, the slope generated for the relationship between the extent of the 
venture’s social mission and the evaluation of the investment decision 
would be significantly different (i.e., more positive) from the slope created 
when mindsets are hybrid. Furthermore, when mindsets are hybrid, 
Hypothesis 1b indicates that the slope generated for the same relationship 
will be significantly different (i.e., more positive) from the slope created 
when mindsets are commercially-dominant (i.e., socially-dominant slope > 
hybrid > commercially-dominant slope).  
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In support of the Hypothesis 1b, results of a multivariate slope test 
showed that when mindsets are socially-dominant, the slope for the 
relationship between the extent of the venture’s social mission and the 
evaluation of the investment decision was in fact statistically significantly 
more positive than the slope created when mindsets were hybrid (x2 [2] = 
23.35, p < .001), as indicated in Table 41.135 Also in support of the 
Hypothesis 1b, results of a multivariate slope test showed that when 
mindsets are socially-dominant, the slope for this relationship was in fact 
statistically significantly more positive than the slope created when 
mindsets were commercially-dominant (x2 [2] = 15.08, p < .001). However, 
failing to support Hypothesis 1b, no statistically significant difference 
emerged between the slope when mindsets were hybrid, and the slope 
when mindsets were commercially-dominant. Thus, we validate that there 
is a more positive relationship (regarding the venture’s social mission and 
investment evaluation) when mindsets are socially-dominant versus when 
mindsets are hybrid or commercially-dominant, but we cannot validate that 
there is a more positive relationship (regarding the venture’s social mission 
and investment evaluation) when mindsets are hybrid versus when 
mindsets are commercially-dominant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was only 
partially supported. We illustrate these slopes in Figure 42. 
  
 
Figure 42: Interaction effect of mindset dominance and hybridity on the extent of a venture's social mission 
With regards to the moderating impact of individual mindsets on the 
relationship between the hybridity of a venture’s revenue model and the 
evaluation of the investment decision, we find the following: Providing 
partial support for Hypothesis 2a, simple slope analyses indicated that the 
relation between the venture attribute and the overall evaluation of the 
                                                                        
135 We used the multivariate Wald Chi-Squared Test provided by Raudenbush and colleagues (2011), which follows Agresti’s (2003) 
recommendation based on larger sample sizes. We compared the x2 critical values based on p value and degrees of freedom cut-offs 
using Piegorsch’s (2002) table. 
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investment decision is positive and statistically significant from zero for 
individuals with socially-dominant mindsets, but not for hybrid mindsets or 
commercially-dominant mindsets (see rows 19-21 of Table 40). We 
illustrate these slopes in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43: Interaction effect of mindset dominance on the hybridity of a venture’s revenue model 
 
Hypothesis 2b postulates that when mindsets are hybrid, the slope 
generated for the relationship between the extent of the hybridity of a 
venture’s revenue model and the evaluation of the investment decision 
would be significantly different (i.e., more positive) from the slope created 
when mindsets are socially-dominant. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 indicates 
that when mindsets are socially-dominant, the slope generated for the same 
relationship would be significantly different (i.e., more positive) from the 
slope created when mindsets are commercially-dominant (i.e., hybrid 
mindset slope > socially-dominant > commercially-dominant slope). 
In support of Hypothesis 2b, results of a multivariate slope test 
showed that when mindsets are commercially-dominant, the slope 
explaining the relationship between the hybridity of a venture’s revenue 
model and the evaluation of the investment decision was in fact statistically 
significantly more positive than the slope created when mindsets were 
socially-dominant dominant (x2 [2] = 20.21, p < .001). 
However, challenging Hypothesis 2b, results of a multivariate slope 
test showed that when mindsets are socially-dominant, the slope for this 
relationship was in fact statistically significantly more positive than the 
slope created when mindsets were hybrid (x2 [2] = 25.73, p < .001), 
indicating that individuals who are socially-dominant will care more that a 
venture has a reinforcing business model (versus a traditional parallel set of 
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activities) than individuals with hybrid mindsets. While we had argued that 
socially-dominant decision-makers would place less emphasis on hybrid 
revenue models (compared to generally hybrid mindsets), evidence 
suggests that the contrary could be true.  
Next, failing to support Hypothesis 2b, no statistically significant 
difference emerged between the slope when mindsets were hybrid and the 
slope when mindsets were commercially-dominant. Thus, we validate that 
there is a more positive relationship (regarding the hybridity of the 
venture’s revenue model and investment evaluation) when mindsets are 
socially-dominant versus when mindsets are commercially-dominant, but 
we challenge the hypothesis that there is a more positive relationship 
(regarding the hybridity of the venture’s revenue model and investment 
evaluation) when mindsets are hybrid versus when mindsets are socially-
dominant. Thus, Hypothesis 2b was also only partially supported. These 
slopes are displayed in Figure 44. 
 
 
Figure 44: Interaction effect of mindset dominance and hybridity on the hybridity of a venture's revenue model 
Finally, with regards to the moderating impact of individual 
mindsets on the relationship between the commercial investment value and 
the evaluation of the investment decision, we find, from simple slope 
analyses, that the relation between the venture attribute and the overall 
evaluation of the investment decision is not statistically significant from 
zero for all three mindsets tested, failing to support Hypothesis 3a.  
Hypothesis 3b postulates that slopes generated for the relationship 
between the commercial investment value and the evaluation of the 
investment decision when individuals possess different mindsets will be 
statistically different from each other (i.e., commercially-dominant slope > 
hybrid > socially-dominant slope). As indicated in Table 44, results of a 
multivariate slope test showed that when mindsets are hybrid, the slope for 
the commercial investment value and the evaluation of the investment 
decision was in fact statistically significantly more positive than the slope 
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created when mindsets were socially-dominant (x2 [2] = 19.81, p < .001). 
The other relationships between slopes were not statistically significant. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3b is partially supported. For reference, we display these 
slopes in Figure 45.  
 
 
Figure 45: Interaction effect of mindset dominance and hybridity on the hybridity of a venture's revenue model 
 
Robustness of Results 
In this study we investigate the moderating relationship of 
individual-level attributes on venture attributes and the evaluation of 
investment decisions, because of the implications that decisions have for 
strategy, defined as “a pattern in a stream of decisions,” as per Mintzberg 
and Waters (1985: 257). As a robustness test we investigate the behavioral 
implications of decision-maker mindsets, focusing on the mindset effects 
relative to each other.  
Mindset orientation and fund allocation. We begin with our results 
for Hypothesis 1b, which proposes that individuals with socially-dominant 
mindsets would be most affected (i.e., the slope would be most positive) by 
a change in the venture’s social mission, from low to high, followed by 
individuals with hybrid mindsets, and individuals with commercially-
dominant mindsets. Our results provided evidence partially supporting this 
hypothesis: a more positive relationship (regarding the venture’s social 
mission and investment evaluation) when mindsets are socially-dominant 
versus when mindsets are hybrid or commercially-dominant. 
As a robustness test of the behavioral implications of the 
relationships moderated by the commercial and social mindsets, we would 
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expect to find (1a robust) a negative relationship between decision-makers’ 
commercial mindset and allocation to investments which address a social 
cause, and (1b robust) a positive relationship between decision-makers’ 
social mindset and allocation to investments which address a social cause. 
We used decision-makers’ mean item scores for their self-focused identity 
and their unknown-other-focused identity (continuous variables), and using 
data from our post-assessment questionnaire, we constructed a variable 
(invcause) to indicate what proportion of their portfolio addressed a social 
or an environmental cause. We asked respondents to indicate how 
frequently their portfolio ventures explicitly sought to address the 13 
following areas: health and well-being, environmental issues, community 
and social cohesion, economic development, economic inequality, 
unemployment, poverty, education, gender issues, public infrastructure, 
humanitarian aid, security and peace-building, visual and performing 
arts—on a scale of 1-7 (1 = “Never,” 7 = “Almost always”).136 We took the 
sum of their score and divided by 13. Controlling for gender, geography, 
years of investment experience, and average ticket size, our linear 
regression model (n = 154, r2 = .36) indicated a negative relationship 
between commercial mindsets and allocation to investments which 
prioritized societal returns (β = -.16, t[7] = -2.17, p < .05), and a positive 
relationship between social mindsets and fund allocations to investments 
which prioritized societal returns (β = .63, t[7] = 8.63, p < .001). We ran 
the same model including our measure of hybridity, and did not find a 
significant finding (p > .05). However, the role of mindset orientation in 
explaining the emphasis placed on the importance of cause targeted by 
venture is largely robust to actual cause-related investment allocation. 
Regarding Hypothesis 2b, our results provided conflicting evidence 
supporting this hypothesis: a more positive relationship (regarding the 
hybridity of the venture’s revenue model and investment evaluation) when 
mindsets are socially-dominant versus when mindsets are commercially-
dominant (supporting our hypothesis). However, we also found that the 
relationship between the hybridity of the venture’s revenue model and 
investment evaluation, was also more positive than the same relationship 
when mindsets are hybrid (challenging our hypothesis). If the former 
confirmatory result is correct, we would expect to find (2a robust) a 
positive relationship between the extent of social dominance in an 
individual’s mindset and allocation to investments which deliver both a 
social return and a financial return, and (2b robust) a negative relationship 
between the extent of commercial dominance in an individual’s mindset 
and allocation to investments which deliver both a social return and a 
financial return. We test the behavioral implications of our original 
hypothesis using decision-makers’ mean item scores for their unknown-
                                                                        
136 These sectors are inspired by the social sector classification proposed by Salamon and Anheier (1996) and the European Venture 
Philanthropy Association (2016) industry survey. 
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other-focused identity, as well as, data from our post-assessment 
questionnaire on the percentage breakdown of capital each decision-maker 
has allocated to investments which sought to deliver both a social return 
and a financial return (see mandate [3] in the following question): “Please 
indicate percentage of funds allocated to the following mandates: (1) 
allowing societal returns only, no financial return possible, (2) societal 
returns are a priority, and financial returns are accepted, (3) societal return 
and financial return are on an equal footing, (4) financial returns are a 
priority, and societal returns are actively sought out, and (5) financial 
returns are a priority, and societal returns are accepted.”   
Using the same controls, our linear regression model (n = 151, r2 = 
.28) indicated a positive relationship between the extent of social 
dominance in an individual’s mindset and allocation to investments which 
deliver both a social return and a financial return (β = 5.24, t[7] = 2.38, p < 
.05) (2a robust). We also find a negative relationship between the extent of 
commercial dominance in an individual’s mindset and allocation to 
investments which deliver both a social return and a financial return (β = -
10.14, t[7] = -4.48, p < .001). We ran the same model including our 
measure of hybridity and it did not yield a significant finding (p > .1). 
Thus, the role of mindset orientation in explaining the emphasis placed on 
the interdependence of revenue-generating and cause-related activity is 
robust with respect to actual investment allocation. 
Mindset orientation and board representation. We turn to 
Hypothesis 3b, which proposes that individuals with commercially-
dominant mindsets would be most affected (i.e., the slope would be most 
positive) by a change in the venture’s investment value, from low to high, 
followed by individuals with hybrid mindsets, and individuals with 
socially-dominant mindsets. Our results provided evidence partially 
supporting this hypothesis: a more positive relationship (regarding the 
venture’s commercial investment value and attractiveness of investment 
decision) when mindsets are hybrid versus when mindsets are socially-
dominant. 
Given the role of control rights (e.g., voting rights), purchase options 
and other investment terms in negotiating a venture’s valuation, and 
knowing that investors are willing to accept less control in exchange for a 
more attractive venture valuation (Bowden, 1994; Feld & Mendelson, 
2016), we use board seat representation as a proxy for our venture attribute 
related to investment value. As a robustness test of the behavioral 
implications of our confirmed findings, we would expect to find (3 robust) 
a positive relationship between the general hybridity of a decision makers’ 
mindset and high levels of control in their investments. We test this 
relationship between mindset hybridity and terms of control, by using our 
measure for hybridity and data about board representation from our pre-
assessment questionnaire. In this section, we asked respondents to indicate 
on a 7-point Likert scale how frequently they have, in the past, taken a 
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board seat in their venture investments (1 = “Never,” 7 = “Almost 
always”). We create a dummy variable, where board = 1 if respondents 
indicated 4 (“Sometimes”) or above. Controlling for gender, geography, 
years of investment experience, and investment size, our linear regression 
model (n = 154, r2 = .23) indicated a positive relationship between 
decision-maker hybridity and board seat representation in past investments 
(β = .15, t[7] = 2.11, p < .05). In the same model, we do not find significant 
findings for the social or commercial dominance of decision-makers’ 
mindsets. Thus, our previous findings are largely consistent with actual 
decision-making behavior. 
 
Discussion  
In this study we developed a theoretical framework to understand 
how individual mindsets influence the moderating effect of social, 
commercial and hybrid attributes on the overall attractiveness individuals 
assign to a strategic decision. We tested this model in the context of 
investment decision-making.  
Although we do not find significant findings for the influence of 
commercially-dominant mindsets and hybrid mindsets on the relationship 
between social, commercial and hybrid attributes and the overall 
attractiveness individuals assign to a strategic decision, we observed strong 
significant results for the socially-dominant mindsets on the relationship 
between social, commercial and hybrid attributes and the overall 
attractiveness individuals assign to a strategic decision. Moreover, we 
observed a significant difference between the slopes of five pairs of 
mindsets. Four out of the five are consistent with our reasoning and have 
several implications.  
Turning first to our findings on the role of mindsets in influencing 
the evaluation of a social venture attribute, we found a statistically 
significantly more positive relationship (between the extent of the 
venture’s social mission and its overall investment evaluation) when 
mindsets are socially-dominant versus when mindsets are hybrid or 
commercially-dominant. This finding adds to the “growing evidence 
suggest[ing] that social motivation not only affects the strategic choices 
people make, and the individual and collective gains they achieve, but also 
the more fundamental information […] processing activities they engage 
in” (De Dreu et al., 2008: 33).  By offering evidence on how social 
orientation within individual mindsets systematically shapes investment 
decisions related to hybridity, through the specific venture attributes, this 
study responds to calls to investigate the role of social orientation in 
decision-making (Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2015).  
Turning next to our findings on the relationship between the 
hybridity of a venture’s revenue model and its overall investment 
evaluation, we found a statistically significantly more positive relationship 
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in this case when mindsets are socially-dominant versus when mindsets are 
hybrid or commercially-dominant. This contradicts our hypothesis, which 
argued that the relationship between the hybridity of a venture’s revenue 
model and its overall investment evaluation, would be more positive 
relationship for hybrid mindsets, due to the hybrid revenue model being a 
“critical” venture attribute from the perspective of individuals with hybrid 
mindsets. However, an alternative explanation could be that we have 
mischaracterized what should happen when decision-makers have hybrid 
mindsets. For example, individuals with social mindsets would accept 
revenue in order to support their social cause; and individuals with 
commercial mindsets would accept cause-related activities in order to 
support their commercial mission. However, individuals with hybrid 
mindsets may not expect joint outcomes in the way that individuals with 
social mindsets and commercial mindsets do. Due to their comfort in both 
domains, hybridity in revenue models is not a deal breaker, as we argued, 
because to individuals with hybrid mindsets, social-dominant outcomes are 
as acceptable as commercial-dominant outcomes.  
Like bicultural individuals (Smith & Tracey, 2016; Tadmor & 
Tetlock, 2006; Wry & York, 2017), hybrid individuals are attempting to 
reconcile demands of their local context with their individual disposition. 
Rather than being the combination of both extremes of preferences 
between social and commercial mindsets, perhaps they are more of the 
“average.” A more suitable metaphor may be hybrid mindsets as 
chameleons; more contextually grounded, intuitively blending in, working 
with whichever adequate venture opportunity comes along. This finding 
seriously challenges how the literature has conceptualized hybrid 
preferences. 
Finally, regarding the relationship between a venture’s commercial 
investment value and the overall attractiveness of the investment decision, 
this study found that when mindsets are hybrid, the slope for the 
commercial investment value and the evaluation of the investment decision 
was in fact significantly more positive than the slope created when 
mindsets were socially-dominant. While this is partially consistent with our 
findings, we miss the full picture due to the lack of significant findings on 
the relationship between the slope of the effect of a venture’s commercial 
investment value and the overall attractiveness of the investment decision 
when mindsets are hybrid versus when mindsets are commercially-
dominant. If the order of positivity of the slopes is commercially-dominant 
> hybrid > socially-dominant, then this would fully support our reasoning, 
however, perhaps the order of positivity of the slopes is hybrid > 
commercially-dominant > socially-dominant. We discuss this possibility in 
the next section on limitations.  
What these results tell us is that that differences in the attractiveness 
of investment decisions is significantly affected by, not the proposal itself 
(since all respondents received the same set of hypothetical investment 
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decisions), but the goals, frames of reference and values held by individual 
decision-makers. Next, while the social investing literature offers rich 
insights into the behavior of social investment firms, we extend this 
research by investigating data on investment decisions made by individuals 
in those firm. The importance of individual-level attributes suggests that 
tensions associated with hybrid organizing may not be due to the quality of 
hybridity within an organization itself, but rather, the recruitment and 
assignment of specific individuals to specific roles within the 
organizations.  
 Finally, although organizations which combine social welfare and 
commercial mindsets have been of great interest to a large number of 
research streams (Battilana et al., 2017), individual-level and 
organizational-level research have largely developed in parallel to each 
other (for rare exceptions, see: Almandoz, 2012; Tracey et al., 2011). By 
drawing on research on mindsets and employing methods from an 
established individual-level theory to measure individual commercial and 
social orientation (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Sieger et al., 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we join other scholars in 
building a bridge between individual-level attributes and organizational 
outcomes.  
 
Limitations and future research 
  In the real world, there are not two types of one-dimensional people 
[one that wants to maximize profits and one that wants to create 
social benefits and do good things for people and the planet.]  
Instead, there is only one type of person: people with two, three, four, or 
many interests and goals, which they pursue with varying and ever-
changing degrees of interest. 
— Mohammed Yunus (2007)137 
 
While the hybrid organizing literature offers rich insights into the 
behavior of social-commercial hybrid firms, and how managers embedded 
in these firms can shape organizational processes which maintain or break 
down hybridity in organizations over time, because the majority of this 
research does not provide counterfactuals, it is unclear to which extent the 
behavior of these individuals is driven by the organizational context or the 
individual’s own mindset. In this study, we presented 154 individuals the 
same 22 investment profiles designed in a simplified way in order to better 
generalize across settings. While we were able to uncover a systematic way 
in which these individual mindsets shape strategic investment decisions 
with regards to rating of social, hybrid and commercial venture attributes, 
                                                                        
137 Quote adapted from Location 519 in the Kindle Edition of Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of 
Capitalism. 
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such experimental, abstracted designs have been criticized for lack of 
ecological validity. As one of our respondents said after reading the 
indicator that one of the venture’s teams had “strong business experience,” 
“I wish it were that easy to tell” (Respondent, Family Office). Hence, an 
opportunity for future research would be to create more ecologically valid 
experimental settings, which could be achieved by drawing on video 
excerpts, audio excerpts, more detailed business plans, as well as by 
narrowing down on one particular attribute, e.g., revenue model, or team, 
so as to make the scenarios more specific and less abstract. 
Our surprising and conflicting results about the role of hybrid and 
commercially-dominant mindsets raise several possibilities for further 
research. One opportunity, which can help determine whether our 
insignificant results were truly null is to conduct another wave of data 
collection for this exercise. Seventy-three percent of our sample were 
classified as general social-commercial hybrids, despite the fact that 52 
percent of our sample indicated that commercial returns were the main 
priority of their firm. While our sample of 73% general hybrids shed light 
on unexpected findings for how individuals with hybrid mindsets operate, 
we might obtain interesting findings by investigating samples with more 
“pure” mindset-types.  
A second opportunity related to the hybridity of decision-makers’ 
mindsets is to explore the mismatch between the individual decision-maker 
and the firm’s objective. Perhaps hybridity in individual mindsets indicates 
internal conflict, in which decision-makers battle between the concerns of 
their firm and their own personal motivations. On the other hand, a third 
opportunity for research may be to view the large number of hybrid 
individuals may be a finding in itself, representative of how norms within 
the social investing and commercial investing space have come together 
(Mair & Hehenberger, 2014). Numerous commentators draw parallels 
between the rise of the internet, the rise of mobile internet and the rise of 
social impact. Nowadays it is unthinkable for major corporations not to 
take the Internet seriously. For example, Albert and colleagues (2000: 14) 
describe how organizational identity can evolve, saying, “organizations 
that come into contact with new entities, such as Web-based competitors, 
are likely to have to rethink whether they wish to add a “.com” to their 
name.” Other commentators have drawn a parallel to having a mobile 
phone-accessible website and integrating social concerns into a business; 
both will be indispensable in the future (e.g., Bannon, 2015). 
Finally, these findings demonstrate the difficulty of studying values, 
social motivation, and other sensitive and nuanced factors, especially in 
context of hybrid decision-making. One respondent with a socially-
dominant mindset was taken aback by the social contents of our 
questionnaire, remarking to us “This is the strangest interview I’ve ever 
had” (Respondent #72, VC Firm #72). 
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Perhaps these findings suggest the need for additional inductive 
studies to understand the different types of hybridity within hybridity. In 
our sample of 73% general hybrids, a portion of them were socially-
dominant hybrids, and another portion were commercially-dominant 
hybrids. However, our theoretical approach opens up more opportunities to 
investigate heterogeneity within these mindsets. Within the unknown-
other-interested identity in the entrepreneurial identity literature, 
interestingly, we still find a respect for business as a vehicle which can be 
used to effect social change. Had we used another framing, we might have 
found an aversion to commercial structures among other-interested 
identities. However, we do not find an aversion but a de-prioritization of 
commercial goals, which can occur on a spectrum. Within the self-
interested identity in the entrepreneurial identity literature, interestingly, 
we also find a reference to helping others by building a business that “will 
be inherited by the next generation” (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011: 942). One 
high-commercial mindset’s respondent gave us the following feedback, 
“[The questions about who I] strongly identify with is a tough one to 
reflect upon. I don't really identify with women or minorities or tattoo 
companies, but we invest in them. I love it and think it's an amazing” 
(Respondent #54, micro VC #33). Overall, our findings suggest that we 
may need to go beyond notions of dualistic hybridity, to hybridity related 
to “three, four, or many interests and goals” (Yunus, 2007) 138 
Finally, we already know from the literature that there may be 
particular organizational attributes—and/or combinations of organizational 
attributes—which are more attractive for some individuals rather others 
(Franke et al., 2006; Gruber et al., 2015; Patzelt et al., 2009). However, the 
exact configurations of organizational attributes most appealing to hybrid 
mindsets, or, rather, the exact framing of social attributes to appeal to 
commercial mindsets and vice versa, are not yet known. This type of study 
may bring us closer to finding configurations of organizational attributes 
which be strongly appreciate by a wide number of decision-makers and 
help to reduce conflict in multiple hybridity types, not only social-
commercial hybrids. 
 
Conclusions 
In this study, we extend the literature on hybrid organizing by going 
beyond (mostly) firm-level research to investigate the microfoundations of 
hybrid organizing—how individual-level attributes shape social-
commercial hybrid outcomes in decision-making. To gain a better 
understanding of the individual-level antecedents to hybrid decision-
making in the context of early-stage investments, we investigate the role of 
                                                                        
138 The scale we used to measure mindset is also capable of measuring known-other focus in individual mindsets, however, our 
setting was not suitable for testing this variable, due to the prevailing norm in investment that it is unwise to invest in your friends. 
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individual mindsets in influencing the perception of hybridity 
attractiveness. We asked 154 investors to make investment decisions based 
on a set of social and commercial cues, resulting in a dataset of 3,388 
hypothetical investment decisions. Results from statistical analysis confirm 
what we know about social mindsets, commercial mindsets and related 
preferences, but the findings challenge how we think about hybridity. 
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VI. Matters of hybridity 
- Reflecting on the implications of social-commercial hybridity research 
 
The three studies in this thesis build on the idea that individual and 
organizational self-concepts are key to understanding organizational, 
economic and social outcomes, particularly because these self-concepts 
shape actors’ understanding of what is appropriate and, consequently, 
direct individual and organizational behavior (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; 
Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Watson, 2008; Weber & Messick, 2006). 
However, in recent years, interest has grown in organizations that combine 
organizational identities which would “not normally be expected to go 
together” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 270), with a particular interest in 
individuals and organizations which have sought to combine “the best of 
both worlds” by jointly pursuing both social welfare-related and 
commercial profit-related goals.139 Although social-commercial hybrid 
organizations have existed for centuries in the form of revenue-generating 
charitable organizations or for-profit schools, in recent decades, changes in 
public opinion on the role of business in addressing social issues has 
catalyzed a growth of research and practice around social-commercial 
hybrids.  
 
Social-commercial hybridity 
A rich body of scholarly work has emerged to address questions 
about social-commercial organizational hybridity (Battilana et al., 2017; 
Battilana & Lee, 2014), the types of challenges it entails and how managers 
can address these. Early research in this field, for example, has found 
evidence that hybridity in organizations necessarily leads to tension (Pratt 
& Rafaeli, 1997; Zilber, 2002), conflict (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; 
Glynn, 2000), hybridity collapse (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Yue et al., 2018), 
or, organizational failure (Tracey et al., 2011).140  
                                                                        
139 We refer to these organizational identities as commercial and social identities, respectively. Not to be confused with social 
identity from social identify theory (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). For more information on these two ways of thinking, please refer to 
the section titled “Introduction to social and commercial identities” in Chapter 1. 
140 The use of hybridity from this point forward refers to social-commercial hybridity. 
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However, more recent studies suggest that hybrid identities can 
coexist in configurations which are both compatible and complementary 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014), helping to strengthen the dual identity of 
members within the organization (Besharov, 2014; Gotsi et al., 2010), 
organizational processes and, consequently, the dual identity of the 
organization (Jay, 2013; Murray, 2010). Emergent hybridity even 
engenders implications for the adoption and evolution of identities in the 
wider industry within which such organizations are found (Haveman & 
Rao, 2006; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014; Rao et al., 2003). This recent 
literature has helped managers and scholars better understand how 
managers can use organizational strategies to generate, perpetuate, or 
resolve conflicts arising from the combination of two different 
organizational identities (Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002), e.g., structure 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Perkmann et al., 2018; Ramus et al., 2017; 
Smith & Besharov, 2017), processes (Jay, 2013; Lok, 2010), language 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Besharov, 2014; Fiol, 2002; Gotsi et al., 
2010) and other strategies (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pache & Santos, 
2013). It is on this rich foundation of scholarly work that the questions and 
contributions of this thesis could be developed. 
Practical implications 
This thesis also offers contributions to practice. Organizations are 
under pressure to achieve seemingly impossible tasks, asking their 
members to combine mindsets and identities which would not normally be 
expected to go together. However, better understanding how managers can 
adapt seemingly contradictory mindsets or organizational templates may 
offer a greater choice set from which society can draw to solve important 
problems (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). 
This research attempts to build on work which recognizes the 
powerful role of agents in creating and maintaining mindsets, offering the 
practical implication of helping managers and decision-makers better 
handle the challenges of day-to-day organizing in what seems to be a 
growing number of hybrid organizations.  
As past scholars suggest, research which observes organizational 
processes that accomplish changes may lead to more actionable outcomes 
than those scholars studying direct triggers of organizational change (Beer, 
1972; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976). Among these processes, an 
effective tool for change is, not only the initial steps required to begin 
implementing new initiatives, but also the initial processes which need to 
be established to receive new data and update priors, i.e., feedback loops. 
The importance of these self-correcting mechanisms―gleaned through 
processual research―are described below, 
“Attempts to force discrete shifts in processes amplify behavioral 
errors, establish contradictions across parallel processes, and elicit 
 
301 
rejection mechanisms, so processes need to be modified gradually in 
social contexts that acknowledge the transience of what is being 
done at any time” (Hedberg et al., 1976: 43). 
Paraphrasing Kraatz and Block (2008:40), this thesis aims to discover how 
organizations can achieve “what Collins and Porras (1994) optimistically 
call ‘the genius of the and’ while avoiding its obverse (‘the tyranny of the 
or’).”  
This is an extremely challenging task, but potentially beneficial task. 
Increasing pressure on private entities to contribute to solutions to social 
and/or environmental ails (either due to the corporate mistrust or the failure 
of public actors) has forced private actors to find creative ways to jointly 
pursue social and commercial goals (e.g., Radon et al., 2008). Research in 
this field can thus help scholars decisively move away from theories which 
may be “bad for practice” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), and towards more 
optimistic and pragmatic ones (Eden, 1984; Ferraro et al., 2005). 
Moreover, social ventures provide an alternative to donor- or tax-
funded solutions and may also produce substantial financial returns for 
their investors, with significant economic repercussions for society at large 
(Barry et al., 1990; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986). As a result, public entities 
have been eager to promote and fund them. But inability to accurately 
evaluate promising social ventures results in scandals like Solyndra, a 
failed solar venture which had received over 500 million USD in loans 
from the U.S. government (Howell & Dinan, 2015). 
Serious empirical investigation into what makes social ventures 
successful can help the industry better allocate funds to truly promising and 
efficient social ventures (rather than, for example, well-publicized, well-
connected ventures). 
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to further research on organizations which 
jointly hold dual social and commercial identities. It did so by studying the 
selection and evaluation processes of social venture capitalists—equity 
investment firms which invest in early-stage social-commercial hybrid 
organizations—and other types of social and commercial investors. This 
work demonstrates how social-commercial duality affects new venture 
evaluation and investor decision-making. 
Study One features an inductive study based on archival data 
collected on 1,614 investment decisions made by a social investment firm 
over five years. This study investigate how SVCs translate their hybrid 
social and commercial identity into their own investment criteria, offering 
a deal-by-deal view of how SVCs apply selection criteria, and which 
venture attributes are important to them. These findings reveal selection 
criteria used by the investor to assess investment proposals from a social 
and a commercial perspective. Interestingly, while some of the SVC’s 
investment evaluations build on commercial venture attributes to predict 
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commercial potential and others build on social-mission-related attributes 
to predict social potential, some venture attributes evaluated by the SVC 
were used to make decisions about both the venture’s commercial and 
social potential. Moreover, the study finds that the SVC evaluates ventures 
in an iterative process not wholly intended to identify immediately 
investable targets. 
Study Two investigates further into the processes present in the same 
context. It continues to use inductive, qualitative approaches to understand 
how social investors evaluate and act upon investment proposals, focusing 
on interactions between ventures and the investor. Study Two uncovers 
five strategies used by the investor to empirically illustrate, not only how 
SVCs evaluates hybridity in emerging organizations, but how, in doing so, 
SVCs shape hybridity and the factors leading to sustainable, performative 
hybridity in emerging organizations.  
Study Three employs quantitative approaches to investigate the 
microfoundations of hybrid organizing—how individual-level attributes 
shape hybrid outcomes. Data collection consisted of 154 investors asked to 
evaluate investment proposals consisting of social, commercial and hybrid 
cues. Their combined responses of 22 investment proposals each resulted 
in a dataset of 3,388 investment evaluations. Results from statistical 
analysis confirm what we know about social mindsets, commercial 
mindsets and related preferences, but the findings challenge how we think 
about hybridity. 
These three studies—investigating how SVCs translate their dual 
social and commercial identity into their own investment criteria, how 
SVCs evaluate and shape duality in other organizations, and how 
individual-level attributes affect hybrid decision-making—shed light on 
organizational hybridity, hybridity outcomes and the microfoundations of 
hybridity. In doing so, this thesis responds to calls for research on how 
social missions affect decision-making outcomes among investment firms 
and fundraising ventures (Dacin et al., 2011; Hollensbe et al., 2014; 
Shepherd, 2015; Short et al., 2009). Moreover, it adds fuel to conversations 
on the potential benefits and downsides of tackling important social issues 
through business.  
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▪ Scouted social entrepreneurs in California, France, Italy, Japan, UAE for corporate mentorship program 
2009-2011 Hertog Global Strategy Initiative, Columbia University History Department           
Manager of Public Relations and New Media Strategy 
▪ Organized research seminars and weekly lectures of 200+ attendees; online moderation of lectures, e.g. “Can 
We Move Toward a Nuclear Weapon-Free World?“ by Dr. Hans Blix 
▪ Created, curated and published articles and media for related websites semiweekly 
// NETWORKS & ASSOCIATIONS  
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2016-2017 Columbia Alumni Association  
Volunteer Interviewer for Undergraduate Admissions, Alumni Representative Committee (ARC) 
2014-Present Academy of Management 
Member, Reviewer 
2009-2017 Sandbox Network: Handpicked global community of 1000+ young leaders and entrepreneurs  
Léman Ambassador (2014-2017), Global Screening Committee Member, Paris Ambassador (2012-2013) 
▪ Screen applications from 25+ cities, refer potential candidates, recruited first class of Paris & Léman 
▪ Managed Paris community of 200+ members and non-members (organize retreats, workshops etc.) 
▪ Grew the Paris hub from a group of 4 to 40 entrepreneurially-minded, close-knit young achievers 
2008-2013 New York City International Relations Council & Association, Inc. 
Advisory Board Member, formerly: Award-Winning Delegate, Conference Chair  
▪ Advise elected Columbia University students on annual Model UN workshops and debate conferences 
 
// SKILLS & INTERESTS  
Teaching interests New venture strategy, purpose-driven organizations, creativity, fundraising, marketing 
Research interests Organizational emergence, organizational identity, social identity, decision-making, philosophy of science 
Languages English (native), French (fluent), Khmer (spoken fluency, basic written skills)  
Technology STATA; Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint; social media, online publishing, html 
Hobbies  Creative writing, guitar and singing, painting, running, swimming, yoga 
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B: Executive summary of thesis (322 words) 
 
For Their Own Good and for the Good of Others: 
Identity Duality in New Venture Evaluation and Investor Decision-Making 
In three empirical studies, this thesis investigates how firms manage 
and respond to competing demands (and opportunities) arising from the 
joint pursuit of two goals. It focuses specifically on the joint pursuit of 
commercial and social  goals in the context of new venture evaluation and 
investor decision-making, thereby shedding light on a dynamic, opaque 
industry growing in influence and market value. 
The first study, Investing in Hybrids, analyzes five years of archival 
data on 1,614 investment evaluations to create a detailed breakdown of the 
selection criteria employed by an investment firm targeting early-stage 
ventures with social and commercial goals. In addition to deriving classic 
venture investment proposal attributes of interest and social-mission-
related attributes of interest from actual evaluations over the length of the 
ventures’ evaluation period, the study notably finds evidence suggesting 
that the investment firm’s evaluation process is not wholly focused on 
finding immediately investable targets.  
The second study, Heart Money, builds on interviews and a 25-
month ethnography (conducted at the same investment firm) to examine 
how an SVC assesses and engages with ventures prior to the final 
investment outcome. The study uncovers five strategies that enable the 
investment firm to co-create and access attractive investment opportunities, 
while also helping it to identify and avoid investments in ventures with a 
high risk of prioritizing commercial outcomes at the cost of social 
outcomes or vice versa.  
Finally, the third study, Both Sides Now, uses an experimental 
approach to collect data on 154 decision-makers at philanthropic, hybrid, 
and profit-oriented funds situated in 29 countries. The study quantitatively 
estimates the effect that an individual funder’s social and commercial 
orientation has on perceived investment proposal attractiveness, thus 
underlining the role of venture-investor fit in predicting investment 
proposal assessments.  
Together, these three studies offer insight on investor decision-
making, organizational emergence, and organizing in pursuit of social and 
commercial goals. 
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C: Extended executive summary of thesis (869 words) 
 
For Their Own Good and for the Good of Others: 
Identity Duality in New Venture Evaluation and Investor Decision-Making 
 
In three empirical studies, this thesis investigates how firms manage 
and respond to competing demands (and opportunities) arising from the 
joint pursuit of two goals. It focuses specifically on the joint pursuit of 
commercial and social  goals in the context of new venture evaluation and 
investor decision-making, thereby shedding light on a dynamic, opaque 
industry growing in influence and market value. 
In three empirical studies, this thesis investigates how firms manage 
and respond to competing demands (and opportunities) arising from the 
joint pursuit of two goals. It focuses specifically on the joint pursuit of 
commercial and social  goals in the context of new venture evaluation and 
investor decision-making.  
Study One, Investing in Hybrids, offers a detailed taxonomy of 
investment selection criteria used by a Social Venture Capital firm (SVC): 
an investment firm investing in social ventures—early-stage companies 
that use commercial revenue models to pursue social missions. Applying 
inductive, qualitative analysis to a total of 1,614 actual investment 
evaluations from five years of archival data collected at a European-based 
SVC, the study finds that actual investment selection is based on five 
classic general venture investment selection categories, as well as three 
investment-firm-specific categories related to firm preferences, thematic 
foci, and context. Within these categories, the study specifies actual 
investment proposal attributes of interest to an SVC, notably identifying 
social-mission-related attributes as derived from actual investment 
decisions (e.g., issue selection, venture contribution to issue, venture 
approach to issue, and founder motivation). Interestingly, while some of 
the SVC’s investment evaluations build on commercial venture attributes 
to predict commercial potential, and others build on social-mission-related 
attributes to predict social potential, some venture attributes evaluated by 
the SVC were used to make decisions about both the venture’s commercial 
and social potential. Moreover, the study finds that the SVC evaluates 
ventures in an iterative process not wholly intended to identify immediately 
investable targets. The study finds high variation in the length  of the 
evaluation period, even when holding the reason for venture rejection 
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constant. The evaluation outcomes uncovered in this study suggest that the 
SVC prolongs the formal evaluation period to help improve evaluated 
ventures despite understanding the venture’s immediate investment 
potential. 
Study Two, Heart Money, details the strategies used by the same 
SVC to assess and engage with ventures over the length of the evaluation 
process. Data collected through interviews and a 25-month ethnography 
reveal five emergent strategies applied by the SVC to evaluate the 
plausibility of ventures’ commercial claims, social claims, and the 
interaction between the two sets of claims. These strategies (Cautious 
Pursuit, Tinkering, Rapprochement, Helping, and Filtering Out) are costly 
in terms of time and emotional labor, and depend on the SVC’s rich and 
diverse social capital, commercial expertise, and interpersonal skills. 
However, these strategies allow the SVC to identify and avoid investments 
in ventures with high Trade-off Hazard (i.e., high risk of prioritizing 
commercial outcomes at the cost of social outcomes, or vice versa). 
Moreover, when successful, these strategies enable the SVC to pursue their 
curiosity in the evaluated ventures’ “true” social and commercial potential, 
co-creating attractive investment opportunities previously unavailable to 
them.  
Study Three, Both Sides Now, demonstrates the extent to which 
funders’ individual-level attributes influence the perceived attractiveness of 
evaluated investment proposals. Relying on an experimental method called 
conjoint analysis, 154 decision-makers at philanthropic, hybrid, and profit-
oriented funds situated in 29 countries were asked to quantitatively assess 
the same set of 22 different venture investment proposals, resulting in a 
dataset of 3,388 investment evaluations. Statistical analyses of these data 
demonstrate that the social and commercial orientation of the individual 
funder’s mindset affects how much weight they assign to key investment 
proposal attributes—the extent of the venture’s social mission, the 
interdependence of the venture’s revenue model and mission-related 
activities, and the commercial investment value of the proposal—
confirming established knowledge on social mindsets, commercial 
mindsets and related preferences, but challenging expectations of how 
social-commercial hybrid mindsets affect investor decision-making. These 
results hold even when controlling for other proposal attributes and a set of 
funder characteristics (gender, investment experience, funder type, 
investment size, and geographic location) and support the view that 
investment outcomes rely on venture-fund fit as partly  determined by 
initial evaluators.  
These three studies shed light on a dynamic, opaque industry 
growing in influence and market value. First, they offer a detailed 
illustration of the criteria and processes employed by an investment firm 
targeting early-stage ventures with social and commercial goals. Next, they 
reveal how venture engagement strategies, implemented early on in the 
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evaluation process, can help investment firms create and access investment 
deals in a competitive industry. Finally, they quantify how individual-level 
preferences affect investment evaluations at the level of the proposal 
attribute, demonstrating the importance of venture-investor fit in 
explaining investment proposal attractiveness.  
Together, this empirical work is intended to offer insight on investor 
decision-making by investigating early-stage investments conducted in the 
joint pursuit of commercial and social goals. By analyzing large(r) samples 
of firm- and individual-level data directly produced by the subjects of 
interest, these studies offer a rare and rich illustration of factors leading to 
both successful and failed investment outcomes in a dual-goal context. 
Hopefully, this work provides helpful evidence on the challenges, 
complexities and benefits of tackling important social issues through 
business, and further stimulates thinking and action among scholars, 
venture supporters, investors and entrepreneurs in this domain. 
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D: Résumé étendu de la thèse en français 
Pour leur propre bien et pour le bien des autres :  
Dualité de l’identité dans l’évaluation des nouvelles entreprises et dans la prise de décision des investisseurs 
 
L’organisation est un processus managérial qui exige un sens et un 
but. Des entreprises à but lucratif aux associations à but non-lucratif, des 
mouvements sociaux aux nouvelles initiatives : les gens s’organisent pour 
une raison. Les croyances sur qui ils sont, en tant qu’individus et en tant 
qu’organisations, constituent un « ensemble de « raisons ultimes » pour la 
planification, l’explication et la justification d'une action collective » 
(Whetten & Mackey, 2002, p. 396). Lorsque les récits à propos de « qui 
nous sommes » et de « ce que nous faisons » sont simples et cohérents, la 
prise de décision est facilitée pour les responsables (Martens, Jennings, & 
Jennings, 2007 ; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Voss, Cable, & Voss, 2006). 
Cependant, il arrive parfois qu’une organisation « se considère (et que les 
autres la considèrent) alternativement, voire simultanément, comme étant 
deux types d’organisation différents » (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 270). 
Ce type d’hybridité organisationnelle déroute, car il remet en cause nos 
connaissances en matière d’organisation (Battilana, Besharov, & 
Mitzinneck, 2017). Lorsque des organisations combinent des identités que 
l’on pourrait « normalement ne pas considérer comme pouvant aller 
ensemble » (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 270), la prise de décision ne 
repose plus sur une idée cohérente et unique de ce qui convient, ce qui 
entraîne des incertitudes au sujet des principes, ou de la combinaison de 
principes, qui guideront la pensée de l’organisation en tous moments.  
Un type   de dualité organisationnelle d’intérêt particulier pour les 
dirigeants et les universitaires est celui qui associe une identité liée à un 
profit commercial à une autre liée au bien-être social. Ces organisations à 
double identité (ou hybrides) intriguent particulièrement en ce qu’elles 
semblent demander aux décideurs de choisir entre ce qui est mieux pour 
leur entreprise et ce qui les rapprochera des objectifs qu’ils ont pour les 
autres (par exemple, leur communauté et/ou le monde). En conséquence, 
un riche ensemble de travaux a émergé visant à traiter des questions 
relatives à la dualité organisationnelle socio-commerciale (Battilana et al., 
2017 ; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Les origines de cette littérature suggère que 
l’hybridité entraîne des tensions (Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997 ; Zilber, 2002), du 
conflit (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014 ; Glynn, 2000), de l’effondrement 
d’hybridité (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014 ; Yue, Wang, & Yang, 
2018) ou des défaillances organisationnelles (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 
2011). En revanche, des études récentes suggèrent que les configurations 
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hybrides peuvent également être compatibles et complémentaires 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014), contribuant à renforcer la double identité de 
leurs membres (Besharov, 2014 ; Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 
2010) et de leurs organisations (Jay, 2013 ; Murray, 2010), voire faciliter la 
croissance et l’adaptation dans leur secteur au sens large (Haveman & Rao, 
2006 ; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014 ; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). Nous 
comprenons mieux comment les dirigeants peuvent utiliser la structure 
organisationnelle (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014 ; Perkmann, McKelvey, & 
Philips, 2018 ; Ramus, Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 2017 ; Smith & Besharov, 
2017), les processus organisationnels (Jay, 2013; Lok, 2010), le langage 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002 ; Besharov, 2014 ; Fiol, 2002 ; Gotsi et al., 
2010) et les stratégies (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997 ; Pache & Santos, 
2013) pour générer, perpétuer ou résoudre les conflits découlant de la 
combinaison de deux identités organisationnelles différentes (Glynn, 2000 
; Zilber, 2002).  
Cependant, à ce jour, l’étude des organisations socio-commerciales a 
été entravée par cinq défis. Premièrement, la majorité des recherches dans 
ce domaine s’appuie sur des recherches conceptuelles innovantes (e.g., 
Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012 ; Nicholls, 2010 ; Pache & 
Santos, 2010) ou des échantillons plus restreints d'organisations 
organisations socio-commerciales (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011) n’ayant 
ainsi que peu d’accès à de grands ensembles de données. Deuxièmement, 
la plupart des recherches ont été menées sur des organisations à double 
identité qui réussissent ou durent (Dacin et al., 2011 ; Denrell, 2005). Cela 
s’explique probablement par la difficulté d’obtention d’informations sur les 
organisations ayant échoué et par le fait qu’il est difficile de définir et de 
mesurer la réussite socio-commerciale (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
Troisièmement, la majorité des recherches sur les organisations socio-
commerciales a eu tendance à se concentrer davantage sur l’organisation 
socio-commerciale elle-même, ses processus internes, son équipe 
fondatrice et ses objectifs sociaux (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014 ; Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010 ; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011 ; Pache & Santos, 2013). Cela a 
permis aux chercheurs, entre autre choses, de mieux comprendre la 
manière dont la motivation sociale influe sur la prise de décision 
stratégique, et comment les organisations à double identité commerciale et 
sociale gèrent cette dualité. Cependant, l’attention se portant 
principalement sur les processus internes, le rôle important des interactions 
inter-organisationnelles, l’influence des fournisseurs de ressources (Huang 
& Knight, 2017 ; Stinchcombe, 1965) et l’effet possible des tierces parties 
en matière d’influence sur les résultats d’hybridité (Jones, Maoret, Massa, 
& Svejenova, 2012) se voient exclus. Quatrièmement, les recherches sur la 
dualité organisationnelle ont jusqu'à maintenant eu tendance à se 
concentrer sur un type particulier d’organisation hybride avec des identités 
incarnées par deux groupes internes distincts (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014). 
Ce type d’organisation, appelé hybride idéographique (Albert & Whetten, 
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1985), tend à faire face à des conflits (par exemple,  Glynn, 2000 ; Zilber, 
2002) et à des échecs (par exemple,  Tracey et al., 2011). Il existe moins 
d’études réalisées sur les hybrides holographiques, c’est-à-dire des 
organisations dont tous les membres possèdent des identités doubles 
(Smith & Besharov, 2017) et au sein desquelles l’hybridité peut être source 
de synergies et de complémentarité (Besharov & Smith, 2014 ; Murray, 
2010). Cela suggère que les attributs et les conséquences de l’hybridité ont 
pu être confondus dans la littérature existante et, par conséquent, la 
possibilité que la gamme complète des résultats de découlant de l’hybridité 
n’ait pas été intégralement explorée (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Et finalement, 
les organisations dans ces études ont tendance à être sélectionnées en 
raison de leurs qualités hybrides préétablies (Perkmann et al., 2018 ; 
Ramus et al., 2017 ; Smith & Besharov, 2017). Lorsque les antécédents 
d’hybridité sont abordés, les études existantes mettent généralement 
l’accent sur le contexte, se référant à des facteurs au niveau du terrain ou 
du secteur (Haveman & Rao, 2006 ; Rao et al., 2003 ; Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999) tout en négligeant l'hétérogénéité de la cognition managériale et le 
potentiel des attributs au niveau individuel en matière de résultats hybrides 
(pour de rares exceptions, voir : Miller & Wesley II, 2010 ; Miron-Spektor, 
Ingram, Keller, Smith, & Lewis, 2018 ; Zhang, Waldman, Han, & Li, 
2015).  
Pour traiter des obstacles à l’étude de l’hybridité organisationnelle et 
continuer de faire progresser nos connaissances de ce phénomène 
important, cette thèse tire parti du contexte empirique des investisseurs 
sociaux. Les sociétés d’investissement social gèrent des fonds qui 
investissent en prenant en compte des enjeux sociaux et environnementaux. 
Parmi ces investisseurs sont des fonds de capital-risque sociaux. Ces fonds 
investissent dans des entreprises hybrides socio-commerciales, en étant 
aussi une entreprise hybride socio-commerciale. 
Les fonds de capital-risque sociaux (CRS) sont un ensemble de 
partenaires sous-étudié, mais crucial, pour les entreprises hybrides socio-
commerciales, qui représentent un capital financier, social et de 
connaissances. Les chercheurs ont spécifiquement demandé que soient 
réalisées davantage d’études empiriques sur la prise de décision des 
investisseurs de fonds de capital-risque sociaux (Austin, Stevenson, & 
Wei?Skillern, 2006 ; Lyons & Kickul, 2013; Nicholls, 2010 ; Short, Moss, 
& Lumpkin, 2009), se référant à l’importance et à la difficulté d’accéder 
aux ressources en tant que jeune organisation à double identité (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994 ; Harding, 2007 ; Lyon & Ramsden, 2006 ; Pache & Santos, 
2013), ainsi qu’au manque de recherches sur la prise de décision combinant 
des identités commerciales et prosociales (Shepherd, 2015 ; Shepherd, 
Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). 
Répondant à cet appel, cette thèse examine l’impact de la dualité 
socio-commerciale sur l’évaluation des nouvelles entreprises et la prise de 
décision des investisseurs. Elle cherche spécifiquement à comprendre : 
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1) comment la dualité est perçue et manifestée par des CRS, 
2) comment les CRS évaluent et façonnent la dualité dans d’autres 
organisations (émergentes) et 
3) comment les attributs de niveau individuel affectent la prise de 
décision hybride.  
 
Je fais cela dans trois études empiriques impliquant des 
organisations hybrides holographiques (c’est-à-dire, entièrement intégrées) 
et idéographiques (c’est-à-dire, séparées). Mes deux premières études tirent 
parti du contexte de recherche d'une unique société d'investissement social 
holographique. Dans la première étude, je me base sur un jeu de données 
unique et riche de 1 614 décisions d'investissement pour examiner les 
critères d’investissement utilisés par l’investisseur pour évaluer les 
organisations socio-commerciales dans leurs phases initiales (« 
investissements sociaux »). Dans ma deuxième étude, j’effectue un travail 
de terrain approfondi et je mène des entretiens au sein de la même société 
d’investissement pour mieux comprendre le comportement de la société 
d’investissements sociaux lorsqu’elle évalue et agit par rapport aux 
propositions d’investissement. Enfin, ma troisième étude examine les effets 
des attributs au niveau individuel sur les résultats hybrides dans la prise de 
décision sur la base de données recueillie auprès de 154 investisseurs dans 
une expérience conjointe. Prises ensemble, ces études allument les 
projecteurs sur un acteur important et pourtant négligé de l’organisation 
socio-commerciale, développant ainsi notre compréhension de la dualité 
d’identité au sein des organisations établies et émergentes.  
 
Une brève description de chaque étude est disponible ci-après : 
La première étude de cette thèse, Investir dans les hybrids, mène une 
étude de cas exploratoire et longitudinale sur la façon dont un investisseur 
social traduit ses identités sociales et commerciales en critères de sélection 
et d’évaluation d’investissements. L’investisseur social sélectionné 
présentait quatre avantages empiriques pour la conduite de recherches dans 
cet espace. Premièrement, j’ai identifié une société holographique qui 
cherchait à investir dans d’autres organisations socio-commerciales 
holographiques, ce qui offrait une perspective rarement examinée dans la 
littérature. Deuxièmement, par l’évaluation de centaines de propositions 
d’investissement émanant d'organisations socio-commerciales tous les ans, 
sur cinq ans, cette société a acquis une expertise considérable s’agissant de 
comprendre les formes holographiques d’hybridité, donnant ainsi une 
perspective intrigante et informative (pour un parallèle, voir : MacMillan, 
Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985). Troisièmement, la perspective de cet 
investisseur social investor donne accès à des décisions d'investissement 
concernant un large échantillon d’organisations socio-commerciales dans 
leurs phases initiales, cet échantillon présentant de hauts niveaux de 
validité interne et de validité conceptuelle auxquels la littérature existante 
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n’avait auparavant jamais eu accès (Dacin et al., 2011 ; Gibbert, Ruigrok, 
& Wicki, 2008). Quatrièmement, le pool de propositions d’investissement 
évaluées par cet investisseur inclut les propositions acceptées et refusées 
d’organisations en phase de démarrage. En incluant également les 
entreprises plus jeunes qui n’obtiennent pas de financements dans 
l’échantillon étudié, nous pouvons réduire le biais du survivant (Denrell, 
2005) et utiliser les résultats des financements de cet investisseur social 
expert comme un simple indicateur de performance (Navis & Glynn, 2011 
; Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016).  
Agissant sur ces opportunités, j’ai principalement puisé dans les 
données d’archives de la société pour construire une base de données de 1 
614 décisions d'investissement prises sur cinq ans, incluant les propositions 
d’investissement acceptées (19), échoué (1 574) et à l’étude (40). Par le 
biais d’analyses inductives et itératives de ces données qualitatives sur une 
base individuelle, je commence l’ouverture de la boîte noire de 
l’investissement social, en identifiant 6 catégories de critères de sélection 
utilisés par l’investisseur pour évaluer les propositions d’investissement 
d’un point de vue social et commercial, incluant 14 critères d’importance 
particulière pour l’investisseur d’un point de vue social. Étonnamment, 
bien que ces critères se superposent aux conclusions de la littérature sur les 
préférences commerciales et sociales, une analyse de l’application de ces 
critères au fil du temps (par exemple,  pendant la période de due diligence 
et négociation) suggère que le processus d’évaluation de l’investisseur 
social est fondamentalement différent du processus d’investissement 
traditionnel. En outre, une extension de l’analyse suggère que l’investisseur 
pourrait appliquer ensemble les prismes social et commercial afin 
d’évaluer un attribut unique dans une proposition d’investissement. Mes 
observations suggèrent que l’investisseur peut appliquer les deux prismes 
simultanément, ainsi que séparément, à différents moments. J’avance que 
cet acte intuitif de commutation des perspectives fournit aux investisseurs 
les fondations cognitives nécessaires pour transformer les attributs « non-
relatifs à la mission » d’une entreprise en attributs relatifs à celle-ci et vice-
versa.  
Du point de vue de la recherche, ces conclusions suggèrent que les 
méthodes post-positivistes visant à comprendre la prise de décision 
d'investissement d’un investisseur social ne sont pas suffisantes et que des 
approches plus constructivistes sont nécessaires. D’un point de vue 
pratique, cette étude représente la première taxonomie des critères de 
sélection des entreprises sociales dérivée de décisions d'investissement 
réelles. Pour les entrepreneurs, le nombre de refus d’entreprises en raison 
de préférences spécifiques au fonds de capital-risque suggère qu’ils 
devraient effectuer des recherches et accorder la priorité au concept général 
d’adéquation entre l’entreprise et l’investisseur. En outre, les attributs 
d’entreprises liés à la mission suggèrent que les entreprises à motivation 
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sociale ne devraient pas hésiter à développer et articuler ce composant de 
leur offre investissement lorsqu’elles approchent les investisseurs sociaux.  
Dans l’étude suivante, L’argent du cœur, j’utilise le même contexte 
pour approfondir la façon dont les investisseurs sociaux évaluent et 
agissent par rapport aux propositions d’investissement, en portant mon 
attention sur les interactions inter-organisationnelles qui s’effectuent entre 
la proposition de la nouvelle entreprise et la décision finale 
d’investissement. Sur la base de 25 mois de travail sur le terrain au sein 
d’une même société d’investissement social (dont sept mois consécutifs in 
situ), j’ai pu observer que l’investisseur applique un cadre complexe mais 
intuitif dans son dialogue avec les nouvelles entreprises qui lui font des 
demandes de financement. Ces processus trans-limites (entre les 
entreprises et leur investisseur) ont une incidence sur le développement de 
l’identité hybride de la nouvelle entreprise, ainsi que ses performances, 
comme le mesurent les résultats de financement (Navis & Glynn, 2011 ; 
Ter Wal et al., 2016). L’analyse inductive d’une sélection d’entretiens 
transcrits, de notes de terrain et autres documents (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013 ; Miles & Huberman, 1994) a révélé quatre comportements 
utilisés par l’investisseur pour comprendre et façonner la « constellation de 
déclarations au sujet des fondateurs, de l’organisation et des opportunités 
de marché d’une entité entrepreneuriale qui donne une signification aux 
questions « qui sommes nous » et « que faisons nous » » (Navis & Glynn, 
2011, p. 480). 
Premièrement, l’investisseur s’est acquitté de son double mandat en 
effectuant un filtrage inclusif et un filtrage éliminatoire, cherchant des 
investissements dans des nouvelles entrepises plus orientées marché et 
croissance comparé à des organismes à but non lucratif, mais plus 
conscientes sur le plan social comparé aux entreprises classiques et 
présentant un potentiel d’impact profond sur des problèmes sociaux par le 
biais de la vente rentable de ses produits ou services (Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2015 ; TechCrunch, 2017). Deuxièmement, l’investisseur 
cherchait à éviter les contreparties (c’est-à-dire, favoriser les résultats 
sociaux au détriment des résultats commerciaux ou inversement). Je 
présente la preuve d’un aléa du compromis étant un critère de sélection clé 
utilisé par l’investisseur pour identifier et éviter d'investir dans des 
hybrides idéographiques, ainsi que cinq stratégies auxquelles il a recouru 
pour rendre davantage de nouvelles entreprises investissables de ce point 
de vue poursuite prudente, ajustement, rapprochement, assistance et 
filtrage éliminatoire). Bien que ces stratégies d’évaluation ne soient pas 
totalement fiables, lorsqu’elles étaient couronnées de succès, elles aidaient 
l’investisseur à identifier, voire à potentiellement co-créer des entités 
d’entreprise prometteuses. Enfin, l’investisseur consacrait aussi des 
ressources significatives à l’assistance aux entreprises sous-performantes 
sans voie claire vers un investissement, mais dont l’investisseur pensait 
qu’elles pourraient être source d’avantages commerciaux inattendus, mais 
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plus important, cela l’aidait à maintenir la cohérence de son identité 
(Stratégie de protection de l’identité).  
Ces découvertes ont des implications pour l’investissement dans les 
phases initiales, l’organisation hybride et la recherche en entrepreneuriat. 
Premièrement, la société d’investissement démontre qu’une approche 
moins transactionnelle (offrir un soutien à l’entreprise avant une décision 
d’investissement) peut permettre aux investisseurs d’accéder à des accords 
exclusifs et contribuer à améliorer les performances grâce à une relation 
nouvelle-entreprise-investisseur renforcée. Dans un contexte 
d’investissement social, ces découvertes suggèrent qu'offrir du temps et de 
l’attention avant d’effectuer un investissement financier pourrait être 
crucial pour la création d’opportunités d’investissement qui réaliseront de 
bonnes performances à la fois sur le plan social et commercial. 
Deuxièmement, elles suggèrent que les investisseurs pourraient être en 
mesure de combiner un comportement qui apporterait une aide aux 
nouvelles entreprises sans itinéraire clair vers investissement avec des 
activités qui peuvent encore leur être bénéfiques sur le moyen terme (par 
exemple,  d’un point de vue des relations publiques). Enfin, l’étude traite 
des processus par lesquels les fournisseurs de ressources influent et 
façonnent l’identité des nouvelles entreprises, suggérant qu’une 
intervention précoce (à la phase de démarrage) de tierces parties 
compétentes et motivées pourrait être un élément crucial pour créer un plus 
grand nombre d’organisations hybrides durables.  
Enfin, la troisième étude de cette thèse est relative aux antécédents 
d’hybridité. Bien que les organisations hybrides, en particulier les 
entreprises hybrides qui associent une mission sociale et/ou 
environnementale à un état d’esprit commercial-à but lucratif, sont en train 
de gagner en proéminence dans les recherches et en pratique, la majorité 
des recherches sur l’organisation hybride (incluant deux des trois chapitres 
de la présente thèse) est restée jusqu’à maintenant au niveau 
organisationnel et négligeait les antécédents au niveau inviduel. C’est un 
constat étonnant étant donné le rôle influent des individus en matière de 
création (Glynn, 2000; Zilber, 2002), de perpétuation (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002 ; Fiol, 2002 ; Murray, 2010) et de résolution (Besharov, 
2014 ; Jay, 2013 ; Lok, 2010 ; Powell & Baker, 2017) des tensions au 
niveau de l’entreprise liées à l’hybridité.  
Pour mieux comprendre les micro-fondations de l’organisation 
hybride (comment les attributs au niveau individuel façonnent les résultats 
hybrides en matière de prise de décision), cette étude utilise une conception 
expérimentale de la tradition de l’analyse conjointe. J’ai demandé à 154 
investisseurs au sein d’organisations hybrides et non-hybrides et à l’état 
d’esprit varié d’évaluer des propositions d’investissement basées sur un 
ensemble de repères commerciaux et sociaux, ce qui a donné un ensemble 
de données de 3 388 évaluations d’investissement. L’hybridité de leurs 
états d’esprit a été capturée au moyen d’une échelle d’identité sociale 
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adaptée (Sieger, Gruber, Fauchart, & Zellweger, 2016), tandis que les 
résultats hybrides l’ont été par le biais de l’analyse de l’évaluation de 
l’attractivité de différentes propositions d’investissements variable.  Les 
conclusions montrent que la « qualité sociale » de l’état d’esprit d’un 
individu augmente l’attractivité perçue de l’hybridité dans les décisions 
d’investissement, tandis que le degré d’orientation commerciale de l’état 
d’esprit d’un individu réduit cette attractivité perçue. En outre, ces résultats 
démontrent un soutien partiel de la façon dont, et dans quelles conditions 
les états d’esprits hybrides entraînent une divergence des préférences de 
prise de décision de ces préférences connues. Comme attendu, les individus 
dont l’état d’esprit est fortement hybride considèrent les modèles 
commerciaux hybrides comme étant plus attrayants et l’importance de la 
cause sociale visée d’une entreprise comme étant moins attrayante comparé 
aux individus dont l’état d’esprit est à dominante sociale.  
Cependant, on pourrait s’attendre à ce que des individus à l’esprit 
commercial dominant soient plus sensibles au prix des parts d’une 
entreprise comparé à des individus hautement hybrides (c’est-à-dire le 
montant de capital offre par montant d’investissement fixe), mais nous 
observons le contraire. Les individus à l’état d’esprit hautement hybride 
accordent plus d’importance au valeur commerciale de l’entreprise 
comparé aux individus à dominante sociale, mais, étonnamment, ils y 
accordent davantage d’importance comparé aussi aux individus à 
dominante commerciale. Ces découvertes démontrent les résultats parfois 
paradoxaux de la combinaison de deux façons de penser et soulignent 
l’importance et l’influence des agents individuels en matière de promotion 
et de perpétuation des états d’esprit au sein des entreprises. Elles offrent 
des implications importantes pour les recherches sur la prise de décision, 
l’identité et l’entrepreneuriat social. 
Pour terminer, les conclusions de cette thèse ont des implications 
pour les recherches relatives aux prises de décision des investisseurs, à 
l’organisation hybride et à l’entrepreneuriat. J’amène le débat sur la façon 
dont les organisations gèrent des objectifs, identités et motivations 
multiples dans le domaine de la recherche sur la prise de décision des 
investisseurs ; un flux de recherche académique qui s’est largement 
développé en parallèle des recherches sur les organisations hybrides (pour 
de rares exceptions, voir par exemple, Daggers & Nicholls, 2016 ; Mair & 
Hehenberger, 2014 ; Miller & Wesley II, 2010). Je présente la façon dont 
la dualité est considérée et comment les investisseurs sociaux la 
manifestent, comment les investisseurs évaluent et façonnent la dualité au 
sein des organisations émergentes et comment les attributs au niveau 
individuel affectent la prise de décision hybride. Ce faisant, cette thèse 
répond aux appels à la recherche sur la façon sont les missions sociales 
affectent les résultats de prise de décision parmi les sociétés 
d’investissement et les initiatives de levées de fonds (Dacin et al., 2011 ; 
Hollensbe, Wookey, Hickey, George, & Nichols, 2014 ; Shepherd, 2015 ; 
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Short et al., 2009), et alimente les conversations sur les avantages et 
inconvénients potentiels relatifs au traitement de problèmes sociaux 
importants par le biais de l’entreprise. 
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E: Cover letter 
 
The following excerpt is included to complement the discussion in 
Chapter 2 about the researcher’s intentions when beginning this project. 
This excerpt, dated August 28, 2013, is of the cover letter sent to the Chair 
of Entrepreneurship and Technology Commercialization at EPFL in its 
entirety. In this letter, the reader may supplement their opinion about the 
reliability of the thesis by providing data about the context in which it was 
carried out. The cover includes the researcher’s stated interests at the time, 
and original goals in pursuing this research project.  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Nettra Pan. I am a French-American citizen of 
Cambodian origin applying for the role of Ph.D. candidate at the Chair for 
Entrepreneurship and Technology Commercialization at the EPFL College 
of Management. I have recently completed a Master’s Degree at the Paris 
School of International Affairs at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences 
Po), where I studied public management, development policy and East 
Asia. Previously, I attended Columbia University, where I received my 
Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science. I believe my professional and 
academic background – added to my personal motivation – make me a 
strong candidate for the study of entrepreneurship, a subject I believe is 
vital to the growth of meaningful economic opportunities for young people. 
During my undergraduate education, I honed my skills in 
quantitative and qualitative research, in addition to gaining a solid 
foundation in ethics and Western political culture. At the graduate level, I 
delved deeper into the study of financial systems, public policy and drivers 
of human development in developing countries. I now seek an opportunity 
to specialize in the creation of societal wealth at an individual level, and to 
work on projects with directly applicable implications for entrepreneurs 
and governance reform. 
I am an intellectually curious and resourceful person who has 
consistently worked in the social and education sector. This year I 
completed an internship in management consulting, helping organizations 
to fulfill their social and environmental goals while remaining 
economically viable. Working full-time at Hystra (Hybrid Strategies 
Consulting) introduced me to the challenges and rewards of being the 
intermediary between entrepreneurs, foundations and large corporations. 
Interacting with a range of startups, community organizations and non-
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profits taught me the extent to which social ventures can rely on 
conventional business principles. After many interviews with firm founders 
and local contacts, we found that selling and marketing durable goods to 
rural areas actually required strong value propositions, high gross 
margins, sophisticated digital and mobile marketing tools and specially 
adapted sales training for micro-entrepreneurs (many of which were 
women working part-time). This opened my eyes to the amount of 
misinformation and uncertainty entrepreneurs in developing countries 
faced, and the potential for a scientifically-sound and well-executed 
education campaign to have a positive impact. 
I have great admiration for entrepreneurs and hope to one day to 
offer holistic education in Cambodia through workshops and classes with a 
focus on creativity and entrepreneurship. In the last two years, as a Paris 
Ambassador for Sandbox, a global community of young leaders, I helped 
grow the hub from a group of 4 to 40 entrepreneurially-minded, close-knit 
young people committed to supporting each other and making a difference 
in their field. Through Sandbox, I have explored the New York City and 
Paris tech and social startup ecosystem, serving as a mentor, facilitator 
and judge in workshops and venture competitions. I would greatly welcome 
spending four years at EPFL to deepen my understanding of successful 
ventures and entrepreneurial ecosystems. Thank you for considering my 
application. 
 
Sincerely, 
Nettra Pan 
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F: Shortlist of dimensions considered for conjoint study 
 
Figure 46: Potential non-social-mission-related dimensions and levels for conjoint study 
 
Figure 47: Eight potential dimensions and levels for conjoint study – Option 1 
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Figure 48: Alternative potential dimensions and levels for conjoint study 
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G: Study 3 Appendix 
Categories explaining investment outcomes, their definition and frequencies 
Category 
and sub-
category 
Examples Exemplary data Main reason 
for ejection  
(1/proposal) 
All given reasons for ejection 
(average of 1.6/proposal) 
Reasons for rejection and reasons for ejection # % # % Weighted 
Product/service 142 8.8 416 16.5 140 8.7 
Offer 
attributes 
- Value 
proposition 
unclear 
- Not 
differentiated 
(no USP) 
- Limited 
appeal 
- [We] struggled with the product's 
ability to be a truly differentiated and 
'game changing' technology within the 
accessibility market. (785, 
Correspondence with venture) 
- I ultimately think this service is still a 
little ahead of its time and not a 
holistic enough solution (i.e.: nice to 
have for those who can afford it, but 
limited prospect of continual 
engagement and mass adoption). 
(1104, IC Poll) 
- Concerns around willingness to [pay] 
for separate handset (885, IC Poll) 
81 5.0 
 
212 8.4 76 4.7 
Commercial 
strategy 
- Defensibility 
of offer 
- Route to 
market 
- High user 
acquisition 
costs 
- difficult to 
scale 
- distribution 
strategy 
inadequate 
- Not sure what's defensible here, until 
they generate sufficient brand/critical 
mass. (735, IC Poll) 
- Pass - lack of scalability of brick and 
mortar school model. (484, IC Minutes) 
- The team agreed that the opportunity 
and change you're aiming to create in 
how we consume art in the day-to-day 
is intriguing. However, the team could 
not agree on our views around the 
commercial strategy of creating 
coffee+art hubs at scale. In particular, 
the model seems to entail quite a 
complex process in creating a 
"template-able" model at scale across 
new geographies and networks of 
artists. (990, Correspondence with 
venture) 
61 3.8 204 8.1 64 4.0 
Market   80 5.0 245 9.7 82 5.1 
Addressabl
e market 
- Market size,  
- Competition 
- Active 
incumbent 
- First, the competitive landscape has 
become quite saturated over the past 
few years, with corporates facing an 
increasing spectrum of similar 
propositions for their employees. The 
team struggled to see what the 
competitive edge is for corporates to 
choose [venture] over these 
propositions. (720, Correspondence 
with venture) 
- Pass on investing due to competition 
(836, SVC Database) 
34 2.1 126 5.0 37 2.3 
Market 
regulation 
risk 
- Risk of 
government 
intervention 
- Relying on local authorities as partners 
may be difficult to scale - red tape and 
budget dependent? (1264, IC Poll) 
1 0.1 8 0.3 2 0.1 
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or lack of 
government 
support 
- Legal 
complexities 
- [We] spent considerable time 
discussing the opportunity, but 
couldn't arrive at a consensus on 
balancing the capital needs of the 
business over time and the potential to 
scale and become adopted across 
multiple jurisdiction (714, 
Correspondence with venture) 
Product-
market fit 
- No evidence 
of product-
market fit 
- Limited sales, 
users, 
partners, and 
other kinds of 
traction 
- No signs of market traction or 
adoption by schools. (1530, SVC 
Database) 
- I think it's a bit premature for us to 
consider investing until such point as 
they gain a bit more traction, would 
you mind keeping us posted in this 
regard? (515, Internal correspondence) 
- All expressions of interest - no signed 
contracts (1546, Venture meeting 
notes) 
45 2.8 111 4.4 43 2.7 
Finance   38 2.4 118 4.7 42 2.6 
Capital 
expenditur
e required 
- High capital 
requirement 
- Long payback 
period 
- Not as immediately appealing, 
especially given longer payback 
periods and capex needs (14, SVC 
Database) 
- Significant capex and lead time to 
market (1503, SVC Database) 
8 0.5 26 1.0 8 0.5 
Revenue 
model 
- Small margins 
or insufficient 
volume 
- Not-for-profit 
approach 
- Interesting idea, but no idea how to 
monetize (1450, SVC Database) 
- Yes, agree don’t think there is big 
revenue opportunity. [They] want to 
open-source software and have 
hardware “subsidized” by NGO’s / 
gov’t bodies (?) (1476, Venture 
meeting notes) 
30 1.9 92 3.6 34 2.1 
Team   10 0.6 77 3.0 24 1.5 
Founder - Founder 
personality 
and values 
- Founder 
talent 
- Rapport with 
VC 
- Founder 
commitment 
to venture 
- I don’t [sic] think we can back 
[founder].  He is not a founder that I 
would like to take out for a beer (or 
fruit juice), which in my mind makes 
him a tough proposition for us to back.  
(1256, Poll) 
- Key questions are […] founder: can she 
attract top talent to work with her and 
is she taking our feedback?" (1303, 
Venture meeting notes) 
- serious concerns on his character.  This 
is something absolutely not right about 
him. I think we would struggle to work 
with him. (1255, IC Poll) 
- [P3] met 22/7: [P2] and [P3] agree - 
not convinced with founder [founder]'s 
intentions/strategy/capability. (193, 
SVC Database) 
4 0.2 27 1.1 9 0.6 
Team’s 
skills and 
experience 
- No or 
incomplete 
team 
- Lacking key 
expertise, 
e.g., in 
business or 
technology 
- Lost co-founder. To stay in touch as 
reforms team and be helpful. (1249, 
SVC Database) 
- The focus on talent acquisition was 
missing from your broader plans, as 
whilst consultants can be helpful when 
given discrete project based work, the 
ability to find and retain top talent will 
be what truly turns [venture] into a 
great business. (1282, Correspondence 
with venture) 
6 0.4 50 2.0 15 0.9 
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VC-specific criteria 754 46.7 1078 42.6 735 45.5 
VC-focus:  
venture 
location 
- Outside 
geographic 
focus 
- No local 
contact 
 
- Need to see local investors in [region] 
(1247, IC Minutes) 
- [vote no]. Can we help this particular 
business in [emerging-country]/target 
markets? 
- Passed due to […] geographical risk 
([emerging-country] based) 
18 1.1 31 1.2 19 1.1 
VC-focus: 
venture 
stage 
- Too early 
- Company too 
advanced 
- Valuation too 
high 
- Raise too 
large 
- Too big for us (8) 
- Pass due to size. (784) 
- The team was impressed with the 
product and traction to date; however, 
the business has progressed to a later 
stage than the current focus of FIRM's 
investments. (1009, Correspondence 
with venture) 
-  Take off table for now due to: 
valuation (617) 
- [DM2] and [DM2] met with [founders]. 
Venture is still idea stage. (221) 
- Interesting what they're building but 
quite early. (315) 
- Pass due to stage (lack of proof of 
concept). (549) 
- Too early to invest in (1179) 
99 6.1 153 6.1 92 5.7 
VC-focus: 
venture 
mission 
- Hazardous 
relationship 
of social 
outcome to 
revenue 
mechanism 
- Unclear 
founder social 
motivation 
- Inappropriate 
problem 
scope 
- Unclear 
venture 
contribution 
- Ease of 
measurement 
of venture 
contribution 
- Action Area=N/A (20, SVC Database) 
- Social (Yes/No/Maybe): No (28, SVC 
Database) 
- No impact (32, SVC Database)  
- P2 relayed message: pass on investing 
due to lack of fit with our impact 
framework (67, SVC Database) 
- NFP [not-for-profit]- not for us (277, 
SVC Database) 
- We believe the venture is currently not 
analogous with our broader portfolio, 
as we seek to measure the pre-
determined social outcomes generated 
by the product or service of the 
company. (141, Correspondence with 
venture) 
- I'm not sure there is a clear enough fit 
with our investment areas and impact 
focus, but we do wish you all the best 
(179, Correspondence with venture) 
- Very intersting idea [sic], but not clear 
what social outcome here is (564, Poll) 
- We could not arrive at a consensus in 
how [venture] fits into our investment 
framework, particularly in how we aim 
to measure the social outcomes 
generated by the products over time. 
(1322, Correspondence with venture) 
429 26.6 629 24.9 425 26.3 
VC 
preference: 
deal 
structure 
- Small round 
allocation 
- Insufficient 
control, e.g., 
board seat 
- Share grade 
- We were going to be the largest ticket, 
but we weren’t going to have a board 
seat, and there were some other 
concerns around the terms (149, 
Interview) 
- [No.] We should be either in great 
value deals/leading, and/or a minority 
of 'access' deals, where we have a v 
strong partner who can lead and 
underwrite for a long time (eg [lead 
investor] in [5564]). Note also [deal 
structure], with pref 8% cum divi 
9 0.6 20 0.8 9 0.6 
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structure, which is typically not quite 
right for us. (373, Poll) 
VC context: 
SVC 
capacity 
- Mismatch 
with VC 
expertise 
- Lack of expert 
endorsement 
- Low team 
capacity  
- Biology is too advanced for me. (279, 
SVC Database) 
- We failed to get back [to this venture 
on time] and missed this round (750, 
Venture Minutes) 
- Closing too soon (1603, SVC Database) 
- I think given your timelines it'll be 
difficult for us to close an investment 
(1032, Correspondence with venture) 
50 3.1 77 3.0 45 2.7 
VC context: 
Relation to 
other 
ventures 
and 
portfolio 
- Conflict with 
another 
venture under 
consideration 
- Conflict with 
portfolio 
venture 
-  [A3] met, as comparison to [other 
venture in pipeline, 3334] [only] (no 
further action) 
- Not high enough on our shortlist at the 
moment to prioritize. (1338, SVC 
Database)  
- There may be a similar venture with 
more traction/better model - [venture 
616 which we are in touch with] (907, 
SVC Database) 
- Interesting tech but too similar to 
other parts of portfolio (722, IC 
Minutes) 
13 0.8 27 1.1 13 0.8 
VC context: 
Venture 
rejection 
- Venture not 
currently 
raising 
- Venture 
closed round 
without 
invitation 
- Venture did 
not respond 
- Not raising at the moment. [founder] 
will update us (133, SVC Database) 
- not looking for funding, is looking for 
advice and input (159, Venture 
meeting notes) 
- Family emergency - waiting til Jan for 
update (786, SVC Database) 
- No reponse from venture [sic] (1590, 
SVC Database) 
- [To venture]: I must admit, however, 
that I'm disappointed that we were not 
offered an allocation in the round 
alongside the other investors. (214, 
Correspondence with venture) 
- Oversubscribed - P2 to write back - 
[there is] not space for us. (847, IC 
Minutes) 
136 8.4 141 5.6 133 8.3 
Other - Not fully 
passed 
- Stay in touch 
- No reason 
given  
- Pass on investment conversation at 
this time. (153, SVC Database) 
- [P2] and [P3] spoke with [founder] No 
further action. (176, SVC Database) 
- No further action (220, SVC Database) 
- She said, “I took a look and I don’t find 
it interesting.” (1051, Interview) 
- We don’t really have a good answer. 
What does art mean to us from an 
impact perspective? Let’s not fully 
pass. (80, IC Transcript) 
- Team not selected as finalist for 
[competition] (825, SVC Database) 
550 34.1 554 21.9 551 34.1 
Investment status (for ventures still under consideration) # % # % # % 
Under 
review 
- To be 
reviewed 
- Under review 
- Due diligence 
- Terms under 
negotiation 
- Fundraising 
- P1 wants to schedule follow-up. (608, 
IC Minutes) 
- A3 to look into: What is size of 
problem? Quantifying number of 
people at risk. (146, IC Minutes) 
- Would you be available for a call over 
the next couple weeks to discuss? 
(1539, Correspondence with venture) 
21 1.3 21 0.8 21 1.3 
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Invested - Deal closed 
and money 
transferred 
- Transfer of money to occur (1287, IC 
Minutes) 
- Negotiation re: valuation. [2 weeks 
later:] DM1 to prompt them to sign. 
[One month later:] Need to sign today 
- DM2 will liaise. [One week later:] 
Closed. (610, IC Minutes) 
19 1.2 19 0.8 19 1.2 
Total 1614 100 2528 100 1614 100 
Table 41: Exemplary data for SVC’s top-level categories for investment outcomes, definitions and frequency 
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Dual-purpose investment proposal attributes (Phase IV alternative coding expanded) 
Exemplary Data Indicating Reason for Rejection141 
(Note: decisions may have multiple reasons) 
Phase III Coding (original) Phase IV Coding (alternative) 
Sub-
category 
Code group Category Sub-category 
I'm not sure there is a clear enough fit with our 
investment areas and impact focus, but we do 
wish you all the best (179, Correspondence with 
venture) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Social mission 
(general) 
Market Social impact 
area 
Discussed at IC on 16.01 - not a fit due to testing of 
stem cells (258, SVC Database); 
Don't think we should be investing in company 
using human stem cell research. Personal views 
aside, this is still controversial area. (258, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Social mission 
(general) 
Market Social approval 
risk 
I did not buy into the idea of selling to rich and 
then subsidising the solution for the poor.  This is 
not lock step. It should make money by servicing 
the poor.  Can they change to make this more 
accessible? 
More detail on the business plan and revenue 
model? (815, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Relationship of 
social activity to 
core revenue 
generating 
activity 
Revenue 
model  
Relation to 
social activity 
Team discussed at IC on 27/7: No investment at 
this stage due to not fitting lock-step model. [DM2] 
provided response on 1/9. (Tracker) 
Will get bought by a big insurer - need to work out 
impact. (898, SVC Database, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Relationship of 
social activity to 
core revenue 
generating 
activity 
Revenue 
model  
Relation to 
social activity 
While we are aligned with respect to the social 
outcomes the business aims to achieve in 
supporting local and small-scale producers, we 
look for scalable for profit businesses which deliver 
sustainable social and commercial outcomes. 
(1550, Correspondence with venture) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
Follow-up=pass; Meeting=No; Comment=Non-
profit (1556, SVC Database) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
"Not a fit for venture (more NFP)" (1560, SVC 
Database) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
DM1: Can they sustain and grow as a for-profit? 
Seems more like a (great) nfp [not-for-profit] 
model. Again, $1.50 is quite expensive for a wash 
and reading session (I paid about the same for 3-4 
weeks of washing - soap and water, my own two 
hands).  
[venture offers washing machines for rent, inside a 
community library]  
P1: Nice idea, but I really struggle to understand 
the business viability. (790, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Not-for-profit 
approach 
Revenue 
model  
Profit model 
Team: Average - the team has extensive business 
experience (particularly the CEO), but seems to 
have limited focus on generating real social 
impact. (93, Venture Meeting Notes) 
 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Founder/team 
social 
motivation 
Founder 
/team 
Commitment 
(to generating 
positive social 
outcomes) 
Don’t seem that impact driven. (450, IC Minutes) VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Founder/team 
social 
motivation 
Founder 
/team 
Commitment 
(to generating 
positive social 
outcomes) 
VC8: [Vote no.] Great idea and business potential. 
The impact is not convincing to me so. 
VC-specific 
criteria 
Problem scope 
(inappropriate 
problem) 
Product 
/service  
Differentiated 
(social) 
proposition 
                                                                        
141 All are direct quotes; each number refers to a different investment proposal. 
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VC4: [Vote no.] Impact appears limited, and much 
more interesting would be creating capsules to be 
used in existing Nespresso machines. 
VC3: [Vote no.] I don't think this is actually that 
impactful (yes, it saves time for parents, but I find 
the health effects tenuous). The idea seems 
interesting and anecdotally (and instinct) tells me 
there is [low] initial willingness to pay (esp among 
upper middle class) until price points fall over 
time.  
VC1: [Vote no.] amazing idea, but i dont see an 
impact case here. (723, Poll) 
 
(venture 
mission) 
I hope you're well. I wanted to firstly thank you for 
your patience and engagement in this process, 
with the materials you provided this morning 
being very helpful in framing our Investment 
Committee discussions. The feedback from the 
team this morning was that whilst the technology 
was fascinating and the team compelling, we could 
not get comfortable with the following points: 
 
1). The high price point excluded large parts of the 
population, and therefore limited the positive 
social outcome generation. 
 
2). The go-to-market strategy was not diversified 
or differentiated enough to really excite us. 
 
Therefore, [] will not be investing in this round. I 
understand that this must be disappointing, but if 
you would like more detailed feedback please do 
let me know. (Venture correspondence) 
 
VC2: Too niche and high-end for the moment, 
perhaps we can revisit if they look to broaden their 
appeal? 
VC1: [Vote no.] I think the impact case here is 
weak. 
VC3: [Vote no.] from an impact perspective.  
VC4: [Vote no.] No impact, but a potentially 
lucrative high margin business if the sales strategy 
can be accurately executed. (724, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Problem scope 
(high-end 
customer 
target) 
Market  Size (niche 
premium 
market) 
[We] struggled with the product's ability to be a 
truly differentiated and 'game changing' 
technology within the accessibility market. (785, 
Correspondence with venture) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Venture 
contribution 
(general) 
Product 
/service  
Differentiation 
of (social) 
proposition 
How can you measure that and what is actually a 
leading indicator? Also, because we don't measure 
impact and for the sake of measuring impact. You 
measure impact in the belief that it should be 
driving your financial story. […]  We'd need to think 
about what is a driver of success for your business 
alongside delivering a positive social outcome. 
(777, Fieldwork notes) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Venture 
contribution 
(measurability) 
Product 
/service  
Competitive 
advantage 
(social 
proposition 
effectiveness) 
I like the company but raise two questions [sic]: 1) 
How does it fit in our impact metric? [It’s] 
education, but there are no clear impact metrics 
defined and they do not use any KPIs 2) Very 
competitive market. DD [due diligence] has to 
reveal a clear competitive advantage (What do 
they have that no one else can mimic? (229, Poll) 
VC-specific 
criteria 
(venture 
mission) 
Venture 
contribution 
(measurability) 
Product 
/service  
Competitive 
advantage 
(social 
proposition 
effectiveness) 
Table 42: Additional exemplary data of alternative coding of SVC’s mission-related decisions, revealing SVC’s use of dual lens  
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Detailed breakdown of SVC investment milestones 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total 
       
Deals received (entry) 16 74 680 719 125 1614 
Deals reviewed (exit) 14 47 650 725 178 1614 
       
Investments (new) 1 3 2 6 2 14 
Investments rate (new) 7% 6% 0% 1% 1% 16% 
Follow-ons made 0 0 0 4 1 5 
Investments (total) 1 3 2 10 3 19 
Investments rate (total) 7% 6% 0% 1% 2% 17% 
       
Resubmit rate of invested 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 11% 
Resubmits received 0 0 13 76 16 105 
Resubmit rate (incl. FO) 0 0 2% 11% 13% 25% 
Resubmits reviewed (no FO) 0 0 10 69 24 103 
Resubmits reviewed (total) 0 0 10 69 26 105 
Resubmits invested (no FO) 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Resubmits invested (incl. FO) 0 0 0 6 1 7 
Table 43: Detailed breakdown of SVC investment milestones 
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Investment selection outcomes over time at a Social VC (red line) vs. a traditional VC (black 
line) 
 
Figure 49: A comparison of ejections over time between a traditional VC (black line) and a social VC (red line) 
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H: Study 4 Appendix 
 
Extended introduction to empirical context 
 
Social Venture Capital  
In the last few decades, expectations about who is responsible for 
addressing social and environmental problems has palpably changed 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014). On one hand, citizens are dissatisfied with 
traditional providers of social services, expressing record-levels of distrust 
of the government (Edelman Berland, 2014; Nye, 1997a, 1997b). On the 
other hand, businesses and investors understand the growing demand from 
stakeholders to engage in more prosocial (and more pro-environmental) 
behavior (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008; BlackRock, 2018; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Walsh, Meyer, & Schoonhoven, 2006). These 
combined two factors provide a niche for social ventures and social 
investors. 
Although failure rates among social ventures remain high (Harding, 
2007; Lyons & Kickul, 2013; Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008), interest in these 
structures grows, attracting interest from media (Short et al., 2009), 
government (Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000), and students. In top U.S. 
business schools, the number of students enrolled in social enterprise 
courses or independent projects has risen by over 800% in a 15-year 
period142 (Milway & Goulay, 2013). The number of benefit corporations—
a legal entity in the United States that allows for-profit companies to 
include social welfare-oriented activities, in addition to its commercial 
goals—has grown exponentially since 2010 (Bannon, 2015).  
On the investment side, one report estimates that social investors 
overall will manage 500 billion to one trillion USD143 in assets by 2020 
(Acumen Fund & Monitor Institute, 2012), raising funds from diverse 
sources: large institutions, public, and private funds and foundations 
(Center for Global Development, 2010; Puttick & Ludlow, 2012; Rodin & 
Brandenburg, 2014). Many of these funds operate in frontier markets, 
although this is not always the case. They are also found in a variety of 
social sectors such as renewable energy (23%), rural development (17%), 
                                                                        
142 From 71 in 1995 to 600 in 2010.  
143 For reference, this is 5-10 times the amount of overseas development aid in 2008 (Yasmin, 2009). The MoneyTree Report 
estimated venture capital investment at over $58 billion in the United States in 2015 (National Venture Capital Association, 2016). 
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trade (14%), education (4%), and health (17%) (Simon & Barmeier, 2010), 
but also traditional sectors such as Agriculture, Health, Food (AHF), 
Consumer Products, Retail (CPR), Energy, Environmental Technology, 
Utilities (EEU), Financial, Consulting, Services (FCS), Manufacturing, 
Construction, Transportation, Media, Education (MCT), Communications 
(MEC), and Software and IT (SIT) (Clark & Ucak, 2006: 22).  
SVCs in particular, mostly operating in a traditional venture capital 
structures144 and targeting early-stage ventures in a number of industries, 
have raised 10 billion USD to invest in social ventures since 2010 
(Randjelovic, O’Rourke, & Orsato, 2003; Rheingold, 2017; Santos et al., 
2015). While these funds have been areas of great growth in the last few 
decades, they are also still a source of confusion, due to fragmentation in 
the overall industry, with multiple actors using the same terms to describe 
different approaches to investing and vice versa (Chiappini, 2017; Daggers 
& Nicholls, 2016; Freireich & Fulton, 2009; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015).  
For example, what we refer to as “Social Venture Capital” (Miller & 
Wesley II, 2010) is also referred to as “impact investing” (Rodin & 
Brandenburg, 2014), “blended value investing,” “double-bottom line” or 
“triple-bottom-line investing” (Harold, Spitzer, & Emerson, 2007), 
“community development venture capital” (Jegen, 1998), “developmental 
venture capital” (Rubin, 2009), “mission-driven investing” (Kolodny, 
2016), “patient capital” (Novogratz, 2010), “philanthrocapitalism” 
(McGoey, 2014), “philanthropic venture capital” (Scarlata & Alemany, 
2010), “social investing” (Nicholls, 2010), “sustainable venture capital” 
(Bocken, 2015), and “venture philanthropy” (Healey & Hoyt, 2013; 
Moody, 2007; Pepin, 2005). At times, these terms are also lumped together 
with related but separate social investment styles from the commercial 
side—such as “Socially Responsible Investing” and “Environmental-
Social-Governance Investing,” whose decision rules are primarily based on 
selective filters applied to publicly traded companies and physical assets 
(Irvine, 1987; Rudd, 1981; Yan, Ferraro, & Almandoz, 2018)—as well as 
from the social side, whereby terms such as “investment” are used, but 
refer to a charitable grant without the expectation of financial return (The 
European Venture Philanthropy Association, 2016).  
When these terms do refer to the same thing, that is, investing with 
the dual purpose of creating strong social and financial returns, they still 
encompass a number of different financial preferences (Chiappini, 2017; 
Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015), investment structuring approaches (Scarlata 
& Alemany, 2010)—including different investment targets (e.g. early-
stage, later stage, social themes, legal structures)—and financial 
instruments (e.g., equity, loans). 
                                                                        
144 A traditional venture capital structure refers to a fund managed by a General Partner on behalf of Limited Partners whose money 
is being managed. 
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Prior literature in this area has tended to focus on the concept of 
trade-offs, that an investor must either sacrifice rigor in the evaluation of a 
venture’s potential social contribution or, if she truly wishes to enable 
meaningful social outcomes, accept below market-rate financial returns 
(Daggers & Nicholls, 2016; Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011). 
Essentially, the literature has implied that investors must prioritize either 
financial outcomes (acting as a “finance-first” investor) or prioritize social 
outcomes (acting as an “impact first” investor), but they cannot pursue both 
and achieve competitive outcomes (Achleitner, Spiess-Knafl, & Volk, 
2014).  
One of the reasons why competitive outcomes are thought to be 
unattainable is due to the assumed negative interdependent relationship 
between social activities and financial activities within a firm, as echoed by 
one stream of hybrid organizing research. In the context of social investing, 
scholars caution that resource providers can limit hybridity in the 
organizations they fund by encouraging “mission-drift,” a phenomenon 
whereby organizations gradually come to prioritize demands of the 
commercial identity over the social one (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jegen, 
1998). Yet, much like the research on ideographic hybrid organizations, 
empirical work on resource providers that combine commercial and 
(pro)social identities is equally rare (Lyons & Kickul, 2013; Shepherd, 
2015; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). Thus, it is not certain that 
third-party support in hybrid organizing tends to lead to hybridity collapse.  
In fact, theoretically it would follow that an ideographic hybrid 
organization would seek investments in hybrid organizations with qualities 
they believed essential to success. The new nature of this phenomenon 
suggests that young, dual-identity organizations may simply not have 
managed to raise funds (or raise funds from appropriate partners) (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994; Harding, 2007; Lyon & Ramsden, 2006; Pache & Santos, 
2013). SVCs in this context would represent an important source of 
financial, social, and knowledge capital (Huang & Knight, 2017; Lyons & 
Kickul, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Our social investor of interest, SVCs, are like traditional VCs in that 
they expect their portfolio companies to generate revenue and eventually 
return cash to their investors (MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Yet unlike traditional VCs, social VCs also 
expect their investees to deliver on social outcomes (Scarlata & Alemany, 
2010). An independent study referred to them as “VCs first that intend to 
generate market-beating financial returns because of, not in spite of, [a 
social] impact-oriented investment thesis” (Rheingold, 2017). They usually 
hold both a social and financial mandate. If structured as a fund they have a 
fiduciary responsibility to their investors. Some funds also self-impose a 
social performance requirement on the managing partners of the firm, 
which prevent them from touching the financial gains from their 
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investment (e.g., “carry”) if social performance indicators are not met 
(alongside financial indicators) (Fieldwork). 
As such, social investors represent a viable window into the 
complexities of duality, as they seek out dualistic organizations they 
believe to have the markers of sustainable hybridity. We detail the 
empirical advantages of our context in the following section. 
 
Social Venture Capital as a Window into Organizational Identity Duality  
The primary reason why SVCs are intriguing as an organizational 
setting is due to the specificities of its hybrid nature. Theoretically, SVCs 
have the capacity to be ideographic or holographic hybrids, as they can be 
inhabited by two groups of individuals: one that identifies mostly with the 
(pro)social identity145 of the firm and one that mostly identifies with the 
firm’s commercial identity. In fact, this is what we have seen modeled by 
other hybrid financial institutions in the literature (e.g., the microfinance 
institution studied by Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Alternatively, SVCs may 
be populated only by individuals who equally identify with the dual sides 
of the firm’s activities, rendering their firm’s identity as holographic 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Whetten, 2006). 
From another theoretical perspective, SVCs have the capacity to be 
structured in a way that places the social and commercial identities at odds 
with each other (low compatibility), while also ensuring that manifesting 
both identities in “core features that are central to organizational 
functioning” (high centrality) (Besharov & Smith, 2014: 7). Scholars 
theorize that this low compatibility and high centrality results in a 
contested organization—a key indicator of conflict in hybrid organizations. 
Indeed, this might be the more commonly expected case. Scholars argue: 
 
“inevitably there will be a tension between social and financial 
goals, and at some point[,] every [social venture capital firm] will 
have to choose between higher financial returns and the fund's 
social agenda” (Jegen, 1998: 189). 
 
However, it does not preclude the possibility of an SVCs with high 
compatibility and high centrality, which may be more mindful and cautious 
of being the cause of “mission-drift,” whereby organizations gradually 
come to prioritize demands of the commercial identity over the social one 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jegen, 1998). Moreover, the literature has rarely 
examined such holographic/high compatibility organizations, and yet much 
could be learned about hybridity from such organizations.  
                                                                        
145 Our identity construct of interest in this study is organizational and new venture identity, not social identity, which is a social-
cognitive, individual level construct. Hence, from time to time, we use the preface (pro)social to indicate the type of identity we are 
referring to (i.e., social welfare-related, driven by the desire to help others, prosocial). 
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SVCs have extensive experience in evaluating duality and strong 
incentives to accurately assess organizations due to their dual identity. The 
literature on emerging organizations suggests that access to resources is an 
indicator—if not a determinant—of success (Baum & Silverman, 2004; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Starr & MacMillan, 1990), especially in young 
hybrids (Lyons & Kickul, 2013). While there is some debate on 
endogeneity (i.e., whether these “winners” are selected or made (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004)), the fact is that SVCs review hundreds of investment 
proposals per year. This suggests that compared to any other actor, such 
firms have developed some expertise in understanding the factors affecting 
performance in holographic forms of hybridity, making their perspective 
intriguing and informative (for a parallel, see: MacMillan et al., 1985).  
Moreover, we know that organizations are inspired by the forms 
which surround them, and that they selectively choose which forms to 
integrate and emulate according to their values (Perkmann et al., 2018). 
However, this does not explain why the hybridity of many social-
commercial organizations—organizations that are likely to embrace both 
social and commercial values (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014)—experience 
mission-drift or hybridity collapse (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Tracey et al., 
2011). We know that dual-identity organizations wish to incorporate 
elements of both identities and both sets of values into their organization, 
but we do not know exactly how a dual-identity organization may go about 
this in a way that sets itself up for sustained hybridity and long-term 
success. Given that SVCs build up extensive experience in venture 
evaluation and are incentivized to achieve both social and financial returns, 
we anticipate that their perspective can shed light on the identity 
configurations, which may be sustainable and productive. 
Finally, the perspective of an SVC offers access to investment 
decisions regarding a large sample of early-stage social-commercial 
organizations, one with high levels of internal validity that prior literature 
has not yet had access to (Dacin et al., 2011). The larger sample, combined 
with the positive and negative outcomes (regarding the investment 
decision) allow us to reduce survivorship bias (Denrell, 2005), and use 
funding outcomes from this expert social investor as a simple proxy for 
performance vis-à-vis the new venture identity (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Ter 
Wal et al., 2016). To be clear, we still maintain an inductive interest in the 
SVC process; our interest in the larger sample in this study is not for 
purposes of hypothesis testing beyond the pseudo-replication methods 
undertaken in qualitative studies. 
Additional details about Phase I of data analysis  
We began by focusing on explicit and known frameworks in internal 
documents used by the Firm to describe and guide their own decision-
making strategy internally, which we triangulated with fieldnotes and 
transcriptions from IC meetings. We created data displays depicting the 
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general investment process, upon which we solicited feedback from the 
Firm (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and continued to update as new 
information arose. 
In the second part of Phase I, we shifted our focus from the explicit 
frameworks to the implicit frameworks used by the Firm to assess 
investment proposals. Focusing on key archival documents pertaining to 
investment decisions, including the IC minutes, the Pre-IC poll, the venture 
database, and email correspondence, we sought to move past the Firm’s 
intended strategies, as evidenced in their internal guidelines and public-
facing events, and investigate their emergent decision policies—actual 
reasons explaining why the Firm continued to pursue or stopped pursuing 
different investment opportunities (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Petty & 
Gruber, 2011). 
In this phase, we used an open coding protocol to label all data in 
these documents pertaining to an investment proposal (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Gioia et al., 2013), using labels that were as close to the data as 
possible. This resulted in a set of labels referring to investment proposal 
statuses (whether or not the investments were under consideration by the 
fund), the types of behaviors, emotions, and reactions associated with the 
pending evaluation, and venture attributes, which were at times directly 
linked to a proposed evaluation action in an evaluation-action link (e.g., 
“Too early stage. Stay in touch.”). Although numerous behaviors emerged, 
and the Firm used numerous terms to refer to investment outcomes, we still 
maintained a simplified framework in this phase of analysis, focusing on 
investment proposal attributes—viewing them as determinants of 
investment outcomes—and placing various investment outcomes under 
three large umbrella groups of “still under consideration,” “no longer under 
consideration,” and “invested.” 
In the second phase of Phase I, we enlisted the help of a second 
coder to increase trustworthiness in our coding. After empirical themes 
related to investment proposal attributes stabilized over several rounds of 
coding, and we began to organize these under sub-categories related to 
social-mission-related venture attributes (including hybridity-related 
attributes), commercial venture attributes, and investment-firm-specific 
preferences (see conceptual categories B, D, E and G, in our Figure 25 
illustrating our Data Structure). 
The second coder, who was briefed on the purpose of the study and 
given full access to the archival data (with the Firm’s consent), was then 
brought in and asked to develop his own coding scheme for a sample of 
investment outcome-related data and venture-attribute-related data. We 
compared his coding to our own, discussing instances when different codes 
were proposed, or when the coding did not match our own. We then 
repeated the same exercise, coding separately and then coming together, 
until we had converged on a common codebook. We conducted a test on 
excerpts pertaining to 100 randomly selected ventures and venture 
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outcomes and achieved a high level of interrater agreement at the category 
and sub-category levels (90.42% and 85.45% respectively). Having 
established confidence in the validity of our coding scheme we returned to 
the IC minutes, Pre-IC poll, venture database and email correspondence, 
coding investment proposal attributes and investment outcomes for 492 
investment decisions. 
 
Example of data displays created during Phase III of data analysis 
 
 
Figure 50: Example of data displays created during Phase III of data analysis (each number indicates a separate investment proposal) 
 
Complete Excerpt of Interview with SVC4, Month 1 of Year 4 
SVC4: […] sometimes I'll need to meet companies even [00:22:27] 
twice and then maybe that's a better way to do it is to 
actually go to the IC with conviction in what I'm saying as 
opposed to going to IC and going, here are some ideas when 
I could have more conviction. 
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Researcher: Kind of you go to IC when you're not ... 
SVC4: I don't bring stuff to IC that I don't care about. 
Researcher: Mm-hmm (affirmative), but you can bring it in as a “no.” 
SVC4: Well I'll bring it in as like, "Here's something I've seen." 
Like if I've had a meeting, like a meeting that I had this 
morning I'm not going to pitch for it. 
Researcher: Which one was this morning? 
SVC4: Deal 790 [ 00:23:04], it was sort of like, I had a meeting this 
morning and I'm not going to pitch it. I don't like it so I'm 
not doing more work but if someone else likes it that's fine. 
When I really like something I kind of give it the ability to 
present strongly at IC as opposed to ... just being some other 
one that I bat around and have no real basis of saying 
anything. Does that make sense? 
Researcher: You want to have an opinion. 
SVC4: Well I want to be able to answer questions because so often 
in IC we go back and ask more questions and we don't 
achieve anything. People lose conviction and stuff when you 
can't answer basic questions. You know, like [Dart] they 
came 2 weeks after I first met them. Everybody had, like… 
[then] in the third week we really discussed it. 
Researcher: Yeah, okay. Is 2 weeks a short amount of time? 
SVC4: I saw them 3 times in a 2 week, twice in that [00:24:08] 
timeframe really trying to understand what they were trying 
to achieve. Because key for me was are they really wanting 
to change women's lives or is it just the hook? 
Researcher: Could it be that you see the commercial opportunity needs to 
be strong enough and once it is strong enough it kind of 
intrigues you to also see can we make this also impactful? 
SVC4: No, so it's not [also 00:24:37] it's actually, is that actually 
your motivation for it. I need to like the commercial, I need 
to like that from the start but then… have you retrofitted this 
into this? I'll say stuff like, "Once you get upscale you'll stop 
doing that," to try and ... 
Researcher: Provoke. 
SVC4: Provoke them to either give me the answer they want to hear 
and when they say, "No," that's what I want. I don't want 
that, like I want this, that's a better answer. Because it's 
easy. If you want money, you're just going to agree with me.  
Researcher: Right. 
SVC4: If that's all you want is money you're going to agree with me. 
Researcher: They're going to ruin- 
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SVC4: Well, no, they'll just, if I say to them, "But that's not [very 
scalable right 00:25:15]. When you hit a few million pounds 
in revenue you'll bin that, right?". If you are purely 
interested in the funding you would agree with me on that 
point. 
Researcher: Okay. 
SVC4: You do. 
Researcher: Okay, so they'll just start agreeing and then you'll be like, 
"Okay, no." 
SVC4: Exactly, you're not motivated, whereas when they challenge 
you and they're like, "No, I don't think that's the case at all. 
That's core to what we do." 
Researcher: Okay, so you have to be a little bit manipulative sometimes 
or stone-faced to kind of ... 
SVC4: Yeah, well I mean it's like working out what people's true 
motivations are. The point is that if they are desperate for 
funding they will say anything to get it. 
Researcher: Okay, so then you just ask it a hundred different ways to- 
SVC4: Yeah, exactly. I'll say, "What is success for you?". That's 
one. Some [inaudible 00:25:59] but then some people, it's 
just a case of really figuring out what makes you make a 
decision. This is a critical decision for you is if, with me 
you're going to just say what I want to hear, [then] 3 or 4 
years down the road if we invest with you your decision will 
be driven by [inaudible 00:26:21]- 
Researcher: You won't be able to do anything because you guys will 
already have a stake in them [00:26:25]. 
SVC4: Exactly, exactly. 
Researcher: Have you said no to people like that where it's- 
SVC4: Yeah, so we've had, I'm trying to think back ... [inaudible 
00:26:38] I'll see if I can dig up my notes, but yeah, it was 
someone who I thought was interesting and genuinely 
motivated by that. Then when I was like, "What's success for 
you?", they were like, "Oh, you know, do this and this and 
this.". Then I was like, "But, you know that's not very 
scalable," it's like, "No, you're right, that's not very scalable 
so we'll just have to," ... Then it's like if at this critical point 
you're so willing to say what I want you to say, then you 
don't have that much conviction in what you want to do. 
Researcher: Is there any confusion sometimes because they think you're a 
hardcore investor and so they- 
SVC4: Yeah, but they're going to encounter that in ... future. 
Researcher: Oh, in future. 
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SVC4: Exactly, so they're going to encounter that so you need to 
understand their motivation from the start. 
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I: Study 5 Appendix 
Comments by respondents about their approach to decision-making 
Respondent 
number 
Type of 
firm 
Remarks 
Commercially-dominant 
123 Firm “If you're working at a fund, I feel like you have a responsibilities [sic] to the [fund’s limited 
partners—the shareholders], if they haven't told you to be focusing on a cause, then it's not my role 
to, even if it's a cause I personally care about outside of work. Personally, I am cause driven, but 
beyond setting standards in day to day practice that's not something I think should come into the 
day to day decision-making.” (Respondent #123, with commercially-dominant mindset, Firm #7) 
 
69 VC Firm “The cause is not important, however, if the company, in addition to their revenue-generating 
activity allocates resources to any social cause – personally, I lead the Women in Fintech group and 
lead gender diversity – but for me, when I evaluate the venture, [a cause] is an add-on. This is a 
nice-to-have, but it would never play a role in the decision of whether to invest or not. In that sense, 
the interdependence [of the revenue model and cause-related activity]… I don’t want to see that the 
revenue success is linked to a cause – I want them to be completely independent” (Respondent #69, 
with commercially-dominant mindset, VC Firm #39).  
 
Socially-dominant 
40 Investmen
t Boutique 
“I have no time to waste on ventures that do not target the causes in which I am engaged in. I focus 
[first] on the [venture’s targeted] cause and on the cause-related experience of the founders” 
(Respondent #40, with socially-dominant mindset, Investment Boutique #22). 
 
31 VC Firm “Basically, we're looking for businesses who have strong interdependencies, what we call ‘inherent 
impact’ The social success is tied to success of their product, addressing big causes or several big 
causes together (like the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals)” (Respondent #31, with 
socially-dominant mindset, VC Firm #16). 
 
52 Micro VC “Instead of putting strongly disagree on ‘it is important for me to advance my career in the business 
world’ I only put ‘disagree’ because I somewhat care about it—it's a lever that helps me to achieve 
societal impact goals” (Respondent #52, with socially-dominant mindset, Micro VC #31) 
 
2 Holding 
Company 
“No [I do not invest to become rich], this is definitely a loss-making business. [...] Oh, it is… Anyone 
who does venture capital, who expects to make money is… is… is… doing the wrong thing. Especially 
in impact investment” (Respondent #2, with socially-dominant mindset, Holding Company #1). 
 
59 Not-for-
profit 
“10% of our funding does not allow any financial return [grants], 40% of our funding seeks societal 
return and accepts financial return, while 50 percent, as sad as it is, is dedicated to projects which 
pursue financial and societal returns on equal footing” (Respondent #59, with socially-dominant 
mindset, Not-for-profit #5) 
 
136 VC Firm “If the [social] impact-related characteristics are high, I'd still be willing to look at a high-valuation 
startup. If the impact is low, but the valuation is high, I probably would not be willing to explore that 
further... unless the team was very strong. Then, clearly, high impact and low valuation is a 
conversation I'd like to keep going” (Respondent #136, VC Firm #42). 
 
General hybrid 
2 Holding 
Company 
“I would disagree with [the statement that revenue-generating activities should have no effect on 
progress towards a cause]. I think it is helpful to have revenue-generating activities promote 
progress towards a cause” (Respondent #2, with hybrid mindset, Holding Company #1). 
 
65 VC Firm “The one thing that we're really focused on is that interdependence between the revenue 
generating activity and impact. We'll never do a TOM’s-like model where it's a post-revenue-
 
368 
 
  
generating activity. We're really focused on the sustainability of impact through the commercial 
viability of the business” (Respondent #65, with hybrid dominant mindset, VC Firm #36) 
 
160 Not-for-
profit 
“Interdependence was very important to me - I have something personally against impact that is 
‘artificially’ created. So, being able to structure a company that has good correlation with business 
impact is very important. […] By artificially created, I mean - it is not a strong company. If you sell a 
product [with the promise that you’ll] donate breakfast to kids in Cambodia - for [every] 1 dollar of 
this [product’s revenue] - if management changes and is not a fan of this anymore they can easily 
drop it. So, by this I mean the impact is ‘artificial’ because it is not being created by the product or 
service being sold. Also, on the flip side, if the product becomes so popular that no one looks at the 
donation portion anymore, the company may also feel comfortable with dropping this impact 
portion” (Respondent #160, with hybrid mindset, Not-for-profit #12) 
 
138 VC Firm “I want to be financially successful – earn fair pay, etc., but I don't want to get rich for myself. I 
don't have a problem being rich but for me, it's about being an example of a successful woman in 
business. [And showing others that] backing women in venture [has made] me successful.” 
(Respondent #138, VC Firm #72). 
 
Table 44: Comments by respondents about their approach to decision-making  

